
KAYE'S AND MALLESON'S HISTORY
OF THE
INDIAN MUTINY
OF
1857-8

EDITED BY COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. V.

By COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.



NEW IMPRESSION

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA

1911

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

*Transferred from W. H. Allen & Co. to Longmans,
Green, & Co., February 1896.*

Re-issued in Silver Library, August 1897.

*Re-issued in new style, July 1898; reprinted October
1898; February 1907; and January 1911.*

I INSCRIBE THIS VOLUME TO THE MEMORY OF
THE LATE
SIR HENRY MARION DURAND,
K.C.S.I.

A MAN WHO COMBINED A RARE GREATNESS OF SOUL
AND A PERFECT GENIUS FOR AFFAIRS
WITH SIMPLICITY OF MANNERS, DIRECTNESS OF PURPOSE.
AND A DETESTATION OF ALL THAT IS MEAN AND FALSE.
AS WISE IN COUNSEL
AS HE WAS PROMPT AND DECIDED IN ACTION,
HE MET ALL THE STORMS OF LIFE WITH FORTITUDE,
RENDERING EVER, ALIKE BY HIS ACTION AND HIS EXAMPLE,
UNSURPASSED SERVICES TO HIS COUNTRY.

AFTER A SERVICE FULL OF HONOUR, EXTENDING OVER
FORTY-TWO YEARS,

HE DIED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY.
"HE LEFT A REPUTATION WITHOUT SPOT—THE BEST
INHERITANCE HE COULD BEQUEATH TO HIS CHILDREN."

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH VOLUME.

THE present volume concludes the history of the purely military events of the great Indian uprising of 1857.

The question whether that uprising was simply a military mutiny, or a revolt of which that military mutiny constituted the prominent feature, was debated keenly at the time, and is to this day as warmly contested. In the concluding chapter of this volume I have endeavoured to throw some light on the dispute, by the simple process of tracing effect to its cause. There is not a line in that chapter which will not bear the most searching analysis. The conclusion I have arrived at is that the uprising of 1857 was not primarily caused by the greased cartridges; that it was neither conceived nor designed by the Sipáhis. The mutiny was in reality the offspring of the discontent roused by the high-handed measures inaugurated, or at least largely developed, by Lord Dalhousie, and brought to a climax by the annexation of Oudh. The greased cartridge was the opportune instrument skilfully used by a band of conspirators, for the most part men of Oudh, for the purpose of rousing to action the Sipáhis, already made disaffected by consecutive breaches of contract and of faith.

Of these acts—of the attempt, as I have termed it, to disregard the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people, and in the course of that attempt to trample upon prejudices and to disregard obligations—the mutiny was the too certain consequence. It is remarkable that the decisive points of this great uprising were at two places, famous in Indian history, in both of which we had, by force or by the moral power engendered by the possession of force, displaced the former rulers. These places were Dehli and Lakhnao. At the one we were the besiegers, in the other we were besieged.

Dehli and Lakhnao constituted, so to speak, the wings of the rebel army. Had the centre, represented by Gwáliár, gone with the wings, it had fared badly with us. But, for the reasons I have specially referred to in the concluding chapter, the centre remained sound long enough to enable us to concentrate the bulk of our forces on the two decisive points of the rebel line.

It was after Dehli had fallen and a severe blow had been dealt at Lakhnao that we had to deal with the centre—a centre formidable indeed, but which the loyalty of Sindhiá had deprived of much of its power and prestige. It is with the contest with that centre, carried on by Colonel Durand, Sir Hugh Rose, Sir Robert Napier, Generals Stuart, Roberts, Michel, and Whitlock, Brigadiers Smith, Honner, Parke, Somerset, Colonel Holmes, Becher, and many others, that the military portion of this volume mainly deals; and I venture to affirm that no part of this history is more remarkable for the display of capacity and daring by the generals, of courage and endurance by the men. It is a page of history which every Englishman will read with pride and satisfaction—with pride because the deeds it records were heroic; with satisfaction because many of the actors survive, ready, when they are called upon, to repeat their triumphs in other fields.

But, important and full of interest as are the military records of this volume, the political action it relates is certainly not less so. There was not a moment of more consequence to India than that in which Lord Elphinstone had to decide whether he would content himself with saving his own Presidency, or, risking everything, would send every available man to the decisive points in the endeavour to save India. Not for a second did that illustrious man hesitate. It has been to me a task of no ordinary pleasure to demonstrate how the daring and generous conduct of the Governor of Bombay vitally affected the interests of England at the most critical period of the struggle.

Nor have I experienced less gratification in rendering justice to the character of Lord Canning, as that character developed itself, when, in the early part of 1858, he stood unshackled at Allahábád. I have entered in the concluding chapter so fully upon this point, and into others affecting the judgment passed upon his action in the earlier part of his Indian career, that it is unnecessary to allude to the matter further here.

Since the first edition of this volume was published I have received numerous letters from gentlemen who were actors in the several campaigns, and have conversed with many of them. I have enjoyed the opportunity likewise of revisiting India. The result has been that I have been able to render some share of justice to distinguished officers whose deeds were not so fully described as they deserved to be. I may add that I have likewise obtained the fullest information regarding the transactions between the Government of India and the State of Kírwí prior to 1857, and have re-written that portion of the narrative.

Although I have exerted myself to the utmost to ensure accuracy of detail in all the military operations, I am conscious that there are many other gallant deeds the details of which have not reached me, and which are therefore unnoticed. I have found it impossible, even in a work so bulky as this, to mention every individual who deserved well of his country. When a small body of men attack and defeat a large number of enemies, every man of the attacking party is necessarily a hero. There may be degrees of heroism, but it is difficult to distinguish them. Napoleon, feeling this difficulty, announced to his army after one of his great campaigns that it would be sufficient for a soldier to declare that he had belonged to the army which had fought in that campaign, for the world to recognise him as a brave man. That assurance is certainly not less applicable to the soldiers whose gallant deeds are recorded in this volume, and on whom the campaigns of Málwá, of Central India, of the southern Maráthá country, and again of Málwá and Rajpútáná, have fixed the stamp of heroes.

The appendix gives the story of Tántiá Topí's career as related by Tántiá Topí himself.

I cannot conclude without expressing the deep obligations under which I lie to the many gentlemen who have placed their journals and letters, all written at the time, at my disposal. The value of the information I have thus been able to obtain is not to be expressed in words. But especially do I desire to acknowledge the benefit I have received from the services of the gifted friend who read the first edition of this volume in proof-sheets, and whose frank and judicious criticisms greatly contributed to the clearness and accuracy of the military narrative.

I may add that there is in the press a sixth volume, which, in addition to an analytical index prepared by my friend,

Mr. Pincott, will contain a reference, taken in the order of the Governorships, Lieutenant-Governorships, and Chief-Commissionerships to which they severally belonged, to many of the civil districts throughout India. To this volume has been transferred the narrative of the five civil districts, and the chapter regarding the Indian Navy, which originally appeared in this volume. Although I have taken the greatest pains to ascertain the truth regarding the events in several of these stations, I am conscious that much has been left still to be recorded. In but few cases were journals kept; many of the actors are dead; many are old and indifferent. I trust, however, that it will be found that I have succeeded in unearthing many deeds of daring, in rescuing from oblivion more than one reputation, and generally in adding to the interest of the story of the most stupendous event that has occurred in the reign of Queen Victoria.

G. B. MALLESON.

27, *West Cromwell Road*,
1st July, 1889.

LIST AND SHORT DESCRIPTION OF IMPORTANT PLACES MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME, AND NOT DESCRIBED IN PREVIOUS VOLUMES.



- AMBERÁ**, a Native State in Málwá, within an area of 581 square miles.
- ÁSINGARH** is a fortress in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, situate on a spur of the Sátpúra range. It stands at an elevation of 850 feet, and is a place of great strength. It was once taken by Akbar, and twice by the English, to whom it now belongs. It lies 313 miles from Bombay.
- AURANGÁBÁD**, a city in the Haidarábád State, which derives its name from the Emperor Aurangzib, who built here a beautiful mausoleum over the remains of his favourite daughter. It lies 215 miles from Bombay, and 690 from Madras.
- BÁLÁBET**, a town in the Gwáliár State, 40 miles to the north-west of Sagar.
- BANDAH**, chief town of district of same name, now in the Allahábád division, 95 miles south-west of Allahábád, and 190 south-east from Ágra.
- BÁNÚR**, a parganah in the Lálitpúr district, Central Provinces, forming the seat of a chief who rebelled in 1857.
- BELGÁON**, the chief town of the district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, situate on the northern slopes of the Bellárl watershed, 2500 feet above the sea. It is 318 miles from Bombay.
- BHOPÁWÁR**, a ruinous town in the Gwáliár State; 64 miles south-west of Ujjén, and 330 south-west of Gwáliár.
- BURHÁNÚR**, an ancient and famous city in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, was for a long period the capital of Khándesh, and the chief city of the Dakhan under the Mughul emperors. It lies on the north bank of the Taptí. It was founded by Nasír Khán, of Khándesh, and was called after the renowned Sheikh Burhanu'dín, of Daulatábád. It is famous for its quaint porcelain. It is two miles from the Lálbágh station of the Great India Peninsula Railway.
- CHÁNDÉRÍ**, a town and fortress in the Gwáliár State, described at page 104.
- CHARKHÁRÍ**, capital of State of same name in Central India, on the route from Gwáliár to Bandah, 41 miles south-west of the latter.

- DEWÁS**, a State in the Central Indian Agency, with two chiefs, one called Bábá Sahib, the other Dádá Sahib. The territories of the former have an area of 1378 square miles; those of the latter, 6197 square miles; yet the Bábá Sahib is the senior of the two.
- DHÁR**, a State in the Central Indian Agency, with an area of 2500 square miles. Its capital is also called Dhár.
- DHÁRWÁR**, capital of district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, lies 351 miles from Bombay. Is a great cotton centre.
- GORARÁ**, a village in the Gwáliár State, between Nímach and Mandesar.
- HAIDARÁBAD**, described in the text, page 80.
- JADALPÚR**, capital of district and division of the same name in the North-West Provinces. The town is an important centre of trade. It lies 70 miles from Calcutta; 202 from Allahábád; 879 from Madras, and 67½ from Bombay.
- JALÁUN**, a town in the district of the same name in Jhánsí territory. The district has an area of 1469 square miles, and comprises the towns, Kalpi, Kunch, Jaláun, and Uráí (the capital). The chief rivers in the district are the Jamnah, the Betwá, and the Pahúj.
- JÁMKHÁNDÍ**, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country, 70 miles north-east of Belgáon; 68 east of Kolhápúr, and 162 south-east of Puná. The chief maintains a force of 57 horse and 852 foot.
- KÍRWÍ**, a town, formerly capital of a principality in Bundelkhand, 45 miles from Bandah.
- KOLÁPÚR**, capital of a native State of the same name between the Retnagíri and Belgáon districts, distant 123 miles south-east from Puná; 64 from Satárah, and 220 from Bombay.
- KULÁNGÍ**, capital of the district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, to the north-east of Belgáon. It lies 314 miles from Bombay.
- KUNCH**, a town in the Jaláun district, 19 miles west of Uráí, and 42 miles south-west of Kalpi.
- KURUNDWÁ** is the capital of two States of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, ruled by two branches of the Patwardhan family.
- LÁLITPÚR**, capital of a district in the Jhánsí division, as it now is, of the North-West Provinces. The district borders on that of Ságár.
- MALTHON**, a town in the Ságár district, 40 miles north of Ságár.
- MÁLWÁ**, the name applied to the western portion of the Central Indian Agency. It is a tableland of uneven surface, rising from 1500 to 2000 feet above the level of the sea, bounded on the west by the Araváli range; on the south by the Vindhya chain; on the east by Bundelkhand, and on the north-east by the valley of the Ganges. It comprises the States of Gwáliár, Indúr, and Dhár.
- MÁLWÁ (WESTERN)** is the westernmost tract of Málwá, and constitutes a subordinate agency of the Central Indian Agency. It comprises the States Jáurí, Ratlam, Sóláná, and Sítámáu.
- MANDESAR**, a town in Sindhiá's dominions, on a tributary of the Chambal, 80 miles from Ujjen, 120 from Indur, and 328 from Bombay.

- MEHIDPUR**, a town in the Indur State, on the right bank of the Sîprâ, north of Ujjén, 432 miles from Bombay. Since 1817, when Sir J. Hislop defeated Mulhar Rao Holkar on the banks of the Sîprâ, it has been a cantonment for British troops.
- MIRAJ**, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country. The chief is a first-class Sirdár, with a military force of 597 men.
- MEDHAL**, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country, south of the Jámkhândi State. The chief maintains a military force of 700 men.
- NÁGOD**, town in the Uchahárá district, Central Indian Agency, on the direct route by Rewah from Sagar to Allahábád; is 48 miles from the first; 43 from the second, 180 from the third, and 110 from Jabalpur.
- NARGUND**, town in the Dhárwár district, 32 miles north-east of Dhárwár. The chief lost his possessions in consequence of his conduct in 1857, related in this volume.
- NARSINHPUR**, a district in the Narbadá division of the Central Provinces, with an area of 1916 square miles. Its capital, also called Narsinhpúr, is on the River Singrí, a tributary of the Narbadá. It lies 60 miles to the west of Sagar.
- PÚCH**, a village in the Jhánsí district, on the road from Kalpi to Gúnalí, 55 miles south-west of the former, and 150 north-east of the latter.
- PUNÁ**, the ancient Maráthá capital, is situate near the confluence of the Mntá and Mnlá, in a plain 2000 feet above the sea. It is 90 miles from Bombay. Adjoining it is the artillery cantonment, Kírkí, where Colonel Burr, in 1817, defeated the Peshwá's army.
- RÁHATGARH**, a fortified town in a tract of the same name in the Sagar district, 25 miles to the west of the town of Sagar.
- RAIPÚR**, capital of the district of the same name in the Central Provinces, 177 miles to the east of Nágpúr, by the road from that place to Calcutta.
- REWAH**, native State in Bundelkhand, having a capital of the same name. It is bounded to the north by the Bandah, Allahábád, and Mírzápúr districts; to the east by part of the Mírzápúr district and the territories of Chutiá Nágpúr; on the south by the Chhatísgarh, Jabalpur, and Mandlá districts; on the west by Maihír, Nágód, and the Kothí States. It has an area of 13,000 square miles. The position of the town is described in the text.
- SÁGAR**, capital of the district of the same name, situated on an elevated position, 1940 feet above the sea, on the north-west borders of a fine lake nearly a mile broad, whence it derives its name (Sagar, *Anglicè*, the Sea). It lies 90 miles north-west of Jabalpur; 185 miles north of Nágpúr; 313 miles south-west of Allahábád; 221 miles north-east of Indur, and 602 from Bombay.
- SÁNGLÍ**, capital of the State of the same name in Southern Maráthá country, the chief of which is a Sirdár of the first class, with a military force of 822 men. It is situate on the River Krishna, to the north-east of Kohlápúr.

SATÁRAH, capital of the district of the same name, lies 56 miles south of **Puná**, at the junction of the Krishna and the Yena. It is 163 miles from **Bombay**.

SÁVÁNUR, capital of State of same name in the **Dhárwár** district; lies 39 miles south by east of **Dhárwár**. The **Nawáb** is of **Afghán** descent.

SHÁHGARH, town in **Ságar** district, **Central Provinces**, 40 miles north-east of the town of **Ságar**.

SIHOR, a town in the **Bhopál** State, **Central India**; situate on the right bank of the **Saven**, on the road from **Ságar** to **Ásirgarh**, 132 miles south-west from the former, and 152 north-east from the latter; 22 miles from **Bhopál**, and 470 from **Bombay**.

TAL-BAHAT, chief town of parganah of same name in **Lálitpúr** district, **Central Provinces**, stands on a hill, 26 miles north of the town of **Lálitpúr**.

TEHRÍ, capital of the **Tehrí** or **Urchah** estate, to the east of **Lálitpúr**. It is 72 miles north-west of **Ságar**. The **Rájah** is looked upon as the head of the **Bundelás**.

UJJÉN, a very important town—more so formerly than now—on the **Síprá**, in the **Gwáliar** State. The modern town is six miles in circumference, and surrounded by groves and gardens. The old town lies about a mile to the north of the new town. It is 1698 feet above the sea. It is 40 miles from **Indur**.

ÚRCHAH, ancient capital of State of the same name, also called **Tehrí**, in **Bundelkhand**. The State is bounded on the west by the **Jhánsí** and **Lálitpúr** districts; on the south by the **Lálitpúr** district and **Bijáwar**; on the east by **Bijáwar**, **Charkhári**, and **Garáuli**. The town is on the **Betwá**.

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HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.

BOOK XIII.—BOMBAY, CENTRAL INDIA, AND THE DAKHAN.

[1857.]

CHAPTER I.

LORD ELPHINSTONE, MR. SETON-KARR, AND MR. FORJETT.

THE western, or Bombay, Presidency of India comprises a long, narrow strip of country of varying breadth and irregular outline. Including the province of Sindh, the administration of which is subordinate to it, it occupies the western coast of the peninsula from the mouths of the Indus to the northernmost point of Goa, and from the south of that territory to the borders of Maisúr. It is thus bounded on the west by Balúchistán and the Arabian Sea; on the south by Maisúr; on the east by the Madras Presidency, Haidarábád, Barár, the central provinces, the states forming the central Indian agency, and Rajpútáná; on the north by Bhawalpúr, the Panjáb, and Balúchistán. The area of the British portions of the Presidency is one hundred and thirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-five square miles, supporting fourteen millions of inhabitants; but, in subordinate political relations to it, there are, or rather there were in 1857, native states comprising seventy-one thousand three hundred and twenty square miles with six millions of inhabitants. The principal of these were Barodah, Kúthiwár, Kachh, Kambháyat, Mahikantá, Réwakántá, Kohlápúr, Sáwantwári, and Khairpúr.

1857.
May.
The Bombay
Presidency.

Its area and
population.

The native
states con-
tained in it.

In 1857 Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay. A man of culture and ability, Lord Elphinstone had enjoyed more experience of India than generally falls to the lot of governors unconnected with the civil or military services. He had been Governor of Madras from 1837 to 1842; and, although the records of the Madras Presidency throughout his incumbency had marked no stirring events within its borders, yet the first Afghán war, with its early success and its later collapse, had excited the minds of the natives throughout the country, and had called for the exercise of tact and judgment on the part of the rulers. These qualities Lord Elphinstone was eminently qualified to display, and he had displayed them. He was called, however, to deal principally with administrative details. The manner in which he performed these duties gained for him the confidence of the natives. His measures for improving the resources of the country, and for establishing means of communication in all directions, are spoken of to this day.

Lord Elphinstone revisited India at the time of the first Sikh war, 1845-6, and marched in company with the 14th Light Dragoons, then commanded by the late Colonel William Havelock, who had been his military secretary, from Bombay, through central India, to the head-quarters of the British army before Láhor. On the transfer of Kashmír to Guláb Singh, a proceeding following the treaty of 1846 with the Sikhs, Lord Elphinstone formed one of the party which first visited that famous valley. After a residence in it of nearly three months, he set out for Ladákh by the Husora valley, and endeavoured to proceed thence up the Gilgit valley—in those days an utterly unknown country. Forced, perhaps fortunately, by the objections of the authorities, to renounce this expedition, Lord Elphinstone crossed the Hurpo pass to Rondu on the Indus, being the first Englishman by whom that journey had been attempted.

It will be seen, then, that when in 1853 Lord Elphinstone was called to the post of Governor of Bombay, he brought to that office experience such as few men, not trained in the Indian services, could command. His knowledge of men, his courtesy, his genial bearing, gave effect to that experience. Up to the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857 his conduct as Governor of Bombay was

invariably marked by temper, judgment, and discretion. Calm and dignified in manner, courteous to his colleagues and to all with whom he was brought in contact, he evinced, on every occasion likely to test his action, the possession of a guiding mind, of a will not to be shaken, a resolution that went direct to its aim. The crisis of 1857 was just one of those occurrences which Lord Elphinstone was constitutionally fitted to cope with. He at once realised its difficulty and its danger, and rose equal to encounter the one and to neutralise the other. In the words of a contemporary writer, generally unfavourable to him, he displayed "the courage of the soldier who knows his enemy." *

Well fitted to encounter the crisis of the mutiny.

The truth of this judgment was proved by the action taken by Lord Elphinstone when the news reached him of the outbreak of the 10th of May at Mirath. Lord Elphinstone was at Bombay when he heard of that event. It happened that General Ashburnham, commanding the expeditionary corps on its way to China, was staying with him. So greatly did the importance of the intelligence impress the Governor, so certain did he feel that the Mirath revolt would spread, and that it should be met at once by bringing large reinforcements of European troops without delay into the country, that he urged General Ashburnham to proceed immediately to Calcutta, and to offer his services, and the services of the China expeditionary force, to the Governor-General.

Lord Elphinstone's action on hearing of the mutiny at Mirath,

with reference to General Ashburnham;

It was a fortunate circumstance that the war with Persia had just been brought to a successful conclusion. Fortunate, likewise, that the disaffection had not spread to the native army of Bombay. Lord Elphinstone thus felt himself equal to the most decisive measures. He at once authorised the Commissioner of Sindh, Mr. Frere, to transfer the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Karachi to the Panjáb. He arranged that the 64th and 78th regiments, then on their way from Persia, should proceed forthwith, without landing at Bombay, to Calcutta. The more speedily to carry out this object, he caused vessels to be equipped and prepared for the reception of these regiments, so that on the arrival in the Bombay harbour of the transports

to Mr. Frere;

regarding the regiments on their way from Persia;

* *The Friend of India.*

which were conveying them from Bushír they might be transhipped without loss of time. This measure was duly and effectively carried out. The men moved from the one transport into the other, and reached Calcutta in time materially to influence the campaign. But Lord Elphinstone did more. He despatched on the instant to Calcutta a company of Madras artillery which happened to be on the spot, taking the duty of the Bombay artillery, then absent in Persia. He at the same time sent instructions to the officer commanding at Disá to hold the 83rd regiment and a troop of horse artillery at that station in readiness to march on Ajmír, on the sole condition that, in the opinion of the local authorities, the departure of the only European troops in the vicinity of Ahmadábád and Gújrát might be hazarded without the absolute certainty of an outbreak. And, still penetrated by the necessity to concentrate on the scene of the mutiny as many European troops as could be collected, Lord Elphinstone chartered, on his own responsibility, two steamers belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the *Pottinger* and the *Madras*, provided them with all necessary stores, and despatched them, under the command of Captain Griffith Jenkins of the Indian navy, to the Mauritius and the Cape, with letters to the Governors of those settlements, dwelling upon the importance of the crisis, and begging them to despatch to India any troops they could spare.

regarding the
Madras Artillery in Bombay.

He prepares
to assist Rajpútáná,

and sends to
the Mauritius
and the Cape
for reinforcements.

I may here state that the result of these applications was such as might have been anticipated from the characters of the men to whom they were addressed. The Governor of the Mauritius, Sir James Higginson, embarked on board the *Pottinger* the head-quarters and as many men of the 33rd as that steamer could carry. Not content with that, he took an early opportunity to charter and despatch another transport to convey the remainder of that regiment, a battery of artillery, and as much money as could be spared from the treasury of the island.

Nor was the Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, animated by sentiments less patriotic. It fortunately happened that an unusually large force of British regiments was, at the moment, concentrated at Cape Town. Sir George despatched, without delay, as many of them

and to the
Cape.

as he could spare. The 89th and 95th he sent to Bombay; the 6th, the 1st battalion 13th, the 2nd battalion 60th, the 73rd, 80th, and 31st to Calcutta. In subsequent vessels he despatched horses in as large a quantity as he could conveniently procure.

The despatch of Lord Elphinstone to Sir George Grey had painted the urgency of India's needs in terms so glowing that that able Governor considered himself justified to stretch his powers. He did not hesitate to direct the commanders of the transports conveying the China expeditionary army so far to divert from their course as to call at Singapor for orders. The result of this patriotic action was most happy. The intelligence which met these transports at Singapor induced their commanders, in every case, to bear up for Calcutta.

Responsibility nobly assumed by Sir George Grey.

To return to Bombay. So important did it appear to Lord Elphinstone that reinforcements should promptly be sent from England by the overland route—a route till then untrodden by British troops—that, telegraphic communication being open with Calcutta, he suggested to the Governor-General the propriety of sending to England a special steamer, which he had ready, with despatches, impressing upon the Home Government the urgency of the need. There can be no doubt that the suggestion was a wise one. A fast lightly-laden steamer, travelling at her highest speed, would have anticipated the ordinary mail steamer by three or four days at the least. This, too, at a time when the most important events depended on prompt and decisive action. But Lord Canning did not view matters in the same light. He refused to interfere with the ordinary mail service. The steamer, therefore, was not sent.

Lord Elphinstone suggests sending a special steamer to England,

but Lord Canning refuses.

Before I pass from the record of the precautionary measures taken in the early days of the revolt, to describe the actual occurrences in the various parts of the Bombay Presidency, I wish to advert for a moment to one material result which followed them. Those measures undoubtedly saved Bombay from serious outbreak. They did more. They secured an important base of operations against central India and Rajpūtānā, and they preserved the line of communication between those provinces and the provinces beyond them and the seaboard. It is diffi-

Effect of the precautionary measures above recorded.

cult to over-estimate the importance thus gained, solely by the exercise of timely foresight.

A rather serious breach of the law at Bharoch in the month of May, originating in a dispute between the Pársis and the Muhummadans, might have led to important consequences but for the firmness with which it was met, in the first instance, by the officer commanding on the spot, and, in the next, by the Governor. The spirit of Lord Elphinstone's action may be judged from the fact that, to prevent the spread of the riot, he despatched a hundred and fifty men of the 86th to Súrat—a movement of troops which left only three hundred and fifty European troops of all arms in Bombay itself.

The riot at Bharoch was, for a time, the only indication of ill feeling manifested in the western Presidency, and it was entirely unconnected with the great revolt then raging in the north-west. Lord Elphinstone, whilst carefully repressing it, did not abate a single effort to carry out the policy which he was convinced was the only sound policy—the policy of offensive defence. Almost from the very first he had designed to form, at a convenient point within the Presidency, a column to secure and

He designs a policy of offensive defence ;
to hold the line between Bombay and Ágra,

hold the great line of road between Bombay and Ágra. Not only would the line thus secured form a base for ulterior operations, but a great moral advantage would be gained by its tenure. In the crisis which then afflicted India, it was not to be thought that any portion of the empire would stand still. The attitude of folded arms was an attitude to invite danger. To check the approach of evil, the surest mode was to go forth and meet it. A column marching towards the north-west would encounter the elements which, having brewed there disturbance, were eager to spread it, and, encountering, would annihilate them. The presence of such a column, marching confidently to the front, would, moreover, go far to check, perhaps even to suppress, any disloyal feelings which might have been engendered in the minds of the native princes whose states bordered on this line of communication. For these reasons, then, at a very early period of the crisis, Lord Elphinstone proposed in council, and ordered, the formation of a column, under the

and, by advancing to meet the evil coming from outside, to prevent it entering within.

With this view forms a column under General Woodburn.

command of Major-General Woodburn, to open out communications with central India and the North-West Provinces.

The column formed in consequence, under the command of Major-General Woodburn, was but small in numbers. It consisted only of five troops of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Captain Woolcombe's horse-battery of artillery, and a pontoon train. It set out from Puná on the 8th of June, under orders to march with all speed to Máu, with the view to save that place while there was yet time, and to prevent the spread of the insurrection in Málwá, and along the northern frontier of the Bombay Presidency.*

Composition
of the
column.

June.
It is ordered
to march to
Máu.

The state of affairs at Máu and at Indúr was such as to demand the most prompt action on the part of General Woodburn. It was just possible that, making forced marches, he might approach so near to Indúr as to baffle the plans of the discontented. The dread that he might do so for a long time paralysed their action.† Circumstances, however, occurred which baffled the hopes expressed by Lord Elphinstone, when, acting on his own unaided judgment, he pressed upon the military authorities the necessity for General Woodburn to advance.

Possibilities
before
General
Woodburn.

The city of Aurangábád—once the capital of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and, at a later period, the favourite residence of the Emperor Aurangzib—occupies a prominent and important position in the north-western corner of the dominions of the Nizám. The corner of which it was the capital juts like a promontory into British territory. To the east and north-east it touches western Barár and the central provinces; to the south, the west, and the north-west, the northern portions of the Bombay Presidency. Beyond the northernmost part of that Presidency, and within easy distance of Aurangábád, lies Málwá.

Aurangábád.

Disaffection was known to reign in Málwá, and it was of the highest consequence that that disaffection should not spread southward to Bombay. But at Aurangábád, the capital of the small promontory I have described, almost touching Málwá on one side and running into Bombay on the other three sides,

* Lord Elphinstone's letter to General Woodburn

† *Ibid* Vol. III. page 137.

were quartered the 1st and 3rd Cavalry, the 2nd Infantry, and a battery of artillery, of the Haidarábád Contingent. These regiments, commanded by British officers, were composed chiefly of Muhammadans, and one of them—the 1st Cavalry—had, in the early part of June, displayed symptoms of disaffection.

Garrison of
Aurangábád.

Aurangábád is distant from Púná a hundred and thirty-eight miles; from Ahmadnagar, about midway between the two, sixty-eight miles. In the ordinary course of events, General Woodburn, armed with positive instructions to push on with all speed to Mán, would not have entered the dominions of the Nizám. It happened, however, that the authors of the disaffection I have spoken of as prevailing at Aurangábád proceeded on the 13th of June to more open demonstrations, and in consequence General Woodburn received, not from Lord Elphinstone, instructions to deviate from the line urged upon him by that nobleman, and to march upon Aurangábád.

Disaffection
of the
garrison.

In explanation of the open demonstrations at Aurangábád, I may state that a rumour had reached that place that the cavalry regiment stationed there would be required to join General Woodburn's column and march with him on Dehlí. The rumour was founded upon truth, for it had been intended that the regiment in question should join General Woodburn's force. But to the minds of soldiers who were not British subjects, who lived under the rule of the descendant of a viceroy appointed by the Mughul, the idea of fighting against the King of Dehlí was peculiarly distasteful.* They showed their dislike on the moment. On the 13th of June the men of the 1st Cavalry openly expressed their dissatisfaction, and—it was stated at the time—swore to murder their officers if pressure to march against Dehlí were put upon them. Fortunately, the commanding officer, Captain Abbott, was a sensible man. He summoned the native officers to his quarters, and discussed the question with them. The native officers declared that, for their own part, they were ready to obey any lawful order, but they admitted that their men would not fight against the mutineers. Captain Abbott

Reasons of
the disaffec-
tion.

Judicious
conduct of
Captain
Abbott.

* The splendid manner in which the Haidarábád cavalry atoned for this momentary disaffection will be found recorded in subsequent pages.

then, after communicating with the Resident, resolved to adopt a conciliatory course. He gave the men assurances that they would not be required to march on Dohlí. In this way order was restored. So little confidence, however, in the stability of the compromise was felt on both sides, that the officers proceeded to barricade themselves in their mess-house, whilst the mutinous cavalry boasted over their moral victory in every quarter of the city.

Order is restored, but not confidence.

Matters were in this state when, on the morning of the 23rd of June, General Woodburn's column entered Aurangábád, marched at once to the ground occupied by the mutineers, and ordered the men to give up their arms. With the exception of one troop of the 1st Cavalry, all obeyed. The general gave the men of that troop six minutes to consider the course they would pursue. When the time elapsed, the men, instead of submitting, put on a bold front and attempted to ride away. In this attempt most of them succeeded. The next morning some three or four, convicted of attempts at assassination, were hanged, and order was restored.

Woodburn enters Aurangábád and disarms the mutineers.

General Woodburn was under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Somerset. In the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, the danger at Aurangábád had not been so pressing as to necessitate the deviation of the field force from the direct road to Máu. He thought that, in the presence of two dangers, that which would result from the mutiny coming down to Bombay from central India and Málwá was greater even than the disaffection of a portion of the troops of the Nizám. Forced, however, to accept General Woodburn's action at Aurangábád, he lost not a moment in urging him to press on towards Máu. "I am persuaded," he wrote to that officer on the 22nd of June, "that the local officers greatly exaggerate the danger of a rising in our own provinces. I have no fear of anything of the sort; and, if it should happen, I trust that we should be able to put it down speedily. But I feel confident that it will not happen—at all events, for the present. If you allow the insurrection to come down to our borders without attempting to check it, we shall almost deserve our fate; but if by a rapid advance you are able to secure Máu you will also, in all probability, save Mehidpúr, Sagar, Hoshangábád," &c. Lord Elphinstone

Lord Elphinstone urges Woodburn to press on to Máu.

followed up these noble words, displaying the true conception he had formed of the situation, by a letter addressed, the same day, to Sir Henry Somerset: "I am very much obliged to you," he wrote, "for the perusal of General Woodburn's letter. I conclude that since it was written he has received his orders to continue his march to Máu with all possible expedition."

But General Woodburn did not move forward. In reply to the letter I have just quoted, he wrote, on the 25th, to Lord Elphinstone, urging the various reasons which, he thought, would necessitate a long stay at Aurangábád. These reasons might, in the presence of the greater danger at Máu, be justly termed trivial. They consisted in the possibility of a fresh outbreak after his departure, and in the necessity of trying some sixty-four prisoners by court-martial.

Woodburn, however, delays to try his prisoners.

Lord Elphinstone answered the objections to advance urged by the general in a very decided manner. "I wish you to remember," he wrote to him on the 27th of June, "that it was for the object of relieving Máu, and not for the purpose of chastising a mutinous regiment at Aurangábád, that the field force was formed. The latter is an incidental duty, which it was hoped would not interfere with the main object. I am perfectly aware that, in those times, circumstances may occur to divert your force from its original destination, but I do not think they have yet occurred." He then proceeded in a few forcible words to urge the folly of wasting unnecessary time upon trials,* and the necessity of disarming regiments which might show disaffection, instead of delaying a movement of the first importance from a fear that a revolt might take place after the departure of the British troops.

Lord Elphinstone combats his reasons and still urges him onwards.

This letter, I have said, was despatched to General Woodburn on the 27th of June. On the morning of the 28th Lord Elphinstone received a despatch from Calcutta, instructing him to send to Calcutta by sea the wing of the 12th Lancers then stationed at Púná. This diminution of his available European strength, already extremely small, following immediately upon the departure

Lord Elphinstone is ordered further to diminish his strength.

* "To allow twenty days for the trial of sixty-four prisoners is out of the question in these times."

from the Presidency of General Woodburn's force, and accompanied by reports received from many district officers to the effect that rebellion was only watching its opportunity, so affected Lord Elphinstone, that for a moment he felt inclined to authorise General Woodburn to halt at Aurangábád. Indeed, on the spur of the moment he wrote that officer a letter, expressive of his deep regret and disappointment at having to request him to give up a measure which he believed to be of great importance. But the night dissipated his anxiety. In the morning he had resolved to dare all, to risk all, for the supreme advantage of saving central India. On the 29th, then, he wrote again to General Woodburn, cancelling that portion of his previous letter which had given him authority to defer the projected movement.

This order, for a moment, causes Lord Elphinstone to waver.

But only for a moment.

But before this letter could reach General Woodburn that officer had become incapacitated for command by ill-health. The Government promptly replaced him by Colonel C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay Army, then commanding the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry. Pending the arrival of that officer, the command of the field force devolved upon Major Follett, 25th Regiment Native Infantry.

Woodburn falls ill and is replaced by Major Follett.

Major Follett had a grand opportunity before him. He had only to move forward. Unfortunately, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief a letter in which he dwelt upon the impossibility of leaving Aurangábád in the then condition of the Nizám's regiments. More unfortunately still, Major Follett's representations were strongly supported by the head of the army.

Follett inherits Woodburn's opinions.

Lord Elphinstone's reason and instincts still told him that the further delay thus proposed was the delay of red tape—the natural consequence of the absence of a clear mind and a firm will. But he was in a very difficult position. He was not a soldier.

Difficulty of Lord Elphinstone's position.

And although he would unhesitatingly have regarded the scruples of Major Follett, unsupported by higher authority, he could not treat with contempt the weighty support given to those scruples by the officer who was Commander-in-Chief of the armies serving in India. Unwillingly, then, and solely in deference to the strong opinion expressed by Sir Henry Somerset, Lord Elphinstone consented to the delay.

A few days proved how true had been his judgment. On the 7th of July, Major Follett convicted himself and the chief who supported him of a hasty and premature decision. On the 7th of July that officer wrote to Lord Elphinstone,* declared that it was perfectly feasible to leave Aurangábád, and announced his intention to march for Máu on the 10th, leaving a troop of cavalry and two guns for the protection of the Aurangábád cantonment.

July.
Major Follett
is converted
to Lord El-
phinstone's
views.

Lord Elphinstone promptly requested Sir Henry Somerset to confirm this change of feeling by cancelling his previous orders. This was, in effect, carried out.

The force led by Colonel C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, who joined it on the 8th, quitted Aurangábád on the 12th, too late to prevent the mutinies at Máu and Indúr, but not too late, under the guidance of Colonel Durand, who joined it at Asirgarh, to restore British authority in central India. To the further movements of this column I shall return in a subsequent chapter. Its march beyond the Bombay frontier was due solely to Lord Elphinstone.† Had he been unfettered, and had its first commander been a man after his own heart, it

Colonel
Stuart comes
to command
the force, and
sets out for
Asirgarh.

* It is probable that Major Follett's change of opinion was due to the receipt of a despatch from Colonel Durand addressed to Mr. Plowden, and sent through the officer commanding at Aurangábád. This letter contained convincing proofs of the necessity of promptly advancing.

† "I quite agree with you," wrote Lord Elphinstone to Colonel Durand, the 27th of July, "in regretting the delay which took place in the advance of the force. You cannot have written more strongly than I have upon the subject, but there was a strong counter-prejudice on the part of the officers on the spot, every one of whom declared that the departure of the column from Aurangábád would be the signal of a general rising. I from the first recommended that the mutinous troops should be disarmed and dismounted. But this was considered inexpedient. It was represented that it was not so much the troops but the whole population was against us. Mr. —, the Deputy Commissioner in North Barar, who is reckoned a very good officer, said that there were, I am afraid to say how many, armed Musalmans in his district, who would rise the moment the column was ordered to move. Colonel —, who commands the Madras cavalry regiment at —, said it was utterly impossible to send half his regiment over to Aurangábád, as the people in that neighbourhood would attack the station." It is immensely to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that, in spite of these and many similar reports from district officers, and of the opposition referred to in the text, he should have persevered in urging the forward movement. He was, in fact, one of the few men in high position in India who realised how the mutiny should be met.

would have taken place in time to prevent much evil in central India.

But the despatch of Colonel Stuart's column to central India was not the only aid proffered by the Bombay Presidency for the suppression of the mutiny. I have already alluded to the splendid self-abnegation by which the province of Sindh was denuded for the benefit of the Panjáb. Again, the western Presidency was prompt to comply with the indent made upon it by Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Governor-General's agent in Rajpútáná.* The greater part of the garrison of Dísa, consisting of a troop of horse artillery, one regiment and one squadron of native light cavalry, a detachment (four hundred men) of the 83rd, and a detachment of the 12th Native Infantry, was formed into a movable column, and placed at the disposal of George Lawrence, just then nominated Brigadier-General in Rajpútáná. Lord Elphinstone was prompt to confirm this arrangement—an arrangement which gave General Lawrence a power, exercised with remarkable ability and judgment, to maintain order in a country ruled over by the great Rajpút chiefs.† Further, on the 23rd of July, four companies of the 86th Regiment were sent from Málígáon to join Colonel Stuart's column on its way to Máu. Marching direct by the Bombay road, they did not join till after that column had arrived at Máu.

Lord Elphinstone places a column at the disposal of Colonel Lawrence.

Whilst Lord Elphinstone was thus actively employing a policy of aggressive defence alike to keep the evil from his own borders and to crush it in the provinces beyond them, the spirit which had worked so much mischief in the north-west suddenly raised its head on his very hearth. The first symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency broke out shortly after the march of the columns whose movements I have just recorded.

First symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency.

The southern Maráthá country comprises the territory between Satárah and the Madras Presidency to the north and south, and between the Nizám's dominions and the western gháts to the east and west. It has an area of fourteen thousand square miles and a population of about three millions, for the most part of pure Maráthá blood. Within this country are the two

The southern Maráthá country;

its area,


* Vol. III. page 170.

† Vide pages 171 to 174. Vol. III.

collectorates, Belgáon and Dharwár, the native state Kolhápúr, and numerous small semi-independent states, each with an annual revenue rising up to, but in no case exceeding, fifty thousand pounds. In 1857 the principal of these were SÁNGLI, MÍRAJ, SÁVANÚR, KURANDWÁR, JÁMKHANDI, NARGÚND, and MUDHOL.

Of this important country the Collector and Magistrate of Belgáon, Mr. George Berkeley Seton-Karr, had political charge. Mr. Seton-Karr possessed remarkable natural abilities, and these had been developed by an education which had continued up to the date of which I am writing. He was a firm advocate for the rights of native princes, for continuing to them the power to adopt, for interfering as little as possible with their customs which, however little understood by Europeans, were harmless in themselves, and which were hallowed by the practice of ages. He was one of those men who, whilst possessed of a firm and decided character, yet preferred to try to their fullest extent the arts of persuasion before having recourse to intimidation or violence.

The internal condition of the southern Maráthá country when Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it in May 1856, just twelve months prior to the revolt, was one of brooding discontent. The annexation by the Government of India of Barár and of Oudh had been in the one case followed, in the other preceded, by an Act known as Act XI. of 1852, under the operation of which an Inám Commission was empowered to call upon all landed proprietors to produce the title-deeds of their estates. A new tribunal had, under this Act, been invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over this vast mass of property. The holders of estates, careless and improvident, unacquainted with law, and accustomed to consider that thirty years' possession conferred an irrefragable title, had failed in many instances to preserve the most valid muniments of their estates. In some cases, indeed, no muniments had ever existed. Chiefs who, in the anarchy which prevailed in India subsequent to the death of Aurangzib, had won their estates by the sword, had not been careful to fence them in with a paper barrier—in that age utterly valueless—but they had transmitted to their descendants the arms and the retainers who had constituted their right to possession, and with whose



aid they had learned to consider mere titles superfluous, as without it they were contemptible. In other cases, men who had acquired land in the general scramble which preceded the downfall of the Peshwá's Government, had transmitted their acquisitions to their children, fortified by no better titles than entries in the village account-books. To both these classes the Inám Commission had been a commission simply of confiscation. In the southern Maráthá country the titles of thirty-five thousand estates, large and small, had been called for by the new tribunal. In twenty-one thousand cases that tribunal had pronounced sentences of confiscation. Thousands of other landowners, still unevicted, looked on in dismay, tremblingly awaiting the sentence which was to add their wail of distress and resentment to that of their impoverished neighbours.* Can it be wondered at, then, that Mr. Seton-Karr, when he assumed charge under these circumstances in May 1856, found the native landowners of the Southern Maráthá country in a state of moody discontent, which was prevented from bursting into open disaffection only by a sense of the utter hopelessness of success?

The manner in which that commission affected many of the chiefs and landowners.

Their discontent.

But another cause increased, even intensified, the discontent, and, by its connection with the religious feelings of all classes, added greatly to the danger of the situation. Of all the rights devolving upon a Hindu landowner, the right to adopt is at once the most cherished and

The right of adoption.

* In writing thus of the feelings of the actual landowners, I am far from desiring to say a single word against the inquiries instituted by the Inám Commission. I wish to record only the discontent of the men who actually possessed the land when the inquiry was ordered. I admit not only that the Government was perfectly justified in ordering that inquiry, but that it was demanded by thousands who had been violently and, in some cases, fraudulently dispossessed of their hereditary acres during the period antecedent to the fall of the Peshwá. The Inám Commission rendered substantial justice to these men. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that forty years had elapsed since the dominions of the Peshwá had been brought under British sway, and that during those years, and, in many cases, during many antecedent years, the landowners who felt aggrieved by the action of the Inám Commission had enjoyed and transmitted to their children the estates which their fathers had gained. The long possession gave them in their eyes a better right than any which could be urged by the descendants of the men who had been dispossessed. No wonder, then, from their point of view, the Inám Commission was an instrument of tyranny.

the most sacred. It is an observance enjoined upon him by his religion. Should he fail to beget a child, he is bound to provide for himself an heir by adoption. On the child so adopted he bestows all the care and the affection ordinarily lavished on the offspring of love. Taught by his religion to believe that his own happiness in the other world depends upon the transmission to the adopted son of the inheritance of his fathers, he is ever careful to instil into his mind that he actually is of the family, and will be, after his death, the representative of its traditions and its honours. The idea that he might die heirless is to the Hindu landowner not blessed with offspring an ever-present canker-worm. It is sufficient to make him moody, despairing, miserable. The prohibition to find for himself such an heir might even make him reckless.

But the Anglo-Indian Government had, in many instances, pronounced such a prohibition. The policy of absorption adopted by Lord Dalhousie had shown no respect for the principle of adoption. Under its action large states had been absorbed, and the power to adopt had been denied to lesser landowners. This refusal had been extended to the landowners of the southern Maráthá country—amongst others, to the important chief of Nargúnd. The prohibition produced consternation. The effeminate early training of the Hindu upper classes often rendered it absolutely necessary to employ the rite of adoption to prevent the extinction of a family. The custom had been hallowed by time. The prohibition of it by a paramount power, alien in race and faith, could be attributed only to greed for the land. When, then, the prohibition was extended, and the landowners saw family after family disappear, a great fear fell upon them. They felt, one and all, that their turn would come; that their names, too, would perish; that none would succeed to commemorate their deeds and the deeds of their ancestors, and to appease their *manes* by yearly celebrations. In the common despair old feuds were laid aside, hereditary enmity was forgotten. A common dread produced a common sympathy, and the indignation or alarm of each was supported and increased by the sense that it was shared by all. For the moment, indeed, the aggrieved landowners had no thought to combine against the British Government. But

a religious
rite necessary
for the
Hindu.

The policy
of Lord Dal-
housie

its action

denies the
exercise of
this rite to
many influ-
ential chiefs.

Effect pro-
duced by this
refusal.

though tranquillity prevailed, it was not the tranquillity which is based upon contentment. The landowners were tranquil simply because successful revolt seemed impossible. The British authority seemed too firmly fixed to be easily shaken. But, were it to be shaken, it was always possible, considering the intense and widespread discontent of the landowners, that their hopeless apathy might become the audacity of despair.

Such was the state of the southern Maráthá country when, in May, 1856, Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it.

But a few weeks elapsed before his experienced mind had mastered the causes of the discontent which he found everywhere prevailing. It was difficult, even for a man who condemned the policy of the Government and who sympathised with the native landowners, to allay it. He found, in fact, that in almost every instance the landowners had been grievously wronged. The influential chief of Nargúnd had been denied the rights of adoption in terms which—owing to the faultiness of the translation of the original English—added insult to injury. Other landowners of ancient lineage, and possessing weight in the country, were found by Mr. Seton-Karr estranged from their loyalty by the causes to which I have adverted—the Inám Commission and the withholding of the right of adoption—and plunged in moody mistrust of the Government. It was not in the power of Mr. Seton-Karr to carry out the only act which would have restored confidence—to moderate the action of the Inám Commission and to restore the right of adoption. Nor, conciliatory and sympathising as he was, was he more able to reconcile the native chiefs and landowners to the new order which had to them all the effects of a revolution. But all that an earnest and high-minded man could

do he did. He visited every landowner. Their individual characters he carefully studied. To their complaints he listened with patience. He met them generally with such explanations of the policy of the Government as might remove misapprehension as to its general intention; whilst in cases of individual hardship—which he was powerless to remedy—he endeavoured to soothe the sense of hardness and injustice by kindly expressions of sympathy. In this way he won their confidence. He made the landowners

State of the
southern
Maráthá
country in
May, 1856.

Mr. Seton-
Karr's
powers, in re-
spect of the
grievances,
restricted;

but he uses
all his in-
fluence to
soothe the
discontented.

He wins the
confidence of
the land-
owners.

feel that in the highest official in the province they had a real friend. More it was impossible for him to effect. Regard for the individual in no way obliterated resentment at the action of the Government. A sense of deep injury still continued to rankle in each breast.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 21st of May, 1857, the news of the mutiny at Mirath and Dehlí reached Belgáon. The effect of this news, and of the worse tidings which continued to follow, upon the peoples of the southern Maráthá country, was electric. The Muhammadans were at once aroused to an intense pitch of excitement. The Hindus, on the other hand, were far more reticent, and for some time concealed their inner feelings by an impassive exterior. British authority seemed so firmly rooted in the country that they hesitated to believe that it could be suddenly destroyed.

Mr. Seton-Karr was fully alive to the dangers of the crisis. The force at Belgáon consisted of one regiment of native infantry, the 29th, a weak battery of European artillery, and the depot of the 64th Foot, composed of about thirty men fit for duty, guarding upwards of four hundred women and children belonging to that regiment. Exclusive of the artillery, not more than a hundred Europeans fit to carry arms could be mustered in the place; whilst between Belgáon and Púná and Sholapur there were more than two thousand native, and only a hundred and twenty European, soldiers. The defences of Belgáon consisted of a fort nearly a mile in circumference, the ramparts of which, unrepaired for years, presented breaches in several places. In a military point of view the place was, in fact, untenable, but it had, nevertheless, to be regarded as the sole refuge for the European non-combatants, consisting of some five hundred including children. Belgáon was the head-quarters of the southern division of the army, and Major-General Lester had arrived there on the 11th of May to assume that command. Mr. Seton-Karr at once placed himself in communication with that officer, and, under his direction, such improvements as in so brief a time were practicable were made to the defences.

Effect produced in the Maráthá country by the revolt at Mirath.

The means at Mr. Seton-Karr's disposal totally inadequate.

General Lester.

An emissary arrives from the north-west.

During the week or two following, the unusual exaltation of the Muhammadans alone gave evidence of the effect produced by the bad news from

the north-west. But in the early part of June Mr. Seton-Karr discovered that an emissary from that part of India had arrived some days before, and that he had been in daily communication with the Muhaminadan leaders. Prompt to act in the presence of real danger, as he was slow to use violence when the end could be accomplished by peaceable means, Mr. Seton-Karr caused this intruder to be arrested and confined. He did not act one minute too soon. The Sipáhis, many of them natives of Oudh, had for some days previous displayed an unaccustomed insolence. It had become hourly more and more evident that they sympathised with the action of their brethren in the north, and that they would grasp at an opportunity to follow their example. In the proportion in which their insolence displayed itself did the peril of Mr. Seton-Karr's position increase. It was still further augmented by the action of Náná Sáhib at Kánhpúr towards the end of June. To understand this it is requisite only to remember that Náná Sáhib claimed to be, and in the eyes of his countrymen actually was, the adopted heir of the last of the Peshwás; and that some of the most important estates in the southern Maráthá country—the estates of Súngli, of Jámkhandi, of Miraj, and of Kúrandwar—were held by branches of the great Patwardhan family, the most illustrious of the dependants of the Peshwá. The fact that Náná Sáhib was married to the first cousin of the chief of Súngli; that his most active lieutenant was that chief's uncle; and that the chief himself, on the verge of his majority, had evinced a taste for low and intriguing associates, did not certainly lessen the danger of the position.

He is
arrested.

Relationship
of many of
the southern
Maráthá
chiefs to
Náná Sáhib.

There were other chiefs whose discontent was hardly less formidable. Prominent amongst these were the Desái of Nipáni, a small fortress built on the model of Bharatpúr, forty-five miles from Belgáon—a chieftain who had lost a large portion of his estates under the operation of the Inám Commission, who was known to be disaffected, and whose disaffection would cut off communications with Bombay; the Desái of Jámboti—a chieftain whose family, settled for many generations amongst the forests which stretch onwards from the Gháts, had come to be regarded as the natural lords of the wild population of the jungles, and who, in his own person,

The discon-
tent of the
Desáis of
Nipáni,

of Jámboti,

had been reduced to penury by the action of the same arbitrary tribunal. The temper of this chieftain had been soured by his misfortunes. He had little to lose, everything to gain, by rebellion. It was in his power to draw after him a large portion of the jungle population, and by their means to sever the communications of the British with the sea. Not less dangerous was the adopted son of the late Desái of Kittúr.

of Kittúr, The retainers of this family, twenty-four years previously, had crowned a rash insurrection by a

gallant defence of their fort, only twenty-six miles from Belgáon, in the siege of which a political agent of that day had fallen. The last representative of the race was then living as a pensioner upon the bounty of his father-in-law, commanding in his fallen state the sympathies of the whole Lingáyat population. He, too, had nothing to lose, everything to hope, from rebellion. His father-in-law the Desái of

and of Wantmúrí, Wantmúrí, though a cautious and prudent man, did not possess the strength of character to resist extraordinary pressure placed upon him by his co-

religionists. Add to these the chief of Nargúnd, connected with some of the most powerful families in the southern Maráthá country, and known to be thoroughly disaffected; add, moreover, that the population, naturally turbulent and warlike, had

also of the chief of Nargúnd, retained the aims which had all but gained empire for the Maráthás; and the reader may gather some idea *causes apprehension,* of the position which, difficult in May, became dangerous in the early part of June, and threatening as every day witnessed a closer approach to the advent of July.

For long Mr. Seton-Karr met the increasing danger from the resources suggested to him by his long experience, and by his thorough acquaintance with native character. But as time went on, each post bringing with it intelligence of further outbreaks in the provinces of the north-west, that gentleman deemed it at last his duty to bring the situation of the

Mr Seton-Karr applies for extended powers and responsibility. provinces under the eyes of the Government of Bombay. He did this on the 20th of June. Cognisant, however, of the great difficulties which Lord Elphinstone had to encounter, of the unselfish foresight which had induced that heroic man to denude his own Presidency that he might crush rebellion upon

its borders, Mr. Seton-Karr did not ask for aid, material or other. He merely asked that his own powers might be extended. He asked, in fact, that the entire responsibility of meeting and encountering the crisis might be cast on him alone. It was a noble request; especially noble at that crisis; especially noble considering the resources at his disposal—a native regiment in a state of veiled rebellion, a weak battery of artillery, about a hundred Europeans—to meet the rebellion which might occur at any moment. The request was complied with.

His request
is complied
with.

Free now to act, Mr. Seton-Karr developed his plan. The use of force was out of the question. The only possible policy was conciliation. In carrying this out Mr. Seton-Karr enjoyed advantages which would have been denied to many men. During the year immediately preceding the mutiny he had carefully cultivated friendly relations with the chiefs. Over the minds of many he had acquired an extraordinary ascendancy. This ascendancy he now tested—and in the most cases with the happiest results. Valuable information was placed at his disposal; the inter-communication of the disaffected was prevented; a vigilant watch upon their movements was secured. In this way, and by a show of confidence towards all, by impressing upon each chief the idea that his neighbour was loyal, and by the expression of a confidence, really felt, that the scare would soon pass away, leaving the British complete master of the situation, Mr. Seton-Karr succeeded in staving off the fatal day and in averting the dreaded explosion.

He gradually
unfolds his
plans

and retains
the confi-
dence of the
chiefs.

Difficulties, however, continued to increase. On the 31st of July the 27th Native Infantry mutinied at Kolhápúr, plundered the treasury, and, after murdering such officers as fell in their way, set off for the Ghats. Kolhápúr is sixty-five miles from Belgáon. Communications between the 27th Regiment and the 29th at the latter place had been frequent. At Dharwár, forty-two miles from Belgáon in a direction opposite to that of Kolhápúr, the 28th Regiment had been for some time on the very verge of revolt. Mr. Seton-Karr was thus occupying a position between one station where the garrison had just mutinied, and another the garrison of which was on the verge of mutiny—the troops at the central point

Mutiny at
Kolhápúr.

Its position
with respect
to Belgáon
and Dharwár.

being also infected. It happened, however, that the native officer of the 29th—the regiment stationed at Belgáon—who was the secret leader of the disaffected, one Thákur Singh, was known

August.
Mr. Seton-
Karr and
General
Lester adopt
plans for pre-
venting the
spread of
mutiny to
Belgáon,

to Mr. Seton-Karr. That gentleman at once, and before the news of the mutiny at Kolhápúr was generally known at Belgáon, entered into communication regarding this native officer with General Lester. To arrest him might have precipitated a calamity. It was more easy to devise a pretext to remove him honourably from the station. Such a pretext was soon found. Two companies of the 29th, that of Thákur Singh being one of them, were

ordered on command to Badámí, a small town some ninety miles distant, near the south-western frontier of the Nizám's dominions. The two companies set out on the morning of the 2nd August, still ignorant of the mutiny at Kolhápúr. When the tidings of that mutiny reached the sipáhis left behind at

which
succeeded.

Belgáon they were too disconcerted by the absence of their leader to act on the moment. The opportune seizure and the condign punishment of an emissary

from Jámkhandi who had come to incite them to an immediate outbreak, averted them into still longer inaction.

Conspiracy of
the Muham-
madan popu-
lation at
Belgáon

The danger, however, was by no means removed. Concurrently with the events I have just related, Mr. Seton-Karr discovered a plot of the Muhammadan population of Belgáon. He soon found that this conspiracy had its ramifications at Kohlápúr, at Haidarábád, and at Púná, and that its outbreak was

to be signalled by the seizure of Belgáon itself. The arrest of one of the chief conspirators at Púná seemed likely to precipitate the outbreak. Mr. Seton-Karr, therefore, no sooner

is baffled by
Mr. Seton-
Karr.

received information of this event, than he secured the local leaders at Belgáon, all of whom he had carefully watched. The evidence regarding some of these proved defective, and they were discharged.

But the principal conspirator was convicted on the clearest evidence, and he was blown from a gun in company with the emissary from Jámkhandi just spoken of.

Three days before this execution—the 10th of August—a small detachment of European troops arrived to reassure the authorities at Belgáon. Another detachment went on to produce a similar good effect in Dharwár. General Lester at

once proceeded to repress the rising mutinous spirit of the 29th Native Infantry. Five men of that regiment were tried, one of them was condemned to death, the remainder were transported for life. Taking advantage of the good effect produced by these proceedings, Mr. Seton-Karr began the work of disarming the district, including the towns of Belgáon and Sháhpúr. On the 24th of August a further reinforcement arrived in the shape of a detachment of the 86th Foot. Its presence, combined with other precautionary measures he had taken, enabled Mr. Seton-Karr to steer his state bark through the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram * without disturbance—and, for a time, the Europeans in the southern Maráthá country felt that they could breathe freely.

The arrival of reinforcements enables General Lester to suppress the ill-feeling in Belgáon and Dhúrwar.

Mr. Seton-Karr had thus succeeded, by a combination of firmness and tact, the result of good judgment directing intimate acquaintance with the native character, in guiding the territories committed to his charge through the most dangerous crisis of the mutiny. Considering the previous discontent of the chiefs and landowners, the fact that he was supported by no force, that he had only his own energies upon which to rely, this result will ever be quoted as a marvellous instance of skilful management of men. It is not too much to say that a single false step would have produced the most fatal consequences. Not only would it have involved the southern Maráthá country in revolt, but it would have kindled a flame which would have spread throughout the dominions of the Nizám. Had Mr. Seton-Karr diverged, but for one day, from the line of vigilant forbearance which he had laid down as his policy; had he hurried the ill-disposed into open insurrection by any unguarded word of suspicion or slight; or had he encouraged their designs by supineness a great calamity would have been inevitable. Unhappily, subsequent events proved only too truly the truth of this assertion. When in an evil moment, to be related hereafter, the charge of political affairs was removed from the hands of Mr. Seton-Karr to those

Review of the success of Mr. Seton-Karr's measures and the reason of that success.

The truth of the argument proved by subsequent events.

* The "Muharram" is the name of the first Muhammadan month, held sacred on account of the death of *Husain*, son of *Ali*, who was killed by *Yazid*, near *Kifá*, in the pashalic of *Bághdád*.

of an officer distasteful, from his previous connection with the Inám Commission, to the chiefs and landowners, one month did not elapse before the rebellion, no longer controlled by good management, began its course with murder. All honour, then, to the wise and far-seeing officer who kept it within bounds when its outburst would have been far more dangerous.*

Before returning to Bombay, I must ask the reader to
 Kolhápúr. accompany me for a brief period to Kolhápúr. The
 state of this name, ruled over by the descendants of
 Síváji, had up to the year 1842 suffered from continuous dis-
 order and misrule. To such an extent had the evil proceeded,
 that in the year I have mentioned the British
 Its previous Government was forced to interfere and to nominate
 history. a minister to introduce order and good government.
 The efforts made in that direction by this enlightened man, a
 Brahman named Dájí Krishná Pandit, to deprive the corrupt
 party in the state of their illicit gains, provoked a rebellion.
 This rebellion having been suppressed, the British Government
 assumed the direct administration of the state during the
 minority of the Rájah. Within this period, which did not
 expire till 1862, the forts of every description were dismantled,
 and the system of hereditary garrison was abolished; the native

* The Government of Bombay was not insensible to Mr. Seton-Karr's great merits. On the 14th of September, 1857, he was informed that "the Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers that in a conjunction of great anxiety and danger you have displayed a calmness, an energy, and a foresight which entitle you to the thanks and commendations of Government." Again, "the judicious arrangements made by you have amply secured the future tranquillity of the southern Maráthá country." These and other commendations were repeated and confirmed by Lord Elphinstone in letters under his own hand, in which he alludes to "the marked ability and success" with which Mr. Seton-Karr had performed his duties. In his published minute on distinguished services rendered during the mutiny, Lord Elphinstone placed Mr. Seton-Karr's name third on the list of those who had deserved well of their country. The honour was the more marked, because, as Lord Canning observed, every recommendation from Lord Elphinstone carried double weight from the fact, that out of the many who had rendered important services in western India he selected only a few names for mention. Yet, strange as it may appear, when so many were decorated, Mr. Seton-Karr received neither honours nor reward. He returned to England towards the end of 1860, his proud nature suffering from the unmerited slight which had been cast upon him. In less than two years he died, conscious that he had performed a great service which his country had failed to recognise.

military force was disbanded, and a local corps, officered by three English officers, was substituted for it. These measures, especially those for the disarmament of their forts and the disbandment of their native force, though in view of the many previous rebellions absolutely necessary, had been regarded with great disfavour by the higher orders in Kolhápúr, and had tended not a little to the unpopularity of the paramount power.

Reasons for
the discontent
of the
people.

Such was the state of affairs in the province when the mutiny broke out at Míráth. Hopes and wishes similar to those which I have described as actuating the Muhammadan population of the Belgáon district, at once took possession of the minds of their neighbours in Kolhápúr. To a people accustomed to revolt, living on the memories of plunder and corruption, and hating orderly government, the occasion seemed singularly favourable. The town of Kolhápúr is distant only sixty-five miles from Belgáon. It was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 27th, and by the local corps raised on the disbandment of the native force. There were no European troops nearer than Belgáon, and it was impossible to spare any from that place. Satárah was eighty-one miles to the north, and Púná, whence European aid was alone possible, seventy-one miles further. The political superintendent of Kolhápúr was Colonel Maughan. Major Rolland commanded the 27th Native Infantry, Captain Schneider the local corps.

Effect of the
Míráth
mutiny at
Kolhápúr.

Garrison of
Kolhápúr.

I have already stated* that communications between the 27th Native Infantry at Kolhápúr, the 29th at Belgáon, and the 28th at Dhárwár, had been frequent during the months of June and July. Supported, as they were, secretly, by discontented chiefs, almost openly by the disaffected Muhammadan populations, these three regiments had the game in their own hands. Concerted and simultaneous action was only necessary to their success. Happily on this, as on so many occasions at this eventful period, the conspirators failed in this essential particular. It would seem that they reckoned without the telegraph. Instead of deciding to rise on a settled date, they arranged that the example should be set by Kolhápúr, and followed at once by Belgáon and

The mutinous
regiments at
the various
stations inter-
communicate.

The one blot
in their
plan.

Dharwár. The 27th Native Infantry accordingly rose on the 31st of July at Kolhápúr. But for the telegraph the regiment at Belgáon would have received by express intelligence of the movement, and have followed the example. But the telegraph forestalled their express. And Mr. Seton-Karr, using his priority of news with judgment, averted, as we have seen, the calamity from that place.

But the mutiny at Kolhápúr was a reality. During the night of the 31st of July the 27th rose in arms and detailed parties to attack their officers' bungalows. The native adjutant, a Jew, and a Hindu hawáldár ran to give warning only just in time to permit the ladies to escape from their houses before the Sipáhis came up and poured volleys into them. Some of the officers nobly endeavoured to bring back the rebels to their duty, but their efforts were vain. The treasury and the bazaar were plundered, and riot reigned supreme. Three officers who had escaped into the country were shot and thrown into the river. The remainder took refuge in the Residency, about a mile from the cantonment, but near the lines of the Kolhápúr local regiment, which happily remained loyal.*

The news of this disaster reached Bombay by telegraph. Lord Elphinstone acted with promptitude and decision. It happened that Colonel G. Le Grand Jacob, a man of the old heroic type, ready in council, prompt and decisive in action, had but just returned to Bombay from a command in the Persian campaign. He was about to start for Púná under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, when the telegram from Kolhápúr was placed in the hands of the Governor.

Lord Elphinstone at once sent for Jacob; told him all that had occurred at Kolhápúr; that he would receive orders from the Commander-in-Chief to take command of the troops in that quarter. He added that he was well aware that there were no troops to be depended upon, except perhaps the local regiments; but that he would receive special powers, and was to do the best he could.*

* *Western India before and during the Mutinies*, by Major-General Sir George Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.

† The final orders to Colonel Jacob were not issued till the following day, as Lord Elphinstone wished, before their issue, to receive a reply to a telegram he had sent to Kolhápúr. As no reply came, the orders were at once issued

Colonel Jacob set out at once, saw the Commander-in-Chief at Púná, pushed on then to Satárah, and found there a troop of horse artillery and dragoons. The rainy season was at its height, the track between Satárah and Kolhápúr was composed of the black soil in which, during the monsoon, horses not unfrequently sank up to their girths, and wheels to their axles; there were several rivers and streams unbridged and unfordable. Still, time was everything. Colonel Jacob then pushed on two guns with double allowance of men and horses, and riding forward himself with a few men of the Southern Maráthá Horse, a loyal and capable regiment, reached Kolhápúr on the 14th of August, just before midnight.

Jacob sets out,

and, despite of difficulties,

How, meanwhile, had matters been progressing in Kolhápúr? There, according to all probabilities, there would have been little to check the victorious progress of the rebels! Thanks to their delays and to the prompt action of Colonel Maughan, it had happened otherwise. The Sipáhis, greedy of plunder, went first to pillage the treasury and sack the station. Then, and then only, did they make their way to the town, fully expecting to find its gates open. But Colonel Maughan had closed those gates. The Sipáhis, not caring to attempt to force them, took up a rather formidable position outside, close to the gates, in a small outwork where the Rájah's horses and menagerie were kept. Here they maintained their position all night, repulsing Colonel Maughan in an attempt made by him to dislodge them.

reaches Kolhápúr. The mutineers have, meanwhile, been checked by Colonel Maughan.

It would seem that from this time the greater part of the regiment returned to its allegiance. This movement was probably hastened by the knowledge, brought to the Sipáhis by some of their still recalcitrant comrades, that the passes to the coast had been occupied by Europeans landed on the coast by the splendid exertions of the Indian Navy. This is certain, that the recalcitrant Sipáhis were checked in this way; that the greater number betook

Many return to their duty;

'They were,' writes Sir G. Le G. Jacob, "brief and satisfactory. 'I am aware,' said Lord Elphinstone, 'that in a crisis like this, a person on the spot ought to be the best judge of any action that might be at once necessary; to wait for orders may allow events to become too strong to master. I have confidence in your judgment; do your best to meet the present emergency, and rely on my full support.'"—*Western India*, by Sir G. Le Jacob.

themselves to the jungles; whilst the minority, about forty in number, returning to Kolhápúr, reoccupied the outwork close to the town. But the garrison of the town had in the meantime been reinforced. Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Maráthá Horse, had marched a detachment of that regiment from Satárah—a distance of eighty-one miles—without a halt. The rebels were at once attacked, on the 10th of August, in their outwork, some of their own comrades joining in the attack. They made a desperate defence—but, a secret entrance to the outwork having been pointed out to Lieutenant Kerr, that gallant officer dashed in, followed by horsemen whom he had caused to dismount, and fought his way to the interior of the building. At the same time, Lieutenant Innes, with a party of the 27th, took the rebels in the rear. These two attacks decided the affair; but so desperate had been the defence, that of the forty rebels three only escaped wounds or death.*

the remainder are attacked and killed.

When, then, Colonel Le G. Jacob reached Kolhápúr, he found that the mutiny had been quelled. Some forty of the most rebellious men of the 27th Native Infantry had been killed in fair fight; a larger number was in the jungles; but still the great bulk of the regiment was doing its duty, and there was no evidence against any man of it.

Three days after his arrival, Colonel Jacob was reinforced by the two horse-artillery guns he had sent on from Satárah, and about a hundred men of the 2nd Europeans from the coast—the same who had so opportunely occupied the passes. With so small a force at his disposal, he felt it would be impossible

Jacob determines to disarm the 27th Native Infantry.

to act against the insurgents unless he should decide, before acting, to disarm the regiment whose conduct had been so suspicious. On the one hand was the danger of his being attacked before his force should gather further strength, or of the mutineers marching away with their arms; on the other, the chance of the men who were still loyal, those of the local corps especially, yielding to the temptation to join their countrymen. It was a balance of risks and probabilities. Many men would have preferred to wait. But Jacob was, as I have said, a man of the old heroic type, and, feeling the

* Jacob's *Western India*. Lieutenant Kerr received the Victoria Cross for his conduct on this occasion.

importance of striking the first blow, he determined to disarm the men of the 27th Native Infantry.

He disarmed them on the morning of the 18th of August. Under his orders were twenty-five European gunners, with two guns and two howitzers; ninety men of the 2nd Europeans; one hundred and eighty men of the Southern Maráthá Horse; and three hundred and fifty men of the local corps. These were drawn up in a manner to command any movement tending to resistance on the part of the rebels.

He disarms them.

But they made no resistance. They piled their arms in silence. The investigation which followed brought to light many hidden springs of the movement. It had been intended, it was discovered, to delay the mutiny till the 10th of August; but the action of the Jew native adjutant on the 31st of July, in sending away his family, aroused suspicion, and prompted a sudden and ill-matured rising. This premature movement ruined the plot. Acting hurriedly and without concert with their brethren at Belgáon and Dharwár, the mutineers acted without plan or settled purpose. It required, then, only energy to baffle them, and that energy was conspicuous in the conduct of all the European officers concerned, in the conduct alike of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, of Maughan, of Kerr, of Innes, in defence and attack, and of Colonel Jacob in striking the decisive blow.

Remarks on the success of the prompt action of the Bombay authorities and officers.

I ask the reader to return with me now to Bombay. Until the approach of the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram there had been no apprehensions of an outbreak in that city. The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Forjett, a gentleman who, born and bred in India, knew the natives thoroughly, had deemed it sufficient, when the news of the massacre of Kánhpúr reached Bombay, to obtain permission to incorporate into the police a body of fifty mounted Europeans. He reasoned justly that, as the Muhammadan population of the city exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand, it would be folly to trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police.

The police force there.

It may be fitting to describe here the officers to whom was entrusted the direction of the civil and military forces, upon whose conduct depended the safety of the important town of Bombay at this critical juncture.

The commander of the military forces was Brigadier-General Shortt of the Bombay army. General Shortt was an officer of capacity and intelligence. He thoroughly understood the native soldier. He was quick to decide on an emergency and prompt to carry his decision into execution. In a word, he was an officer thoroughly to be depended upon in danger, a tower of strength to the Government in the crisis which was then impending.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. C. Forjett, was* one of the most remarkable men brought to the front by the events of 1857. I have already stated that he was born and bred in India. When the mutiny broke out, he was in the very prime of manhood. He was so thoroughly acquainted with all the dialects of all the languages of western and southern India, that it was easy for him to pass himself off as a native upon the most astute of natives. Mr. Forjett gave an extraordinary proof of this talent immediately prior to his nomination to the office of Superintendent of Police. He had gained so great a reputation for ability, tact, and judgment in the performance of his duties in the southern Maráthá country, that in 1855 Lord Elphinstone sent for him to offer him the chief superintendence of the police in Bombay. Mr. Forjett came to the Presidency, saw Lord Elphinstone, and received the offer. He at once expressed his willingness to accept it, but requested that Lord Elphinstone would defer the nomination for a fortnight, so as to give him time to find out for himself the true character of the men he had been summoned to command. The request was at once granted. Mr. Forjett then disguised himself as a native and went to places haunted by the police, passing himself off as the son of a subahdar in search of a girl whom he loved. He so completely deceived the natives that men of the highest caste invited him to eat with them. He found out the character, the secret longings, of the natives, who, in a few days would be his instruments. Nor did he neglect the European police. His experience with some of them was remarkable. Of those whom he tested

* I am happy to add that the imperfect tense is used only historically. Mr. Forjett still lives in the vigour of healthy life.

not one refused the bribe he offered. At the end of the fortnight he presented himself to Lord Elphinstone, and took up the office. I leave the reader to imagine the consternation of his native subordinates when they learned who it was whom they had now to serve.

He assumes
the office.

But quickness, cleverness at disguise, readiness of resource, represented but a small part of Mr. Forjett's qualities. Small in person, endowed, according to all appearance, with no great strength, he united the cool courage of a practised warrior to remarkable powers of endurance. The courage was not merely the physical courage which despises danger; it was that, and much more. It was a courage set into action by a brain cool and clear—so cool and so clear that there never was a crisis which could blind it, never a danger which it was unable to parry. I venture to describe it as the highest form of intellectual courage.

His other remarkable
qualities;

his intellectual
courage;

I have spoken of his powers of endurance. These were often tested in the southern Maráthá country prior to 1855. If to ride a hundred miles a day, on dismounting to partake of a rude meal of the natural products of the country, and then to lie on the ground, with a bundle of grass for a pillow, in the morning to wash in the stream or in the water drawn from the well, and pursue a similar journey in a similar manner, if to do this day after day be a test of endurance, then Mr. Forjett may claim to be a passed master in the art. If, to the qualities I have recorded, I add an upright mind, a lofty sense of honour, a devotion to duty, I present to the reader an accurate portrait of the Superintendent of Police of Bombay.

his powers of
endurance;

his lofty
character.

During the two years which had elapsed between his assumption of that office and the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Forjett had gained the complete confidence and esteem of Lord Elphinstone. Those who knew that high-minded nobleman are aware that he never bestowed his trust until he had assured himself by experience that the recipient was fully worthy of it.

He gains
Lord Elphinstone's entire
confidence.

There being thus two men so capable and in all respects so well qualified at the head of the departments regulating order, it would seem that the repression of disturbance in Bombay would be easy. But there were two causes which

militated against such a conclusion. The first was the great disparity between the numbers of European and native troops. Whilst there were three native regiments, the 10th and 11th Native Infantry and the Marine Battalion, of the former there were but four hundred men. The other cause affected the concert between the heads of the two departments. General Shortt believed in the loyalty of his Sipáhis but mistrusted the native police. Mr. Forjett was confident that he could do what he would with the police, but mistrusted the Sipáhis. To use his own words, Mr. Forjett regarded the Sipáhis as "the only source of danger."

Difference of opinion between General Shortt and Mr. Forjett.

The festival of the Muharram was a festival of a character the most dangerous of all. It was a religious festival, lasting many days, the excitement of which increased with each day. Lord Elphinstone had confided to General Shortt the arrangements for preventing disturbance during the whole of the time it lasted. *Granted one premiss—that the Sipáhis were absolutely loyal—*those arrangements were perfect. Mr. Forjett, when informed of them, declined, without pledging himself to the contrary, to admit this premiss, and he informed Lord Elphinstone of his doubts. Lord Elphinstone replied that he was sorry he had not known of his objections before, but that it was now too late to alter them. I may here state that the arrangements made by General Shortt involved the division into very small bodies of the European force under the orders of Mr. Forjett. The reply made by that gentleman to Lord Elphinstone's remark just referred to is eminently characteristic. He intimated that he should, at all events, be obliged to disobey the orders of Government with respect to the police arrangements, because it was necessary for him to have them in hand in the event of a Sipáhi outbreak. "It is a very risky thing," replied Lord Elphinstone,* "to disobey orders, but I am sure you will do nothing rash." Mr. Forjett construed this tacit permission in the sense in which it was doubtless intended.

September. The Muharram festival at Bombay.

General Shortt's arrangements.

Forjett's interview with Lord Elphinstone.

* "Happy was it for Bombay, happy for western India, and happy probably for India itself," wrote Mr. Forjett, reviewing at a later period these events, "that one so noble and clear-headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay during the period of the mutiny."

Five days of the festival passed without disorder. The next night would see its conclusion. On the eve of that night an incident, accidental in its cause, almost produced an outbreak. A Christian drummer belonging to the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, whilst in a state of intoxication, insulted the carriers of a Hindu divinity which was being carried in procession by some townspeople, and knocked over the divinity. Two policemen, who witnessed the outrage, took the drummer into custody. It happened that the Sipáhis of the native regiments were possessed by an inner conviction that their loyalty was doubted by Forjett, and they replied to the feeling they thus imputed to him with one of hatred to himself and his subordinates. When, then, the men of the 10th heard that one of their comrades, albeit a Christian, caught in the act of offering an insult to a Hindu divinity, had been taken into custody by the police, some twenty of them turned out, broke into the lock-up, rescued the drummer, assaulted the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to their lines. The European constable of the section at once proceeded with four native policemen to the lines, and demanded the liberation of their comrades. The demand was not only refused, but the new-comers were assaulted by the Sipáhis. and, after a conflict in which two of the assailants were left for dead, and others were wounded, they were forced to retire. The excitement in the Sipáhi lines, increasing every moment, received a further impetus from this retirement, and the Sipáhis began to turn out in such numbers that a messenger was sent at full speed to Mr. Forjett, with the information that the native regiments had broken out.

This was the one danger which Mr. Forjett had all along dreaded, and against which he had taken every precaution possible under the circumstances, already noted, of his limited sphere of action. He had, that is to say, disobeyed orders, and massed his European policemen. On receiving the news that the Sipáhis had broken out, Mr. Forjett ordered the European police to follow him as soon as possible, and galloped down to their lines at so great a speed as to outstrip all his attendants. He found the

The last night but one of the Muharram.

A Christian drummer insults the Hindús. The police take him into custody.

The Sipáhis take the part of the drummer.

The police try to rescue their comrades, but fail.

Forjett is sent for.

Forjett arrives alone.

Sipáhis in a state of tumult, endeavouring to force their way out of the lines, their European officers, with drawn swords, keeping them back. The sight of Mr. Forjett inflamed the Sipáhis still more. They called out loudly that this was the man who had wished them all to be killed, while the European officers, seeing how the presence of Mr. Forjett excited their men, begged him in earnest language to go away. The fate of Bombay at that moment hung upon the conduct, at this critical conjuncture, of Mr. Forjett. Such are Asiatics, that had that gentleman obeyed the calls of the officers, the Sipáhis would have burst the bonds of discipline and dashed forward to pursue him. He was there, alone, seated on his horse, calmly daring them. His knowledge of natives made him feel that so long as he should remain there, facing and defying them, they would not move, but that a retrograde movement on his part would be the signal for a real outbreak. In reply, then, to the shouts of the officers and men of the native regiments, Mr. Forjett called out to the former, "If your men are bent on mischief, the sooner it is over the better," and remained facing them. Two minutes later his assistant, Mr. Edington, galloped up, followed very shortly by fifty-five European policemen—the men he had kept massed in case of a disturbance. Then Mr. Forjett acted. Forming up and halting his men, he called out, "Throw open the gates; I am ready for the Sipáhis." Again was displayed that complete acquaintance with the Asiatic character which was one of the secrets of Mr. Forjett's power. The excitement of the Sipáhis subsided as if by magic and they fell back within their lines. Never had a nobler deed been more nobly done!

Fury of the
Sipáhis at
seeing him.

The European
officers beg
him to retire.

He refuses,

and crushes
the incipient
mutiny.

The Mubarram, thanks
to Mr Forjett, is tided
over.

The tide now turned. The evil-disposed amongst the Sipáhis—and that many were evil-disposed subsequent revelations fully proved—were completely cowed. Nevertheless, Mr. Forjett relaxed not one of his exertions. The Muharram was not yet a thing of the past, and it was clear that an accident might yet kindle the mine. One night still remained, and Mr. Forjett, far from relaxing his precautions, bent himself to increase them. He so posted his police that the smallest movement upon the part of the Sipáhis would at once become known to the main body of his Europeans, forty-eight in number, located at

a decisive point. His precautions were not only successful, they were the cause of success. To borrow the language, subsequently revealed, of the baffled conspirators, "it was the vigilance maintained that prevented the outbreak." The vigilance was the vigilance of the police personally directed by Mr. Forjett.*

I have already stated that, thanks to the precautions taken and to Mr. Forjett's energetic action, the festival of the Muharram had passed off quietly. The discontented men amongst the Sipáhis still, however, cherished the hope that another opportunity more favourable to the execution of their projects would soon arise. The Hindú festival of the Duáli, occurring towards the end of October, seemed to them to offer such an opportunity. During this festival the Hindus of the upper and wealthier classes are accustomed to collect all their wealth in one room of their dwelling, and, assembling, to worship it. The discontented Sipáhis resolved, in many a secret council, to break out during the Duáli, to pillage Bombay, killing all who should oppose them, and then to march out of the island. Had this

The Sipáhis
hatch a new
conspiracy.

* Mr. Forjett's great services were not left unacknowledged. On the 19th of June, 1858, Lord Elphinstone thus recorded his sense of their value:—"The Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsibilities were imposed during last year." Referring to Mr. Forjett's "very valuable services" in the detection of the plot in Bombay in 1857, the same high authority thus wrote:—"His duties demanded great courage, great acuteness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed by Mr. Forjett at that trying period."

All classes combined to testify to the great services rendered on this occasion by Mr. Forjett. Couched in varying phraseology, every letter received from the members of the European community indicates that, in the opinion of the several writers, it was the vigilance of Mr. Forjett which saved Bombay.

I may add here that, for his services in the mutiny, the European and native communities in Bombay presented Mr. Forjett with addresses, and, with the sanction of the Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of three thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds. It was still more gratifying to him that, after he had left the service and quitted India, the native cotton merchants sent him a handsome address and a purse of fifteen hundred pounds. "in token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive forces of native society, that they seem to have become permanently subdued." In addition, and likewise after he left India, the shareholders of a company, mainly composed of natives, presented Mr. Forjett with shares, which they subsequently sold on his account, for thirteen thousand five hundred and eighty pounds

plan been carried out, it is nearly certain that the contagion would have spread all over the Presidency, and have even reached Madras.

But again had the mutineers to reckon with Mr. Forjett. That gentleman was informed by a detective that suspicious meetings were being held by disaffected Sipáhis at the house of

October,
which is dis-
covered by
Mr. Forjett,

one Gangá Parshád. Attempts to introduce a confidential agent of the police into those meetings having been baffled by the precautions of the Sipáhis, Mr. Forjett had Gangá Parshád conveyed to

the police-office during the night, and obtained from him a complete revelation. Fertile in disguises, Mr. Forjett subsequently became an eye-witness—by means of holes made in the wall which separated the chamber where the conspirators assembled from the ante-room—of the proceedings of the Sipáhis, a listener to their conversation. More than that, aware

and revealed
by him to
Major Bar-
row,

of the feeling prevailing amongst the officers regarding himself, he induced Major Barrow, the officer commanding the Marine battalion, to accompany him, on four different occasions, to the meetings.*

The information there obtained was duly reported to General Shortt by Major Barrow, and to Lord Elphinstone, through his private secretary, by Mr. Forjett. Courts-martial

by which
means the
conspiracy is
nipped in
the bud.

were in due course convened. The proceedings resulted in sentences of death being passed and executed on two, of transportation for life on six, native soldiers of various ranks. But the projected

mutiny was nipped in the bud.

With the story of the measures taken for the safety of

December.
Recapitula-
tion of events
at Bombay.

Bombay closes the general sketch of events in the western Presidency up to the close of 1857. We have seen how, displaying at once a rare foresight and a remarkable self-reliance, Lord Elphinstone had denuded his own Presidency of European troops in order to crush the mutiny beyond its borders. No man in high position recognised more truly, and applied more conscientiously,

* “Major Barrow’s astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Gangá Parshád’s house was remarkable. He exclaimed, ‘My God, my own men! Is it possible?’ And his memorable words to me at the court-martial were: ‘It is well I was present and saw and heard them myself, but for which I should have been here, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as one for the defence; such was my confidence in these men.’”—Forjett’s *Our Real Danger in India*.

the maxim that the art of war consists in concentrating the greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the action. Now, the decisive point of the action in the early days of the revolt of 1857, was not in Bombay. To Lord Elphinstone it was clear that Dehli could only be reached from Bengal, and that it was just possible he might save central India and Rajpútáná. Whilst, then, he sent every available European soldier to Calcutta, he formed, from the small remnant which was left, a number in reality not sufficient for his own needs—one column which should march on Mán, another which should restore order in Rajpútáná. Feeling that amidst the many dangers which threatened him the most fatal was that which would come from without, he sent to meet and to crush it before it should penetrate within. His defence of Bombay was an aggressive defence. It was a policy requiring rare courage, immense confidence in his own judgment, and great resolution. In carrying it out he exposed himself to the danger, only one degree less, of a rising within the Presidency. How nearly that was occurring I have shown in these pages. The southern Marúthá country was saved, in 1857, partly by the prudence and the judgment displayed by Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, aided by the energy of General Lester, partly by the bungling and want of concert of the conspirators. How Bombay was saved I have just told. The reader will have seen that the danger was real, the peril imminent, that but for the unlimited confidence placed by Lord Elphinstone in Mr. Forjett—a man of his own selection—it might have culminated in disaster. That he dared that risk to avert a greater danger is one of the many proofs of Lord Elphinstone's capacity. Sufficient credit has never been given to him for his noble, his far-seeing, his self-denying policy. In the presence of the massacres of Kánhpúr and of Jhánsí, of the defence of Lakhmao, and of the siege of Dehli, the attitude of Lord Elphinstone, less sensational though not less heroic, has been overlooked. Had there been an uprising attended with slaughter in Bombay, the story of its repression and the deeds of valour attending that repression would have circulated throughout the world. Instead of that, we see only calm judgment and self-reliance meeting one danger and defying

Lord Elphinstone's forethought, unselfishness, and decision.

His plan of aggressive defence.

Mr. Seton-Karr.
General Lester.

Mr. Forjett.

The attitude of Lord Elphinstone has never yet received its due meed of praise.

another, carefully selecting the most experienced instruments, and by their aid preventing a calamity so threatening that, if it had been met by men less tried and less worthy of confidence, it must have culminated in disaster. It is an attitude which gains from being contemplated, which impresses the student of history, in an ever-increasing degree, with admiration of the noble character of the man whose calm trust in himself made possible the success of the policy he alone inaugurated.

CHAPTER II.

CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND.

ÁSÍRGARH is a very famous fortress in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, lying two hundred and ninety miles to the north-east of Bombay, one hundred and fifty miles from Málígaon, and ninety-nine miles to the south-east of Mán. It is built on an isolated hill, detached from the Sátpúra range dividing the valley of the Taptí from that of the Narbadá. It has a history which has sent its name through the length and breadth of India. Alike in the times of the Hindu, of the Muhammadan, and of the British overlordship, it has been considered a place worth fighting for. After many changes of masters, it surrendered, on the 9th of April, 1819, after a vigorous resistance, to a British force commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton, and it has, ever since, remained in the occupation of a British garrison.

Ásírgarh.

In 1857 that garrison consisted of a wing of the 6th Regiment Gwáliár Contingent, lent by the Bengal Presidency to replace the 19th Bombay Native Infantry, ordered on service to Persia, but which never embarked for that country. The commanding officer of the garrison was Colonel Le Mesurier, and the Fort Adjutant was Lieutenant John Gordon of the 19th Bombay Native Infantry.

Garrison of
Ásírgarh.

The hill on the summit of which Ásírgarh is perched rises abruptly to about five hundred feet above the jungle. Below it is a town of no real importance, inhabited by villagers mainly engaged in tending their flocks.

Situation of
the fort.

The men who formed the garrison of Ásírgarh belonged to a contingent which speedily asserted its right to a prominent place amongst the mutineers. The events at Nímach and at Gwáliár speedily convinced the European residents at Ásírgarh that their guardians were not to be trusted. Even before this discovery

The men of
the contin-
gent evince
symptoms
of mutiny.

had been made, the fort adjutant, distrusting their demeanour, had enlisted some ninety men from the villagers of the town, and had charged them with the task of watching the behaviour of the Sipáhis. These men are known as Gordon's Volunteers.

On the 19th of June the Europeans of the garrison heard of the mutinies at Nimach and Nasirábád. From that day almost every post brought them distressful tidings. Every precaution was taken by Lieutenant Gordon. To relieve the fort, by fair means, of a portion of its real enemies, one company of the regiment was detached to Burhánpúr, twelve miles distant. The anxieties of the ladies of the garrison were lessened about the same time by the intelligence, verified by a personal visit made by Lieutenant Gordon, that Captain Keatinge,* the political agent for that part of the country, had fortified a position fourteen miles distant from Ásírgarh.

From this time till the end of July good and bad news succeeded each other with great rapidity. At times the Europeans were in great danger. The company sent to Burhánpúr mutinied, marched on Ásírgarh, and was only prevented from entering it by the hawáldar-major of the regiment, whose loyalty had been appealed to, not in vain, by Lieutenant Gordon.

The following morning the four remaining companies obeyed, not without murmuring, the order given to them to march out and encamp below the fort, their places within being taken by Gordon's Volunteers. The next day a party of Bhíl infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Birch, surprised and disarmed the Burhánpúr mutineers, and carried their arms into Ásírgarh. A few hours later that place was reinforced by two companies of the 19th Native Infantry under Captain Blair. The disarming of the Gwáliár men outside the fort—a work performed admirably and without bloodshed by Captain Blair and Lieutenant Gordon—completed the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the fortress pending the arrival of Colonel Stuart's column.

Arrival of
Stuart's
column and
of Durand.

That column, the earlier movements of which I have recorded in the preceding chapter, quitted Aurangábád for Ásírgarh on the 12th of July.

* Now Major-General Keatinge, V.C.

Marching rapidly, it reached Burhánpúr on the 21st and Ásírgarh on the 22nd idem. Here it was joined by Colonel Durand, who had reached Ásírgarh some days previously.

In another part of this history I have shown how Durand, after the catastrophe of Máu, had fallen back on Sihor; how, staying there only one day, he had set out for Hoshangábád on the southern bank of the Narbadá in the hope of being able to communicate there with General Woodburn; how, learning at Hoshangábád of the safety of Máu he heard also of the attempts made to change the direction of Woodburn's force from the line of the Narbadá to Nágpúr; how, not content with simply protesting against such a line of conduct, he had set off for Aurangábád with the intention of enforcing his arguments there, and, if necessary, of pressing on to Bombay; how, on his road, he received the gratifying intelligence that Woodburn's column, now commanded by Stuart, was advancing towards Ásírgarh; how he had at once hurried to that place. He had the gratification of meeting that force on the 22nd of July. From the moment of his joining it, he assumed his position as the Governor-General's representative, and became likewise, in everything but in name, the real leader of the column.

Summary of
Durand's
proceedings
after leaving
Indúr.

He assumes
the real direc-
tion of the
column.

The column pushed on for Máu on the 24th with all practicable expedition. On the 28th it was joined by the 3rd Regiment Cavalry, Haidarábád Contingent, under the command of Captain S. Orr. On the 31st it ascended the Simrol pass, halted on its summit to allow the artillery to close up, and the following morning marched into Máu. The weather for the time of the year, the height of the monsoon, had been exceptionally fine; no rain had fallen to hinder the march of the guns over the sticky black soil. On the night of the 1st of August, however, the weather changed. Heavy rains set in and continued throughout August and September. But Durand was now at Máu, within thirteen and a half miles of the capital whence the mutinous conduct of Holkar's troops had forced him to retire just one month before. He had returned to vindicate British authority, to punish the guilty, to give an example which should not be forgotten.

Is joined by
the 3rd
Regiment
Cavalry,
Haidarábád
Contingent.

Durand ar-
rives at Máu.

Even before he had marched into Máu, whilst he was yet halted on the top of the Simrol pass, Durand had received a message from the Indúr Durbar. Mahárájah Holkar and his minister sent to inform him that they were still in a state of alarm as to the conduct of their own troops, and to inquire whether aid could not be afforded to them. Durand replied that he was ready, if the Mahárájah wished it, to march with the entire force into Indúr instead of into Máu. Apparently, this was not the end desired by the Durbar, for the messengers at once withdrew their requisition.

In deciding to march on Máu instead of Indúr, Durand was mainly influenced by considerations regarding the state of the surrounding districts which will be presently adverted to. At the moment, indeed, there was another consideration which he had to take into account. He had with him no European infantry.* Four companies of the 86th were indeed marching up by the Bombay road, and would join in a few days. But it was desirable, after the events which had occurred, that the Indúr rabble should see in the British force the white faces of the unvanquished foot soldiers of England. Durand marched then on Máu.

The four companies of the 86th having joined a few days later, the propriety of marching on Indúr to punish Holkar's guilty troops and the townspeople who had abetted the revolt again became a question for Durand's consideration. It was a very difficult question. That Holkar's troops had attacked the Residency on the first of July was a fact admitted by every one. But Holkar had asserted that this act had been committed without his sanction or authority. Durand himself was never satisfied of this: to the last he regarded Holkar as a trimmer, a watcher of the atmosphere: but officers who had occupied the Máu fort in July, notably Captain Hungerford, had been penetrated with the conviction that Holkar was innocent, and, in his letters to Durand, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, had insisted on the same view. Under

* The force consisted of five troops 14th Light Dragoons, 3rd Cavalry Haidarábád Contingent, one horse battery of European artillery, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, and a pontoon train.

these circumstances Durand, duly weighing the difficulties presented by the case, deemed it advisable to defer all action, so far as Holkar was personally concerned, until he should become acquainted with the views of the Governor-General regarding him. He accordingly made a complete reference on the subject to Lord Canning.

Holkar, on his part, was naturally anxious to delay Durand's action as long as he could. He knew that, in his heart, Durand had thoroughly mistrusted him. And, although it was well known that, in the excited state of native feeling throughout the country, he could not depend on the conduct of his own troops, and would have been glad to see them coerced by the British, yet, when he thought of the possible results of such action, he inclined to prefer the uncertainty of his actual condition. Could he, he felt, but stave off the critical moment for a few months, Durand would be relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, and Sir Robert Hamilton, an old and much-regarded friend, would, he felt confident, accept explanations regarding the events of the 1st of July which Durand would utterly condemn.

Probable reasons for Holkar's conduct.

The question of disarming Holkar's revolted troops, whilst the personal case regarding Holkar was still pending, opened out difficulties of another description. The force at the disposal of Durand was small, and, though sufficient to dispose of the revolted troops of Indúr, could these be encountered *en masse*, it was scarcely large enough to attack its several component parts in detail, holding the bulk in check whilst portion after portion should be destroyed. It must always be remembered, writing of this period, that the revolt had at that time nowhere received a serious check. The force before Dēhlí was almost as much besieged as besieging. The English garrison of the Lakhnao Residency was supposed to be at its last gasp; Havelock had made no impression upon Oudh; Bihár was surging with mutineers. The disaffected in central India might, then, well be excused if, regarding all these points, they were not only hopeful, but confident, that resolute resistance on their part would serve the cause which they now regarded as the common cause of their co-religionists throughout India. Under these circumstances, it was to be apprehended that Holkar's troops, the three arms of which,

Reasons why Durand determines to defer to a later period any movement against Holkar's troops.

each superior in numbers to the entire British force, were located in separate cantonments, might evince a strong disinclination to be disarmed; and that, morally supported as they were by a large party in the city of Indúr, and, as I shall presently show, by a strongly aggressive party in the districts lying between Indúr and Nímach, they might offer a resistance certain to entail great loss on the attacking party, and to cripple its future movements. This will be clear to the reader when, recalling the composition of the force at the disposal of Durand,* extremely weak in infantry, he reflects that a rainy season of unusual force was at its height, that the roads could be traversed by guns only with the greatest difficulty, that the bridges in many places had been carried away, and that any military operation against the several cantonments occupied by Holkar's troops would have to be carried out on a swampy plain, on which, at that season of the year, it would be impossible for the three arms to work together.

But there were other reasons which impressed Durand with the necessity of dealing in the first instance with those rebels in the districts, of whose aggressive tendencies I have just spoken.

Mandesar is a large and important town on a tributary of the river Chambal, about a hundred and twenty miles from Indúr. In the month of July this place had been occupied by some of Sindhiá's revolted troops, and these had been joined, and were being constantly further strengthened, by Afghán, Mekrání, and Mewátí levies. In August the insurrection at Mandesar threatened not only to embrace all western Málwá, but Nímach as well. Impressed with a confidence in themselves, justified only by the prolonged immunity which had been allowed them, the rebels at this place began, in the month of August, to display an aggressive temper far more dangerous than the sullen disaffection of the compromised troops of Holkar. The more active and daring of the mutineers of Holkar's army had proceeded to Gwáliár after the insurrection of the 1st of July; the less energetic mass remained, sullen, dangerous, watching events, but to a certain extent paralysed, though not controlled, by the English party in power at Holkar's court. The progress of the Mandesar

Mandesar

becomes a
centre of in-
surrection,

aggressive in
its nature,

* Vide page 42, note.

insurrection was, however, so rapid, that to uphold British supremacy in Rajpútáná and Málwá, and to maintain the line of the Narbadá, it became absolutely necessary to check its growth with the utmost promptitude. In the presence of this new danger, the disarming of Holkar's troops became, in every sense, a matter of secondary importance. An attempt to subdue the lesser evil might have augmented the greater, whilst a decisive blow struck at the greater could not fail to affect fatally the lesser.

and requiring the most prompt attention.

Action in any shape was impossible so long as the heavy rains continued. But when, in the beginning of October, the monsoon passed away, and the country began to dry up, the Mandesar rebels began to give proof of the possession of the aggressive nature with which I have credited them.

The rains an impediment to prompt action.

The leader of the Mandesar insurgents was Firúzsháh, a Sháhzáda or prince connected with the imperial family of Dehlí. It was estimated in September that some fifteen thousand men, with sixteen or eighteen guns, had rallied round his standard, and this estimate was subsequently found to have been below the actual number. To meet these, Durand, after deducting the sick and wounded, and a sufficient number of men to guard Máu, could not bring into the field more than fifteen hundred men * and nine guns.

Composition of the Mandesar insurgents.

below the

Durand's effective force.

Under these circumstances it was perhaps fortunate that the aggressive movement was made by the rebels. Durand expected it. Towards the very end of September he had intercepted letters from Haidarábád from Nágúr, from Súrat, from Ujjén, from Gwáliár, and from Mandesar, all telling the same tale. The tale was to the effect that, after the conclusion of the Dasahra festival,† a general rising would take place in Málwá, and that influential personages were coming

Durand learns that central India is about to rise in revolt.

* Thus composed: Artillery, one hundred and seventy; Dragoons, two hundred; 86th, two hundred and thirty; 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three hundred and fifty; 3rd Nizám's Cavalry, three hundred and fifty.

† A festival of ten days' duration, nine of which are spent in worship and religious ceremonies. The tenth day is the birthday of Gangá (the Ganges). Whoever bathes in the Ganges on that day is purified from ten sorts of sins. The festival occurs in September or October, the date varying with each year.

from Nágpúr and Haidarábád for the purpose of giving life and strength to the insurrection. The close of the Dasahra corresponded with the setting in of the dry season. The

The rebels attempt to cut off Durand from Bombay.

result corresponded with the information Durand had thus obtained. Early in October the Sháhzáda's troops, who had previously occupied Dhár and Amjhéra, advanced to the Bombay road and threatened to interrupt Durand's communications with Bombay, to command the line of the Narbadá along the Bombay frontier, and to attack Nímach. They sent also a pressing invitation to Holkar's troops to join them.

The vital importance of rapid action.

Everything depended upon the rapidity with which Durand would be able to strike a blow at this enemy. Failing it, it was quite possible that Náná Sáhib, who at that time was hovering in the vicinity of Kálpí, might transfer the whole of his troops to central India, and that the Maráthá war-cry might raise the entire country formerly acknowledging the supremacy of the Peshwá. Seeing the necessity, Durand struck.

Durand strikes at Dhár.

On the 12th of October he detached one body of Haidarábád cavalry to defend Mandlésar on the Narbadá, threatened by the rebels, and another to the village of Gújri to intercept them on their way. On the 14th he sent three companies of the 25th Native Infantry and some dragoons to support this last-named party, and on the 19th, with all the men who could be spared from the garrison of Máu, he marched for Dhár.

History of Dhár immediately previous to the events of 1857.

Ánand Ráo Púár, a lad of thirteen years, had succeeded to the chiefship of Dhár on the death of his brother, cut off by cholera on the 23rd of May 1857.* His minister, Rámchandar Bápují, a shrewd and intelligent man, who, from his thorough knowledge of the English and from his large acquaintance with British officers, was supposed to be devoted to British interests, began, almost immediately after his assumption of office, to pursue a line of policy the very reverse of that which had been hoped from him. In direct opposition to the policy pursued by the Government of India ever since the settlement of Málwá, to prevent the

Disloyalty of Rámchandar Bápují.

* The formal recognition by the British Government only reached the young chief on the 28th of September, but he was acknowledged and treated as Rájah from the date stated.

employment of mercenary troops in native states, this man began to enlist large numbers of Arabs, Afgháns, and Mekránís. As soon as the news of the Indúr rising of the 1st of July reached Dhár, a party of these mercenaries, four hundred in number, joined with the mercenaries of the Rájah of Amjhéra, and plundered the stations of Bhopáur and Sirdárpúr, burning the hospitals over the heads of the sick and wounded. Returning to Dhár with their plunder, they were met and honourably received by Bhím Ráo Bhonslá, the young Rájah's uncle, and three of the guns which they had captured were placed in the Rájah's palace. On the 31st of August they were in possession of the fort of Dhár, with or without the consent of the Durbar was not certainly known. But on the 15th of October Captain Hutchinson, the political agent, reported that there was strong reason to believe that the Rájah's mother and uncle and the members of the Durbar were the instigators of the rebellion of the Dhár troops, that the conduct of the Durbar was suspicious, that its agent had purposely deceived him regarding the negotiations entered into by its members with the mutinous mercenaries and the number of men they had enlisted, and that it had received with attention and civility emissaries from Mandesar, the centre of the Muhammadan rising. It was this intelligence which decided Durand to dismiss the Dhár agent in attendance on him, with a message to the Durbar that its members would be held strictly responsible for all that had happened or that might happen,* and to despatch all his available troops to attack Dhár.

He enlists mercenaries,

whom, after their plunder of British stations, he receives with honour.

Captain Hutchinson reports the complicity of the Rájah's family, and of the Durbar.

Durand dismisses the Durbar's agent with a warning.

On the 22nd of October the British force arrived before Dhár. The Arab and Mekrání levies who garrisoned that fort gave a signal instance of the confidence engendered by the long compulsory inaction of the British by quitting the protection of their lines of defence and coming to attack them in the open. Planting three brass guns on a hill south of the fort, they extended from that point along its eastern face in skirmishing order, and advanced boldly against the British.

The British troops arrive before Dhár.

* Durand repeated this warning to the Rájah in person during the siege of the fort.

But their confidence soon vanished. The 25th Bombay Native Infantry, a splendid regiment, often to be mentioned, and always with honour, in these pages, led by their most capable commandant, Major Robertson, charged the three guns, captured them, and turned the guns on the rebels. Almost simultaneously, the four companies of the 86th and the sappers, flanked by Woollcombe's (Bombay) and Hungerford's (Bengal) batteries, advanced against the centre, whilst the cavalry threatened both flanks, the dragoons, under Captain Gall, the left, the Nizám's cavalry, under Major Orr, the right. Baffled in their advance by the action of the 25th, and the play of the British guns on their centre, the enemy made a rapid movement to their left, and attempted to turn the British right. But the dragoons, led by Gall, and the Nizám's cavalry, led by Orr and Macdonald, Deputy Quarter-master-General of the force, charged them so vigorously that they retired into the fort, leaving forty bodies of their companions on the field. On the British side three dragoons and one native trooper were wounded, a jámadar and a native trooper were killed.

The fort was now invested, but the British force had to wait for the siege guns, expected on the 24th. They arrived on the evening of that day; the next morning they were placed in position.

The fort of Dhár is entirely detached from the town of the same name. Its southern angle rests on the suburbs, the road running between. It is situated on an eminence of thirty feet above the surrounding plain, and is built of red granite, in an oblong shape, conforming itself to the hill on which it stands. The walls are about thirty feet in height, and have at intervals fourteen circular and two square towers.

On the 25th a sandbag battery, two thousand yards south of the fort, armed with one 8-inch howitzer and one 8-inch mortar, began to shell the fort. Under cover of this fire the infantry pushed on to a low ridge, about two hundred and fifty yards from the southern angle of the fort, forming a natural parallel, and took possession of it. On this the breaching battery was at once constructed. Simultaneously, strong cavalry and infantry pickets were thrown out

on the north and east faces of the fort, security on the west face being assured by an extensive tank or lake which could not be forded. Durand was in hopes that the rebels, seeing themselves thus surrounded, would spontaneously surrender. But although, during the six days the siege lasted, they made many efforts to obtain aid from outside, acting and writing in the name of the Durbar, under whose orders they professed to be defending the fort, they waited until, on the night of the 29th, the breach had been made so large that its practicability was only a question of a day or two, ere they sent a white flag to inquire the terms which would be granted. "An unconditional surrender," was the reply, upon which the firing continued.

The rebels
ask for
terms.

The reply.

At sunset on the 31st the breach was reported practicable, and that night a storming party was detailed to assault the place. Never was a task easier. The breach was easily ascended. Almost immediately afterwards firing was heard on the plain. Whilst dragoons and irregulars were despatched in that direction, the storming party entered the fort. It was empty.*

The breach
practicable
and

the fort
evacuated.

In fact the rebels, foreseeing the assault, had quitted the fort by the main gate between 9 and 11 o'clock, and escaped in the direction of the north-west. The firing heard on the plain at the moment the breach was entered was only a skirmish with the rear-guard of the retreating enemy and an outlying picket of the 3rd Nizam's cavalry. The main body had passed by them and the dragoons† wholly unobserved, and were well away before the alarm could be of any avail. Pursuit, though it could scarcely accomplish much, was attempted. It resulted, however, only in the capture of a few wretched stragglers.

Escape of the
rebels.

Pursuit
useless.

Durand ordered the fort of Dhár to be demolished, the State to be attached, pending the final orders of Government, and charges to be prepared against the leaders and instigators of

* Sindhiá and Dhár. *Calcutta Review*. Lowe's *Central India*. Private papers.

† It had unfortunately happened that the European pickets, which had been there for some days, and which knew the ground well, had been changed that very day. The trooper, sent by the jámadar of the native picket to give the alarm, fell with his horse on the way, and was disabled.—Lowe.

the rebellion.* The force then continued its march through western Málwá towards Mandesar, in pursuit of the rebels. These latter, however, had by no means renounced their aggressive tendencies. On the 8th of November they attacked the cantonment of Mehidpúr, garrisoned by a native contingent of the three arms, officered by English officers. Major Timmins, who commanded the contingent, imprudently permitted the rebels, without offering opposition, to take up a strong position close round his guns and infantry. The men of the contingent, on their side, displayed mingled cowardice and treachery, the majority eventually going over to the rebels. Half a troop of the cavalry behaved, however, extremely well, and, after making a gallant but ineffective charge, in which their leader, Captain Mills, was shot dead, and their native officer severely wounded, escorted the remainder of the European officers to Durand's camp, where they arrived on the 9th.

Durand demolishes the fort and marches towards Mandesar.

The rebels attack Mehidpúr,

and plunder the station.

Two other affairs, which occurred during the pursuit of the rebels to Mandesar, deserve here to be recorded. The first was the capture and destruction of the fort of Amjhéra by a small party of Haidarábád cavalry and infantry under Lieutenant Hutchinson. There was, indeed, no opposition; but the fact of the occupation was satisfactory, as it proved that Durand's rapid action had saved the line of the Narbadá, and had maintained that barrier between the blazing north and the smouldering south.

The other action was one in which Major Orr and the Haidarábád Contingent was prominently engaged.

I have already stated* how one regiment of the Haidarábád Contingent had joined Brigadier Stuart's force on its march from Aurangábad. The remaining cavalry of the contingent and a large force of its infantry and artillery had, about the same time, been formed at Eldábad, one of the chief outlets of the Dakhan, on the high road to central India. Here they remained until the monsoon had ceased and the roads had

Reinforcements brought by the Haidarábád Contingent.

* Ultimately, owing to circumstances upon which it is unnecessary for me to enter here, they all escaped punishment. To consideration was shown, and he was restored to his title and position.

† Vide p. 41.

begun to dry up. They then marched with all speed into Málwá, and coercing on their way the refractory zamindárs of Pípliá* and Rághugarh, reached Durand's force before Dhár.

Upon the news reaching camp of the successful action of the rebels at Mehidpúr, Major Orr, with a small force, consisting of three hundred and thirty-seven sabres drawn from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments Nizam's cavalry, was sent to follow on their track. The second morning after he had left camp, Orr, having marched some sixty miles, arrived before Mehidpúr. There he learned that the rebels had left the place the same morning, carrying with them all the guns, stores, and ammunition upon which they could lay hand. Orr stopped to water and feed his horses, and whilst thus halting had the gratification to receive Mrs. Timmins, the wife of the commandant already mentioned, who had been unable to effect her escape† with her husband. Having despatched that lady under a sufficient escort to rejoin her husband, Orr followed the rebels, and, after a pursuit of twelve miles, came up with their rear-guard, about four hundred and fifty men with two guns, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the village of Ráwal. They were prepared to receive him. They had taken up a very formidable position, especially calculated to resist cavalry, their right resting on the village, and their front covered by a muddy nullah or rivulet. Occupying this position, they hoped effectually to cover the retreat of their main body, conveying their stores, their ammunition, and the spoils of Mehidpúr. But they had not counted on the gallant spirit of their enemy. Orr, and his officers, Abbott, Johnstone, Clark, Murray, and Samwell, led their men forward, crossed the nullah, charged the guns, and then fought hand to hand with the enemy. The contest was desperate and continued till the sun went down. Then the rebels gave way, and all their guns, eight in number, and stores fell into the hands of the victors. The nature of the engagement may be gathered from the fact that the British lost

Major Orr
pursues the
Mehidpúr
plunderers.

He catches
them up.

Their strong
position.

Orr gallantly
and success-
fully assails
it,

and carries it,
though with
loss.

* Called also, and more correctly, "Hath Ka Pípliá," a town in the Diwás State, twenty-eight miles east from Indúr. Rághugarh lies two short marches distant from it.

† This lady had been concealed by a faithful tailor, who frustrated all the efforts of the rebels to discover her hiding-place.

nearly a hundred men killed and wounded. Amongst the latter was Lieutenant Samwell, shot through the abdomen. The rebels lost a hundred and seventy five killed, and some seventy taken prisoners.

When the despatch containing the account of this affair reached Durand, he handed it over to Major Gall to read to the 14th Dragoons and 86th Foot. By these men it was heard with more than satisfaction, for it dissipated any doubt which might have been caused by the escape of the garrison of Dhár.

Durand now pushed on as fast as the baggage carts and the roads would permit him, and on the 19th of November reached Hernia on the banks of the river Chambal. The crossing of this river, unopposed as it was, presented no inconsiderable difficulties. Its

banks are rugged and almost perpendicular, its stream is deep and rapid, and its bed is broken by enormous boulders of basalt. The baggage of the force was carried almost entirely on carts drawn by bullocks, a few camels

only having been obtainable, and to convey these carts and the artillery guns across a river presenting the difficulties I have described would, under no circumstances, have been an easy task. That the rebels, hitherto so aggressive, should have

neglected the opportunity thus offered to them adds another to the many proofs in which this history abounds, that, brave as they were in fight, they understood little of the art of war. As it was,

nearly two days were spent in effecting the passage, nor was this possible until the sappers had cut a road down the bank for the artillery and carts, and another up the opposite bank.*

* "I never saw a more animated and beautiful picture in my life than when our brigade crossed this river. The steep, verdant, shrubby banks, covered with our varied forces, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks; the deep flowing clear river, reaching on and on to the far east, to the soft deep-blue tufted horizon: the babble and yelling of men, the lowing of the cattle, the grunting screams of the camels, and the trumpeting of the wary, heavily-laden elephant; the rattle of our artillery down the bank, through the river, and up the opposite side; the splashing and plunging of our cavalry through the stream—neighing and eager for the green encamping ground before them; and everybody so busy and jovial, streaming up from the deep water to their respective grounds; and all this in the face, almost, of an enemy, formed a *tableau vivant* never to be forgotten."—Lowe's *Campaign in Central India*.

The column halted the afternoon of the 20th on the east bank of the Chambal, and, marching early the following morning, encamped four miles south of Mandesar, in a position covered to the front by some rising ground, flanked on the left by a little village and gardens, beyond which again were several large topes, some cultivated ground, and another village surrounded by gardens and trees. On the right of the British position were hills and villages, and between these and the rising ground in front already referred to was an extensive plateau, covered here and there with acres of uncut corn. Beyond it, again, the city of Mandesar.* A reconnaissance having indicated that all was quiet in front, the camp was pitched and the men went to their breakfasts.

Durand
approaches
Mandesar.

Aggressive
humour of
the rebels.

But the rebels were again in an aggressive humour. Rumours had been industriously spread in their ranks that the British force had been repulsed from Dhár, and, in sheer desperation, was now meditating an attack on Mandesar. The leaders knew better, but they used all their efforts to give currency to the story. Consequently, about mid-day on the 22nd, the rebels, confident that they had before them only a dispirited and beaten column, sallied forth from Mandesar, and, marching gaily, took possession of a village surrounded by trees and gardens beyond the extreme left of the British line, and, making that village their extreme right, occupied, with two considerable masses, the plateau connecting it with Mandesar.

They
threaten the
British force,

The men in the British camp were at their breakfasts when the news of the rebel movement reached them. Instantly they fell in, and the line formed; the dragoons on the extreme right, the Nizám's horse on the extreme left, Hungerford's and Woolcombe's batteries forming the right-centre, the bullock battery of the Haidarábád the left centre, the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry the centre, and the Haidarábád infantry with the Madras Sappers on the left of the Haidarábád guns, opposite the village occupied by the rebels. The British guns at once opened fire; and Woolcombe's guns, pointed by Lieutenant Strutt, to be again mentioned in these pages, firing very

which turns
out to re-
ceive them,

true,* the rebels wavered. An advance of the Haidarábád troops converted their wavering into flight. The cavalry then pursued and cut up a number of them. The remainder escaped into the city.

and beats
them.

The next day, the 22nd, Durand crossed to the right bank of the Mandesar river, and encamped to the west of the town within two thousand yards of the suburbs. His object was to gain a position whence he could threaten Mandesar with one hand, and the rebel force which had occupied Nímach,† and which, he had learned from spies, was now hastening to the aid of their comrades, on the other. A cavalry reconnaissance showed the Nímach rebels to be in considerable force in the village of Gorariá on the high road to that place.

Durand inter-
poses be-
tween the
Mandesar
and Nímach
rebels.

In that direction, then, Durand moved on the 24th. After a march of three miles, he espied the rebels about a mile distant, their right resting on the village, their centre on a long hill, and their left well covered by fields of uncut grain, with broken ground and nullahs in their front, full of water and mud.

The British guns, opening on the rebels, soon overcame the fire of their five field-pieces, and forced their line to fall back. They clung, however, with great pertinacity to the village of Gorariá, and on this, retiring from the centre and left, they fell back very slowly. Whilst the British were endeavouring to drive them from this position, a strong party sallied from Mandesar and attacked their rear. The Nizám's horse and the dragoons met the assailants boldly, and, after a sharp contest, drove them back with loss. In front, however, the British could make no impression on the village. The brigadier detailed the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry to carry it with the bayonet, but the fire from it was so fierce that he countermanded the order, preferring to reduce it with his guns. When night fell the rebels still

Attacks the
latter at
Gorariá.

Desperate
conflict.

* "Lieutenant Strutt's shooting was very true. All the while this firing was going on at the village, a fine fellow, dressed in white, with a green flag, coolly walked out from the cover, and sauntered leisurely along the whole line of our guns, while round shot and shell were whizzing about him in awful proximity. He occasionally stooped down, but never attempted to run; he then quietly retraced his steps, when a shot from Lieutenant Strutt struck him just before he regained the village."—Lowe's *Central India*.

† Vol. IV. page 400.

occupied Gorariá. The British loss had been considerable, amounting to upwards of sixty officers and men killed and wounded.

At 10 o'clock next morning the 18-pounders and the 24-pounder howitzer were brought to within two hundred and fifty yards of the village, and the firing commenced. The place was shelled till it became a mere wreck; everything that could be burned in it was consumed. Still the rebels held on. At last, about mid-day, some two hundred and twenty came out and surrendered. Those that remained were Rohílahs, and they stuck to the last brick in the place. About 4 o'clock the Brigadier directed that the firing should cease: the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry then stormed the battered ruins.

Gorariá is finally carried.

The stern defence of the Rohílahs did service to their cause. Whilst the British force was dealing with them the Sháhzáda and his two thousand Afghans and Mekránís evacuated Mandesar and retreated on Nángarh. The cavalry, worn out by four days of unremitting exertion, was unable to pursue them.

The gallantry of the Rohílahs allows the Sháhzáda to escape.

Pursuit, however, was scarcely necessary. The blow struck at Gorariá was a blow from which there was no rallying. The Afgháns and Mekránís, as panic-stricken as they had been bold, fled through the country, avoiding towns and villages, and endeavouring to seek refuge in the jungles. One party of them, more daring than their fellows, suddenly appeared at Partábgarh. The loyal chief of that state, summoning his Thákurs, attacked them, killed eighty of them, and drove the rest into flight. The others seemed, above all, anxious to place the Chambal between themselves and their conqueror.

The blow struck at Gorariá is decisive.

The objects which Durand had in his mind when he set out from Máu on the 14th of October had now been accomplished. With a force extremely weak in infantry, he had crushed the rebellion on the plateau of Málwá, thus saving the line of the Narbadá, and cutting off the disaffected troops of Holkar from the supports on which they had rested. The campaign, brief as it was, had proved decisive, and had vindicated to the letter the prescience of Durand when, resisting every temptation to act otherwise, he resolved to allow Holkar's troops to rest quiet until he should

The objects of the campaign achieved.

have disposed of the Dhár rebels and the mutineers of Mandesar and Nímach.

He was now at liberty to turn his arms against Holkar's troops. This he did. Leaving the Haidarábád contingent under Major Orr at Mandesar, and constituting Major Keatinge political agent for Western Málwá, he returned by Mehidpúr and Újjén, and reached the vicinity of Indúr on the 14th of December, fully prepared to encounter the troops of the Maharájah should they offer opposition to his entrance into the city. But the spirit which had prompted the treacherous attack on the 1st of July quailed before the sight of a British force returning from victory over traitors. The Indúr troops, held in check during Durand's campaign by the Máu garrison, had been utterly disheartened by the defeat of their sympathisers at Mandesar, and were as humble as some few weeks previously they had been boastful and defiant.

Near the ground on which Durand encamped on the 14th of December he met and disarmed Holkar's regular cavalry, and placed the men under the care of the Sikh cavalry of the late Bhopál Contingent. He sent likewise to Holkar's chief minister a letter, in which he insisted that the remainder of the troops should be promptly disarmed. Should this demand not be complied with immediately, he expressed his firm resolution to disarm them himself.

The reply came that afternoon. The agent who brought it expressed the intention of the Durbar to disarm the infantry at once, and the request that whilst the operation was being carried into effect Durand would halt at a point one mile from the cavalry lines. Durand complied, and Holkar's infantry, sixteen hundred in number, were quietly disarmed that same evening.

After the disarming had been completed, Durand, accompanied by a large body of the officers of the Máu column, called upon the Maharájah in his palace in the city of Indúr. It was the first time since the month of June that Durand had seen Holkar. Regarding him in his own mind as an accessory to the attack made upon the Residency on the 1st of July, Durand had sent a report of all the circumstances of the case to Lord Canning, and, pending a reply, had declined to renew personal relations with a prince who might possibly be adjudged by the supreme British authority in India to be a rebel. But when, after the Málwá campaign,

Holkar had acquiesced in the disarming of his cavalry and infantry, and his minister had promised that a suitable punishment should be meted out to the guilty, Durand, on the eve of being relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, felt that the circumstances were not such as to warrant the omission of the ordinary courtesy required to be displayed on such an occasion. Holkar himself was anxious for the visit, and that it should be conducted with a ceremony and an ostentatious display of friendly intercourse such as would produce an impression on his people. Durand acceded. The visit went off well. Holkar was in good spirits, expressed himself delighted at the disarming of his troops, and a hope that the act would be regarded by the British Government as a proof of his loyalty. Durand quietly, but firmly, impressed upon him that something further was yet required—the punishment of the guilty, whether soldiers or citizens—and stated his confident belief that the British Government and the British people would expect that this remaining duty would be properly carried out. Holkar gave an assurance that a Commission, which he had previously appointed, would make full inquiries into the matter. The interview then terminated. The next day Durand was relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton.

prompted by
reasons of
courtesy.

Interview
between
Durand and
Holkar.

He had completed a noble task. His personal character had been the mainstay of British authority in central India. Had Durand not been there, the result had not been accomplished. This little sentence conveys to the reader more clearly than a multitude of words the vast value of his services. He was the representative of political power, and, virtually, the general; the brain and the hand, in a most important part of India. He foresaw everything, and he provided for everything. He foresaw even—his own despatches and memoirs written at the time show it most clearly—all that was to happen in the few months that were to follow; how the pacification of the North-West Provinces would increase the pressure west of the Jamnah; the action of Náná Sáhib and his nephews; the incursion of Tántiá Topí. He saw equally clearly the line that should be, and that was, followed. "If affairs at Indúr are successfully arranged," he wrote on the 12th of December, "I shall lose no time in marching the bulk of the Máu column to Sihor with the view of concentrating Sir H.

Durand's
"character
created his
career"

His great
capacity;

his foresight.

Rose's command, and enabling him to relieve Sagar, clear Bundelkhand, and advance on Jhānsi and Gwāliār." In these lines Durand foreshadowed the course which he would himself have pursued, and which Sir Hugh Rose did pursue. But it is his actual achievements which call for special commendation.

The value of
his great
achievements.

In spite of his earnest entreaties, in spite of the pressure exercised by Lord Elphinstone, Woodburn had in June chosen to waste most precious moments at Aurangābād. Had that general not delayed at that Capua, it is more than probable that the insurrection of the 1st of July would never have been attempted at Indúr. But mark the conduct of Durand after that misfortune had happened. He hastens to meet Woodburn's column, now commanded by another officer; he meets it, quickens its move-

In spite of
the incapacity and
wrong-headedness
of others,

ments, and brings it to Máu. He finds western Málwá in a state of aggressive insurrection, and the only line which had remained a barrier between the Central Provinces and Bombay—the line of the Narbadá—sorely threatened. Of all the political officers in central India he alone understands the enormous importance of that line. He finds Mr. Plowden from Nágpúr, Major Erskine from the Sagar and Narbadá territories, urging measures which would have lost it. Though pressed by many considerations to disarm Holkar's troops, he, receiving from no quarter a word of encouragement or support, risks everything to save that important line. Then what do we see? With a weak column of five hundred Europeans of all arms and eight hundred natives,* he sets out from Máu, and in five weeks takes a strong fort, fights several cavalry combats, gains

he wins back
in four
months all
that had
been lost.

three actions in the open field, takes more than forty guns, crushes the Mandesar insurrection, saves the line of the Narbadá, and, marching back to Indúr, causes the disarming of the disaffected troops of Holkar. In four months he more than counteracts the evil effected by an army of conspirators.

It was, I repeat, a noble work, nobly performed, and, like many noble works, left unrewarded. No man has been more calumniated than its author. No one more bravely fought the battle of life in face of calumny. I may add that of no man that ever

His greatness
not appreciated
by his contemporaries,

* Reinforced at Dhár by the Haidarābād troops.

lived will the career bear more acute and critical examination. Should the life of Henry Marion Durand be written with the fearlessness the occasion demands,^{*} his countrymen will realise alike the worth of the man who, at a most critical period, secured a line the loss of which would have produced incalculable evils. They will learn, too, something of the nature of the smaller beings who aided in the attempt to calumniate, to insult, and to depreciate him. They will learn that it is not always the truly great man who occupies the most conspicuous position in the eyes of his contemporaries!

who were
also rivals,
though far
below him.

Many officers distinguished themselves in this campaign. One of these, who for his daring, his gallantry, and his brain power was especially noticed by Colonel Durand, requires mention here. "Much of the success in quelling this insurrection," wrote Durand to Lord Canning at the end of November 1857, "is due to the judicious daring, the thorough gallantry with which, whenever opportunity offered, Major Gall, his officers and men, sought close conflict with the enemy—a bold one, who often fought most desperately. I feel it a duty to Major Gall and H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons, men and officers, thus especially to beg your Lordship's influence in favour of officers and men who have merited, by conspicuous valour, everything that Her Majesty's Government may be pleased to confer. They deserve most highly." Durand also noticed with marked commendation the splendid services of Major Orr, Captain Abbott, and the officers and men of the Haidarábád Contingent and of the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. This regiment boasted a commanding officer, Major, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel, Robertson, than whom no one rendered better service to the State. Captain Woolcombe, Lieutenants Strutt and Christie, of the Bombay Artillery, the last-named of whom was shot by a bullet in the region of the heart, † also greatly distinguished themselves. But there were many others in the same category. The list is too long.

Some of the
men who
served under
him.

* This was written in 1879. The life has subsequently been written by his son.

† Captain Christie recovered from the wound, took part in the subsequent campaign, and was killed by a tiger some years afterwards.

CHAPTER III.

THE SÁGAR AND NARBADÁ TERRITORIES, AND NAGPUR.

THE territories known as the Ságár and Narbadá territories formed an extensive tract, bounded on the north by the British districts of Bandah, Allahábád, and Mírzápúr; on the south by Nágpúr and the dominions of the Nizám; on the west by Gwáliár and Bhopál. Within these boundaries is comprehended the state of Rewah, whose Rájah recognised the overlordship of the British. The other native feudatories, the feudatories of Kótí, Maihír, Uchahará, and Soháwal, held their lands under grants from the East India Company. Within the limits of those lands, however, they exercised a ruling authority, subject to the interference, when necessary, of the paramount power. The larger portion of the Ságár and Narbadá territories were directly British. This portion comprised the districts of Ságár, Jabalpúr, Hoshangábád, Sióní, Damoh, Narsinhpúr, Betúl, Jhánsi, Chanderi, Nagod, and Mandlah.

When, in 1843, the Gwáliár Durbar commenced those hostilities against the British which culminated in the battle of Maharájpúr, the chiefs and people of the Ságár and Narbadá territories, then ruled by Mr. Fraser, C.B., as Agent to the Governor-General, broke out into open rebellion. This rebellion was due partly to the great dislike felt by the people to the civil courts, and more particularly to the mode in which they were administered, and partly to the propaganda of the Gwáliár Durbar. When, however, the pride of that Durbar had been lowered by the battle of Maharájpúr, peace was restored to the Ságár and Narbadá territories. Lord Ellenborough, who, throughout his Indian career, always displayed a marked detestation of proved

Sketch of the
later history
of those
territories.

abuses, inaugurated the newly gained peace by making a clean sweep of the British officials serving in the territories, and by sending one of the ablest officers in the Indian services, the late Colonel Sleeman, to administer them on a new basis. Colonel Sleeman succeeded in pacifying the chiefs and in contenting the people. When, after a rule of two of three years, he was promoted to be Resident at Lakhnao, he handed over the territories to his successor, Mr. Bushby, in perfect order. Mr. Bushby's administration for five or six years was characterised by ability and good judgment; but when, at the close of that period, he was promoted to the Residency of Haidarábád, the Ságár and Narbadá territories were joined to the North-West Provinces, then ruled by Mr. Colvin, Major Erskine^{*} receiving the appointment of Commissioner of Jabalpúr, and becoming Mr. Colvin's representative in the territories. Subordinate to Major Erskine were, amongst others, Captain Skene, Commissioner of Jhánsi, and Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Narsinhpúr.

With their transfer to the North-West Provinces, the Ságár and Narbadá territories came under the Sadr Board of Revenue. In accordance with its traditions, that venerable Board at once proposed changes in the administration so startling that, if carried out, they would inevitably have caused a violent rebellion. Before finally deciding in favour of the proposed changes, Mr. Colvin had the good sense to ask the opinion of the officer who had served longest in the territories, a man of remarkable sense and strength of character, Captain A. H. Ternan. Captain Ternan replied by pointing out the inapplicability of the rules of the Sadr Board of Revenue to the needs of the province, and the certain consequence which would follow any attempt to enforce them. Mr. Colvin, struck by Captain Ternan's representations, withdrew nearly the whole of the proposed changes. It is to be regretted that he did not withdraw the whole, for the few that he allowed, relating chiefly to the subdivision of properties, roused a very bad feeling, and led to many agrarian outrages.

They fall under the rule of the Ágra Board of Revenue,

which proposes revolutionary changes.

On Captain Ternan's representation many of these are modified.

Such was the state of the territories in 1855. The temper of

* Afterwards Earl of Kellie.

the people, kindled by the cause I have mentioned, had not wholly subsided into its normal conditions of contentment. The outbreak in the North-West Provinces came inopportunately to inflame it still more.

Sufficient remains to
sour the temper of the
people.

The small station of Narsinhpúr on the Singrí, sixty miles to the west of Ságár, was garrisoned at the outbreak of the mutiny by four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Captain Woolley, an excellent officer. The Deputy Commissioner of the district, Captain Ternan, to whose calm and cool judgment I have already referred, had his headquarters also at Narsinhpúr. The district of which this town was the capital was largely inhabited by petty chiefs, who had gone into rebellion in 1843, and who had never submitted willingly to British jurisdiction. So early as December 1856 there were not wanting indications that some great event was looming before the eyes of these men, but no European could venture an opinion as to the form that event would take. It happened, however, that one evening, in January 1857, Captain Ternan was sitting outside his tent, smoking a cigar, when the Kotwál of the village came running to him, bearing in his hand some small chapátis or cakes of unleavened bread. On reaching Ternan, the Kotwál, out of breath and panting, stated that the cakes were the remnant of a large quantity he had received that morning, with instructions to leave them with the watchmen of every village to be kept till called for; that he had so distributed them in the neighbouring villages, and that those which he held in his hand constituted the surplus. "What," he asked Ternan, "was he to do with them?"

His first ex-
perience of
the chapátis
in circulation.

Ternan, naturally shrewd, and that natural shrewdness sharpened by the experience of the rebellion of 1842-43, at once divined the truth. In those small unleavened cakes he saw the fiery cross sent through the land to unsettle the minds of the great mass of the people; that, distributed broadcast as the Kotwál had distributed them in his district, they would indicate a sudden danger that might come at any moment upon the people, threatening their caste and

Ternan
divines the
mystery,

and reports
his views to
Major
Erskine.

* A Kotwál is generally a chief officer of police.

undermining their religion. He at once embodied these ideas in a report, which he transmitted forthwith to his official superior, Major Erskine.

Major Erskine was an officer who had written a book entitled "Forms and Tables for the Use of the Bengal Native Infantry." That book was a reflex of his mind. His mind was a mind "of forms and tables."

Major
Erskine

His mental vision commanded the line of strict and formal routine. Out of that line he saw nothing, he was incapable of seeing anything. When, therefore, he received Ternan's report and read the conclusions drawn by that officer regarding the unleavened cakes, he ridiculed them; he considered the idea far-fetched, absurd, impossible. He wrote back to Ternan to that effect, adding that it was simply a case of "a dyer's vat having gone wrong," and that the owner of the vat was propitiating the gods by the distribution of cakes.

utterly
declines
Ternan's
view.

Subsequent events made it abundantly evident that Erskine was wrong and Ternan was right. Distributed broadly over the North-West Provinces and in Oudh, in the earlier months of 1857, these cakes were the harbingers of the coming storm. It is certain now that they originated in the brain of the Oudh conspirators, of the men made conspirators by the annexation of their country, and they were sent to every village for the very object divined by Ternan—the object of unsettling men's minds of preparing them for the unforeseen, of making them impressionable, easy to receive the ideas the conspirators wished to promulgate.

Ternan's
prescience
is justified
by events.

I may record here a decision of the Government promulgated in the same district a year or two prior to 1857, and of the remarkable consequence it produced after the mutiny had broken out, as illustrative of the influence which an able and conscientious English officer can almost always bring to bear upon native chiefs. One of the most influential chieftains in the territories under Captain Ternan's supervision was the Rájah of Dilhéri, the feudal lord of all the Gónd clans. This chief had ever been loyal. For his fidelity and good conduct in the trying times of 1842–43, the Government had presented him with a gold medal. Like many of the Gónd tribe, he had been somewhat too profuse in his expenditure and had incurred debts; but, by exercising a strict economy,

The Rájah
of Dilhéri

he had paid off those debts. Such was his condition in 1855, shortly after the Sagar and Narbadá territories had been brought under the government of the North-West Provinces. It had been a principle of that government, since the time when it was administered by Mr. Thomason, to discourage large landowners.

falls under
the displea-
sure of the
Board of
Revenue,

One morning in that year Captain Ternan received instructions, emanating from Ágra, desiring him to inform the Rájah of Dilhéri that, inasmuch as he was unfit to hold the title of Rájah and had proved himself incapable of managing his estates

and is de-
prived of his
title and
estates.

he was deprived of both; that his title was abolished, and that his property would be distributed among his tenants, he receiving a percentage from the rents! When this decision was most unwillingly announced to the Rájah by Captain Ternan, the old man drew

He feels the
insult
bitterly;

his medal from the belt in which it was habitually carried, and requested the English officer to return it to those who had bestowed it, as they were now about to disgrace him before his clan and before the whole

district. With great difficulty Ternan pacified him. It

but, despite
Ternan's re-
monstrances,
the decision
is persisted
in.

was generally expected that he would break out into rebellion. He might well have done so, for every member of the clan felt insulted in his person. Ternan, fearing an outbreak, pressed on the Government the mistake they had committed and urged them to rectify it. But the Government

would not listen. The order was carried out. Ternan did all in his power to save the family from ruin; but even he could do little.

Before the mutiny broke out in May 1857, the old man had

When the
mutiny
breaks out,
his grandson
and his
clansmen

died; his son, too, had died. The next heir took the title—for, however the Government might order, the representative of the family was always Rájah to the people. Then came the mutiny of May 1857. The Narsinhpúr district felt its shock. Muhammadans from across the border invaded the district and pillaged the villages. The outlook became every

day more gloomy. "Save yourselves while there is yet time," said the loyal officials to Ternan. But Ternan stayed. One morning, however, early in June, his house was surrounded by a considerable body of armed men, with lighted matchlocks. Ternan saw at a glance that they all belonged to the Dilhéri

clan. He at once summoned the chief and asked him what had brought him and his clansmen in such numbers and in so warlike a garb. The chief replied that he would answer if he and the other chiefs were allowed a private audience with their interlocutor. Ternan admitted them into his drawing-room. The chief replied: "You behaved kindly to us and fought our battle when the title and estate were confiscated, and you were abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are rife, and we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you as you stuck by us. What do you wish us to do?"

Ternan thanked them, accepted their offer, assured them they should be no losers by their conduct, and promised to do his utmost to see justice done them. The members of the clan remained loyal throughout the trying events of 1857-58, resisted the urgent solicitations made to them to join the rebels, and, what was of equal importance, they induced other clans to join them in rendering most valuable service to the British cause.

offer their services to Ternan, and continue loyal under every change of fortune.

I turn now to the part of the territories the chief centres in which were more purely military stations.

There were three military stations in the Ságar and Narbadá territories—the stations of Ságar, Jabalpúr, and Hoshangábád. Ságar was garrisoned by the 31st and 42nd Bengal Native Infantry, the 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry, and sixty-eight European gunners; Jabalpúr by the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, and Hoshangábád by the 28th Madras Native Infantry. The commandant of the Ságar district force was Brigadier Sage, who had his headquarters at Ságar.

Garrisons of the Ságar and Narbadá territories.

Neither the news of the mutiny at Miráth nor the tidings of the nearer and more horrible events of Jhánsí,* affected, according to all appearance, the demeanour of the native troops at Ságar. Indeed, so conspicuous was their good conduct, that, early in June, Brigadier Sage, not trusting them, yet unwilling to openly display an opposite feeling, did not hesitate to send a detachment, consisting of five hundred infantry, a hundred and twenty-five cavalry, and two 9-pounders, against a Rájah who had rebelled, promising them a reward of six thousand rupees for the capture

Brigadier Sage at Ságar.

* Vol. III. page 126.

of the said Rajah, dead or alive. A few days later, however, the brigadier had reason to feel that the policy of concealing distrust was not likely to answer better in Sagar than in the places where it had been already tried and failed. The station of Sagar was laid out in a manner which rendered it difficult for a commander with only sixty-eight European soldiers at his disposal, to exercise a general supervision over every part of it. At one end of it were the fort, the magazine, and the battering train. At the other end, distant from it three miles and a quarter, was a commanding position known as the artillery hill. Both these points could not be retained. The artillery hill, though in many respects important as a position, wanted water and storing-room for provisions. There was no question, then, in the brigadier's mind, as to the position which should be abandoned. Yet he laboured under this great difficulty, that the Sipáhis guarded the fort and the treasury, and they took care to let it be surmised that they would yield neither the one nor the other. In a word, the station seemed to be at their mercy.

Affairs were in this position when, on the 13th of June, Brigadier Sage received an application for assistance in guns from Lálitpúr, a station in the Jhánsí territory, though bordering upon that of Sagar, garrisoned by three hundred men of the 6th Infantry of the Gwáliar Contingent. The brigadier promptly despatched two 9-pounders, escorted by one company of the 31st Native Infantry, one of the 42nd, and seventy-five troopers of the 3rd Irregulars. The detachment never reached Lálitpúr. The very evening before it left Sagar, the three companies of the Gwáliar regiment at that station had broken out into mutiny, had plundered the treasury, and had driven the European officers* to flee for protection to the Rájah of Bápúr, who, under the pretence of being a friend, had been for some days in the vicinity of Lálitpúr, exciting the Sipáhis to mutiny.

For a moment I follow the action of this Rájah. Finding that the rebel Sipáhis had taken possession of the Lálitpúr treasury, and were marching off with its contents, he attacked them, and was repulsed.

* Captain Sale, commanding; Lieutenant Irwin, second in command, his wife and two children; Dr. O'Brien, and Lieutenant Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Chandérf. They were made over to the Rájah of Sháhgarh, by whom they were kindly treated. Ultimately they were all released.

Thus baffled, he sent off his European guests to the fort of Tehrí, there to be confined, and then marched in haste to meet the detachment coming from Ságar, with the view of inducing the Sipáhis composing it to join him.

Major Gaussen, commanding that detachment, had reached Málthon, forty miles from Ságar, when he heard of the mutiny at Lálitpúr and of the movement of the Bápúr Rájah. He at once halted and wrote for reinforcements. Sage replied promptly by sending four hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry. The night previous to the day on which those men were ordered to set out, great commotion reigned in Ságar, and it seemed as though mutiny might break out at any moment. The danger passed, however. Brigadier Sage, though urged by many of those about him to put an end to the terrible suspense by striking a blow with the few Europeans under his orders, remained impassive. He had resolved to act only when the Sipáhis should commit themselves unmistakably to revolt.

Major Gaussen with a detachment from Ságar reaches Málthon.

The detachment marched the following morning, the 19th of June, and joined Major Gaussen on the 23rd.

Gaussen then marched with his whole force against the fort of Bálábét, held by the rebels, stormed it,* and took sixteen of the garrison prisoners. The Sipáhi stormers promised these men their lives, and two days later, on the return of the detachment to Málthon, they insisted on their release. Major Gaussen being powerless to refuse the demand, they released the prisoners, and made them over to the Bápúr Rájah. No sooner had this act been accomplished than that Rájah entered the British camp, and openly offered the Sipáhis a monthly pay of twelve rupees if they would leave their officers and go over to him with their arms and ammunition! The Sipáhis agreed, dismissed their officers, and joined the Rájah.

His men revolt.

The information brought by the returning officers to Ságar decided Sage to act promptly. He saw that, if he were to wait till the rebel Rájah should march on Ságar, he and his sixty-eight men would be surrounded and lost. Accordingly he at once, and in the most judicious manner, began his operations. He first moved the contents of the treasury into the fort; to the same

Sage prepares for a decisive movement.

* In blowing open the gate, Ensign Spens of the 31st was accidentally killed Lieutenant Willoughby of the artillery was wounded.

place he next conveyed the contents of the expense magazine and the artillery magazine; and, last of all, he removed thither the women, the children, and the baggage of the European artillery. As soon as this had been accomplished, he took a guard of Europeans and relieved the Sipáhi guard at the fort gate. Thus, by a few decisive strokes, the one following the other with rapidity, Sage gained a place of refuge, secured the contents of the magazine, and saved the treasure.

The second day after, the morning of the 30th of June, whilst the ordinary grand guard-mounting was progressing, Sage marched the Europeans and sixty cavalry, who remained loyal, into the fort. He then sent for all the native officers, and, frankly telling them the reason of his action, added that they had suffered acts of mutiny to take place without opposing them, and had forfeited their character; that there was yet one method open to them of regaining it, and that was to have the leading mutineers seized and delivered up to justice. The native officers of the three regiments, apparently very much affected, promised everything. The next morning, however, the 3rd Irregulars and the 42nd Native Infantry broke into open mutiny and plundered the bazaars and the bungalows of the officers. The 31st held aloof, professing loyalty; and on the 7th of July, one of their men having killed a trooper who had fired at him, a desperate fight ensued between the two native infantry regiments. The 31st, being unable to make much impression on the 42nd, who had two guns, sent into the fort to implore assistance. Sage despatched to their aid the sixty loyal troopers. A good deal of fighting then ensued, but, in the midst of it, forty of the 31st deserted to the 42nd. Still the bulk of the loyal regiment persevered, and, when evening fell, they sent again to the fort to implore assistance in guns. Sage replied that it was too late to send them that night, but in the morning he would bring them victory. The disclosure of this message to the two belligerent parties fixed the 31st in their loyal resolves, whilst it so dispirited their opponents that during the night they fled, pursued for some miles by the loyal Sipáhis and troopers, who captured one of the guns. When the victors returned, it was ascertained that

He reasons
with the
native
officers.

The 3rd
Irregulars
and the 42nd
Native In-
fantry break
out into
mutiny: the
31st Native
Infantry
remains
staunch.

Battle
between the
loyal and dis-
loyal Sipáhis.

Final victory
of the loyal
natives.

whilst the entire 31st, the forty above alluded to excepted, had remained loyal, fifty of the 42nd had followed their example, and the sixty loyal troopers had been joined by at least an equal number of the same temper from out-stations.

The brigadier now devoted himself to strengthening the mud fort. He had supplies and medical stores for six months, and a sufficiency of guns and ammunition. The able-bodied men of the Christian community were gradually drilled, and, as they numbered nearly sixty, Sage soon had at his disposal a force of a hundred and twenty-three fighting men. The number was not at all too large, for the duties were heavy; there were a hundred and ninety women and children to be guarded, and occasionally parties of Bundéla rebels, into whose hands the surrounding country had fallen, made known their presence by a sudden volley. They invariably, however, disappeared in the jungles on the first appearance of pursuit.

Life in the
Ságar fort.

The districts—in close vicinity to each other—of Jabalpúr, of Ságar, of Chandéri, of Jhánsí, and of Jaláun, continued, from this time until the arrival of the relieving force under Sir Hugh Rose, to be over-run by rebels, Sipáhi and other. These harried the country, captured forts, plundered villages, for a long time with impunity. Before I narrate the manner in which they were ultimately dealt with, it will, I think, be advisable to clear the ground by recording the events passing at the other stations in this part of India.

The districts
held by the
natives.

Of Lálitpúr I have spoken. Jabalpúr, a hundred and eleven miles south-east from Ságar, has next to be noticed.

This station was, in 1857, garrisoned by the 52nd Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jamieson. It was the head-quarters likewise of Major Erskine, the chief political officer in the Ságar and Narbadá territories. For a few weeks after the news of the mutiny at Míráth had reached Jabalpúr the men of the 52nd showed no sign of disaffection, but it soon became clear that they, too, were only watching their opportunity. On the 16th of June one of the men attempted to murder the adjutant; and, though the man in question was subsequently released on the ground of insanity, the conduct of his comrades a little later proved that there had been method in his madness. They assumed the usual airs of authority, treated

Jabalpúr.

Pubious con-
duct of the
52nd Native
Infantry.

their officers with patronising familiarity, and declared that they would only mutiny if a European regiment were sent to disarm them. The folly of retaining the ladies and children at the station—a folly which had been pointed out to Major Erskine, but upon which he had insisted—became then apparent.

The news that a native brigade was advancing on Jabalpúr from Kámthí would appear to have produced a good effect on the men of the 52nd, for in the interval between the period I have referred to and the arrival of the brigade, 2nd of August, they were usefully employed by Major Erskine in repressing disturbances in the district. The Kámthí movable column—for it was no

For a time
they do good
work in the
district.

The Kámthí
column
arrives.

more—consisted of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry under Captain Tottenham, the 33rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Millar commanding the column, a battery of Field Artillery under Captain Jones, and one company Rifles of the Nágpúr Irregular Force, under Lieutenant Pereira. This column marched into Jabalpúr on the 2nd of August. After a halt there of a few days, the larger portion of it was sent into the neighbouring districts to restore order. During its absence an old Rájah of the Gónd dynasty, Shankar Sháh, his son, and some adherents of his house were convicted, on the clearest evidence, of plotting the destruction of the English at Jabalpúr, and the plunder of the station. On the 18th of September the father and son were blown away from guns, the adherents being reserved for the following day. But little doubt was entertained that the incriminated Rájah and the incriminated son had made many efforts to seduce the men of the 52nd from their allegiance.

Rájah Shan-
kar Shah
and his
son mutiny
and are
punished.

To allay, then, the excitement which, it was apprehended, their execution might create in the minds of the rank and file, Colonel Jamieson and other officers of the regiment proceeded almost immediately to the lines, and explained to the men that the Rájah and his son had merely paid the penalty for proved misconduct. They judged, from the manner of the men, that they had removed all apprehensions from their minds. At 9 o'clock that night, however, the entire 52nd regiment marched quietly out of the station, without noise or alarm, and proceeded some twenty miles without a halt to the Tahsildári of Patan. At that place

The 52nd
Native
Infantry
mutiny,

was stationed a company of their own regiment commanded by Lieutenant MacGregor. MacGregor, who naturally had no intimation of the proceedings of the regiment, was surprised, and at once placed in confinement under sentries. The Sipáhis then sent in to their colonel a letter, most respectfully worded, in which they announced their intention of marching to Dehli, and offered to release MacGregor in exchange for ten Sipáhis left behind in Jabalpúr. This offer not having been complied with, the rebels kept their prisoner till they were attacked, and then shot him.*

and kill one
of their
officers.

But, long before the commission of this atrocity, information of the high-handed action of the 52nd Native Infantry, and orders to return to Jabalpúr, had been conveyed to the Madras column in the district. That column, consisting of four hundred men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, the rifle company of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, one troop of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, and four guns, manned by European gunners, happened to be at Damoh, sixty-five miles to the north-west of Jabalpúr. It started at once, on the 21st of September. On the night of the 25th it encamped at Sangrámpúr, about twenty-five miles from its destination. Between this place and Jabalpúr, close to a village called Katangi, flows a navigable river, the Hiran, the passage across which, it was thought possible, might be disputed by the 52nd. To secure the means of crossing it, a party, consisting of the grenadier company 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Watson, and a few troopers of the 4th, under Major Jenkins, left the camp at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 26th. At daybreak, as they were nearing Katanji, Jenkins and Watson, who were riding in front of their column, were suddenly fired at, and almost immediately surrounded. How they escaped it is difficult to imagine. It is, however, a fact, that notwithstanding all the efforts made by the Sipáhis, they fought their way through them and reached their men. These were

A Madras
column
marches
against the
52nd Native
Infantry.

An advanced
party meets
them,

fights its way
through
them,

* MacGregor's body was found by the officers of the Madras column with one ball through the neck, both arms broken, and his body perforated with thirty or forty bayonet wounds. Major Erskine had previously offered eight thousand rupees for his release.

not numerous enough to take the aggressive. Jenkins, therefore, drew them up on a hill difficult to and waits for the main body, escalade, and there awaited the arrival of the main column.

To this column, on the point of starting about 6 o'clock in the morning, information arrived, in an exaggerated form, of the events at Katangí. The two European officers were reported killed, and the rebels were said to be pressing on in force. Eager to avenge their officers and relieve their comrades, the gallant native soldiers of the coast army hurried forward. On reaching the mouth of the gorge leading to Katangí, they found the 52nd had taken up a very strong position, both flanks covered by thick jungle. Without hesitating, they opened fire from the guns, and then attacked the rebels with the bayonet and drove them before them. On reaching Katangí, which totally defeats the rebels, they were joined by Jenkins and Watson. The pursuit was continued beyond that place. In Katangí the body of MacGregor, murdered that morning, was found. The rebels suffered severely. A hundred and twenty-five dead were actually counted on the field, and it is certain that many more were wounded. On the side of the victors one man was killed and fifty were wounded. The column then returned to Jabalpúr.

This was not by any means the only skirmish which took place in the Ságár and Narbadá territories during the autumn of 1857. In my story of the transactions at Ságár, I have alluded to the conduct of the Bápúr Rájah. This rebel chief, still hoping to gain greatly by the downfall of the British, had, after a great deal of promiscuous plundering, taken up a position at Niráulí, about nine miles from Ságár, and had strongly intrenched it. Against this position a force was sent from the Ságár fort on the 15th of September, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalyell, 42nd Native Infantry. The expedition was not successful; for, though the rebels suffered severely from the fire of the British guns, Colonel Dalyell was killed and the loss of the attacking party in killed and wounded was very severe. The intrenchment was not stormed.

This affair did not increase the chances of the restoration of order. The remnant of the 52nd Native Infantry, numbering

some five hundred and thirty men, continued, after its defeat at Katangí, to ravage the country. Joining the adherents of rebel Rájahs, these men took advantage of the withdrawal of the Madras column from Damoh to plunder that place and to release the prisoners left there. They then took possession of a strong fort, about thirty miles from Ságar, called Garhákótá, situated on a tongue of land in an angle formed by the rivers Sonár and Gadhairí, and from this they constantly sallied forth to plunder and destroy. In fact, as the year drew to a close, in spite of the fall of Dehlí, the daring of the rebels increased, whilst the handful of British, shut up in the stations at long distances from each other, and powerless to interfere effectually, could do little more than hold their own. Several skirmishes, indeed, occurred, but with no decisive result. In one of those, early in November, near Jabalpúr, the Madras troops defeated the enemy, but their commander, Captain Tottenham, was killed. In others, the defeat of the rebels merely signified a disappearance from one jungle to appear immediately in another.

The country
is still
ravaged by
the rebels.

In preceding pages of this chapter I have alluded to the conduct of Captain Ternan in the Narsinhpúr district. I must devote a few lines to the military operations in that quarter. The garrison of Narsinhpúr consisted of four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry under Captain Woolley. These Sipáhis, unlike the bulk of their brethren in Bengal, continued throughout the period of 1857-58 loyal and true. In November 1857, led by Woolley and accompanied by Ternan, they restored order in the disturbed parts of the district, co-operating for that purpose with a detachment sent from Ságar under Captain Roberts of the 31st Bengal N.I. and Captain Mayne of the 3rd irregular cavalry. Its action was most successful. The districts north of the Narbadá were cleared of rebels; and, in a hand-to-hand encounter with the largest body of them, the rebel leader, Ganjan Singh, a landowner of considerable consequence, was slain, and nearly all his followers were destroyed. Ternan, who had his horse shot under him in this encounter, then urged a rapid march upon Singhpúr, a place held by a noted rebel called Dalganjan.*

Military
operations in
the Narsinh-
púr district.

Woolley.

Ternan.

Roberts.

Mayne.

* The following is the official report of this gallant operation: "On this occasion Captain Ternan took a party of the Irregular Cavalry (some of the

His advice was followed, and Dalganjan was taken and hanged. The following month another fatal blow was dealt to the insurgents near Chínápúr. When Woolley reached this place it was found evacuated. Ternan, however, pushing on a small party in search of the rebels, succeeded in surprising them, and capturing their tents, a 4-pounder gun, and many native weapons. This enterprising officer followed up the blow in January 1858 by completely defeating the invading rebels from Rátgarh and Bhopál at Madanpúr. By this vigorous stroke Ternan finally cleared Narsinhpúr district of all rebels of consequence.

Before describing the measures ultimately taken to reassert British authority throughout this part of India, it is necessary that I should take the reader for a moment to Nagód.

Nagód is a military station, in the Uchahárá district, distant forty-eight miles from Réwah, a hundred and eighty from Allahábád, and forty-three miles from Ságár. The garrison in 1857 consisted of the 50th Bengal N.I., commanded by Major Hampton. Up to the 27th of August this regiment had displayed no mutinous symptoms, and the men were regarded by their officers as staunch and loyal. It happened, however, that at the time that the 52nd Native Infantry decamped from Jabalpúr in the manner already described, a rumour reached Nagód that Kúnwar Singh was marching on that place. The men of the 50th were accordingly ordered to prepare to march against that warrior. They appeared delighted at the order, made all the necessary preparations with alacrity, and on the date above mentioned marched. They had not, however, reached the second milestone from Nagód when a voice from the ranks gave the order to halt. The regiment halted. Some of the men then told the officers that their services were no longer

3rd Irregular Cavalry, known as Taits' Horse, who had remained loyal) in advance of the rest of the troops, and, coming on Ganjan Singh"—of Singhpúr, also called Dalganjan Singh—"surrounded by about two hundred armed followers, charged him at once under a sharp fire. The success of the troops was most complete. Captain Ternan behaved with much distinction, and his horse was shot under him." Not a few days afterwards, as Erskine says, but then and there, being completely surrounded, Ganjan Singh and his chief followers were taken prisoners, and the chief himself and several others hanged the next day. Most of the rebels were killed during the action, however

required, and that they had better go. Opposition was useless. A few faithful men escorted the officers and their families to Mírzápúr, whilst the remainder, returning to Nagód, plundered and burned the place, and then inaugurated in the district a career similar to that of their brethren of the 52nd.

but they
mutiny,
and ravage
the district.

Réwah, I have already stated, is a small native state, ruled by a quasi-independent Rájah, recognising the suzerainty of the British, bound to them by treaties, and having a British Resident at his court. In 1857 the resident political agent was Lieutenant Willoughby Osborne, an officer of the Madras army, possessing great strength of will, a courage that never faltered, and resolute to do his duty to the utmost. Left unfettered, Willoughby Osborne almost always did the right thing; but, like many other men conscious of their powers, he writhed under the sway of self-appreciative mediocrity. Happily, at Réwah, he was unfettered.

Réwah.

Willoughby
Osborne.

The town of Réwah lies little more than midway between Allahábád and Ságar, being a hundred and thirty-one miles south-west of the former, and one hundred and eighty-two miles north-east of the latter. It is built on the banks of a small river, the Beher, a tributary of the Tons.* Around it runs a high and thick rampart, still nearly entire, flanked by towers, many of which have fallen into decay. Within this outer defence a similar rampart immediately environs the town; and still further inward a third surrounds the residence of the Rájah. It is a decaying place, and the population in 1857 scarcely exceeded six thousand.

Description
of the town
of Réwah.

The residence of a Rájah whose ancestors had been proud of their independence, surrounded by districts in which mutiny was rampant, lying many miles from the route of the British armies between Calcutta and the North-West, Réwah, in June and July of 1857, seemed utterly lost. Not, however, to Willoughby Osborne. The first point to which that able officer directed his efforts was to win the Rájah. His character had, indeed,

Glance at the
political
situation of
Réwah.

* *Vide* list of places at the commencement of this volume. Of the three rivers known as the "Tons," that here mentioned is the South-Western Tons, which rises in the state of Maihar.

already gained the respect and admiration of the prince, but in such times as were then upon them it became necessary that the princes of India, especially the small Rájahs, should feel that they had everything to lose, nothing to gain, by the success of the mutineers. Osborne succeeded in instilling that feeling into the mind of the Rájah. On the 8th of June he was able to announce that the Rájah of Réwah had placed his troops at the disposal of the Government of India; that the offer had been accepted; and that eight hundred of those troops, with two guns, had been sent to Amarpatan—a place commanding the roads to Jabalpúr, Nagód, and Ságár—ready to oppose insurgents from any of those stations, and to intercept communications with the rebellious villages on the Jamnah. He despatched, about the same time, eleven hundred of the Rájah's troops and five guns to the Katrá pass, about midway to Mírzápúr, and whence a rapid advance could be made on that important commercial city, on Banáras, or on Chunár, as might be deemed advisable. A week later he obtained the Rájah's sanction to send seven hundred troops to Bandah, and he induced him to issue a proclamation promising rewards to any of his soldiers who should distinguish themselves by their gallantry and loyalty.

Tact and
judgment
displayed by
Willoughby
Osborne.

the mind

He gains the
Rájah,

and sends his
troops to
guard the
districts.

The measures taken by Willoughby Osborne had a very marked influence on affairs in Bundelkhand. There, as in the adjacent territories, the smaller chieftains, mostly men of impoverished fortunes, thought the opportunity too favourable to be lost. They, too, rose in revolt. But Osborne was incessantly on the watch. By the skilful disposition of the Rájah's troops, and by the display of an energy which never tired, he baffled all the earlier efforts of the rebels. By the exercise of similar qualities he kept open the important line of road between Mírzápúr and Jabalpúr, a necessary part of the available postal route between Calcutta and Bombay. In a few weeks he was able to take an active offensive against the insurgents. He defeated them at Kanchanpúr and Zorah, then advancing on their stronghold—Maihar—he stormed that city on the 29th of December, pushed on to Jakhání, captured that place, thus opening thirty-six miles of road in the direction of Jabalpúr.

Excellent
effect of
these mea-
sures on Bun-
delkhand.

He takes
the field
against the
insurgents,

At a date considerably later he, in the most gallant manner, captured the important fort of Bijérághúgarh. Owing solely to the indefatigable exertions of this gallant Englishman, the rebel cause not only found no footing in Bundelkhand, but it lost way in the adjacent territories.

and performs
wonders.

Nágpúr, till 1853 the capital of the Bhonslá dynasty, and since that period the chief town in the Central Provinces and the head-quarters of the Chief Commissioner, is a large straggling city, about seven miles in circumference, having in 1857 a population somewhat exceeding a hundred thousand. Close to the city, on its western side, is a hilly ridge running north and south, known as the Sítábaldí, possessing two summits, one at each extremity, the northern being the higher, the southern the larger, but both commanding the city.

Nágpúr.

Description
of its
position.

Outside of but near the city were the arsenal—containing guns, arms, ammunition, and military stores of every description—and the treasury of the province, containing a large amount of cash. To protect these and the city, the Commissioner, Mr.

George Plowden, had, of European troops, one company of Madras artillery, whose head-quarters were at Kámthí, eleven miles distant. The local

Mr. George
Plowden.

native troops at his disposal were thus stationed: at Kámthí or in Nágpúr itself, the head-quarters of the 1st infantry, the 1st Cavalry, and the artillery of the Nágpúr irregular force; at Chándá, eighty-five miles south of Nágpúr, were the 2nd Infantry, and a detachment of the 1st, of the same force; at Bhandará, forty miles to the east of Nágpúr, was another detachment of the 1st Regiment; the head-quarters and greater part of the 3rd Regiment were at

The local
troops,

Ípúr, a hundred and thirty-seven miles still further in the same direction; the remainder of that regiment was at Biláspúr on the Arpá, a town in the same division.

These, I have said, were local troops. Kámthí was likewise the head-quarters of a brigade of the Madras army. The troops stationed there in 1857 were the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, the 17th, 26th, 32nd, and 33rd Native Infantry, and the European artillery already alluded to. Brigadier H. Prior commanded the Nágpúr subsidiary force.

and those
of the regular
army at
Kámthí.

Very soon after the events of May 1857 at Miráth became known to the native population of the Central Provinces, symptoms of disloyalty began to be manifested by the troops,

especially by the cavalry portion, of the local force. In the position he occupied, ruling a large city, dependent for physical aid upon a few European gunners and five native regiments, Mr. Plowden could not afford to pass unnoticed even the symptoms of mutiny.

Still less could he afford it when all the circumstances of the intended rising, to the extent even of the signal which was to set it in action,* were, on the 13th of June, revealed

Ill-feeling
amongst the
local troops.

to him. Mr. Plowden then resolved to act, and to act promptly. He arranged with Colonel Cumberlege, who entirely trusted the men of his own regiment—the 4th Light Cavalry—that the troopers of

the local regiment should be disarmed on the 17th of June. Colonel Cumberlege performed the task with skill and tact, and without bloodshed. Mr. Plowden followed up this

Mr. Plowden
prepares for
eventualities.

blow by so strengthening the two peaks on the Sítábaldí hill, that they might serve as a refuge for the residents of Nágpúr in the event of an outbreak

in or about the city. He at the same time converted the Residency into a barrack, in which the civil and military officers should congregate during the night.

These precautions were effective. Notwithstanding serious alarms, no outbreak actually occurred. The Madras

Loyalty of
the soldiers
of the
Madras
army.

soldiers remained faithful, and, when a column comprising many of them was despatched to Jabal-púr,† the departing men were replaced by others of the same army not less loyal and true. The position

at Nágpúr was the more difficult in that the province of which it was the capital was isolated. No part of it was

Isolated
position of
Nágpúr.

used as a high road for troops. No Europeans could be spared for it from their more pressing duties of crushing the revolt in Oudh and in the North-West

Provinces. Its safety was in the hands of the Commissioner. For it he was responsible. It was his duty, with most inadequate means, to assure it. Fortunately, Mr. George Plowden, who represented the Government at Nágpúr, was a gentleman of lofty courage and imperturbable nerve. Without

* The mutiny was to have broken out on the 13th of June; the signal to have been the ascent of three fire-balloons from the city. "The confession of one of the ringleaders, caught in the act of seducing the men of the 1st local infantry, gave the first intimation of the plot.

† *Vide* page 70.

appliances, he acted as though he possessed them. Left without external resources, he regulated his conduct as though they were abundantly at his command. And he succeeded. Eventually, when the first fever-heat of mutiny had subsided, he restored their arms to the local troops. There is no truer test of a man than this capacity to meet dangers and difficulties when he is unarmed, to look them calmly in the face, to remain cool and imperturbable in their presence. If to do this thoroughly, to face disaffection boldly, and by daring self-assertion to force it to inaction, finally to submission—if this be a proof of greatness, then most assuredly Mr. George Plowden deserves to be classed amongst the great men brought to the front by the Mutiny of 1857.

Great credit
due to Mr.
George
Plowden.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZÁM.

It will clear the ground if, before I record the action of the British generals which restored order throughout central India, I deal with the events in a part of the country already slightly touched upon in the first chapter of this book, and upon the issue of which depended, to a very considerable extent, whether the rebellion would or would not extend throughout the length and breadth of southern and western India. I refer to the dominions of the Nizám.

Those dominions—called after the capital, Haidarábad, the abode of Haidar—occupy a portion of India south of the Vindhya range, and enclose about ninety-five thousand three hundred and thirty-seven square miles. Measuring from their extreme point in the north-east, they extend four hundred and seventy-five miles to the south-west, and in their widest part they give almost a similar measurement. On the north-east they are bounded by the central provinces, of which Nágpúr is the capital; on the south-west by portions of the Madras Presidency; on the west by the Bombay Presidency; and on the north-west by a portion of the same presidency, by the dominions of Sindhiá, and by the Ságar and Narbadá territories. A consideration of this proximity to so many inflammable points will convince the reader how dangerous would have proved a Haidarábád in arms; how essential it was that tranquillity should be maintained within her borders.

When the year 1857 dawned, the Nizám was Nasir-úd-dáulah. This prince died, however, on the 18th of May, and was succeeded by his son Afzúl-úd-dáulah. The minister, Sálár Jang, nephew of his predecessor,

Haidarábád.

Extent and
boundaries
of the
Nizám's
dominions.

The Nizám.

Súraj-úl-Mulk, had held the highest office in the state since the year 1853. He was a man of great ability, great intelligence, devoted to the interests of his country and his master. It was his pride to prove that the natives of India can be governed by natives, not only with justice, but with a regard to their habits and modes of thought, such as, he considered was impossible under alien rule. But, holding these opinions, he was, nevertheless, a sincere admirer of the British character; sensible of the absolute necessity of an overlordship, which, while interfering as little as possible with the internal affairs of a native state, should take from each the power to draw the sword against a neighbour. The British Resident at the Court of the Nizám in the early part of 1857 was Mr. Bushby. This able officer, however, died in February of that year. He was succeeded by Major Cuthbert Davidson, an officer of the Bengal army, who had at a previous period held the office temporarily, and who had then shown that he possessed all the qualifications necessary for discharging its duties in quiet times.

Sálar Jang.

Major
Cuthbert
Davidson.

Major Davidson took charge of the office of Resident on the 16th of April. In a very short time an opportunity offered for him to show the stuff he was made of. I have already stated that on the 18th of May the Nizám, Nasir-úd-dáulah, died. His son, Afzúl-úd-dáulah, was installed after the necessary ceremonies. But to the disaffected in Haidarábád the death of one ruler and the succession of another seemed to offer a mine of promise. The late Nizám had trusted Sálar Jang. It was quite possible that his successor might refuse his confidence to that powerful minister. At all events an attempt might be made to discover the actual lay of the situation. Accordingly, when the men of the city of Haidarábád rose on the morning of the 12th of June, they found the walls of the city covered with placards, signed or purporting to be signed by orthodox Maulavis, calling upon the faithful to enrol themselves and murder the Europeans. Major Davidson was not the last to receive the intelligence.

Tumult on
the accession
of the new
Nizám

Acting promptly and with vigour, he at once requested the general to parade his entire force in full marching order, with forty rounds of ammunition per man. This parade impressed the disaffected immensely. On the morning of the 15th a second parade, not less imposing, was ordered. At this the Resident was present, and addressed

is suppressed
by Major
Davidson,

the troops.* By that time it had become known that the influence of Sálár Jang was not less weighty with the new ruler than it had been with his predecessor. That loyal minister, on learning that a large mob had assembled near the mosque known as the Mekka mosque, and had hoisted there a green flag, sent down a corps of Arab mercenaries upon whom he could rely to disperse them. Subsequently he arrested the principal leaders of the movement, and for the moment the plague was stayed.

and by Sálár
Jang.

Bad feeling
produced on
the popula-
tion by the
news from
the north-
west.

Only, however, for the moment. The information which poured daily from the outer world into the city, often in an exaggerated form, made every day a deeper impression upon the minds of the more bigoted of the population. They argued that, whilst their co-religionists had risen for the faith in the north-west, it was not becoming in them to sit idle in the south. They recalled to the minds of listeners, likewise impressionable and fanatically disposed, that little more than half a century had elapsed since Dehli, the capital of the Muhammadan world of India, had fallen into the hands of the infidel; that a supreme effort had now recovered it, and that, if that effort were supported by the entire Muhammadan community of the Dakhan, the recovery would be made complete, the gain would become permanent. These were no idle words. They sank deep into the minds of the people of Haidarábád—a people that had never known European rule, and that had never welcomed its approach to their borders. In a few weeks they produced corresponding acts.

A little before 5 o'clock on the evening of the 17th of July, five hundred of the Rohilah troops in the service of the Nizám, supported by some four thousand of the mob of Haidarábád, rose in insurrection and marched on the Residency, demanding the release of thirteen mutineers and deserters, who, caught red-handed in revolt, had been made over by Major Davidson to Sálár Jang. That minister, who was not very well served by his agents, only heard of the outbreak just

Mutiny at
Haidar-
ábád.

mutineers

Sálár Jang
warns the
Resident

* The garrison at or near Haidarábád consisted of a battalion of artillery, the 7th Madras Light Cavalry; the 3rd Madras Europeans; the 1st, 22nd, 24th, 34th, 41st, 42nd, and 49th Native Infantry. The force, known as "The Haidarábád Subsidiary Force," was commanded by Brigadier, afterwards Sir Isaac Coffin.

on the eve of its occurrence. He at once sent a special messenger to warn the Resident. Major Davidson, however, in anticipation of some such movement, had improvised defences all round the Residency, had mounted guns on the newly-erected bastions, and had warned his military secretary, Major Briggs, to arrange the troops at his disposal in the manner best calculated to meet a sudden attack. Seven minutes then sufficed to send every man in the Residency to his post. The insurgents came on, in the manner of undisciplined fanatics, drunk with excitement, without order, and without leading, properly so called. A fire of grape from the ramparts sent them reeling back. They came on again, only similarly to be received, and similarly to retire. Staggered by this reception, they were beginning to recover from their mental intoxication, when a charge of the Nizám's troops decided them to flee in confusion. Many of them then took refuge in a two-storied house, at the end of a narrow street.

Major Davidson's previous preparations.

Repulse and defeat of the rebels,

In this place it was resolved to allow them to stay till the morning. They did not, however, avail themselves of the permission. Mining under the floor, they escaped during the night. In this attack on the Residency, several of the rebels were killed; in their flight from the Nizám's troops more were taken prisoners. Amongst the latter were the two ring-leaders, Torábáz Khán and Maulaví Alla-úd-din. The former, attempting to escape, was shot dead; the latter was tried, convicted, and transported to the Andaman Islands.

and capture of their leaders.

The manner in which this wanton attack terminated produced a very salutary effect on the minds of the Haidarábád population. It showed them very clearly that their own rulers, men of their own faith, sided with the British. It needed but one word from Sálár Jang to rouse the entire country. Not only was that word not spoken, but the fanatical Muhammadans were made clearly to understand that, in the event of their rising, they would have to deal, not with the British only, but with their own Government as well.

Good effect produced at Haidar-ábád.

Still the situation grew daily more critical. The city of Haidarábád had ever been filled with military adventurers. The custom of importing Arabs from beyond the sea, and of forming of them regiments

The situation still critical

of peculiar trust, had long prevailed. But, in addition to the Arabs, there used to come from every part of India those adventurous spirits to whom the sober administration of the British gave no avocation. From Rohilkhand, from the Panjáb, from Sindh, from Dehlí, and from the border-land beyond the Indus, men of this stamp had never been wanting. To them were added, in the autumn of 1857, adventurers more dangerous still. The mutinied and disbanded Sipáhis who had been unable to reach Dehlí, or whose offers had been rejected by Sindhiá, poured in shoals into Haidarábád. Combining with the other classes I have mentioned, and who gave them a cordial welcome, they helped to swell the ranks of the disaffected and to impart to them a discipline in which the others were lacking.

The presence of these men added not a little to the difficulties of Salar Jang and the Nizám. Every rumour of misfortunes befalling the British arms, which reached the city, roused feelings which might at any moment prelude an outbreak. If we think of all that was happening in the North-Western provinces—of the massacre of Kánhpúr, of the long siege of Dehlí, of the leaguer of Lakhnáo, of Havelock's three retirements, of the events at Ágra, at Indúr, at Jhánsí, at Bandah—we shall understand very easily why this was so. It must be remembered, too, that rumour magnified every skirmish into a battle, every repulse of the British into a catastrophe, whilst it but faintly whispered, or whispered only to discredit, the victories gained by the foreigners. When we think of the news of these disasters coming upon an inflammable people, hating, with the intolerant hate of religion, the dominant infidel, armed to the teeth, and chafing under their forced inaction, we may well wonder how peace was, by any means, preserved.

But peace was preserved—mainly owing to the excellent understanding between the Government of the Nizám and the British Resident. Whilst the former used all those arts which a powerful native government has so well at command, to check the fanatical ardour of the disaffected, the Resident, acting in concert with the Nizám, applied for a larger force of European troops to overawe the same class. In

by reason of
the numerous
adventurers

crowding
into the city.

The effect
of rumours

upon an in-
flammable
people.

Loyalty of
the Nizám.

Reinforce-
ments
arrive.

consequence of these representations Davidson received later in the year a reinforcement of a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of infantry, and some artillery.

Whilst thus securing his base, Major Davidson was not unmindful of another means for employing the trained soldiers of the Nizám—the soldiers of the Haidarábád contingent, led by English officers—in a manner which might transfer the sympathies of the great bulk of the people, from whose ranks those soldiers were drawn, to the British cause. Acting in concurrence, then, with the Nizám and Salar Jang, and with the full approval of the Government of India, he formed towards the beginning of 1858 a brigade from the regiments of the contingent, and sent it to act in central India. This brigade was composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments of cavalry, of the 3rd and 5th regiments of infantry, and of three field-batteries of artillery. The splendid deeds of these troops will be narrated in their proper place. But I will not wait to record that the other purpose which had suggested this action to Major Davidson was entirely accomplished. The successes obtained by these soldiers elated the relations they had left behind them, and these came, in a very brief period, to regard as their own the cause for which their kinsmen were fighting. From that time forward all anxiety ceased in Haidarábád itself. In some parts of the districts the disturbances which arose were eagerly quelled, and, with one exception, no chieftain of rank showed the smallest inclination to question the wisdom of the policy adopted by the Nizám and his minister.

That exception was the Rájah of Shorápúr.* Shorápúr is a small territory situated in the south-west angle of the Nizám's dominions. The Hindu chief who had ruled it had, fifteen years prior to 1857, fallen into pecuniary difficulties so great that he found himself unable to fulfil his obligations to his suzerain, the Nizám. Certain arrangements, unnecessary here to detail, followed, which ended, after the death of the Rájah, in the administration of the country falling for a time into the hands of the British. This arrangement lasted

Davidson suggests the employment of the troops of the Haidarábád contingent in central India.

Successful result of Davidson's policy.

Shorápúr.

Its condition antecedent to the mutiny.

* For a most interesting account of the Rájah of Shorápúr and the causes which led him to revolt, I refer the reader to the *Story of My Life*, by the late Colonel Meadows Taylor, one of the most charming of autobiographies.

till 1853, when the country was handed over to the native ruler in a very flourishing condition. The young Rájah, however, soon dissipated his resources; and, finally, became so embarrassed as to be utterly reckless. He was in this state of mind when the events of 1857 occurred. With the record of the disasters attending the British came whispers of the advantages which must accrue to him from a successful rebellion. The Rájah had not the strength of mind to resist the temptation. Intoxicated by the promises made him, he called together the men of his own clan, and began to levy Rohilah and Arab mercenaries.

Character
and conduct
of the Rájah
of Shorápúr;

he levies
troops.

Full intelligence of the doings of the Rájah was quickly conveyed to Major Davidson. Well aware that to prevent an outbreak even by an extravagant display of force was far wiser and far cheaper than to allow it to come to a head, Davidson at once took decisive measures. Acting in concert with Lord Elphinstone, who displayed on this occasion, as on every other, a far-sighted policy and a rare unselfishness, he called up, with the sanction of that nobleman, from the Bombay Presidency a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, consisting of a detachment of European troops, the Maráthá Horse, the 15th Bombay Native Infantry, and a battery of artillery. This force he located at a point equi-distant between the Shorápúr and the southern Maráthá country. At the same time he arranged that a force from the Madras Presidency, under Major Hughes, should watch the eastern frontier of Shorápúr, whilst he detached four hundred men and two guns of the Haidarábád contingent, commanded by Captain Wyndham, to occupy Linsúgúr, ready to act in concert with either of the other forces, as necessity might require.

Davidson
takes
decisive
measures,

and sur-
rounds the
Rájah's
country.

Before these preparations had been completed Cuthbert Davidson, hoping to save the Rájah from his own folly, despatched to his court, early in January 1858, one of his own most trusted assistants, Captain Rose Campbell. Campbell, however, only wasted his efforts. The Rájah had given himself to the fanatical party. Not only did he continue deaf to all entreaties, but he was, it is believed, prepared to connive at the murder of his guest. This, at least, is certain, that Captain Campbell received an intimation from the Rájah's

Despatches
Rose Camp-
bell to save
him,

but fruit-
lessly.

own relatives and servants that his life was in imminent danger.

It would have been fruitless to temporise further. Captain Campbell proceeded to Linsúgúr and ordered Wyndham to march on Shorápúr. Wyndham started at once and reached Shorápúr on the 7th of February. As he approached, the Rájah, as is customary in such cases, sent his own servants to indicate a proper encamping-ground. The servants led Wyndham to the place selected—a narrow valley, surrounded by lofty hills and rocks. But Wyndham, though but a captain, was too old a soldier to fall into the trap. He moved on to an open plain, where he was comparatively safe from danger of surprise.

Wyndham
moves on
Shorápúr;

sees through
and avoids
a snare laid
for him by
the Rájah.

That night Wyndham was attacked by a force composed of the clansmen of the Rájah, of Arabs and Rohilahs, estimated at from five thousand to seven thousand strong. The attack continued all night, but its result was never doubtful. Wyndham, aided by Rose Campbell and the medical officer, Dr. Williamson, barricaded the position, and with the guns kept up a continuous fire. At 1 o'clock in the morning he was reinforced by a hundred cavalry of the Haidarábád contingent. The rebels then ceased their attack, and occupied the heights near the town.

The Rájah's
troops
attack
Wyndham,

who repulses
them.

Meanwhile, expresses had been sent to Major Hughes and Colonel Malcolm. Major Hughes, with two companies 74th Highlanders and some Madras cavalry, arrived first, early on the morning of the 8th. Joining his troops to those of Wyndham, Hughes at once attacked the rebels. A squadron of the 8th Madras cavalry, commanded by Captain Newberry, led the attack, and charged a body of Rohilahs. Unfortunately, Newberry and his subaltern, Lieutenant Stewart, better mounted than their men, dashed into the middle of the rebels before their men could follow them. Newberry was killed and Stewart was severely wounded. The enemy, however, were driven from the heights above the town. The city being very strong, the approaches to it difficult of access, and the walls and bastions crowded with defenders, Hughes thought it advisable to wait for

Hughes
arrives to
the rescue,

and defeats
the rebels,

who retire
into the city.

Colonel Malcolm's force, which was expected that night, before attempting anything further.

But the Rájah did not wait for Malcolm. Dispirited by the failure of his attack on Wyndham, and aware that reinforcements were approaching, he gave up the game as precipitately as he had entered upon it, and, accompanied by a few horsemen, fled that night towards Haidarábád. Arriving there, with but two followers in his train, he made a fruitless attempt to gain the protection of the Arabs. Despairing of a refuge, he was found wandering in the bazaar, was apprehended, and taken to Salar Jang, who made him over to the Resident.

The Rájah
flies in the
night to
Haidar-
ábád,
where he
is taken
prisoner.

The departure of the Rájah led to the immediate evacuation of Shorápúr by the hostile bands. Colonel Malcolm, who arrived on the evening of the 8th, entered the town the following morning and found it almost deserted. Captain Rose Campbell assumed charge of the administration of the country.*

Malcolm
enters the
town.

So ended the only serious attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the Dakhan.† The preservation of that tranquillity was essential to the maintenance of the British power in India. There can be no question but that the rising of Haidarábád, headed by the Nizám, would have been a blow struck at the heart. The whole of western and southern India would have followed. Central India, the dominions of Holkar, and Rajpútáná could not have escaped; and it is more than probable that the communications between Calcutta and the North-West would have been severed. That this calamity did not occur is due to many causes. The far-sighted and generous policy of Lord Elphinstone did much; the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, contributed all that was possible for a man in his high position to contribute. Major

The tran-
quillity of
the Dakhan
assured in
a great
measure by

Lord El-
phinstone,
Lord Harris,
Major David-
son and the
officers acting
under his
orders,

* The story of the Rájah's end is tragical. He was sentenced to death, but the Governor-General commuted the punishment to four years' imprisonment, after which he might be restored to his territory. The very day the Rájah received this news he shot himself, Colonel Meadows Taylor thinks accidentally.—*Vide Story of My Life*, Vol. II.

† The literal meaning of the term "Dakhan" is "south." Hence the south of India is called "The Dakhan," *i.e.* "the south." It is often incorrectly spelt "Deccan," "Dekhan," "Dekkan."

Cuthbert Davidson displayed a skill, a tact, and an energy far above the average; he was well served by his subordinates: Colonel Malcolm, Major Hughes, Captain Wyndham, and their comrades executed with marked ability the tasks entrusted to them. But the efforts of these men, great and valuable as they were, would have been utterly un-
availing had the Nizám and his minister not
seconded them. For three months the fate of India
was in the hands of Afzúl-úd-dáulah and Sálár Jang. Their
wise policy proved that they preferred the certain position of a
protected state to the doubtful chances of a resuscitation of the
Dehlí monarchy under the auspices of revolte l Sipáhis.

but mainly
by the
Nizám and
Sálár Jang.

BOOK XIV.—CENTRAL INDIA, KÍRWÍ, GWÁLIÁR, AND THE
SOUTHERN MARÁTHÁ COUNTRY.



CHAPTER I.

SIR HUGH ROSE AND CENTRAL INDIA.

IN a previous chapter of this history* I stated that Colonel Durand had been appointed to act as agent for the Governor-General at Indúr in consequence of the departure of the agent, Sir Robert Hamilton, to Europe on leave. Sir Robert Hamilton, on hearing of the mutiny at Míráth, at once asked permission, though he had been but six weeks in England, to return and join his appointment. The application was granted, and Sir Robert arrived in Calcutta in August 1857.

Very soon after he had reached Calcutta, Sir Robert Hamilton was called upon by the Government to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of tranquillity in central India. There were very many reasons why it was natural that the Government should be anxious to have his views on this important subject. Sir Robert Hamilton was a very eminent public servant. He had passed the greater part of his career in high official positions in central India. Not only had he traversed every inch of that territory, but he knew the exact distances between village and village throughout it, the lay of the ground, the disposition of the people, the peculiarities which constituted either a bond or a division between the several districts. Sir Robert had trained

Sir Robert
Hamilton

mutiny at

arrives in
Calcutta.

Qualifications
of Sir R.
Hamilton to
advise the
Government
regarding
central India.

* Vol. III. page 135.

from his early youth the boy who, in 1857, ruled the possessions of his ancestors as Túkaji Ráo Holkar. The training and the connection—that between a guardian and a ward—had inspired both with similar feelings, feelings of the warmest regard. More than that—each thoroughly believed in the other. Each would have wagered the possession he most valued on the question of the loyalty of the other. Sir Robert Hamilton was not less acquainted with all the courtiers of his charge, with their character, their dispositions, the influences they exercised. He knew to a scarcely less degree every man of note in the country.

When, then, the Government of India applied to Sir Robert Hamilton to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of order in central India, they did that which it would have been in the highest degree unwise to omit. Sir Robert Hamilton responded to the call. He drew up a memorandum, which he submitted to the Governor-General. Lord Canning passed it on to Sir Colin Campbell, who was still in Calcutta.

Hamilton submits a plan for the pacification of central India to the Government

Sir Robert Hamilton's plan was as follows. He proposed that whilst one column, coming from the Bombay Presidency, should make Máu its base of operations, and sweep thence the country between that point and Kalpi on the Jamnah, reconquering Jhánsi in its course; another, coming from Madras, should form its base at Jabalpur, clear the line of communication with Allahábád and Mirzápur, and cross Bundelkhand to Bandah. Thus Kalpi and Bandah would constitute the points towards which the two columns would separately be directed.

Nature of the plan.

This plan was fully discussed between Sir Robert Hamilton, Sir Colin Campbell, and the Chief of the Staff—General Mansfield—and, in the end, was, with one slight modification in one of its details, adopted.* Sir Robert Hamilton calculated that if no delay were to occur in the formation of the several columns, the points indicated would be reached by the 1st of May, 1858.

The plan is, with one slight modification, approved of.

* The modification was immaterial. Sir R. Hamilton had suggested that the two brigades of which the Máu column would be composed should, prior to their advance on Jhánsi, effect a junction at Síprí. Sir Colin Campbell substituted Gúnah for Síprí. Gúnah is nearer to Jhánsi by seventy miles.

This plan approved, Sir Robert Hamilton proceeded to Indúr, and arrived there on the 16th of December, 1857, and not only resumed the appointment of Governor-General's Agent for central India, but took up likewise the political functions in respect of all the chiefs in the Ságár and Narbadá territories, which, till then, had been exercised by the Commissioner of those territories.

Sir Robert relieves Durand, and assumes political charge of the country to be traversed by the British forces.

The day that witnessed the return of Sir Robert Hamilton greeted likewise the arrival of the officer who had been nominated by Lord Canning to command the force which, having its base at Máu, was to work up to the southern bank of the Jamnah. That officer was Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B.* Sir Hugh Rose bore, even then, a high character for ability, decision, and firmness. Entering the army in 1820, he had early given proof of those qualities, and when, in 1840, the Government of the Queen decided to detach several British officers to serve in Syria with the view of checking the progress of the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Lieutenant-Colonel Rose proceeded thither in the capacity of Deputy Adjutant-General. Here he distinguished himself no less by his judgment than by his daring courage. In a hand-to-hand encounter with the Egyptian cavalry, in which he was wounded, Colonel Rose captured with his own hand the leader of the enemy, an exploit which procured for him a sabre of honour from the Sultan and the Order of the Nishán Iftihár set in diamonds. For his conduct in Syria, too, he was decorated with the companionship of the Bath. A little later he was nominated by Lord Palmerston Consul-General of Syria.

Character and antecedents of Sir Hugh Rose

in Egypt,

When, a few years subsequently, Russia was preparing to make her bid for the inheritance of the "sick man," Colonel Rose was nominated secretary to the embassy at Constantinople. Later on, just before the storm broke, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe proceeded to England, and Colonel Rose succeeded him as *chargé d'affaires*. Holding that office, he not only penetrated the designs of Russia, but detected that the one means by which England could foil them was to put her foot down, and say, "One step further constitutes war." Impressed with this idea, when

at Constanti-
nople,

* Afterwards Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c.

Prince Menschikoff endeavoured to impose upon the Sultan terms which would have annihilated the independence of Turkey, and the Sultan, turning to the British *chargé d'affaires*, implored him to give a material pledge of the support of England by bringing the British fleet into Turkish waters, Colonel Rose took the responsibility upon himself, and ordered the fleet, which was then lying before Malta, to Besika Bay. The fact that such an order had been sent answered for the moment the purposes of the Sultan. Russia was checked; and, if she renewed her attack, it was because the same firmness and the same clear-sightedness were not apparent in the conduct of the British ministers who approved the admiral for refusing to comply with Colonel Rose's requisition.

Subsequently Colonel Rose served in the Crimean war. He was recommended for the Cross of the Legion of Honour for his conduct at Alma, was repeatedly mentioned for distinguished conduct in the trenches before Sebastopol, and had two horses shot under him at Inkerman. I cannot omit to add that Marshal Canrobert, then commanding the French army in the Crimea, recommended General Rose for the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on three different occasions, and that the claim was not preferred solely because general officers were expressly excluded from the decoration. For his services in this war General Rose received the Turkish order of the Medjidie, was nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath, and received a step in rank "for distinguished conduct in the field."

When the mutiny broke out in India, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded at once to that country. He landed in Bombay on the 19th of September, was brought on the general staff of the army from that date, and was shortly appointed to the command of the force acting in Málwá, the operations of which I have recorded in this volume.* He proceeded accordingly to Indúr in company with Sir Robert Hamilton, who had taken the only route then open, that viâ Bombay.

Simultaneously, almost, with the appointment of Sir Hugh Rose to command one of the columns indicated, Brigadier General Whitlock of the Madras army was nominated to direct the other.

in the
Crimea.

Sir Hugh
lands in
Bombay.

General Whitlock is
appointed to direct the
Madras column.

* Vide Chapter ii. of the last Book.

The proceedings of this officer will be related in the next chapter. This will be devoted to the operations of the Máu column.

The force now called the Central India Field Force, of which Sir Hugh Rose took command on the 17th of December, consisted of two brigades—the first being at Máu; the second at Sihor. The brigades were thus formed. The first, under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, was composed of a squadron 14th Light dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, two regiments of cavalry Haidarábád contingent, two companies of the 86th Regiment,* the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment infantry, Haidarábád contingent, three light field batteries—one belonging to the Royal Artillery, one to that of Bombay, the third to Haidarábád—and some sappers; the second, commanded by Brigadier Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons, of the head-quarters of the 14th Light Dragoons, head-quarters of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, one regiment of cavalry Haidarábád contingent, the 3rd Bombay European Regiment,† the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment of infantry Haidarábád contingent, a battery of Horse Artillery, one light field battery, one battery Bhopál artillery, one company Madras sappers, a detachment of Bombay sappers, and a siege-train; this latter was manned, when brought into action, by draughts from the field batteries.

From the second chapter of the last book the reader will have gathered some idea of the hard work which had already devolved upon this force; he will have seen how the men composing it had triumphed over obstacles, had beaten every enemy, had proved incontestably that they were made of the stuff which required only leading to conquer. They had now once more a leader. Personally, indeed, that leader was a stranger to them, but his reputation had gone before him, and that reputation was of a nature to make the men grudge even the short period of repose which it was necessary that they should take.

That repose was necessary for the perfect carrying out of the plan devised by Sir R. Hamilton with Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta by virtue of which a second force, that to be commanded

Composition
of Sir Hugh
Rose's force.

Antecedents
of the troops
composing
the field
force.

A short period of repose
was necessary to enable
Whitlock to move in
concert with it.

* The remainder of the companies of this regiment joined just before the attack on Chandéri.

† Now the 2nd Battalion, Leinster Regiment

by Whitlock, should start from Jabalpúr. Until tidings of Whitlock's movements should be received, Sir Hugh was forced to halt at Máu.

The time was not thrown away. The two brigades were organized; the country immediately about them was pacified; the line of advance was marked out; the men had time to recruit themselves. The country about Máu and Indúr is peculiarly suited to be a resting-place. It abounds with the necessaries of life; there is plenty of water and of fodder; the climate at that season is most enjoyable; the country, hilly and diversified, is pleasant to the eye. The halt there was but short; it scarcely exceeded three weeks—not too long to satiate the men with their rest, yet long enough to make them glad to be once more on the move.

The period is not wasted.

On the 6th of January Sir Hugh Rose, accompanied by Sir R. Hamilton, started from Máu to join the 2nd brigade at Sihor. On the 8th the siege-train was despatched thither. It arrived on the 15th. On the following morning Sir Hugh, reinforced by about eight hundred Bhopál levies contributed by the loyal Bégam of that principality, started for Ráhatgarh, a strong fort held by the rebels. The 1st brigade left Máu on the 10th, and then marched in a line parallel with the 2nd brigade upon Chándéri, a very famous fortress in the territories of Sindhiá. I propose first to follow the fortunes of the 2nd brigade.

The force enters upon the campaign.

Ráhatgarh, distant only twenty-five miles from Ságar, is situated on the spur of a long high hill, and commands the country surrounding it. The eastern and southern faces of the fortress are almost perpendicular—the rock being scarped. Round their base runs a deep and rapid river—the Bíná—answering the purpose of a wet ditch. The north face is covered by a strong wall, facing a very thick jungle, between which and the wall is a deep ditch twenty feet wide. The western face overlooks the town and the road to Ságar, and its gateway is flanked by several bastions, round and square. Along each face and in the four angles were bastions commanding the only possible approaches. Altogether it was a most formidable position.

Ráhatgarh.

Sir Hugh Rose arrived before this place on the morning of the 24th of January. He at once, with small loss, drove the enemy from the outside positions they had occupied in the town and on the banks of the

Sir Hugh disposes his forces before the place.

river, and then completely invested the place. Fronting the eastern face he posted the Bhopál troops; facing the northern, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry and the cavalry of the Haidarábád contingent. With the remainder of the force he occupied the plain across which runs the road to Ságar. He then reconnoitred the ground preparatory to selecting sites for his breaching batteries.

The enemy, falling back as Sir Hugh advanced, had re-occupied the town. Issuing from its walls into the thick jungle already spoken of, they made thence, during the 25th, several raids on the camp-followers and baggage animals of the force, and at night even attacked the position held by the Bhopál troops. They were, however, repulsed with slight loss.

The rebels make an offensive defence.

Early the following morning Sir Hugh Rose made a move forward. Crossing the Ságar road with the 3rd Europeans, followed by the 18-pounders, howitzers, and mortars, and the guns of the Haidarábád Contingent, he entered the jungle. But no sooner had he reached a point well within its thick covering, than the enemy, who had been lurking near, fired the jungle-grass on all sides. For a few moments the position was perilous, but Sir Hugh, turning back beyond the range of the flames, sent his sappers to cut a road for the guns up the height to the north of the town. This operation and the bringing up of the guns occupied the greater part of the day.

The rebels fire the jungle and force Sir Hugh to change his point of attack

Meanwhile the remainder of the force had occupied the town, and driven the enemy within the fort.

Sir Hugh gains the town.

At 3 o'clock the summit of the hill fronting the northern face of the fort was gained. Sir Hugh at once selected sites for his breaching batteries, and set the sappers to work. By 8 p.m. the mortar battery was ready. Whilst it was being thrown up the 6-pounders of the Haidarábád contingent maintained a constant fire of shot and shell on the fort, whilst the 3rd Europeans employed their Enfield rifles to keep down the matchlock fire of the enemy. At 11 p.m. the mortar battery opened fire, and continued it all night. The breaching batteries were completed by daybreak.

Sir Hugh's mortar batteries open on the fort.

These opened fire early on the morning of the 27th, and continued it all that day and the day following. At 10 p.m. on

the 28th a large breach had been made, and two men went forward to examine it. They had just returned when a sudden rush of camp-followers and cattle-drivers from the rear gave intimation that something startling had happened. It transpired immediately that a rebel force was advancing to the relief of the place.

The breaching batteries open.

It was so indeed. The Rájah of Bánpúr, whose doings in the vicinity of Ságar I have already recorded,* was advancing on the rear of the besieging force with a considerable body of revolted Sipáhis and other levies. He came on with great boldness, his standards flying, and his men singing their national hymns. But, if his appearance at this critical juncture was a surprise to Sir Hugh Rose, it was a surprise that did not embarrass him. Instead of ceasing his fire against the fort he redoubled it. To deal with the Rájah of Bánpúr, he at the same time detached a small force, consisting of a detachment of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the horse artillery, and the 5th Mairatárábád infantry. It did not require extraordinary exertion to effect this object. The confidence of the Rájah and his followers vanished as they heard the tramping of the horses of the British and Indian cavalry. They did not wait to be charged, but, throwing away their arms and ammunition, made off with such celerity, that, though hotly pursued, a few only were cut up.

The Rájah of Bánpúr marches to relieve the place,

but vanishes on the approach of the British troops

The attempt at relief, apparently so formidable, was really a stroke of fortune for Sir Hugh. It had been made, evidently, in concert with the rebels within the fort, and its failure so disheartened them, that they silently evacuated Ráhatgarh during the night, escaping by a path the precipitous nature of which seemed to preclude the possibility of its being used by man.† Their flight was not on the whole to be lamented, for Ráhatgarh was found

Ráhatgarh is thereupon evacuated.

* *Vide* page 66 and the pages following.

† "The most amazing thing was to see the place from whence they had escaped. To look down the precipitous path made one giddy—and yet down this place, where no possible footing could be seen, they had all gone—men and women—in the dead of the night! One or two mangled bodies lay at the bottom, attesting the difficulty of the descent. Nothing but despair could have tempted them to have chosen such a way."—Dr. Lowe's *Central India during the Rebellion of 1857-58*—a book to which I am much indebted.

to be so strong as to make it tenable by a few resolute defenders against numbers greatly superior.

The rebels were pursued, but without much effect; they had gone too far before the evacuation of the place had been discovered. A little before noon on the 30th Sir Hugh received information that the Rájah of Bápúr, reinforced by the garrison, had taken up a position near the village of Barodiá, about fifteen miles distant. He at once ordered out the horse

The rebels
take up a
position near
Barodiá,

artillery, two 5½-inch mortars, two guns of the reserve battery, the 3rd Europeans, the majority of the cavalry, and a section of the Madras sappers, and went in pursuit. About 4 o'clock he came upon

them posted on the banks of the Biná, and prepared to dispute his passage. Sir Hugh at once attacked, and, though the rebels fought well, he forced the passage of the river. The country on the other side was thick and bushy, and the rebels took every advantage of it. From the river to Barodiá

where they
are attacked
and beaten
by Sir Hugh.

Sir Hugh had to fight his way step by step. He did not do this without loss. Two officers* were killed and six were wounded. The casualties

among the men were likewise severe. In the end, however, the rebels were completely defeated, and, though the rebel Rájah was not captured, he owed his safety only to his acquaintance with the intricacies of the jungle. The force returned to Ráhatgarh about 2 o'clock in the morning. It found there a supply of provisions sent from Ságár escorted by a detachment of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

The fall of Ráhatgarh had effected two most important objects. It had cleared the country south of Ságár

Result gained
by the fall
of Ráhatgarh.

of rebels, had reopened the road to Indúr, and had made it possible for the general to march to the relief of Ságár, now beleaguered for nearly eight

months.

The state of Ságár has been recorded in a preceding chapter of this volume. Its situation remained unaltered.

Ságár, since
the reader
last visited
it.

Although, during the interval since we left it, the garrison had made occasional sallies, more or less successful, it may be stated generally that the rebels

had retained possession of the strongholds all over the district,

* One of these was Captain Neville, R.E. He had joined the force only the day before. Captain Neville had served throughout the Crimean war, in which he greatly distinguished himself.

and that, by means of these, they had possessed likewise the country. The manner in which they had used their usurped power had made the peasantry look earnestly to the time when the law-enforcing rule of the British should be restored.

That time had now arrived. Sir Hugh Rose marched from Ráhatgarh direct on Ságár. He entered that place on the morning of the 3rd of February, escorted by the Europeans, officers and others, who had held the fort, and who had gone forth to welcome their deliverers. The 31st Native Infantry was one of the very few regiments of the Bengal army which, retaining its arms, had remained faithful throughout that trying period. The greater honour to the 31st. for its companion infantry regiment had revolted, and it had been tempted on all sides.

Sir Hugh
marches on
Ságár,
and enters
it.

The 31st
Native
Infantry.

Some of those companions had now to be dealt with. Twenty-five miles to the east of Ságár stands, on an elevated angle of ground, the strong fort of Garhákótá. The eastern face of this fort is washed by the wide river Sonár;* the western and northern faces by the nullah Gidári, with precipitous banks; the south face possesses a strong gateway flanked by bastions, and a ditch twenty feet in depth by thirty in width. So strong are the parapets of this fort, that when, in 1818, it was attacked by Brigadier Watson with a force of eleven thousand men, he was unable, in three weeks, to effect a breach in them, and was glad to allow the garrison to evacuate the place with all the honours of war! In February 1858 it was held by the revolted Sipáhis of the 51st and 52nd Native Infantry, and other rebels, well supplied with ammunition and provisions.

The fort of
Garhákótá.

Its great
strength.

Sir Hugh Rose sent a small force to destroy the fort of Sanoda on the 8th, and on the 9th of February marched towards Garhákótá. He arrived within sight of it at half-past 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th. Whilst the men were taking up their assigned positions he made a reconnaissance, which was not concluded

Sir Hugh
arrives
before it and
reconnoitres;

* The Sonár rises in the Ságár district at an elevation of one thousand nine hundred and fifty feet above the sea. It holds a north-eastern course of one hundred and ten miles, receiving the Bairmá on the right, and eight miles lower down falling into the Keu on its left.—THORNTON. (New Edition.)

till 8 P.M. He found that the rebels had thrown up earthworks on the road to the south, by which they had expected him to arrive, and that they were occupying a position close to the village of Basárf, near the fort, in some force. Notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, he at once drove them from the positions they held, and occupied Basárf; nor, though during the night the rebels repeatedly attacked him, could they regain the posts they had lost.

The next day Sir Hugh commenced his attack. He first caused a breaching battery to be thrown up opposite the western face. A 24-pounder howitzer working all day from this battery soon silenced the enemy's guns. Lieutenant Strutt of the Bombay artillery, already referred to in these pages, succeeded in dismounting one of the enemy's guns which had been worked very successfully against the assailants. It was this shot, "one of the many good shots made under fire by Lieutenant Strutt," which, in Sir Hugh's opinion, made the Sipáhis reflect on the casualties which might befall them. Certainly, after their experience of Strutt's correctness of aim, they lost heart. In the night they consulted, and determined to escape if they could. Unfortunately Sir Hugh Rose's force was so small, a great part having been left at Ságar, that he had been unable to place a portion of it in a position which would guard the gateway. By this gateway, then, the Sipáhis made their way into the country during the night of the 12th. They were, however, pursued early the following morning for twenty-five miles by Captains Hare, with his Haidarábád cavalry, two troops of the 14th Light Dragoons under Captains Need and Brown, and a division (two guns) of horse artillery under Lieutenant Crowe. Hare came up with the rebels at the Biás river, near the village of Biár, led his guns and cavalry across it; opened fire on the enemy; then charged and pursued them for some distance, inflicting considerable loss.

Garhákótá was found full of supplies. Sir Hugh had its western face destroyed, and returned to Ságar on the 17th.

Jhánsí, a hundred and twenty-five miles to the north, was the next point to be aimed at. But between Ságar and Jhánsí lay the passes of Málthon and Madanpúr, the forts of Suráhi and of Maráúra, the towns of

drives the
rebels from
the village of
Basárf.

Excellent
effect of
Strutt's fire

impels the
rebels to
evacuate the
place;

they are
pursued by
Hare and
cut up.

The road to
Jhánsí.

Sháhgarh and Bánpur.* After overcoming the certain obstacles which these places would probably offer, Sir Hugh would have, before marching on Jhánsí, to effect a junction with his 1st brigade under Brigadier Stuart.

Before setting out on this expedition there were other considerations demanding attention. Sir Hugh could scarcely move from Sagar until he should receive certain information that Brigadier Whitlock's column had started from Jabalpur for that place. Meanwhile he would have time to repair damages and to store supplies. The necessity for this was the more pressing inasmuch as it had been ascertained that the districts through which the force would have to march, still occupied by rebel Sipáhis or disaffected chiefs, would supply little or nothing in the way of commissariat. The hot season, too, was setting in, and it was certain that not a blade of grass would survive a few weeks of its duration. Sir Hugh foresaw all this, and employed the enforced delay in laying up supplies. He caused to be collected sheep, goats, oxen, grain, flour, and large supplies of tea and soda water. Much of the grain was sent by the loyal Bégam of Bhopál. The sick and wounded men he transferred to the Sagar field hospital, to be sent away or to rejoin as opportunity might offer. He re-supplied the siege-train with ammunition, and strengthened it by the addition of heavy guns, howitzers, and large mortars from the Sagar arsenal. He obtained likewise an additional supply of elephants, and, what was of great consequence, he secured summer clothing for his European soldiers.

Considerations which demanded some delay.

Excellent use to which the delay was put.

At length news came that Whitlock had left Jabalpur. Sir Hugh's preparations were now as complete as they could be made. Accordingly a start was determined upon. On the evening of the 26th of February Sir Hugh detached Major Orr's column of the Haidarábád contingent to march on a route parallel with his own, and at 2 o'clock he set out with the remainder of the troops. The following day he took, after some shelling, the fort of Barodiá. Pressing forward, he found

Hearing that Whitlock had left Jabalpur, Sir Hugh takes the road to Jhánsí.

* Maraura lies thirty-seven miles north of Sagar, and twenty-two west by north of Sháhgarh. Sháhgarh lies forty miles north-east of Sagar. Bánpur is in the Lalitpur district.

himself, on the 3rd of March, in front of the pass of Málthon.

The pass of
Málthon.

convinced

Sir Hugh
decides to
attempt a
flank march.

through the pass of Madanpúr.

Madanpúr.

This pass, of great natural strength, had been fortified, and was now held in force by a mixed army of Sipáhis and local levies. A reconnaissance having determined then only to feign an attack in front, whilst, with the bulk of his force, he should gain the table-land above the hills by a flank movement under Major Scudamore, to menace the pass, whilst with the remainder, now strengthened by the junction of the Haidarábád troops, he moved on Madanpúr.

The pass leading to this town forms a narrow gorge between two ranges of hills, thickly covered with jungle and brushwood. and capable of offering a solid defence.

The Madan-
púr pass

The rebels had not only crowned the heights on both sides of the gorge, and planted guns in the gorge itself, but they had sent, to a considerable distance in advance, skirmishers, who, concealed in the jungle, would be able to harass an advancing enemy. The British troops, in making the turning movement contemplated, marched for about six miles along the foot of the hills, which they then began to ascend.

is attacked
by the
British.

Almost immediately the enemy opened fire. The crests seemed alive with their infantry, whilst their guns from the gorge poured in a continuous fire. Sir Hugh sent the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarábád infantry to storm the heights, brought his guns to the front, and returned the enemy's fire.

The British skirmishers drove back the rebel footmen, but as these retired another artillery fire opened from a commanding position at the further end of the pass. So galling and so heavy was this fire that for a short time the British advance was checked. Sir Hugh

Determined
defence of
the rebels,

even ordered the guns to retire some yards. Before this could be done Sir Hugh's horse was shot under him, and the artillerymen were forced to take refuge behind the guns. Bullets fell like hailstones, and the number of killed and wounded increased every moment.

* Consisting of the 24th Bombay N.I., three guns Bhopál artillery, one howitzer, a detachment 14th light dragoons, and the 3rd Bombay cavalry.

The halt, however was only temporary. The guns of the Haidarábád contingent coming up at this conjuncture opened with shell on the enemy's masses to the left of the pass in support of the guns in action. Under cover of this combined shower, the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarábád infantry charged. Asiatics can stand anything but a charge of European infantry. They had here a splendid position, and a large force of the three arms to hold it; but the sight of the charging infantry struck awe into them. Far from awaiting, with their superior numbers, the hand-to-hand encounter offered, they fled in disorder and dismay. They were followed through the pass by their enemy, and only halted to take breath when they found themselves within the town of Mandanpúr.

but it is overcome by a charge of infantry.

That town, however, was to be no secure refuge to them. Sir Hugh Rose brought his howitzers to the front and opened fire upon it. For a few minutes the rebels replied, and then fled to the jungles behind. The cavalry, sent in pursuit, followed them to the walls of the fort of Suráhi.

Sir Hugh drives them likewise from the town.

The effect of this victory was very great. It so daunted the rebels that they evacuated, without a blow, the formidable pass of Málthon, the fort of Narhat to the rear of it, the little fort of Suráhi, the strong fort of Maráura, the fortified castle of Bánpúr—the residence of the rebel Rájah called after it—the almost impregnable fortress of Tál-Bahat on the heights above the lake of that name. They abandoned also the line of the Bíná and the Betwá, with the exception of the fortress of Chandéri, on the left bank of the latter river.

Great results obtained from the victory

Leaving Sir Hugh Rose to reap the consequences of his victory at Madanpúr, I propose to return for a moment to the division of the Haidarábád contingent left at Mandesar under Majors Orr and Keatinge.

The 1st. brigade.

In a preceding page of this volume I have shewn how Durand, before marching on Indúr, had left, for the conservation of peace and order in western Málwá a detachment of the Haidarábád contingent of all arms at Mandesar under Major Orr, with Major Keatinge as political agent and military governor of the province. There they remained until the arrival at Indúr of Sir Robert Hamilton. That high official at once directed Orr and Keatinge

Orr and Keatinge re-open the Agrá road.

to march up the Ágra road, and to restore on it the postal and telegraphic communications which had been destroyed.

A more interesting march was not undertaken during the entire period of those troublous times. Keatinge and Orr were the first representatives of the British power who had been seen in that part of the country for many months. As they marched up the Ágra road huge coils of telegraph wire were brought by night, and placed on the roadside, by people who dreaded lest the wire should be found in their possession. From the centre of haystacks, likewise, postmasters recovered the mail-bags which had been left with them when the outbreak occurred at Indúr. The little force, re-establishing the wires as it pushed on, proceeded as far as Gúnah, there to await the arrival of the 1st Brigade under Stuart on its way to Chandérí.

To the proceedings of that brigade I must now invite the reader's attention.

In pursuance of the instructions of Sir Hugh Rose, Stuart had left Máu on the 10th of January, and marched upon Gúnah, the road to which had been cleared by Orr and Keatinge in the manner just described. About seventy miles to

Chandérí.

the east of Gúnah lies the important post of Chandérí. Chandérí is a very famous town. Its splendour in the prosperous times of the Mughul empire had made it notorious. "If you want to see a town whose houses are

Its former splendour.

palaces, visit Chandérí," was a proverb in the time of Akbar. In the reign of that illustrious prince it was described as a city possessing fourteen thousand houses built of stone, three hundred and eighty-four markets, three hundred and sixty caravansaries, and twelve thousand mosques. Since that period, it is true, the rule of the Maráthás

Its later decay.

had worked a great change in its prosperity. In later years, too, its manufactures had suffered from competition with Manchester. But its fort still remained, strong, menacing, defiant, with a long history, testifying alike to its prestige and to the valour of its defenders.

Great strength of its fort.

Situated on the summit of a high hill, defended by a rampart of sandstone, flanked by circular towers, the fort of Chandérí, seen by an approaching enemy, looked worthy of its reputation. To this place, in February 1858, flocked the Sipáhis beaten in the actions already detailed by Sir Hugh Rose, to join there the men who had sworn to defend it successfully or to perish.

Against it Brigadier C. S. Stuart, joined by Orr and Keatinge, marched from Gúnah. On the 5th of March he reached a place, Khúkwásás, six miles from Chandéri. Between Khúkwásás and Chandéri the road lay through a dense jungle. Stuart, therefore sent two companies of the 86th foot and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry to the front in skirmishing order. After marching three miles, he arrived at a narrow pass between two high hills—a place offering splendid capabilities for defence. To the surprise of Stuart, no defence was offered. Two miles further, however, the road was found barricaded. The engineers began to clear away the barricades; but they had not worked long before the enemy were seen to climb the hill to the left. On reaching it they opened out a musketry-fire. From this point of vantage they were soon dislodged by a small party of the 86th, and, the barricades having been removed, the artillery advanced, covered by the 86th on the right, and the 25th Native Infantry on the left. They had not gone far, however, before a very heavy fire opened upon them from the wall of an enclosure about a mile distant from the fort. The 86th dashed forward to gain this enclosure. One officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Lewis, and the political agent with the force Major Keatinge,* of the Bombay artillery, outrunning the men, gained first the top of its wall, and jumping down, followed by a few men, drove out the enemy. Stuart pursued his advantage, and did not halt till he had occupied the hills to the west of the fort.

Stuart
advances
against
Chandéri.

Opposition
of the
enemy.

Gallantry of
Lewis and
Keatinge.

The next few days were spent by Stuart in clearing the neighbouring villages, in reconnoitring, and in planting his guns in a commanding position. On the 13th the breaching batteries opened fire, and by the evening of the 16th effected a breach which was reported practicable. Stuart had with him, as I have already stated, but two companies of the 86th. The remainder were marching to join him, and on the 15th were only twenty-eight miles distant. On the afternoon of that day the officer who commanded them received a despatch from Stuart telling him

Preparations
for the
storm.

* The same who had accompanied Orr in the opening of the Ágra road, now General Keatinge, V.C.

that the breach would probably be practicable on the morrow, and, that if he would push on and join him on the 16th, he, Stuart, would defer the assault to the day following. The commanding officer set out at once, and his men pushed on with so much alacrity, that, though they had already marched fifteen miles that morning, they joined Stuart by 10 o'clock on the 16th.

Splendid
march of
the 86th.

Thus reinforced, Stuart, early on the morning of the 17th, sent his stormers, men of the 86th and of the 25th Native Infantry, to the attack. Their impetuous rush carried all before them. Major Keatinge, who accompanied the party, and who led it into the breach, was struck down, severely wounded. But his fall did not stop the stormers. The rebels hurled themselves over the

Keatinge
again dis-
tinguishes
himself.

parapets to avoid the rush they could not withstand, and most of them escaped. A letter which the Brigadier had sent the previous day to Captain Abbott commanding a party of cavalry, and requesting him to invest the north side of the fort, reached that officer too late. But the place was taken with all its guns.*

The storm.

Sir Hugh Rose heard of the storming of Chándéri on the 18th.

Sir Hugh
marches on
Jhānsi.

Informed that the garrison had escaped northwards, he sent a detachment of the Haidarābād contingent to intercept them. This force came up with a few stragglers only, but captured some camels and ponies. On the 19th he marched to Chanchanpūr, one march, fourteen miles, from Jhānsi. After a rest here of about two hours, he despatched the cavalry, horse artillery, and light field-guns of the 2nd brigade to reconnoitre and invest that place.

To the fall of Jhānsi Lord Canning and Lord Elphinstone attached the greatest importance. They regarded that fortress as the stronghold of rebel power in central India, the main strength of the formidable rebel force on the Jamnah. It was a place, moreover, in which the slaughter of English men and women had been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and where hatred to the English name had been illustrated by acts of the most wanton barbarity. Nevertheless, anxious as was Lord Canning, anxious as was Sir Colin Campbell himself, that the blow, the most effective of all to the rebel cause in

Great
importance
attached to
the fall of
Jhānsi.

* The casualties in the capture were twenty-nine, including two officers.

central India, should be struck, they were both so little appreciative of the enormous value of delivering that blow at once, whilst the success of Sir Hugh Rose's brigades was yet fresh in the minds of the rebels, that, on the very eve of the crisis, they both sent orders to defer the attack on Jhānsi, in order to divert the force elsewhere. From the dangerous consequences of their own orders they were saved by the firmness and decision of Sir Robert Hamilton.

Causes which prompted Lord Canning and Sir C. Campbell to order the diversion of the force from Jhānsi.

I have already stated that Sir Hugh had sent the cavalry and horse artillery of his 2nd brigade, on the afternoon of the 20th, to reconnoitre and invest Jhānsi. He was about, a few hours later, to follow with his infantry, when an express arrived in camp bearing two despatches. One of these was from the Governor-General to Sir Robert Hamilton, the other from the Commander-in-Chief to Sir Hugh Rose.

Sir Hugh Rose and Sir R. Hamilton receive despatches

The purport of these two despatches was identical. They represented that the Rājāh of Charkhāri (in Bundelkhand), a man who, throughout the trying period of 1857-58, had shown unwavering fidelity to his British overlord, was being besieged in his fort by Tāntiā Topī and the Gwāliār contingent, and they ordered Hamilton and Rose to march at once to his relief, Whitlock's force not being near enough to effect that purpose.

ordering the former to march on Charkhāri.

Charkhāri was about eighty miles from the ground on which Sir Hugh's force was encamped, on the direct road to Bandah. Jhānsi was within fourteen miles. To the mind of a soldier the idea would naturally present itself that the surest mode of saving the lesser and more distant place was to attack at once the more important and nearer fortress; that to act on the principle indicated in the despatches would be to act in defiance alike of the rules of war and of common sense. So it appeared to both Hamilton and Rose. But Sir Hugh was a soldier. He had received a positive order. Foolish though he knew that order to be, he was bound to obey it unless the means could be devised of superseding it by authority which he might deem higher and more potential.

Reasons why the order appeared devoid of sense to Hamilton and Rose.

Sir Robert Hamilton devised those means. Now, I will relate in his own simple words. "Sir Hugh Rose considered the order of the Commander-in-Chief imperative: there was not anything

left to my discretion in my letter from the Governor-General ; it was clear to me it would be a great political mistake to draw off from Jhánsí, which our cavalry were investing, and our force within fourteen miles ; moreover, supposing the force moved on Charkhári, it was not possible to march the eighty miles before the rebels had carried the fort, the Rájah having no provisions, and having lost the outworks, according to my intelligence. I, therefore, took on myself the responsibility of proceeding with our operations against Jhánsí, trusting to that course as the most effective to draw the enemy from Charkhári, and so I wrote to the Governor-General." *
 Sir Robert Hamilton takes upon himself the responsibility of ordering the continuance of the movement on Jhánsí.

It was a responsibility which only a strong man would take, thus to act in direct opposition to the orders of the two highest officials in the country, but under the circumstances it was a responsibility which it was necessary to assume. It gave a decided character to the campaign, and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to carry to a glorious conclusion the task which he had taken in hand at Máu.
 Hamilton's determination gives a decided character to the campaign.

Freed by Sir Robert Hamilton from the necessity of pursuing the vicious course indicated by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose set out at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st for Jhánsí. He arrived before that city at 9 o'clock, and, halting his troops in the open about a mile and a half from the fortress, proceeded with his staff to reconnoitre. He did the work completely, for it had struck 6 p.m. before he returned.
 Sir Hugh moves on Jhánsí.

Between the open ground on which Sir Hugh had halted and the town and fortress of Jhánsí were the ruined bungalows occupied nine months before by Europeans, the gaol, the "Star" fort,† and the Sipáhi lines. Near the town were several large temples and topes of tamarind trees. On the right of the halting-ground, stretching to the north and east of the city, was a long belt of hills, through which ran the Kálpí and Urchah roads ; to the left were other hills and the Datiá roads ; due north was the fortress on a high granite rock, overlooking the walled-in city.‡
 The lay of the ground before Jhánsí.

* Memorandum submitted by Sir Robert Hamilton to Lord Palmerston, dated the 20th of March, 1862.

† Vol. III. page 122.

‡ Lowe's *Central India*.

The great strength of the fort of Jhánsí, natural as well as artificial, and its extent, entitle it to a place among fortresses. It stands on a elevated rock, rising out of a plain, and commands the city and surrounding country. It is built of excellent and most massive masonry. The fort is difficult to breach, because composed of granite; its walls vary in thickness from sixteen to twenty feet. It has extensive and elaborate outworks of the same solid construction, with front and flanking embrasures for artillery-fire, and loop-holes, of which in some places there were five tiers, for musketry. Guns placed on the high towers of the fort commanded the country all around. On one tower, called the "white turret," then recently raised in height, waved in proud defiance the standard of the high-spirited Rání.

Great strength of the fort of Jhánsí.

The fortress is surrounded on all sides by the city of Jhánsí, the west and part of the south face excepted.

The steepness of the rock protects the west; the fortified city wall springs from the centre of its south face, running south-east, and ends in a high mound or mamelon, which protects by a flanking fire its south face. The mound was fortified by a strong circular bastion for five guns, round part of which was drawn a ditch, twelve feet deep and fifteen broad, of solid masonry.

The city of Jhánsí is about four miles and a half in circumference. It is surrounded by a fortified and massive wall, from six to twelve feet thick, and varying in height from eighteen to thirty feet, with numerous flanking bastions armed as batteries, with ordnance, and loop-holes, and with a banquette for infantry.*

The city of Jhánsí.

The town and fortress were garrisoned by eleven thousand men, composed of rebel Sipáhis, foreign mercenaries, and local levies, and they were led by a woman who believed her cause to be just, and who, classified according to Channing's definition of greatness, was a heroine, though of the third order.

Garrison of the town and fortress.

In his long reconnaissance of the 21st of March, Sir Hugh Rose had noted all the strong points of the defence, and had examined the lay of the ground. He noted the many difficulties presented to the attack, by

Result of Sir Hugh's reconnaissance.

* Sir Hugh Rose's despatch, dated the 30th of April, 1858, from which this description is taken almost textually. Sir Hugh adds, further on: "A remarkable feature in the defence was that the enemy had no works or forts outside the city."

the fort perched on a lofty granite rock, with its three lines of works, its flanking fire, its thick and solid walls. He had discovered that it would be necessary to take the city prior to assailing the fortress, a work involving double labour and double danger. In this reconnaissance, however, he had decided on his plan of attack. That night he was joined by the cavalry of the 1st brigade. The next day he completely invested the city and fortress with his cavalry. In this investment the defenders read the determination of the English general to capture not only the place but its garrison.

One of the measures taken by the Rání might under, other circumstances, have caused considerable embarrassment to the besiegers. She had made the country all about bare. Not a blade of grass was to be seen. Thanks, however, to the loyalty of Sindhiá and of the Rájah of Tehrí,* the force was throughout the operations abundantly supplied with grass, firewood, and vegetables.

The cavalry having invested the city on the 22nd, the siege began on the night of that day. At 9 o'clock a detachment of Madras and Bombay sappers was sent with two 18-pounders, and a company 24th Bombay Native Infantry, to throw up a battery near the Urchah road on the east side of the town wall; other parties were detached at the same time to positions which the general had selected. Working hard that night, the next day, and the night and day which followed, they made ready on the evening of the 24th four batteries, constituting the right attack. On the morning of the 25th they opened fire. That day, too, the bulk of the 1st brigade came into line. It was at once posted south of the fort, constituting there the left attack.

The siege now progressed in real earnest. For seventeen days the fire from the besieging batteries and from the walls of the city and fort was incessant. Shot and shell were poured into the city, and the enemy's guns never ceased to reply. The labour entailed upon the small force of the besiegers was tremendous. During the period of which I have spoken the men never took off their clothes, nor were the horses unbridled except to water. Nor were the exertions of the

* Tehrí, also called Urchah, is a Bundelá Rajpút State, immediately to the east of the Jhánsí and Lalitpúr districts. Its Rájah is looked upon as the Head of the Bundelás.

besieged less determined. Women and children were seen assisting in repairing the defences of the walls, and in carrying water and food to the troops on duty, whilst the Rání constantly visited the troops and animated them to enthusiasm by her presence and her words.

and the
besieged.

For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to employ only two 18-pounders, the remainder of the guns being laid so as to employ the enemy incessantly, and to damage the buildings inside the city. The progress made by these 18-pounders was, owing to the great strength of the walls, extremely slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the mamelon bastion were levelled by the fire from the left attack, and the enemy's guns there rendered useless. The two following days the cannonading continued with great spirit. A breach had been effected, but it was barely practicable; the courage of the enemy continued unabated; danger seemed only to increase their resolution. Such was the state of affairs when a new danger arose for the besiegers. On the evening of the 31st of March intelligence reached Sir Hugh Rose that an army was advancing from the north for the relief of the fortress!

At length a
breach is
effected,

continued

when an
army ad-
vances to
relieve the
place.

This was the army of Tántiá Topí. The career of this able Maráthá leader will be told at fuller detail in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say that, after his victory over Windham and his subsequent defeat by Sir Colin Campbell, Tántiá had crossed the Ganges, and subsequently, in obedience to orders from Ráo Sáhib, the nephew of Náná Sáhib, had proceeded to Kálpí. Thence, complying with orders from the same quarter, he had, with a small force of nine hundred Sipáhis and four guns, moved on Charkhári, and, on the eleventh day, had taken it, capturing twenty-four guns and three lakhs of rupees. Just at this time he received a letter from the Rání of Jhánsí, begging him to come to her help. Again he asked for orders, and again received the full approval of his superior. His force, by this time, had been increased by the junction of five or six regiments of the Gwáliúr contingent and the levies of rebel Rájahs to twenty-two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. Leading it himself, he marched on the English camp before Jhánsí.

Tántiá Topí

captures
Charkhári,

and marches
to relieve
Jhánsí.

The position of Sir Hugh Rose was perilous. Before him was an unconquered fortress, garrisoned by eleven thousand warriors, full of the ardour of battle; advancing against and close to him, an army of more than twenty thousand men led by a chieftain who hated the English, and who had twice revelled in their defeat at Káhn-púr. It was a position which required in a special degree great daring, a resolute will, the power to take responsibility. A single false step, a solitary error in judgment, might be fatal. But Sir Hugh Rose was equal to the occasion.

Danger of Sir Hugh Rose's position.

He resolves to maintain the siege and to meet the relieving army.

Rightly believing that to withdraw the troops then investing the fortress, for the purpose of meeting the new enemy, would give the besieged all the moral advantages of victory as well as the material advantages which they would derive from a virtual raising of the siege, the English general resolved still to press the siege with vigour, whilst at the head of all the troops not engaged in actual duty he should march against the new enemy. The extreme daring of this plan will be realised when the reader reflects that Sir Hugh was unable to assemble more than fifteen hundred men of all arms for this purpose, that of these only five hundred were British, and that the enemy numbered, according to Tántiá Topí's own admission, twenty-two thousand men. Sir Hugh's preparations* for the engagement were made on the evening of the 31st. He resolved to attack early the following morning.

Sir Hugh had drawn his covering force from both brigades, the detachment from the first being led by Brigadier C. S. Stuart, that from the 2nd by himself in person. The men slept in their clothes ready for immediate action. The precaution was necessary. At 4 o'clock in the morning of the 1st, Tántiá Topí advanced towards the British encampment. Half an hour later, the falling back of his pickets warned the English general of his approach. In a few minutes the British guns opened fire, and almost immediately those of the enemy answered. But the fire of a few guns was powerless to check the onward march of an enemy whose line overlapped that of the British on both flanks.

Sir Hugh meets Tántiá Topí,

* The preparations were witnessed with delight by the defenders of Jhánsí, who thought the English were marching to certain destruction. They shouted all night in a frenzy of joy.

Tántiá had but to move straight on to reach with his overlapping wings the troops besieging the fortress, who would thus, literally, be placed between two fires. Sir Hugh comprehended the position in an instant, and took measures to meet it. Massing his horse artillery under Captain Lightfoot on his left, and attaching to it a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, under Captain Prettijohn, he ordered them to attack the enemy's right, whilst he himself, on the other flank, should direct another squadron and a division of guns against their left. On the left, Crowe's division of two guns was sent forward to enfilade the enemy's right. This service was performed with great skill and gallantry, for, though one of his guns was disabled, the fire of the other was so rapid and so correct that the enemy's left was shaken.

attacks their
flanks with
cavalry,

The tactics of Sir Hugh were exactly adapted to the circumstances of the case. The enemy's centre, which up to that time had been advancing steadily, surprised by the double attack, first halted, and then, as the men composing it discerned a movement on the part of the British infantry, broke up into disordered masses. The movement of the British infantry is easily accounted for. Sir Hugh Rose, in the moment of charging, had sent orders to his infantry to advance as soon as the cavalry attack should be well pronounced. This order was now obeyed. The infantry sprang to their feet, advanced a few yards, then poured in a volley and charged. The result was magical. The first line of the enemy at once broke, and fled in complete disorder towards the second line, abandoning several of their guns. An opportune charge of the Dragoons, in which Prettijohn and Lightfoot, who commanded the field battery attached to the cavalry, greatly distinguished themselves, intensified that disorder.

whilst the
infantry
attack their
centre.

The enemy's
first line is
defeated.

The second line, commanded by Tántiá in person, was occupying a position upon a rising ground, its front covered by jungle, about two miles in rear of the first line. Tántiá beheld in dismay the men of the latter rushing helter skelter towards him, followed by the three arms of the British in hot pursuit; but he had scarcely realised the fact when another vision on his right flank came to add to his anguish.

Meanwhile
Stuart
defeats a
detached
body of the
enemy, and

Whilst Sir Hugh Rose had been engaged in the manner I have

described, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, with the detachment of the 1st brigade, had moved round the hill into the plain on the right of the enemy, in order to check a large body of them, who were taking advantage of the battle raging in front of the line to move off towards Jhánsí. Stuart attacked, defeated them, and drove them back, hotly following them. So close, indeed, was the pursuit, that they had no time to re-form, but fled in confusion, leaving gun after gun in the hands of the victors, and numbers of their own men dead or dying on the field. This was the vision that came to add to the dismay of Tántiá Topí.

It had the effect of forcing upon him a prompt decision. The day, he saw, was lost, but there was yet time to save the second line and his remaining guns. I have said that the ground upon which he rested was covered to the front by jungle. This jungle was dry and easily kindled. He at once set fire to it, and under cover of the smoke and flames, commenced a retreat across the Betwá, hoping to place that river between himself and the pursuers. His infantry and horsemen led the retreat, his guns covered it. Right gallantly and skilfully they did it, and he did succeed in crossing the Betwá with his reserve and guns and some of the fugitives of the first line. But he was not the safer for the passage. The British horse artillery and cavalry had dashed at a gallop through the burning jungle, and they were resolved not to cease the pursuit till they had captured every gun that had opened against them. They carried out their programme to the letter. The pursuit did not cease till every gun had been taken. Fifteen hundred rebels were killed or wounded on this day. The remainder, with Tántiá Topí at their head, fled towards Kalpi.*

Whilst this battle had been raging, the besieged had redoubled their fire. Mounting the bastions and the wall, they had shouted and yelled, and poured down volleys of musketry, seemingly threatening a sortie. Never, however, did the besiegers' batteries

* Tántiá states that four or five guns were saved, but these must have been additional to the twenty-eight field-pieces accounted for. He adds that he was followed in his flight by only two hundred Sipáhus.

ply with more vigour or with greater effect. The vision meeting the eye of those who manned the wall, moreover, did not long continue to inspire. Suddenly the yells and the shouts ceased—a sure sign that the garrison had recognised that the hour of deliverance had not arrived for them.

are after-
wards dis-
couraged

The victorious army, returning from the pursuit, its *morale* strengthened as much as that of the enemy had deteriorated, resumed its former positions the same evening. Sir Hugh Rose determined then to take the promptest advantage of the discouragement which, he was well aware, the defeat of Tántiá Topí could not fail to produce on the minds of the garrison. He poured in, then, a heavy fire all that night and the day following. On the 2nd the breach in the city wall having been reported practicable, though only just practicable, Sir Hugh determined to storm the place the following morning. He made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to make a false attack on the west wall with a small detachment under Major Gall, 14th Light Dragoons; as soon as the sound of his guns should be heard, the main storming party was to debouch from cover, and enter the breach, whilst on the right of it attempts should be made to escalate the wall. The right attack, composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, and the infantry of the Haidarábád contingent, was divided into two columns and a reserve. The right column was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, the left by Captain Robinson—both of the 3rd Europeans—the reserve by Brigadier Stuart, 14th Light Dragoons. This attack was to attempt to gain the town by escalade. The left attack, composed of the Royal Engineers, the 68th Foot, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, was similarly divided. Its left column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth, 86th Regiment, was to storm the breach; the right, led by Major Stuart, 86th Regiment, to escalate the rocket-tower and the low curtain immediately to the right of it. The reserve was commanded by Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

Sir Hugh
pours in a
heavy fire
on the fort
all the night,

and prepares
to storm.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of April the storming parties marched to the positions assigned to them, to await there the signal from Major Gall's party. No sooner was it given than the stormers dashed

Storming of
Jhānsí.

to the front. On the left, Lieutenant Jerome, 86th, supported by Captains Darby and Brockman, led the stormers of Colonel Lowth's column up the breach in the most gallant manner, driving the enemy before him. At the same time Major Stuart attacked the rocket-tower, and though met by a strong opposition, forced his way by it into the town. Lowth then collected his men, and despatched a portion of them against that section of the rebel forces which was engaged in opposing the right attack. Taking these in flank and rear, this detachment, led most gallantly by Brockman, forced the rebels to let go their hold on the defences, thus greatly facilitating the difficult task of the right attack. With the remainder of his troops, Lowth prepared to march on the Rání's palace.

Success of
the left
attack.

The right attack, on hearing the signal, had marched silently from their cover in three bodies. No sooner, however, had the troops composing it turned into the road leading towards the gate which was the object of their assault than the enemy's bugles sounded, and a very heavy fire opened upon them.* Through this fire the stormers had to march upwards of two hundred yards. Steadily they pushed on, and planted the ladders in three places against the wall. For the moment, however, it was impossible for the stormers to ascend. "The fire of the enemy waxed stronger, and amid the chaos of sounds of volleys of musketry and roaring of cannon, and hissing and bursting of rockets, stink-pots, infernal machines, huge stones, blocks of wood, and trees—all hurled upon their devoted heads—the men wavered for a moment, and sheltered themselves behind stones."†

is moment-
arily checked.

Notwithstanding this momentary check, the sappers, animated by their officers, kept firm hold of their ladders, and, in spite of the superhuman efforts of the enemy, maintained them in their position against the wall. How long this lasted it is difficult to state. Minutes seemed hours, when, happily, Major Boileau, Madras Engineers, who had gone back to report the state of affairs to the Brigadier, brought up a reinforcement of a hundred

* "For a time it appeared like a sheet of fire, out of which burst a storm of bullets, round shot and rockets, destined for our annihilation."—Lowe's *Central India*.

† Lowe, *ibid.*

men of the 3rd Europeans. The stormers then rushed to the ladders, led by their engineer officers. Some were found too short, others broke down under the men ; but Lieutenant Dick, Bombay Engineers, gained, by means of one of them, the summit of the wall, and, fighting against enormous odds, called upon the men to follow him. Lieutenant Meiklejohn of the same noble regiment mounted by another, and then boldly jumped down into the seething mass below. Lieutenant Bonus, also of the Bombay Engineers, reached the wall by a third. The men pressed on from behind ; but before they could, in any number, join their officers, Dick had fallen from the wall, dying pierced with shot and bayonets ; Bonus had been hurled down, struck in his face by a log or stone ; Fox of the Madras sappers, who had also reached the wall, had been shot in the neck ; Meiklejohn had been cut to pieces. But the stormers pushed on in streams from some eight ladders, and at length gained a footing on the rampart, dealing and receiving death from the enemy, who still continued fiercely to contest every point of the attack.

The ladders
too short, or
too weak.

Gallantry of
Dick,
of Meikle-
john,
of Bonus,

of Fox.

The right
attack gains
a footing
on the
ramparts

It was at this crisis that the stormers of the left attack, led by Brockman, who, looking along the wall from the breach which he had won, had seen the failure of the attack and had resolved on the instant to do all in his power to aid his countrymen to repair the momentary damage, made the charge upon the flank and rear of the defenders of which I have spoken. Its effect was marvellous. The defenders relaxed their hold, the opposition ceased, and the stormers of the right attack jumped down and mingled with their comrades.

The left
attack
renders
timely aid.

The defence having thus given way, the stormers made their way through the city to the palace, Lowth leading the way. The palace had been prepared by the rebels for a resistance in the last resort. The conflict, as the stormers forced their way through the streets, was severe. At the palace it was desperate. The houses on both sides of the street leading to it had been set on fire, and the heat was fearful. When, too, the courtyard of the palace was reached, it became apparent that the resistance had only begun.

The stormers
march on the
palace,

houses on

which, after
a desperate
contest, they
gain.

Every room was savagely contested. Fruitlessly, however. From chamber to chamber the enemy were driven at the point of the bayonet. At length the palace itself was gained. The opposition, however, had not even then entirely ceased. Two hours later it was discovered that fifty men of the Rání's bodyguard still held the stables attached to the building. These men defended themselves to the last before, after a desperate encounter, they were disposed of. But the men who accomplished this task, the 86th and the 3rd Europeans, were compensated for their toil and danger by recapturing a British flag.*

Terrible
scene in the
stables.

This occurrence had but just happened when Sir Hugh, who had been present throughout with the left attack, received information that a body of the rebels, numbering about four hundred, driven from the town, after having vainly tried to force the pickets of one of the cavalry camps, had taken up a position on a hill to the west of the fortress, where they had been surrounded by the cavalry. Sir Hugh instantly sent against the hill the available troops of all arms under Major Gall. This gallant officer sent to storm the hill a detachment of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry. The 24th went at the rebels with a will, and killed all but about twenty, who retreated to the summit and there blew themselves up. The 24th lost an officer and several men in this attack. Another body of about fifteen hundred who had collected in one of the suburbs of the town, declaring they would defend it to the last, were driven out, about the same time, with a loss of three hundred of their number.

The rebels,
driven from
the town,
occupy a
strong
position
outside of it,

whence they
are driven
by the 24th
Bombay
Native
Infantry ;

another
body is
similarly
treated.

All that night, and throughout the following day, desultory fighting continued, the enemy being either slaughtered or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. Sir Hugh was meanwhile engaged in organizing measures for an attack on the fortress. But the Rání saved him further trouble on that score. On the night of the 4th, despairing of a successful defence of the fortress, and, hoping that her presence at Kalpi might induce

Desultory
fighting
continues
during the
night.

* This was a Union Jack of silk, which Lord William Bentinck had given to the grandfather of the Rání's husband, with the permission to have it carried before him, as a reward for his fidelity.—Sir H. Rose's despatch.

Tántiá Topí once more to aid her, she evacuated the fortress with her remaining followers. She rode straight for Kalpí, and arrived there the very evening on which Tántiá, who had travelled more leisurely, reached that place. Sir Hugh sent a cavalry force in pursuit of her, but the start had been too great. A few of the fugitives were, however, cut up.

The Rání
evacuates
the fortress
and rides
for Kalpí.

The fortress of Jhánsí was occupied by Sir Hugh Rose on the morning of the 5th of April. The loss sustained by him during the operations against it, including the action on the Betwá, amounted to three hundred and forty-three killed and wounded, of whom thirty-six were officers. The enemy's loss was computed at five thousand. One thousand dead bodies were actually burned or buried in Jhánsí itself.

Sir Hugh
occupies the
fortress.

The mode by which Jhánsí was captured attests the merits of the noble soldier who planned and carried out the attack. Never was there a more complete combination of daring and skill, of foresight and resolution. The result was worthy of the plan, and of the genius which formed the plan.*

Credit due
to Sir Hugh
Rose.

Sir Hugh's object now was to march on Kalpí, to drive the rebels from that stronghold on the Jamnah whence they had so constantly menaced the communications of the British. Kalpí was the arsenal of the rebels, the head-quarters of the nephew of Náná Sáhib, and was extremely well provided with artillery and warlike stores. It lies on the Jamnah, a hundred and two miles to the north-east of Jhánsí, and only forty-six to the south-west of Kánhpúr. The occupation of this place would enable Sir Hugh to touch the left rear of Sir Colin Campbell's army, and, in co-operation with him, to clear the triangle, the angles of which were Jhánsí, Kalpí, and Ágra—Gwáliár being nearly midway in the line uniting Jhánsí and Ágra.

Importance
of capturing
Kalpí.

* The following extracts from Sir Hugh Rose's despatch attest the great strength of the town and fortress: "It was not till Jhánsí was taken that its great strength was known. There was only one part of the fortress, the south curtain, which was considered practicable for breaching. But, when inside, we saw this was a mistake, there being at some distance in rear of the curtain a massive wall fifteen or twenty feet thick, and immediately in rear of this a deep tank cut out of the live rock."

For seventeen days Sir Hugh's little army had known no repose. The halt at Jhānsí of nearly nineteen days which followed the capture of the place was, however, in no sense devoted to repose. Much had to be done in Jhānsí itself: the arrangements for a fresh campaign had to be organised, provisions had to be laid in, the magazines to be replenished. At length all was ready. Leaving at Jhānsí a small garrison consisting of the head-quarter wing of the 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry, the left wing 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, a hundred troopers Haidarābād contingent, half a company Bombay sappers, and three guns Bhopál contingent—the whole under the command of Colonel Liddell, 3rd Europeans—Sir Hugh detached, on the night of the 22nd of April, a detachment under Major Gall to watch the rebel garrison of Kotá, reported to be at a place called Máu, in the neighbourhood, and set out himself with the 1st brigade at midnight on the 25th, leaving directions for the 2nd brigade to follow two days later. Major Orr had been previously detached with the bulk of the Haidarābād force to prevent the Rájáhs of Bānpúr and Sháhgarh and any other rebels from crossing the Betwá and doubling back southwards.

Leaving for a moment these several officers engaged in carrying out the orders entrusted to them, I propose to return for a moment to the Rání of Jhānsí and Tántiá Topí.

These two important personages had arrived, as I have said, at Kalpí the same day. The first act of the Rání had been to implore the nephew of Náná Sáhib, known as Ráo Sáhib, "to give her an army that she might go and fight." The following morning Ráo Sáhib ordered a parade of all the troops at his disposal. These consisted of some regiments of the Gwáliár contingent, several regiments of the regular native army recruited to nearly full strength, the contingents of various rebel Rájáhs, and the remnant of the Jhānsí garrison. Ráo Sáhib reviewed these troops, addressed them, and then directed Tántiá to lead them against the English. Tántiá obeyed, and, hoping to meet them when possibly all their forces might not be reunited, marched to Kúrch, a town forty-two miles from Kalpí on the Jhānsí road, and there took up a strong position, covered by

Sir Hugh
halts at
Jhānsí to
arrange for
a march on
Kalpí.

Dispositions
made by
him with
that object.

The Rání of
Jhānsí at
Kalpí.

Her appeal
to Ráo
Sáhib,

who holds a
review,
and orders
Tántiá Topí
to march
against the
English.

woods and gardens, with temples at intervals between each of them, surrounded by a strong wall, and there threw up intrenchments.

Meanwhile the English force was advancing on Kúnych. Major Gall, harassed by the enemy on his march, had reached the town of Púch, fourteen miles from Kúnych, on the 1st of May. Here he was joined the same day by Sir Hugh Rose and the 1st brigade. Major Orr, on his side, had crossed the Betwá, attacked the Rájahs of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh at Kotrá, and had taken one of their guns. He had, however, found it impossible to cut them off, and they had succeeded, for the time, in escaping southwards, supplies and carriage being furnished them by the treacherous Rájah of Jigní. By Sir Hugh's direction, Major Orr then marched on Kúnych.

He marches
on Kúnych.
Movements
of Gall,
of Rose,
and of Orr.

The country between Púch and Kúnych was studded with little forts, which, up to the time of which I am writing, had been occupied by the enemy. From these they could undoubtedly cause considerable annoyance to small detachments; but, in the presence of the large force now collecting at the former place, they deemed it advisable to abandon them and concentrate at Kúnych.

The rebels
concentrate
on Kúnych.

Sir Hugh was joined by his 2nd brigade, strengthened by the 71st Highlanders, on the 5th of May. He at once marched on Lohári, ten miles nearer Kúnych, thence to put into action the plan of attack which he had matured. But, when he arrived at Lohári, he was informed that the rebels were in possession of the fort of the same name close to it. He immediately detached Major Gall, with a wing of the 3rd Europeans, some artillery and dragoons, to attack it. Gall took the fort, losing two of his officers and some men; out of the garrison not one escaped. Sir Hugh, meanwhile, had matured his plans.

Sir Hugh
sends Gall
to capture
Lohári,

An Asiatic army, Sir Hugh was well aware, always expects a front attack. He had also noticed that nothing disturbs such an army so much as a turning movement. Instead, therefore, of sending his troops against a position which the rebels had carefully prepared, Sir Hugh resolved to make a flank march with his whole force on the 6th to a position at once

and makes
a flank
march to
turn the
rebels'
position.

facing the unfortified side of the town of Kúrch, and threatening seriously the enemy's line of retreat from that place to Kalpi.

With this view Sir Hugh broke up from his encamping-ground early on the morning of the 6th, and, making a flank march of fourteen miles, brought his force into the position contemplated. His 1st brigade, forming his left, rested its extreme left on the village of Nágupúra; his 2nd brigade, forming the centre, occupied the village of Chumair; Major Orr's Haidarábád force, forming the right, occupied the village of Umri. This position was two miles from Kúrch.

It was 7 o'clock in the morning before the troops sighted the rebels, though still invisible to them. Sir Hugh, who had marched with the 1st brigade, ordered them a dram of rum and some biscuit,* whilst he galloped to inspect the arrangements made in the centre and on the right. In an hour he returned, and ordered Major Gall, with a detachment of cavalry, to reconnoitre the wood, garden, and temples which lay between him and Kúrch, covering that advance by a fire of shot and shell. At the same time he directed the siege-guns to take up a position whence they could play upon the town.

Gall soon returned with a report that the enemy had retreated through the wood to the part of it near the town, having in their rear a body of cavalry; that the siege-guns had had the effect of driving the rebels on the right of the wood into the town, but that some outworks were still occupied by them.

Sir Hugh determined at once to clear the wood and the outworks with his infantry, and then to storm the town. Covering his left wing with a wing of the 86th, and the whole of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, in skirmishing order, and supporting their flanks with cavalry and horse artillery, he sent them into the wood. Advancing in perfect order, the gallant Sipáhis of the 25th Native Infantry cleared the wood, temples, and walled gardens in front of them, whilst the 86th, making a circuit to

* The men had nothing to eat that day till 8 P.M., except the small amount of food they carried in their haversacks.

their left, carried all the obstacles in their front, and then, bringing their left shoulders forward, advanced, despite a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, through the north part of the town and took the fort. This operation, performed by the 1st brigade, drove the enemy's right on their centre.

The 1st
brigade
drives the
rebel right
on its centre,

Meanwhile, Brigadier Steuart, commanding the 2nd brigade, having observed a body of rebel infantry strongly posted in cultivated ground threatening the line of attack of his brigade, marched to dislodge them. The rebels contested their position with great valour, and it was not until the 1st brigade, establishing itself in the manner already described, threatened their flank, that they gave way. It had been intended that Brigadier Steuart should then march straight into the town, but, with the view of cutting off the rebels, he moved to the south of it and missed them.

and affords
aid to the
2nd brigade.

Major Orr's force had, whilst this was going on, advanced through the wood, round the town, to the plains traversed by the road to Kalpi.

Major Orr moves to
cut off the rebels.

Although the operations of which I have given an outline had taken only an hour, and the rebels in that short period had been completely defeated, they managed, nevertheless, to gain with the bulk of their forces the Kalpi road in advance of their pursuers, and on both sides of this road they were now endeavouring to restore some sort of order in their masses, so as to check by every means in their power the ardour of the pursuit. When Sir Hugh Rose, then, emerging from the narrow streets of the town, formed up his brigades for a renewed attack, he beheld the enemy retreating in a long irregular line, covered by skirmishers at close distances, the skirmishers supported by groups who acted to them as a sort of bastions.

The enemy,
nevertheless,
gain the
Kalpi road
in full
retreat.

The terrific heat of the day, and the power of the sun, which had made itself felt with fatal effect on many of his European Infantry soldiers,* forbade him further to risk those soldiers in a pursuit which could not fail to entail a sacrifice of many valuable lives. He, therefore, halted them, whilst he launched in pursuit the cavalry of both

The heat of the sun
forces Sir Hugh to
halt his infantry,
but he launches the
cavalry in pursuit.

* Many of the Sipáhis were also struck down by the sun.

brigades and of Major Orr's force,* and the horse artillery and field guns.

Then was witnessed action on the part of the rebels which impelled admiration from their enemies. The manner in which they conducted their retreat could not be surpassed. They remembered the lessons which their European officers had well taught them. There was no hurry, no disorder, no rushing to the rear. All was orderly as on a field-day. Though their line of skirmishers was two miles in length, it never wavered in a single point. The men fired, then ran behind the relieving men, and loaded. The relieving men then fired, and ran back in their turn. They even attempted, when they thought the pursuit was too rash, to take up a position, so as to bring on it an enfilading fire. Their movement was so threatening that Sir Hugh ordered Prettijohn, 14th Light Dragoons, to charge the enfilading party, an order carried out by that most daring officer with great gallantry and success. Still, however, the rebels maintained the order of their retreat, nor was it until many of them had been killed, and all their guns had been captured, that the survivors were driven in on the main body. Then, for the first time, they lost their nerve; then they crowded into the Kalpi road, a long and helpless column of runaways. But the pursuers were completely tired; they were unable to move faster than at a walk; the cavalry horses were knocked up; and, whilst the guns could not approach near enough to fire grape, the cavalry could only pick up an occasional straggler. When, then, a few hundred yards further, broken ground, over which the rebels scattered, supervened, the pursuit came to an end. It had produced great results. The rebels lost nine guns, a quantity of ammunition and stores, and five or six hundred men in killed and wounded. The mutinous 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, which covered the retreat, was almost annihilated. The English loss was three officers and fifty-nine men killed and wounded, in addition to many struck down by the sun.

The defeat at Kunch sowed great mistrust among the rebels. The infantry Sipáhis taunted the cavalry troopers with having

* Except a party left to watch the Jalaun road and the rear.

abandoned them, and the men of all three arms brought the same accusation against Tántiá Topí, who had disappeared at Kúnych even more rapidly than he had galloped away from the Betwá. The Jhánsí horsemen, too, came in for their share of abuse, and, when they excused themselves on the plea that they had felt bound to escort their Rání⁺ to a place of safety, they were only vilified the more. To such an extent did the animosities among the several parties who constituted the rebel force proceed, that on the morrow of their reaching Kalpí, the rumour, that Sir Hugh was advancing by forced marches against that place, sufficed to induce them to disperse. It is believed that shortly after that rumour arrived there were only eleven Sipáhis left in the town and fort of Kalpí. This dispersion was, however, soon remedied in a manner to be hereafter described.

Bad effect
on the rebels
of the defeat
at Kúnych.

The report which had so disquieted the rebels at Kalpí was not baseless. Despite the fact that his ammunition was well-nigh exhausted, Sir Hugh, determined to give the enemy no breathing time, had pushed on with all practicable speed from Kúnych. On the 15th he established himself at Guláulí, on the Jamnah, six miles from Kalpí. Guláulí is not on the direct road between Kúnych and Kalpí, but two reasons had prompted Sir Hugh to march on it in preference to taking the direct route. In the first place, he had heard from the Commander-in-Chief that Colonel G. V. Maxwell had been detached with the 88th Foot, some Sikhs, and the Camel corps, to co-operate with him; and, Maxwell having reached the left bank of the Jamnah opposite Guláulí, Sir Hugh was able to hold out his hand to him at that place. In the second, by marching on Guláulí, Sir Hugh turned the fortifications which had been thrown up to impede his advance, and threatened Kalpí from an unexpected quarter.

Sir Hugh
pushes on,

and esta-
blishes
himself at
Guláulí, near
Kalpí.

His reasons
for taking
that route.

Sir Hugh's march from Kúnych to Guláulí, though unopposed by the enemy, was in all respects most trying. The terrible heat, and the rays of the sun, told upon his men with deadly effect, and admissions to the hospitals and deaths increased at an alarming rate. This fact was well known to the rebels, and they did their

Trying
character of
the march
to Guláulí.

* The Rání fled to Kalpí after the defeat; Tántiá Topí to Chírki, near Jaláun, the residence of his parents.

utmost to reap full advantage from it. An intercepted general order by their general-in-chief, issued about this time, directed that no attack should be made upon the European infidels before 10 o'clock in the day, as fighting in the sun either killed them or sent them to their hospitals. But in spite of the heat Guláulí was reached on the 15th, communications were opened with Maxwell, and Sir Hugh, in accordance with his invariable custom, made prompt arrangements for engaging the enemy.

Who now constituted the enemy? I have related how, in the panic caused by the rumour of Sir Hugh's onward march, only eleven rebel Sipáhis had been left in the town and fort. A few days later, however, the unexpected arrival of the Nawáb of Bandah with two thousand horse, some guns, and many followers—the remnant of the force defeated by General Whitlock at Bandah, in the manner to be told in the next chapter—and his energetic exertions, backed by those of the Rání of Jhánsí, produced one of those changes from despair to confidence which mark the Indian character.³ The Sipáhis who had left returned, and, exhorted by their leaders to hold to the last Kalpí, their only arsenal, and to win their right to paradise by exterminating the infidel English,† declared their resolution to defend it to the last.

Although as a fortification Kalpí had but little to boast of, its position was unusually strong. It was protected on all sides by ravines, to its front by five lines of defence, and to its rear by the Jamnah, from which rises the precipitous rock on which stands the fort.

Between the British camp and Kalpí, indeed, existed a most extraordinary labyrinth of ravines, over which artillery and cavalry could make no progress, but which furnished an interminable cover of the most formidable description for infantry. On the, so to speak, tongues of land formed by the prolongation of the ravines, the rebels had rapidly thrown up intrenchments, and had cut trenches near to these in a manner rendering it impossible that they should be turned. Even should they be driven out of the intrenchments, it was within the power of the rebels to fall back on eighty-four temples, built, as well as the

* Sir Hugh Rose's despatch, the 24th of May, 1858.

† Intercepted letter, *idem*.

walls round them, of the most solid masonry. These temples constituted a second line of defence; the outwork of ravines a third; the town of Kalpí a fourth; another chain of ravines a fifth; and the fort the last.

On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, constant skirmishes occurred between the two armies, the enemy being the attacking party. On all these occasions they were repulsed, but the British suffered much from the sun, as well as from the incessant toil, anxiety, and heat. On the 19th a mortar battery, established on the right front of the British position, opened on the town. On the 20th a detachment from Colonel Maxwell's brigade, consisting of two companies of the 88th, and a hundred and twenty Sikhs, crossed the river, and joined Sir Hugh Rose. On the 21st the batteries from Maxwell's camp opened on the fort and town. On the 22nd Sir Hugh determined to deliver his long-meditated blow.

Skirmishes
between the
two armies.

Maxwell
reinforces
Sir Hugh.

Sir Hugh had, from the first, determined that, whilst Maxwell's batteries should shell Kalpí, he would clear the ravines and the other obstacles and attack the left face of the fort. Resolved to keep his men for this great blow, he had contented himself with simply repulsing the attacks I have mentioned. But when he received information that the rebels were meditating an attack on the 22nd, which should be fatal to one of the contending parties, he, now ready for them, resolved to second their views.

The British
plan of
attack.

The rebels had prepared a plan so skilful, that, if carried out with courage and resolution, it had many chances in its favour. Whilst their right should make, with great demonstrations, a false attack on the British left, they proposed to steal up the ravines with their main body, and try and overwhelm the right, weakened, they hoped, by detachments sent to support the left.

The rebel
plan of
attack.

It must be understood that the British force occupied the ground situated between the river Jannah and the road running from Kalpí to Bandah; that its right rested on the ravines near the river; whilst its left nearly touched that road. In pursuance of their plan, the rebels marched out in masses at 10 o'clock on the 22nd along the Bandah road, and threatened the British left, opening fire simultaneously with their guns on its centre.

The rebels
open the
battle,

This attack, headed by the Nawáb of Bandah and by Ráo Sáhib, nephew of Náná Sáhib, though intended only as a feint, soon made itself felt, and the British left became heavily engaged. Still Sir Hugh, confident as to the real object of the enemy, did not move a man from his right. He contented himself with replying to the enemy's guns with his guns in a style which soon forced the rebels to limber up and fall back. But the attack on his left not only continued, but became very real indeed: still Sir Hugh did not move a man from his right. It was well he did not. Suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass of fire; the enemy's batteries opened, and their infantry, climbing from below, poured in an overwhelming musketry fire on the right of the British line. The suddenness of the attack, the superior numbers of those making it, and the terrible heat of the day gave the rebels a great advantage. Another point, too, was in their favour. Many of the Enfield rifles had become clogged by constant use in all weathers, and the men, after a few discharges, had found it very difficult to load them. The sun, too, had struck down an unusual number of the Europeans. When, then, the rebels, starting up in great numbers from the ravines, poured in volleys which the British reply to only feebly, when they saw that each discharge from the thin red line became weaker than that preceding it, they began to gain a confidence they had never felt before. They pressed on with loud yells, the British falling back, until they approached the British light field-guns and mortar-battery. Then it was that Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners defend them with their lives. The 86th and 25th Native Infantry, in thin extended line, disputed the advance step by step. Still the rebels pressed on,*

and attack
the British
left,

to the enemy's
guns with his
guns in a style
which soon forced
the rebels to
limber up and
fall back. But
the attack on
his left not only
continued, but
became very real
indeed: still Sir
Hugh did not
move a man from

Maintaining
that attack,
they suddenly
direct their main
energies
against the
British right.

The confidence
of the rebels
increases.

Gallantry of
Brigadier
C. S. Stuart.

* "Well do I remember," writes to me a very gallant officer, who greatly distinguished himself throughout this campaign, "Well do I remember that day. Nearly four hundred of my regiment, 'the 86,' were *hors de combat*, the native regiment was not much better, and thousands of yelling savages were pressing on, a river in our rear. We were well-nigh beaten, when the Camel corps came up, and about one hundred and fifty fresh troops soon turned the tide, and sent the bháng-possessed enemy to the right-about again. It was the Camel corps

and it seemed as though from their very numbers they must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom news of the attack had been conveyed, brought up the Camel corps, which had opportunely crossed the river that very morning, at their best pace; then, dismounting the men, and leading them forward himself at the double, charged the advancing foe, then within a few yards of the British guns. For a moment the enemy stood, but only for a moment. A shout, a dash forward from the whole line, and they went headlong into the ravines below. Not only was the attack on the right repulsed, but the victory was gained! The attack on the left collapsed when it was seen that that on the right had failed, and the guns, gaining the rebels' flank, inflicted great loss on them as they fled. Sir Hugh followed them up so closely that he cut off a number of them from Kalpi. The fire from Maxwell's batteries made those who reached that fort feel that it was no secure place of refuge. They evacuated it accordingly during the night. The rest of their force, pursued by the horse artillery and cavalry, lost their formation and dispersed, losing all their guns and baggage. Even the Rání of Jhánsí, who fled with them, was compelled to sleep under a tree!

Sir Hugh brings up the Camel corps at the critical moment,

and gains the day.

The rebels evacuate Kalpi.

The position of the troops, their sufferings, the feelings that animated them, are thus graphically described by an eye-witness who, throughout its duration, took part in the campaign, and who subsequently gave to the world an eloquent record of the achievements of his comrades. "This was," writes Dr. Lowe,* "a hard day's work, and a glorious victory won over ten times our number under most trying circumstances. The position of Kalpi; the numbers of the enemy, who came on with a resolution and a display of tactics we had never before witnessed; the exhausted, weakened state of the general's force; the awful suffocating hot winds and burning sun, which the men had to endure all day, without time to take food or water, combined to render the achievement one of unsurpassed

Trials to which the English troops were subjected during this campaign.

that literally saved Sir Hugh Rose's division. The enemy were within twenty yards of our battery and outpost tents, the latter full of men down with sunstroke. Another quarter of an hour and there would have been a massacre. Ever since that day I have looked upon a camel with eyes of affection."

* Lowe's *Central India during the Rebellion of 1857-58*.

difficulty. Every soul engaged in this important action suffered more or less. Officers and men fainted away, or dropped down as though struck by lightning in the delirium of a sunstroke; yet all this was endured without a murmur, and in the cool of the evening we were speculating upon the capture of Kalpí on the morrow.[‡]

Their un-
murmuring
endurance.

Before daybreak the following morning, Sir Hugh marched on that place. His 1st brigade, under Brigadier C. S. Stuart, he sent through the ravines, following the course of the Jannah, whilst he led the 2nd himself,* along the Kalpí road.

Colonel Maxwell's batteries still continued to shell the fort and the villages in front of it. As the two brigades advanced, however, these villages were abandoned by the rebels, and it soon became apparent that no serious resistance was contemplated. When the two brigades, having overcome all obstacles in their path, united near the town, and advanced into it, they were not opposed; the rebels had fled, quitting for ever the arsenal which had served them so long and so well.†

The fort of
Kalpí is
evacuated.

The capture of Kalpí completed the plan of the campaign for the column having its base at Máu, which Sir Robert Hamilton had submitted to the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief towards the close of the preceding year. In all respects that plan had been carried out. Marching from Máu in November Sir Hugh Rose had, in five months, traversed central India, crossing its numerous rivers, storming strong forts, taking many towns, defeating armies vastly superior in numbers, led by men and by a woman whose

The capture
of Kalpí
completes
Sir Robert
Hamilton's
plan.

* Brigadier C. Steuart, C.B., commanding the 2nd brigade, had reported sick after the battle of Kúrch, and the command had devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 71st Highlanders.

† The following description, given by an eye-witness, proves how the rebels had used the position of Kalpí, and the good stead in which it had stood them. After enumerating the quantities of ammunition, lead, iron, brass, gun-carriages, gun-moulds, &c., found in the fort, Dr. Lowe adds:—"The enemy had erected houses and tents in the fort, had their smiths' shops, their carpenters' shops. Their foundries for casting shot and shell were in perfect order, clean and well constructed; the specimens of brass shell cast by them were faultless. . . . In the arsenal were about sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder, outside it were large heaps of shot and shell ranged after the fashion of our own. . . . It would appear. . . . that the enemy had prepared for a long stand here."—*Lowe's Central India.*

hatred of the British name incited them to efforts not to be surpassed in the annals of the mutiny. He and his gallant comrades had accomplished these great deeds during a season the terrible heat of which far surpassed the heat of the corresponding season of previous years, and under a sun which proved scarcely less deadly than the enemy.* Yet moving steadily onwards, regarding difficulties as only obstacles to be overcome, keeping in view the goal at which he aimed, Sir Hugh had marched from victory to victory. It may be said of him that it was his character which created his success. Careless of himself, he conducted every reconnaissance, he planned every action, he was foremost in every attack, he courted danger and exposure. At the same time, no leader ever paid greater attention to the soldiers. To look after their comforts, to see, after a hard-fought action, that the wounded were attended to, and, after a long and tedious march, that provisions were abundant, was with him a sacred duty. It was this which endeared him to the troops; this that made them fight cheerily against numbers, endure the killing rays of the fierce sun. If he demanded all their energies on the battle-field, they saw that their wants were attended to when the battle was over; that he never spared himself; that, with all the cares of command upon him, he managed to find time to attend to them. It was that sympathy which evoked the enthusiasm which enabled the soldiers of Sir Hugh Rose to equal the achievements of any warriors of whom history makes record.

Summary
of the
campaign.

Sir Hugh
Rose's
"character
created his
success."

The campaign now appeared over. Its every object had been accomplished. Sir Colin Campbell, sharing that opinion, wrote to Sir Robert Hamilton a letter explaining the mode in which the several corps of the Central India Field Force were to be cantoned,

The
campaign
appears
concluded.

* Dr. Lowe thus describes the condition of officers and men from the effect, of the sun, when they entered Kalpi. "Most of the officers and men were sick and the whole force needed rest. The general himself was very ill; his chief of the staff, Colonel Wetherall, C.B., was in a raving fever; his quartermasters general, Captain Macdonald, was worn out, and among the list of those going away; the chaplain of the force, the Rev. Mr. Schwabbe, had lost his reason and was apparently sinking fast; and other officers, wounded or exhausted by their long and arduous duties and disease, brought on by these and the terrible sun, had been ordered to England."

and adding, with regard to Whitlock's force, that "it would be otherwise employed as a movable division." The general who had conducted the campaign was about to dissolve the force and to proceed to a cooler climate for the recovery of his health, How all these arrangements were suddenly altered I shall tell in another chapter. Meanwhile it is my duty to record the operations of the other column, which, with Jabalpúr as its base, had been directed to move on Bandah, subduing the rebel Rájahs on its route.

CHAPTER II.

KÍRWÍ AND BANDAH.

ON the 16th of November, 1857, Brigadier-General Whitlock, of the Madras army, was appointed to the command of a division for service in the Nágpúr, Ságar, and Narbadá territories. His force was to consist of an artillery brigade, composed of two troops of horse artillery and three companies of foot artillery, with two light field-batteries attached, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Miller; of a cavalry brigade composed of the 12th Lancers and the 6th and 7th Madras Light Cavalry, commanded by Colonel A. W. Lawrence; of one brigade of infantry, composed of the 3rd Madras Europeans and the 1st and 5th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Carpenter, M.A.; of a second infantry brigade, composed of the 43rd Light Infantry and the 19th and left wing of the 50th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel McDuff, 74th Highlanders. There were also details of sappers and miners. The force was to be massed at Jabalpúr, and to march thence towards Bandah.

The composition of General Whitlock's force.

A small force, previously detached from the Madras presidency, or serving in the central provinces, was already at Jabalpúr.* This force consisted of six hundred and fifty men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Colonel Miller; a hundred and twenty men 28th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Standen; a hundred and twenty men of the 1st Nágpúr Rifles†; three hundred men 4th Madras Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cumberlege; three hundred men 6th Madras Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Byng; a hundred and fifty men 2nd Nizám's Cavalry, under Captain Macintire;

The force at Jabalpúr is directed

* *Vide* page 70 of this volume.

† The Nágpúr local force had been rearmed by Mr. Plowden.

to halt
pending
Whitlock's
arrival.

a total of eight hundred and ninety infantry and seven hundred and fifty cavalry. This small column had orders to halt at Jabalpúr pending the arrival of General Whitlock and his force.

General Whitlock reached Kámthí on the 10th of January. He was unable, from various causes, to leave that place till the 23rd of the same month. Setting out on that date, he arrived at Jabalpúr on the 6th of February.* Part of his 1st brigade reached on the 6th, the remainder a few days later.

Whitlock
reaches
Jabalpúr.

On the 17th of February General Whitlock, leaving a small garrison at Jabalpúr, soon to be increased by the arrival of Brigadier McDuff's brigade to a tolerable strength, set out for Ságár. He moved in the direction of Jakhání, with the object of overawing the mutinous landowners in the Réwah district. He reached that place, previously captured by Willoughby Osborne, on the 24th, and was there met by the loyal Rájah of Úrchah. Halting here

He sets out
with part of
his force for
Ságár.

one day, he set out on the 26th for Damoh, and arrived there on the 4th of March. It is worthy of remark that during this march of fifteen days General Whitlock, though strongly urged by Major Erskine, the political officer accompanying his force, to drive the rebels from the strong places they occupied, and from which they still continued to harass the districts between Jabalpúr and Damoh, refused to send a single detachment for that purpose from his force. He preferred, he said, to keep it massed in his hand. The result was that, although Whitlock's column secured the ground on which it encamped, scared into submission the villages through which it marched, and even recovered Damoh, it left the population of the districts still occupied by rebels astonished at the regard paid to the latter.

His move-
ments are
characterised
by extreme
caution.

On the 5th Whitlock rode into Ságár, accompanied by some horse artillery and cavalry. Ságár had previously been relieved by Sir Hugh Rose, but on reaching it

Whitlock
reaches
Ságár.

Whitlock at once sent an express to Damoh for two hundred European and seventy native infantry to come in by forced marches; he also detached a small body of Europeans to escort treasure from Jabalpúr, whilst the remainder of the force he kept halted at Damoh under the command of Brigadier

* The distance is a hundred and forty-eight miles.

Carpenter. He, however, returned and resumed command on the 12th.

On the 17th Whitlock, still halted at Damoh, received the Governor-General's orders to march on Nágód and Panah by way of Hattah, and to afford aid to the loyal Rájahs of Bundelkhand, notably to the Rájah of Charkhári. Lord Canning's despatch further directed Whitlock to communicate his movement to Sir Hugh Rose, so as to enable that officer to work in concert with him.

Whitlock is ordered to march on Nágód, and to communicate with Sir Hugh Rose.

In compliance with this order, Whitlock left Damoh on the 22nd of March, and, entering Bundelkhand, arrived at Panah without molestation on the 29th. Evidently a man of extreme caution, Whitlock halted here to obtain information regarding the position of the enemy and the practicability of the roads. The reader, if he refer to the preceding chapter, will see that this was the precise period when the Government would have diverted Sir Hugh Rose from his attack on Jhánsí in order to succour Charkhári, then besieged by Tántiá Topí; and that activity on the part of General Whitlock was specially desirable. But no activity was displayed. The force remained halted at Panah till the 2nd of April. Whitlock, having by that time come to a resolution, marched on it by Marwá Ghát, a route almost impossible for guns and vehicles. So difficult was the road that on reaching Mándalá, at the foot of the pass, Whitlock had to halt for three days to repair damages. Whilst thus halted, he received (3rd of April) a despatch from Sir Hugh Rose, directing him to move with all expedition upon Jhánsí. Whitlock was unable to leave Mándalá till the 6th of April. He then marched, by way of Chatrpúr, on Bandah, reached Chatrpúr on the 9th, surprised the rebels the following night whilst evacuating the fort of Jhigan, then marched on Mahoba, and thence on Bandah.

Whitlock reaches Panah, and halts to obtain information.

His extreme caution.

Proceeds by a difficult road towards Bandah, still slowly and cautiously,

and eventually reaches Bandah.

The rebel Nawáb of Bandah, was playing the part of an independent prince in the district which took its name from the chief town. The Nawáb had been well supplied with information regarding Whitlock's movements, and, judging him to be a man of a cautious and anxious temperament, determined to attempt to lead him into a trap. No sooner, then, had he been

The Nawáb of Bandah endeavours to draw Whitlock into a trap,

certified of the advance of the English general than he directed the troops he had stationed at Mahoba, and which consisted of eight hundred and fifty men of the mutinied 50th Bengal Native Infantry, two hundred men of the 23rd Native Infantry, the 2nd Regiment Irregular Cavalry Gwáliár contingent, and half a battery of guns, to evacuate that place and take up a position in ambush at Kabrai, whence they should fall upon English troops as they would pass it before dawn. At the same time the Nawáb took care that Whitlock should be informed that he would encounter no enemy south of Bandah.

Had the courage of his troops equalled the cleverness of the Nawáb, the plan would have succeeded. Whitlock so far fell

and succeeds.

The Nawáb's troops surprise the English, but the latter, soon recovering, defeat them.

into the trap that he believed there were no rebels before him. His troops were actually marching through Kabrai an hour before daybreak, when the enemy opened upon them a heavy fire. The surprise was but for a moment. The Horse Artillery, the Lancers, and the Haidarábád Irregulars galloped forward, and soon compelled the rebels to

retreat. Unfortunately, in the pursuit which followed, the principal body of the British force took, in the dark, a wrong direction, so that but few of the enemy were cut up. The attempt, however, clearly indicated to Whitlock what was in store for him at Bandah. He pushed on, however, and on the

The Nawáb's troops take up a strong position in front of Bandah.

early morning of the 19th found the rebel forces, headed by the Nawáb, occupying the plain south of the town, and barring his entrance into it. The Nawáb's forces consisted of seven thousand men, of whom rather more than one-third were regular troops. The position he had taken up was strong.

The ground was very much intersected by ravines and water-courses, and of these the rebels had taken skilful advantage.

Whitlock had broken up his camp at 4 o'clock on the morning

Where he is attacked by Whitlock.

of the 19th. At 5 o'clock his advance guard, commanded by Colonel Apthorp, and consisting of three companies 3rd Madras Europeans, two guns Mein's

troop Horse Artillery, some Haidarábád Irregulars under Macintire, a few of the 12th Lancers, and a detachment 1st Madras Native Infantry, came upon the enemy. Apthorp was at once directed to turn the right of the rebel position, whilst the main body should threaten it in front. These orders were carried out to the letter. Apthorp's men had, however, no easy

task. It was difficult to get at the rebels. When Apthorp had carried one ravine he found them in force in the next. There must have been much in the nature of the ground to screen human life, for though the fight lasted seven hours, from 5 o'clock till noon, the casualties on the British side amounted only to thirty-nine, of whom four were officers. Several deeds of heroism were performed. The coolness of Apthorp was the admiration of every one. Young Colbeck, of the 3rd Europeans, met a glorious death leading his men to the charge of the first nullah. Captain Macintire, of the Haidarábád cavalry—which lost twenty killed and wounded—greatly distinguished himself, as did likewise Brigadier Miller, Sergeant-Major Alford, of the Madras Artillery, and Captain Clifton, 12th Lancers. At length the position was forced, and the Nawáb fled, with two thousand followers, to Kalpí, leaving behind him seventeen guns, the town of Bandah, and a palace filled with property of great value. The rebel loss in the battle was variously estimated at from four to six hundred men. General Whitlock established his head-quarters in Bandah, to wait there till the remainder of his force should join him.

Gallantry of
Apthorp,
Colbeck,
Macintire,
Miller,
Alford, and
Clifton.

The Nawáb is
completely
defeated.

The second brigade, under Brigadier McDuff, reached Jabalpur on the 18th of March, and set out for Sagar on the 24th. In order, however, to prevent the mutineers from heading backwards into the Mirzápur district, Whitlock sent instructions to this brigade to change its course and to proceed to Nagód. McDuff, therefore, only reached Bandah on the 27th of May. He found Whitlock still halted there.

Whitlock is
joined by
McDuff's
brigade.

Whitlock, on being joined by McDuff's brigade, resolved to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kalpí, and had indicated the 29th as the day of departure on that errand. But Sir Hugh Rose, as we have seen, had completely defeated the rebels before Kalpí on the 23rd, and had entered that place on the 24th of May. Information of this reached Whitlock in time to change his plans regarding Kalpí.

The reader who has followed me through this and the preceding chapter, will not have failed to see how, in every particular, the action of Sir Hugh Rose had cleared the way for the action of General Whitlock. It was Sir Hugh, who at Garhákóta, and on the Betwá, had disposed of the enemies with whom, but for that,

In every
particular
Sir Hugh
Rose had
cleared the
way for
Whitlock

Whitlock would have had to deal. The defeat of Tántiá Topí on the Betwá alone made it possible for Whitlock to march on Bandah. Yet—extraordinary perversity of Fortune—whilst Sir Hugh and his force endured all the hardships of the campaign, and did by far the most important part of the fighting, Whitlock and his little army, up to the time of the capture of Bandah, gained all the substantial advantages. The spoils of Bandah, which would not have been gained but for the action of Sir Hugh Rose, were allotted to Whitlock's force alone!

Perversity of
fortune.

The same blind goddess, not content with one perverse distribution of her favours, now set about to perpetrate another. Whitlock had but just renounced his intention to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kalpí, when he received orders from Lord Canning to march against the Ráo of Kírwí.

Whitlock is
ordered to
march on
Kírwí.

Kírwí, formerly better known as Tiróha, is forty-five miles from Bandah, and seventy from Allahábád. The Ráo of Kírwí, Mádhava Ráo, had succeeded to the throne by adoption, when he was only four years old. When the mutiny broke out in 1857, he was then a boy of but nine years, under the tutelage of Rám Chandrá Rám, a man enjoying the confidence of the Government of India, and appointed by it to watch the interests of the young Ráo during his minority. The Ráo was thus, in equity, the ward of the Government of India. It has been commonly asserted that there were two Ráos of Kírwí.* This statement has no foundation. There was, indeed, a discarded relative of the immediate predecessor of Rám Chandrá Rám, to whom he, Mádhava Ráo, was required to pay a monthly stipend of two hundred rupees, and to whom the title of Ráo was granted by courtesy. But this person, Naráyan Ráo, was absolutely without position or influence, and he would not have presumed even to whisper an interference in the affairs of the state.

Sketch of
Kírwí.

The situation at Kírwí, then, was simply this: that the Ráo was a minor, only nine years old, and the affairs of the principality were practically conducted by Rám Chandrá Rám, the nominee of the Government of India. But, though Rám Chandrá was the nominee of the Indian Government, and though he practically managed the state of Kírwí, the feeling amongst the landowners

* I fell into this mistake in the first edition of this work.

of the principality, great and small, was, in 1857, inimical to the British. It seems to me very natural that it should have been so. Many years before, in 1827, Amrit Ráo, the then ruler, had deposited two lakhs of rupees, at 6 per cent. interest, in the hands of the Government of India, for the perpetual maintenance of charities and temples which he had established in the holy city of Banáras. Ten years later, in 1837, the Government of India had reduced their rate of interest to 4 per cent., and Venáyak Ráo, the son and successor of Amrit Ráo, in order that neither the charities nor the temples might feel the loss, and in the view, moreover, of increasing their resources, had then deposited in the hands of the Government three additional lakhs, making a total of five lakhs, the interest of which was to be paid annually for the purposes above stated. The interest was punctually paid during the lifetime of Venáyak Ráo, and for three years after his death, when, for some reason which the Government of India has never divulged, the payment of the interest ceased.

Mádhava Ráo was then only seven years old, and no suspicion of treason, or felonious intent, attached then to the child; but his advisers, and other pious Hindus, men of blameless life and integrity of purpose, were so shocked at the sacrilegious and fraudulent withholding of the interest on sums deposited for a special purpose by the Ráos of Kírwí, that they paid the missing amount out of the estate of the principality. But a very bitter feeling was engendered throughout its broad lands. Princes, priests, and people alike felt that no faith could thenceforward be placed in the promises of the Supreme Power.

Their
adviser,
Rádhava
Govind,
stimulates
their dis-
affection,

When, then, the mutiny broke out in the North-West Provinces; when the Raní of Jhánsí, whose cause, judged from the standard of the prescriptive rights of native princes, was eminently a just cause, broke into rebellion; when the earlier occurrences in the vicinity of Bundelkhand seemed to presage the fall of British rule, it is not surprising that Rám Chandrá Rám, noting the outraged feelings of the people, and their sympathy with the leader of the movement in the Duáb, the heir of the Peshwá, Náná Sáhí, to whom the Ráo of Kírwí, was collaterally related, should have found his task more than ordinarily difficult. But, loyal to the British overlord, he did his duty truly and zealously.

who declare
for Náná
Sáhí.

Up to the third week of May, 1858, the young Ráo, himself innocent of mischief, for, it cannot be too often insisted, he was only nine years old, had enjoyed blissful visions of a fortunate future. He did not know that Kírwí had been placed on the list of the places to which a severe lesson was to be administered, for the discontent of his people had taken a very passive form. For a long time it was covered from danger by the Nawáb of Bandah, but, when Bandah fell on the 19th of April, the young Ráo was made to write to Sir Robert Hamilton, professing loyalty to the British, and offering to admit British troops into his capital.

Causes which prompted the Ráo still to hope after Bandah had fallen.

A little later, when he, Sir Hugh, unaided by Whitlock, had taken Kalpí, and when, on the 2nd of June, Whitlock left Bandah, to march on their palace, the Ráo waited till that general had reached Bharatkúp, ten miles from Kírwí, and then rode out and tendered to him the welcome only offered to those supposed to be friends.

On hearing that Whitlock is marching on Kírwí they ride out and surrender.

Whitlock's march on Kírwí had been made possible by the annihilation of the forces of the Nawáb of Bandah at Kalpí. That chieftain fled from Bundelkhand, never again, during the war, to reappear within its borders. Still, the young Ráo had committed no overt act of rebellion; he was yet virtually a ward of the British Government; he had surrendered without resistance to the British general; and there was assuredly no reason why the great disaffection of his people should be punished in his person as though it had been active treason.

By this act the spoils of Kírwí devolve, without fighting, on Whitlock's force.

But, at Kírwí, there was an accumulation of treasure. The young Ráo was very rich, and it was found not difficult to trump up a case against him.

For Whitlock, moving from Bandah on the 2nd of June,* had entered Kírwí without opposition on the 6th. Not a shot had been fired against him, but he resolved nevertheless to treat the young Ráo as though he had actually opposed the British forces. The reason for this perversion of honest dealing lay in the fact that in

Enormous amount of treasure found at Kírwí.

* The very day on which, it will be seen, one of Sir Hugh's columns started to encounter more dangers at Gwáliár.

the palace of Kírwí was stored the wherewithal to compensate soldiers for many a hard fight, and many a broiling sun. In its vaults and strong rooms were specie, jewels, and diamonds of priceless value!

It was nothing that the young Ráo, to whom this wealth belonged, was himself but a lad of nine years, innocent in his own person of treason; that the Indian Government was his guardian, and, as such, responsible, during his minority for his acts; that the tutor of the young boy, Rám Chandrá Rám, who doubtless had been the interpreter of the outraged feelings of the nobles of Kírwí, had been appointed to his post by British authority. The wealth was coveted, and the wealth was taken—taken as prize money, to be squabbled over by those who took it without firing a shot.*

The question of the proprietary right in this booty, strangely declared to be prize-money, was ultimately argued before the High Court of Admiralty. By this court the claim of Sir Hugh Rose's force to share in the prize, which had come into British possession mainly in consequence of his action, was rejected; the claims of the commanders of other co-operating but independent divisions and columns were rejected; the claims of the Commander-in-Chief in India and his staff, who were hundreds of miles from the spot, and whose action did not influence the capture, and the claims of the officers and men of General Whitlock's force, were admitted to an exclusive right in the prize of Bandah and Kírwí.

The right to the booty subsequently argued before the High Court of Admiralty.

Its decision.

Possibly the reader may feel some interest as to the future of the innocent boy, Mádhava Ráo, whose property was thus unceremoniously disposed of. A treatment similar to that meted out by the Government of India to another of their wards, Dhulip Singh of the Panjáb, was extended to this boy of nine. His estates were confiscated. He was then † “pardoned in consideration of his youth, and is now being educated at Baréli as a ward of the British Government. A provision of Rs. 30,000 a year has been made for him.” ‡ What became of

* *Vide* Appendix A.

† “Aitchison's Treaties,” vol. iii. p. 142 (edition 1863).

‡ The proof that the Government of India were actually the trustees of the Ráo's estate is to be found in the fact that in 1857 they were actually regulating the property, making all-important appointments and authorising all the expenditure, through the Administrator-General of Bengal and his officers.

him subsequently to 1863 I have been unable to ascertain. It is to be hoped that the guardianship announced in the record from which I have quoted has been more faithfully administered than was the first.

After the capture of Kírwí, Whitlock's force was distributed so as to maintain order in the Bundelkhand and Jamnah districts. A portion was sent to Kalpí on the requisition of Sir H. Rose ; one was left at Kírwí, other portions were sent to Mohába, Jaláun, Bandah, Kirka, Ságar, Damoh, and Hamirpúr. The general's headquarters were fixed at Mahóba. Here we must leave him, to return to Tántiá Topí and Sir Hugh Rose.

It is a recognised law, that the malfeasances of agents appointed by a trustee are not to be attributed to the ward.

CHAPTER III.

SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWÁLIÁR.

It has already been related that Tántiá Topí, after his defeat at Kúrch, had fled to Chirkí—about four miles from Jaláur—where his parents resided. He remained there during Sir Hugh Rose's march to Kalpí, and during the events which led to the capture of that place. Learning that Ráo Sáhíb and the Rání of Jhánsí had fled, after their defeat at Galáuli, towards Gopálpúr, forty-six miles south-west of Gwáliár, Tántiá girded up his loins and joined them at that place.

Movements
of Tántiá
Topí, the
Rání of
Jhánsí, and
Ráo Sáhíb
after the
fall of Kalpí.

Their affairs seemed desperate. Not only had they lost their hold on central India, on the Ságár and Narbadá territories and on Bundelkhand, but their enemies were closing in on every side; Roberts had already detached from Rajpútáná a brigade under Colonel Smith to co-operate with Sir Hugh Rose; the force under that officer was at Kalpí, about to be distributed in the territories west of the Jamnah; Whitlock had conquered Bandah and plundered Kírwí. On three sides, then, on the south, east, and the west, they were encompassed by foes. Nor towards the north did the prospect look brighter. There lay the capital of Mahárájah Sindhiá, overlooked by a wall-girt and almost inaccessible rock. Sindhiá was not less their enemy than were the British. In the darkest hour of the fortunes of the British, at a time when hostility seemed to promise him empire, Sindhiá had remained faithful to his overlord. It was not to be thought of, nor was it thought possible, that in the mid-day of their triumph he would turn against them.

Desperate
condition of
their affairs.

Surrounded
by enemies.

The situation then seemed desperate to the rebel chieftains. But desperate situations suggest desperate remedies; and a remedy which, on first inspection, might well seem desperate, did occur to the fertile brain of one

Desperate
remedy
suggested,

of the confederates. To which one it is not certainly known. But, judging the leading group of conspirators by their antecedents—Ráo Sáhib, the Nawáb of Bandah, Tántiá Topí, and the Rání of Jhánsí—we may at once dismiss the two first from consideration. They possessed neither the character nor the genius to conceive a plan so vast and so daring. Of the two who remain, we may dismiss Tántiá Topí. Not that he was incapable of forming the design, but—we have his memoirs—and in those he takes to himself no credit for the most successful act with which his career is associated. The fourth

probably by the Rání of Jhánsí. conspirator possessed the genius, the daring, the despair necessary for the conception of great deeds. She was urged on by hatred, by desire of vengeance, by a blood-stained conscience, by a determination to strike hard whilst there was yet a chance. She could recognise the possibilities before her, she could hope even that if the first blow were successful the fortunes of the campaign might be changed; she possessed and exercised unbounded influence over one at least of her companions—the Ráo Sáhib. The conjecture, then, almost amounts to certainty that the desperate remedy which the confederates decided to execute at Gopálpúr was suggested and pressed upon her comrades by the daring Rání of Jhánsí.

The plan was this. To march on Gwáliár by forced marches, Her plan. to appeal to the religious and national feeling of Sindhiá's troops, to take possession of his capital, by force if it were necessary, and then from the precipitous rock of the Gwáliár fortress to bid defiance to the British.

The scheme was no sooner accepted than acted upon. Emissaries proceeded in advance of the column to tamper with and, if possible, to gain over Sindhiá's troops; The confederates accept it, and march on Gwáliár. the column followed more leisurely, yet with a celerity adapted to the occasion, and reached the Morár cantonment, formerly occupied by the contingent, in close vicinity to Gwáliár, during the night of the 30th of May.

Maharájah Sindhiá was informed that night of the arrival of his dangerous visitors. Probably no prince had ever Maharájah Sindhiá. been placed in circumstances of stronger temptation than was Jaiájí Ráo Sindhiá during 1857–58. The descendant by adoption and the representative of the family of the famous Mádhájí Ráo, of the Dáolat Ráo who had fought for the possession of India with the two Wellesleys; he was still the most

considerable chief of the Maráthá race, and his word, if spoken for religion and race, would have found a response all over central and western India. For four months he had probably the fate of India in his hands. Had he revolted in June, the siege of Dehlí must have been raised, Ágra and Lakhnao would have fallen; it is more than probable that the Panjáb would have risen. That, under such circumstances, possessing strong military instincts and chafing under a great ambition, Sindhiá should have remained loyal, is most weighty testimony to the character of the English overlordship, and to its appreciation by the greater princes of India. That Sindhiá was greatly influenced in the course he followed by his shrewd minister, Rájah Dinkar Ráo, and by the appeals from the fort of Ágra of the able British representative at his court, Major Charters Macpherson, may be admitted. But neither Sindhiá nor Dinkar Ráo liked the English personally. Both the one and the other would have preferred an independent Gwáliár. But, though they did not like the English personally, they had great respect for the English character. Recollecting the state of north-western and central and western India prior to the rule of Marquess Wellesley, they could feel, under the English overlordship, a sense of security such as their fathers and their fathers' fathers never possessed. They had, at least, secure possession of their holdings. No one from outside would venture to molest them as their ancestors had been molested. The question, then, would rise—and it was in answering this that the influence of Major Charters Macpherson came most beneficially into play—"Granting that, by joining the mutincers, we could confine the English to Bengal, would Gwáliár gain by their expulsion? It is doubtful: there would be many competitors for supremacy, and—who knows? The King of Dehlí might, with the aid of Sipáhis, become supreme or the Sikhs of the Panjáb, or Náná Sáhib, or perhaps even Holkar. The risk is too great, for, adhering to the English, we shall be safe in the end."

His great influence.

For four months he had the fate of India in his hands.

Probable reasons for his loyalty.

In some such manner reasoned Sindhiá and Dinkar Ráo. They argued the question in the light of the interests of Sindhiá, and in that light, held ever before them by the steady hand of Charters Macpherson, they cast in their lot with the British.

But not in this manner reasoned many of the great families

The same reasons do not affect the bulk of the Maráthá people,

of Gwáliár, the bulk of the army and of the people. These men could recognise only what was passing before their eyes. Their eyes looked back with longing to the past when the empire was dangling before the Maráthá race, and they never attempted

even to open the book of the future. They could only see, in 1857, the British power struck down, and an opportunity offering itself to their master such as the great Mádhájí would have given half his years to have clutched. They could not understand their Maharájah's inaction, his attempts to befriend the British in the hour of their adversity. They had sympa-

who, in consequence, vent their discontent on Sindhiá.

thatised with the men of his contingent when they revolted and murdered their officers. The higher and more influential amongst them assailed Sindhiá with persuasions and entreaties; and, when they found these fail, they began even to talk of dethroning him and setting up another ruler in his place.

The fall of Dehlí, the British successes in Lakhnao and in north-western and central India, had by no means changed these sentiments. The irritation caused by lost opportunities had produced a state of mind eager to grasp at any chance to mend the situation or to be rid of it.

Such was the state of general feeling in Gwáliár when, on the night of the 30th of May, information was brought to the Maharájah that Tántiá Topí, the Rání of Jhánsí, and other chieftains, with a force estimated at seven thousand infantry, four thousand

Sindhiá hears of Tántiá Topí's arrival at Morár,

cavalry, and twelve guns, had reached Morár. No one knew better the general state of feeling about him than the Maharájah.

and resolves to do battle with him.

But he never wavered. The conviction of the ultimate triumph of the English was never stronger within him than at this apparently inauspicious moment, and, notwithstanding the ill-concealed hostility of many of his adherents, he determined to seize the offered opportunity and do battle with the rebels.

He marches to meet Tántiá,

Accordingly, at daybreak on the 1st of June, he marched out and took up a position about two miles to the eastward of Morár. He had with him six thousand infantry, about fifteen hundred cavalry, his own bodyguard six hundred strong, and eight guns. These he ranged in three divisions, his guns in the centre, and waited for the attack. About 7 o'clock in the morning the rebels

advanced, covered by mounted skirmishers, with camels carrying guns of small calibre. As they approached, Sindhiá's eight guns opened on them. But the smoke of the discharge had scarcely disappeared when the rebel skirmishers closed to their flanks, and two thousand horsemen, charging at a gallop, carried the guns. Simultaneously with their charge Sindhiá's infantry and cavalry, his bodyguard alone excepted, either joined the rebels or took up a position indicative of their intention not to fight. The rebel cavalry, pushing their advantage, then attacked the bodyguard, with which was Sindhiá himself. A portion of the guardsmen defended themselves with great gallantry, and did not cease to fight till many of their number had fallen. But, as it became more and more apparent every moment that it was useless to continue the unequal contest, Sindhiá turned and fled, accompanied by a very few of the survivors. He did not draw rein till he reached Ágra.

is completely
defeated,

and flees to
Ágra.

The first part of the Rání's bold plan had thus succeeded. She and her confederates delayed not a moment to carry it out to its legitimate consequences. They entered Gwáliár, took possession of the fortress, the treasury, the arsenal and the town, and began at once to form a regular government. Náná Sahib was proclaimed as Peshwá, and Ráo Sáhib as governor of Gwáliár.

The rebels
enter
Gwáliár,
and form a
government
there,

Plentiful largesses were distributed to the army, alike to the Gwáliár troops as to those who had come from Kálpí. Rám Ráo Govind, one of the Sindhiá's disgraced courtiers, was appointed prime minister. The royal property was declared confiscated. Four Maráthá chiefs, who had been imprisoned by Sindhiá for rebellion, were released, clothed with dresses of honour, and sent into the districts to raise troops to oppose the British in any attempts they might make to cross the Chambal. The command of the bulk of the troops, encamped outside the city, was entrusted to the Rání of Jhánsí. Those within the town obeyed the orders of Tántiá Topí. Letters were at once despatched to the rebel rájahs still in the district, notably to the Rájahs of Bám-púr and Sháhgarh, to join the new government at Gwáliár.

and prepare
to hold the
place and the
surrounding
territories.

The intelligence of the success of this audacious enterprise reached Kalpí on the 3rd of June. Before I refer to the action taken by Sir Hugh Rose, it is necessary that I should state

The story returns to Sir Hugh Rose.

the exact positions of the various portions of the force with which he had conquered Kalpí on the 24th of May.

His action after the defeat of the rebels at Kalpí.

As soon as, by the occupation of Kalpí on the 24th of May, Sir Hugh Rose had discovered the flight of the rebels, he sent out parties to discover the line they had taken. Information was soon brought to him that, whilst a few had crossed the Jamnah into the Duáb, whilst a few more had been checked in attempting the same course by Colonel Riddell,* the main body had bent their steps in almost a south-westerly direction to Gopálpúr. To pursue these latter he at once organised a column composed of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, and a hundred and fifty Haidarábád cavalry, and despatched it, under the command of Colonel Robertson, on the track of the rebels.

Robertson pushes on in pursuit of the rebels.

Robertson set out from Kalpí on the 25th of May, the rain falling heavily. This rain, which continued throughout that day and the day following, much impeded his progress. He pushed on, however, as fast as possible, and, traversing Mahona and Indúrkí, found that the rebels were but little in advance of him. At Iráwan, reached on the 29th, supplies ran short, and, as none were procurable in the district, the column had to wait till they could be sent up from Kalpí. On the 2nd of June Robertson received these and was joined by two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, a wing of the 86th foot, and four 9-pounders. The following day he reached Mohárar, fifty-five miles from Gwáliár. Here he was startled by information of the attack made by the rebels on Gwáliár and of its result.

An express from Robertson, sent from Iráwan, and which reached Kalpí on the 1st of June, gave Sir Hugh the first in-

* Colonel Riddell, who was moving down the north bank of the Jamnah with the 3rd Bengal Europeans, Alexander's Horse, and two guns, caught sight of a body of the rebels escaping from Kalpí, a few miles above that place, on the south bank of the river, on the 25th of May. He instantly sent the 3rd Europeans across, who captured their camp equipage, the enemy not waiting to receive them. Colonel Riddell's force had previously had several skirmishes with detached parties of insurgents. A small party of his troops had proceeded to Kalpí in boats, joining there Sir Hugh Rose. On their way they were threatened by a numerous body of rebels near Bhijalpúr. Lieutenant Sherrieff, who commanded the party, had at once landed 150 men, defeated the rebels, and captured four guns.

formation that the rebels had taken the road to Gwáliár. Instantly Sir Hugh despatched General Stuart with the remainder of his brigade, consisting of the other wing of the 86th foot, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, four companies of the 25th Bengal native infantry, one squadron 14th light dragoons, No. 4 light field battery, two 18-pounders, one 8-inch howitzer, and some sappers, to join Robertson and to march on Gwáliár. Stuart reached Atakóná on the 3rd—the day on which Robertson had reached Mohárar—and there he too received the first information of the startling occurrences at Gwáliár.

Sir Hugh learns that the rebels are moving on Gwáliár, and at once despatches Stuart's brigade in that direction.

The order which had sent Stuart to Gwáliár was dictated by a sound military instinct. But no one, not even Sir Hugh Rose, had imagined the height of daring to which the Rání of Jhánsí would carry her audacious plans. The rebels might march on Gwáliár, but no one believed they would carry it by a *coup-de-main*. It seemed more likely that they were marching into a trap, to be kept there till Stuart's force should fall on their rear.

No one divined that the daring of the rebels would be successful.

How the "impossible" happened has been told. The information of it reached Sir Hugh on the 4th of June, after he had resigned his command and applied for leave on medical certificate. In a moment he realised the full danger of the situation. Gwáliár had fallen into the hands of the rebels at the time of year most unfavourable for military operations. Another week and the monsoon rains would render the black soil untraversable by guns, and would swell the rivers. Under those circumstances, the transport of siege-guns, in the absence of pontoons, which Sir Hugh did not possess, would be most difficult if not impossible. He realised, moreover, the great danger which would inevitably be caused by delay. No one could foresee the extent of evil possible if Gwáliár were not promptly wrested from rebel hands. Grant them delay, and Tántiá Topí, with the immense acquisition of political and military strength secured by the possession of Gwáliár, and with all its resources in men, money, and material at his disposal, would be able to form a new army on the fragments of that beaten at Kalpi, and to provoke a Maráthá rising throughout India. It might be possible for him, using the dexterity of which he was a master, to unfurl

The effect of its success upon Sir Hugh Rose.

He realises the enormous issues at stake.

the Peshwá's banner in the southern Maráthá districts. Those districts were denuded of troops, and a striking success in central India would probably decide their inhabitants to pronounce in favour of the cause for which their fathers had fought and bled.

Thus reasoning, Sir Hugh considered, and rightly considered, that the time for ceremony had passed. He at once resumed the command which he had laid down,* and, leaving a small garrison at Kalpi, set out on the 5th of June with a small force† to overtake Stuart's column.

With a view to aid Sir Hugh in his operations against Gwáliár, the Commander-in-Chief placed at his disposal, by telegraph, Colonel Riddell's column previously referred to, and Brigadier Smith's brigade of the Rajpútáná field force. The only other troops of which it was possible for Sir Hugh to avail himself were those composing the small garrison of Jhánsí,

under Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks of the artillery, and the Haidarábád contingent, commanded by Major Orr.

The Haidarábád contingent, after their hard and splendid service, had received orders to return home. They had already started; many of them, indeed, were far advanced on their road. But the moment the intelligence of the events passing at Gwáliár reached them they one and all expressed their earnest desire to take part in the operations of their old commander.

Whilst Sir Hugh Rose himself proceeded by forced marches to join Stuart, he directed Major Orr to move to Paníar, on the road between Sípri and Gwáliár, to cut off the retreat of the rebels to the south, and Brigadier Smith, who was near Chandéri, to march with his brigade direct to Kotah-ki-sarai, about five miles to the south-east of Gwáliár. To Colonel Riddell, escorting a large supply of siege-guns, he sent instructions to move with his column by the Ágra and Gwáliár road. He hoped that all

* It is said that for this breach of red tape rules Sir Hugh was severely reprimanded by Sir C. Campbell. Undoubtedly strict routine required the previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. But there are circumstances which require that strict routine must be laid aside; and this was one of them.

† 1st troop Bombay horse artillery; one squadron 14th light dragoons; one squadron 3rd Bombay light cavalry; Madras sappers and miners.

the columns of operations would be at their posts by the 19th of June.

Setting out, as I have said, on the 6th of June, and making forced marches in spite of a heat which occasionally rose to a hundred and thirty degrees in the shade, Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indúrkí on the 12th, and, still pushing on, reached Bahádurpúr, five miles to the east of the Morár cantonments, on the 16th. There he was joined by Brigadier-General Robert Napier, whom he last heard of at the storm of Lakhnao, and who at once assumed command of the 2nd brigade.*

Sir Hugh
overtakes
Stuart and
reaches
Morár ;

There he

is joined by
General
Napier ;

Sir Hugh had reached Bahádurpúr at 6 o'clock in the morning of the 16th of June. He at once directed Captain Abbott with his Haidarábád cavalry to reconnoitre Morár. On receiving Abbott's report that the rebels were in force in front of it, Sir Hugh galloped forward himself to examine the position. He noticed that the side of the cantonments fronting the British position was occupied by strong bodies of cavalry, flanked to the right by guns, supported by infantry in considerable numbers.

reconnoitres
the rebel
position.

The position offered strong temptations to a commander who knew the value of time and promptitude in war, and who considered that minor difficulties must give way when a chance should present itself of overcoming a great obstacle. I shall tell in his own words the effect produced on Sir Hugh Rose by his examination of the position of the rebels before Morár.

Reasons
which decided
him to attack,

"My force had had a long and fatiguing march, and the sun had been up for some time. Four or five miles' more march in the sun, and a combat afterwards, would be a great trial for the men's strength. On the other hand, Morár looked inviting with several good buildings not yet burnt; they would be good quarters for a portion of the force; if I delayed the attack until the next day, the enemy were sure to burn them. A prompt attack has always more effect on the rebels than a procrastinated one. I therefore countermanded the order for encamping and made the following arrangements to attack the enemy." †

told in his
own words.

* Only a small portion of this brigade was present, the bulk of it having been left at Kalpi.

† Despatch of Sir Hugh Rose dated the 13th of October, 1858

He attacked them accordingly. Placing his cavalry and guns on his flanks, and the infantry in the centre, he took ground to the right, the 86th leading the way, with the view of coming upon the road leading to cantonments, and the occupation of which would have turned the left of the rebels. Sindhiá's agent, however, who had promised to lead the troops to this road, lost his way, and Rose found himself in front of a masked battery in the enemy's centre. This at once opened upon the assailants, and its fire was rapidly followed by a musketry and artillery fire from both sides of it. Sir Hugh answered with his guns, at the same time pushing forward his infantry to gain the required turning position on the right. This once gained, he formed to the front, and, reinforcing his left, which bore for a moment the whole weight of the enemy, pushed forward. The advance was decisive. The enemy limbered up and gave way on all sides. The gallant Abbott with his Haidarábád men had meanwhile galloped across the nullahs further to the right, and, dashing through the cantonments at a more northerly point, endeavoured to cut off the retreat of the rebels. But the broken ground he had had to traverse had enabled these to take their guns across the stone bridge which spans the river at the back of the cantonment on the road to the city. The main body of the enemy, driven through the cantonments, fell back on a dry nullah with high banks, running round a village, which they had also occupied. Here they maintained a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with the British. The 71st Highlanders suffered severely, Lieutenant Neave, whilst leading them, falling mortally wounded; nor was it till the nullah was nearly choked with dead that the village was carried. On this occasion Lieutenant Rose of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry greatly distinguished himself. The victory was completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels by Captain Thompson, 14th Light Dragoons, with a wing of his regiment. The wing of the rebel force which he destroyed had been turned by Abbott's advance already spoken of; Thompson, following up the rebels, caught them in the plains and made a great slaughter of them. The guns were splendidly commanded

The battle of
Morár.

The guide
loses his way,

and the army
debouches on
the wrong
front;

but, by a
masterly
movement,
gains a firm
position.

The rebels
fall back,

and continue
the contest in
a village,

which is at
length
carried;

and the vic-
tory is com-
pleted by a
successful
pursuit of the
rebels.

during the day by Strutt, always to the front, and by Light-foot.

The result, then, had justified Sir Hugh's daring. Not only had he dealt a heavy blow to the rebels, but he had gained a most important strategical point.

Result of the battle.

Sir Hugh Rose's success was speedily followed by an exploit on the part of Brigadier Smith, fruitful in important consequences. That gallant soldier, coming up from the south-east, had to make his way through the difficult and hilly ground on that side of Gwáliár before he could reach Kotah-ki-sarai. Picking up on his way the small field-force from Jhánsí, he reached Ántrí, with his brigade,* on the 14th of June, and was joined there the following day by Major Orr and his Haidarábád men. Under orders from Sir Hugh Rose, Smith marched from Ántrí early on the morning of the 17th of June, and reached Kotah-ki-sarai, five miles to the south-east of Gwáliár, at half-past seven o'clock that morning.

Brigadier-Smith advances from the south-east,

and reaches Kotah-ki-sarai;

Smith had met no opposition in marching into Kotah-ki-sarai, but on reaching that place he observed masses of the enemy's horse and foot occupying the hilly ground between himself and Gwáliár. As these masses showed a strong disposition to attack him, and as, hampered with a large quantity of baggage, Smith did not regard his position as a very secure one, he determined to take the initiative. Reconnoitring the ground in front of him, he found it very difficult, intersected with nullahs and impracticable for cavalry. He discovered, moreover, that the enemy's guns were in position about fifteen hundred yards from Kotah-ki-sarai, and that their line lay under the hills, crossing the road to Gwáliár. Notwithstanding this, Smith determined to attack. First, he sent his horse artillery to the front, and silenced the enemy's guns, which limbered up and retired. This accomplished, Smith sent his infantry across the broken ground, led by Raines of the 95th. Raines led his men, covered by skirmishers, to a point about

discovers the rebels massed between him and Gwáliár.

Difficult nature of the ground before him;

he, nevertheless, resolves to attack.

* The brigade was thus composed: a wing 8th Hussars, a wing Bombay Lancers, H. M.'s 95th Foot, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of Bombay Horse Artillery.

Raines leads the infantry to the front, fifty yards from the enemy's works, when the skirmishers made a rush—the rebels falling back as they did so. Raines then found himself stopped by a deep ditch with four feet of water, and having banks so steep that it was with difficulty the men could cross in single file. The rebels took advantage of the delay thus caused to move off with their guns and to retire up the ravines and across the hills. Raines found them so retiring when, after surmounting the difficulty I have recorded, he gained the abandoned intrenchment. Whilst he was continuing his advance across the broken and hilly ground, Smith moved his cavalry across the river Umrah, close to Kotah-ki-sarai. He had hardly crossed when his men came under fire of a battery which till then had escaped notice. At the same time a body of the enemy threatened the baggage at Kotah-ki-sarai. Matters now looked serious. But Smith sent back a detachment to defend the baggage and rear, and pushed forward with the rest of his troops. The road, before debouching from the hills between his position and Gwáliár, ran for several hundred yards through a defile along which a canal had been excavated. As he entered this defile, and during his march through it, he encountered considerable opposition. At length he bore it down, emerged from the further end, joined Raines, then, keeping his infantry halted to hold the defile, he ordered a cavalry charge. This was most gallantly executed by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, led by Colonel Hicks and Captain Heneage. The rebels, horse and foot, gave way before them. The Hussars captured two guns, and continuing the pursuit through Sindhiá's cantonment, had for a moment the rebel camp in their possession.

Amongst the fugitives in the rebel ranks was the resolute woman who, alike in council and on the field, was the soul of the conspirators. Clad in the attire of a man and mounted on horseback, the Rání of Jhán sí might have been seen animating her troops throughout the day. When inch by inch the British troops pressed through the defile, and when reaching its summit Smith ordered the Hussars to charge, the Rání of Jhán sí boldly fronted the British

horsemen. When her comrades failed her, her horse, in spite of her efforts, carried her along with the others. With them she might have escaped but that her horse, crossing the canal near the cantonment, stumbled and fell. A hussar close upon her track, ignorant of her sex and her rank, cut her down. She fell to rise no more. That night her devoted followers, determined that the English should not boast that they had captured her even dead, burned the body.

Thus died the Rání of Jhání. My opinion of her has been recorded in a preceding page. Whatever her faults in British eyes may have been, her countrymen will ever believe that she was driven by ill-treatment into rebellion; that her cause was a righteous cause; and that the treatment she received at the hands of Lord Dalhousie was one of the main causes of the disaffection in Bundelkhand and Central India in 1857-8. To them she will always be a heroine.*

The charge of the 8th Hussars was the last effort of Smith's force. "Upon the return of the squadron, the officers and men were so completely exhausted and prostrated from heat, fatigue, and great exertion, that they could scarcely sit in their saddles, and were, for the moment, incapable of further exertion."† But the enemy, recovering, were again threatening. Smith then determined to content himself with holding the defile, the road, and the adjoining hills for the night. He drew back his cavalry accordingly, and brought up his baggage. The enemy held their ground on the heights on the other side of the canal.

Smith falls back for the night on the head of the defile.

The position thus taken up by Brigadier Smith left much to be desired. It left his left and rear threatened, his baggage within range of the enemy's guns, and his whole force cramped. Sir Hugh, on receiving an account of the action, with characteristic promptitude despatched Colonel Robertson, with the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three troops 14th Light Dragoons, and four guns, to reinforce him.

Dangerous nature of his position.

Sir Hugh reinforces him.

The next day Sir Hugh was reinforced, and his 2nd brigade, commanded by Robert Napier, brought to its full strength by the arrival of the Kalpi garrison. This arrival left him free to act.

The 2nd brigade joins Sir Hugh, who resolves to "finish" with the rebels.

* Vide pages 110, 139, of this volume, and pages 120-1 of Vol. III.

† Brigadier Smith's report.

Leaving Napier in Morár with the troops he could spare,* Rose marched in the afternoon with the rest of the force to join Smith. The distance was long, the heat terrible, the march harassing in the extreme. No less than a hundred men of the 86th were struck down by the sun.† Nevertheless, Sir Hugh pushed on, and bivouacked for the night on the rocky ground between the river and Smith's position.

Harassing
nature of his
march.

He opens
communications
with
Smith.

The first thing that struck Sir Hugh on reconnoitring the following morning was the possibility of cutting off the main body of the enemy from Gwáliár by forcing their left; the next, the extremely cramped and dangerous nature of his own position. The rebels, too, showed every indication that they intended an attack, for with the early dawn they began a heavy fire from their guns, whilst masses of their infantry were seen moving to positions from which they could manœuvre with advantage against the British position. On the principle, then, that when one is disadvantageously posted an attack is often the best defence, Sir Hugh resolved to become the assailant.

Resolves to
anticipate
the rebels'
attack and
to cut them
off from
Gwáliár.

The rebels, as we have seen, were occupying the heights separated by the canal from those gained by Brigadier Smith. That they meant to attack was evident. They spent the early hours of the morning in strengthening their right with the view of assailing the weakest point of the British line, the left. The sun had not risen very high when Sir Hugh received an express from Sir Robert Hamilton to say that he had received certain information that the rebels certainly intended to attack him that day. There was no time for further consideration.

* These were—One troop Bombay horse artillery, three troops 14th light dragoons, three troops 3rd Bombay light cavalry, fifty men 1st Haidarábád cavalry, 3rd Haidarábád cavalry, two squadrons Meade's horse, 21st company Royal Engineers, wing 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay native infantry, three guns Haidarábád artillery.

† Of these men, Sir Hugh reports that they "were compelled by sun-sickness to fall out and go into *dolis*. These same men, the next day, unmindful of their illness, fell in with their companies, and took part in the assault of Gwáliár." These men, be it remembered, formed part of the unreformed British army, an army never surpassed by any other in the world. A "*doli*," generally but incorrectly spelt "*dhooley*"—for it is ignorant of the letter "*h*" and possesses but one "*o*" and no "*y*"—is an inferior kind of palanquin.

Sir Hugh at once directed Brigadier Stuart to move with the 86th regiment, supported by the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, across the canal, to crown the heights on the other side of it, and to attack the left flank of the rebels. As a diversion in favour of this attack he sent Colonel Raines with the 95th regiment from his right front, across the canal in skirmishing order over the shoulder of the hill on which a division of the rebel force was in an intrenched position, covered by guns. This movement was supported by the 10th Bombay Native Infantry. Sir Hugh at the same time ordered up the 3rd troop Bombay Horse Artillery, supported by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, to the entrance of the pass towards Gwáliár. The remainder of the force he disposed in support of the attacking columns and for the defence of the camp from the rear.

Sir Hugh sends Stuart to turn the left of the rebels,

regiment

whilst Raines makes a diversion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth led the 86th, in accordance with the orders he received, against the left of the rebels. These fell back rapidly on the battery; while the 86th pressed them so hard that they made no stand even under their guns. The 86th gave them no time to rally. Brockman's company, led by that gallant officer, then only a lieutenant, dashing with a cheer at the parapet, crossed it and took the guns which defended the ridge two 6-pounders and a 9-pounder. Brockman, with great smartness, turned one of these guns on the rebels, and was engaged in turning the other, when Raines, advancing with the 95th, came up, took command, and completed the operation which Brockman* had so well begun.

Stuart's attack

succeeds.

the ridge

Brockman captures three guns.

Raines completes the operation.

Meanwhile the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, led by Lieutenant Roome, moving up in support of the 95th, and protecting the right of the assailing force, found itself exposed to a fire of musketry and artillery from the heights on the enemy's extreme left. Roome was equal to the occasion. Wheeling to the right, he advanced with half his regiment in

* For his splendid services, Brockman obtained his brevet majority as soon as he got his company, though not until after another officer, whose name I will not mention, had attempted to "annex" his services. The fraud was, however, discovered and rectified with the full sanction of Lord Strathnairn (Sir Hugh Rose).

Gallantry of
Roome and
the 10th Bom-
bay Native
Infantry.

skirmishing order, the other half in support, cleared the two nearest heights of rebel infantry, and captured two brass field-pieces and three mortars which were in the plain below.

Gwáliár lies
at the feet of
the British.

The day was now won, the heights were gained; Gwáliár lay, as it were, at the feet of the British. "The sight," writes Sir Hugh, "was interesting. To our right was the handsome palace of the Phúlábágh with its gardens, and the old city, surmounted by the fort, remarkable for its ancient architecture, with lines of extensive fortifications round the high and precipitous rock of Gwáliár. To our left lay the Lashkar, or new city, with its spacious houses half hidden by trees." In the plain between the heights and the city was a great portion of the rebel forces, just driven from the heights, and now, under the influence of panic, endeavouring to seek a refuge in one or other of the walled enclosures or fortified places towards which they were moving.

Sir Hugh
resolves to
occupy the
city at once.

The sight of these men at once suggested to Sir Hugh that it would be possible to complete his work that day. "I felt convinced," he wrote in his despatch, "that I could take Gwáliár before sunset."

Orders a
general
advance.

He at once, then, ordered a general advance. Covering his extreme right with the 3rd troop Bombay Horse Artillery and a troop of the 8th Hussars, he ordered Colonel Owen, with the 1st Bombay Lancers, to descend the heights to the rear, make his way into the road which led through the hills to the south, and thence attack the grand parade and the new city. Covering his advance, then, with No. 4 Light field-battery, and two troops 14th Light Dragoons, he moved forward his infantry from the left, the 86th leading from that flank, the 95th forming the right.

The British
carry the
Lashkar.

This prompt advance completely paralysed the rebels. Their guns, indeed, opened fire, but the main object of their infantry seemed to be to escape. The British infantry were approaching the plain, when Owen's Lancers, who had gained the point indicated, charged across the grand parade, and, carried away by their ardour, followed the rebels into the Lashkar. In this charge a gallant officer, Lieutenant Mills, was shot through the heart. Raines followed up this charge with a dash on to the parade-ground with two companies of the 59th, and took two 18-pounders and

two small pieces. The British line pushing on, the rebels retreated through the town. Before sunset, as Sir Hugh had divined, the Lashkar, or new city, was completely in his possession. That night, too, Sir Hugh rested in the regained palace of Sindhiá.

Meanwhile, Brigadier Smith had taken the garden palace, the Phúlbagh, killing great numbers of the rebels. He then, in pursuance of orders, followed up the retreating enemy, and continued the pursuit long after dark, inflicting great loss on them and capturing most of their guns.

Smith takes
the palace of
Phúlbagh.

As soon as it was clear the day was won, Sir Hugh sent an express to General Robert Napier, directing him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could. How this order was carried out I shall have to relate presently.

Sir Hugh
sends an
express to
Napier to
pursue,

The Lashkar and palace occupied, Sir Hugh, ever careful even of the vanquished, made arrangements for the security of the city. This task he found comparatively easy, for the shopkeeping class had always been on the side of its best paymaster, the British.

and then
arranges for
the security
of the city.

Thus, on the night of the 19th of June, Sir Hugh had, with a loss of eighty-seven men killed and wounded, regained all Gwáliár, the formidable fortress alone excepted. But the exception was a grave one. The rock fortress, completely isolated, having a length of a mile and a half, and a breadth at its broadest part of three hundred yards, its face presenting a perpendicular precipice, might, if well defended, still give some trouble. The guns from its ramparts had maintained, during the operations of the 19th, a continuous, though not very effective, fire on the British troops. The fire recommenced on the morning of the 20th. It was then, early on that morning, that two officers of the Indian army and their Bombay Sipáhis performed a deed of unsurpassed daring.

The rock
fortress
defies him.

On the morning of the 20th, Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, was in command, with a detachment of his regiment, of the Kotwáli, or police-station, not far from the main gateway of the rock fort. As the guns from its ramparts continued to fire, Rose proposed to a brother officer, Lieutenant Waller, who commanded a small party of the same regiment near him, that

Daring feat of
Lieutenants
Rose and
Waller,

they should attempt to capture the fortress with their joint parties, urging that, if the risk was great, the honour would be still greater. Waller cheerfully assented, and the two officers set off with their men and a blacksmith, whom, not unwilling, they had engaged for the service. They crept up to the first gateway unseen, then the blacksmith, a powerful man, forced it open, and so with the other five gates that opposed their progress. By the time the sixth gate had been forced the alarm was given, and, when the assailants reached the archway beyond the last gate, they were met by the fire of a gun which had been brought to bear on them. Dashing onwards, unscathed by the fire, they were speedily engaged in a hand-to-hand contest with the garrison. The fight was desperate, and many men fell on both sides; but the gallantry of Rose and Waller and their men carried all before them. Rose especially distinguished himself. Just in the hour of victory, however, as he was inciting his men to make the final charge, which proved successful, a musket was fired at him from behind the wall. The man who had fired the shot, a mutineer from Baréli, then rushed out and cut him across the knee and wrist with a sword. Waller came up and despatched the rebel; too late, however, to save his friend.* But the rock fortress was gained.

I have said that when Sir Hugh saw that success was certain he sent a despatch to Brigadier-General Robert Napier requesting him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could.

Napier started on this service at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 20th with about five hundred and sixty cavalry, of whom

* Sir Hugh Rose, in his despatch, thus alludes to this officer: "But the gallant leader, Lieutenant Rose, who has been twice specially mentioned by me for good and gallant conduct, fell in the fort, mortally wounded, closing his early career by taking the fort of Gwáliár by force of arms."

His brigadier, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, thus referred to him in his brigade orders: "Brigadier Stuart has received with the deepest regret, a report of the death of Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, who was mortally wounded yesterday, on entering the fort of Gwáliár, on duty with his men. The brigadier feels assured that the whole brigade unite with him in deploring the early death of this gallant officer, whose many sterling qualities none who knew him could fail to appreciate."

sixty were dragoons, and Lightfoot's battery of artillery, and, pursuing the rebels rapidly, came up with them, about twelve thousand strong, at Jáurá-Álipúr, shortly after sunrise on the 21st. Napier, reconnoitring, found them drawn up in two lines. The first, consisting of infantry and a bullock battery of six guns, had its right resting upon Álipúr; the second, composed of cavalry and horse and field artillery, rested on a village in rear of the front line. They were the entire remnants of the Kalpi army, with additions picked up at Gwáliár.

Napier, receiving Sir Hugh's order to pursue,

pursues, and finds the rebels at Jáurá-Álipúr.

Finding the ground to his right open, Napier directed Captain Lightfoot to take up a position on the left flank of the enemy, about three hundred yards from them, and to enfilade them. He then ranged his cavalry behind a rising ground, which afforded partial concealment, ready to act as soon as the fire from Lightfoot's guns should be felt.

His guns rake their line.

This soon happened. Lightfoot's horse artillery, escorted by Abbott's cavalry, dashed at a gallop towards the enemy's left, and opened fire at the distance indicated by Napier. After a few discharges the ranks of the rebels wavered, then they began perceptibly to thin. Then Lightfoot limbered up and again pushed on at a gallop, whilst the 14th Light Dragoons, led by Prettijohn, and the Haidarábád cavalry, led by Abbott, dashed into their ranks.

The fire causes them to waver,

The result was decisive. Prettijohn's distinguished valour and Abbott's gallant leading were especially conspicuous. The dash of Lightfoot's horse artillery was superb to look at. "You cannot imagine," writes an eye-witness, a cavalry officer, "the dash of the artillery: it was wonderful. We could scarcely keep up with them." But, in fact, every man behaved like a hero: each vied with his comrade. After a brief resistance the rebels broke and fled, hotly pursued.* They lost twenty-five guns,

and, when charged, break and flee.

* An officer who served with great distinction throughout this campaign writes me: "The courage of General Napier in ordering this attack, and the dash and vigour with which it was delivered, so surprised the enemy, that, as we afterwards ascertained, they believed us to be but the advanced guard of a strong force coming up. Just after the action General Napier received a despatch from Sir Hugh Rose ordering him not to attack in consequence of the strength of the enemy."

all their ammunition, elephants, tents, carts, and baggage, and had three to four hundred men killed. Never was a rout more complete.*

The capture of Gwáliár and the dispersion of the rebel army closed the campaign which will for ever be associated with the name of Sir Hugh Rose. In a previous chapter I have alluded to the personal character, strong and firm as iron, and yet singularly sympathetic, which had chained success to all the incidents of that most eventful campaign. I may be pardoned if I briefly recapitulate here all that had been accomplished in a period falling somewhat short of six months. On the 6th of January, 1858, Sir Hugh Rose had left Indúr; on the 24th he laid siege to Ráhatgarh; on the 28th he defeated in the field the Rájah of Bánpur; on the 29th he took Ráhatgarh; on the 3rd of February he relieved Ságar; on the 13th he took the strong fort of Garhákóta; on the 4th of March he forced the pass of Madanpur; on the 17th his 1st brigade stormed the fort of Chandéri; on the 22nd he invested Jhánsí; on the 31st he defeated Tántiá Topí on the Betwá; on the 3rd of April he stormed Jhánsí; on the 6th of May he defeated Tántiá Topí and the Rání of Jhánsí at Kúneh; on the 23rd he beat the rebels at Galáulí, near Kalpí, and occupied that fort the following day. In this chapter I have told how, roused from a bed of sickness by the news of the capture of Gwáliár by the rebels, he pursued them with unremitting vigour, and stayed not his hand till he had recovered all that they had temporarily gained. In every undertaking he was successful, and he was successful, because, careless of himself, he thought of the great end he had in view, and spared no means to attain it.

Close of the
campaign.

Recapitula-
tion of its
results;


real cause
of his
success.

After the victory at Gwáliár, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that Presidency.† The force with which he had won so many victories was, to a great extent, broken up.

Sir Hugh
proceeds to
Bombay,

* Tántiá Topí, who was present on this occasion, thus describes the affair: "We reached Jáurá-Alipur and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots and the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns."

† The following farewell order was issued on this occasion by Sir Hugh Rose: "The Major-General commanding, being on the point of resigning the command



Type, Fitching Co. Sc.

The 95th regiment was ordered to occupy the rock fortress. The 71st Highlanders, the 86th regiment, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, with detachments of cavalry and artillery, remained at Moirár. The 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, with cavalry and artillery, were sent to Jhánsí. Of these troops the command devolved upon Brigadier-General Robert Napier. Brigadier Smith's brigade was distributed in three portions, respectively at Gwáliár, at Síprí, and at Gúnah. It seemed as though they were about to enjoy the rest they had so gloriously earned. But appearances were deceitful. Though one bitter enemy, the Rání of Jhánsí, had disappeared, there had escaped another, not less implacable, perhaps even more fertile in resources than that resolute lady. Though beaten at all points, that other adversary had never despaired. Not many weeks elapsed before the cities, the villages, and the jungles of Central India once more resounded with the name of Tántiá Topí.

and the
regiments
of the
force are
distributed.

The
prospects of
peace are
illusive.

of the Puná division of the Bombay army, bids farewell to the Central India Field Force; and at the same time expresses the pleasure he feels that he commanded them when they gained one more laurel at Gwáliár. The Major-General witnessed with satisfaction how the troops and their gallant comrades in arms—the Rajpútáná brigade under General Smith—stormed height after height, and gun after gun, under the fire of a numerous field and siege artillery, taking finally by assault two 18-pounders at Gwáliár. Not a man in these forces enjoyed his natural health or strength; an Indian sun and months of marching and broken rest had told on the strongest; but the moment they were told to take Gwáliár for their Queen and country they thought of nothing but victory. They gained it, restoring England's true and brave ally to his throne, putting to rout the rebel army, killing many of them, and taking from them in the field, exclusive of those in the fort, fifty-two pieces of artillery, all their stores and ammunition, and capturing the city and fort of Gwáliár, reckoned the strongest in India. The Major-General thanks sincerely Brigadier-General Napier, C B, Brigadier Stuart, C B, and Brigadier Smith, commanding brigades in the field, for the very efficient and able assistance which they gave him, and to which he attributes the success of the day. He bids them and their brave soldiers once more a kind farewell. He cannot do so under better auspices than those of the victory of Gwáliár."

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOUTHERN MARÁTHÁ COUNTRY AND LE GRAND JACOB.

In the first chapter of this volume I have brought the record of affairs in the southern Maráthá country up to the spring of 1858. In Belgáon and the neighbouring districts the crisis had passed away. It needed only the continuance of the same firm and conciliatory rule to ensure that it should never return.

The southern
Maráthá
country.

It happened, however, at this period (March and April 1858) that Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, exhausted by the double labours which had devolved upon him, applied to the Government of Bombay to be relieved of a portion of his overwhelming duties. Mr. Seton-Karr had, unquestionably, reason to believe that the Government, should it accede to his request, would grant him an option in the matter, or, at all events, would relieve him of the less important routine duties appertaining to the administration. But he was mistaken. The Government, in sanctioning Mr. Seton-Karr's request, desired him to retain in his own hands the civil administration of the territory, and to transfer the charge of the political agency to his assistant, Mr.

Mr. Seton-
Karr, apply-
ing to be
relieved of
a portion of
his duties,

is directed to
transfer the
political
agency to
Mr. Manson.

Charles Manson.

Than Mr. Manson there was not a more high-minded, a more generous, or a more earnest officer in the Bombay Civil Service. He was devoted to his profession, he gave to it his whole soul and his undivided energies. He was in the prime of life, intelligent, energetic, decided. But—he had been employed on the detested Inám Commission—and he belonged to a school of politics differing in one essential point from that of which Mr. Seton-Karr was a leader. The reader will have already discovered the title of that school. Mr. Seton-Karr was strongly in favour of the maintenance of the native

Character of
Mr. Manson.

School to
which Mr.
Seton-Karr
belonged.

aristocracy, an upholder of the rights and customs held and enjoyed by native landowners at the time they came under British rule. He believed that, so long as the British respected those rights and customs, it would never be necessary to employ force; that persuasion and management would effect the required end. How he had tried, and tried successfully, that policy I have already shown. The success had proved to him its efficacy. Mr. Manson belonged to a more modern school. In one of the letters which Mr. Seton-Karr addressed to him before the transfer of the political duties, he is jestingly referred to as "an admirer of Lord Dalhousie." This, at least, is certain, that in a crisis such as that which was then prevailing, he gave his preference to measures stronger than those which Mr. Seton-Karr deemed suited to the occasion.

School of which Mr. Manson was a partisan.

Mr. Seton-Karr was greatly disappointed by the decision of the Government, but the reason adduced by that Government was one to which he could take no exception. Lord Elphinstone desired that the whole of the southern Maráthá country should be placed under the control of one officer as Commissioner, and, in the circumstances of the time, he deemed it further advisable that that officer should be a soldier. Now Colonel Le Grand Jacob already exercised political authority in one part of the territory. On the 6th of December he had suppressed a mutiny in Kolhápúr, and had, by his firmness and strength of character, impressed the Bombay Government with the conviction that he was peculiarly qualified to wield political power in troublous times. Lord Elphinstone, then, transferred to him in the new arrangement a similar authority in the other part, with Mr. Manson as political agent under him. If, however, the reason for the transfer was sufficient in that it cast no slur upon Mr. Seton-Karr, it did not the less cause considerable misgivings to that gentleman, for, knowing as he did the native chieftains, he felt that a change would create suspicion in their minds, a change more especially which transferred political action from himself to an officer who had been engaged in the Inám Commission, and that, if that change were followed by a tension of the tie which bound them to the suzerain power, it might even produce a catastrophe.

Reasons adduced by the Bombay Government for the change.

Colonel Le G. Jacob is appointed supreme political agent for the entire territory.

Reasons why Mr. Seton-Karr augured ill of the change.

Previous to the assumption of the charge of the political duties of the Belgáon districts, Mr. Seton-Karr had been gradually engaged in disarming the country—a work in which he had been most ably assisted by Colonel George Malcolm, commanding the Southern Maráthá Horse, and holding military charge of the southern Maráthá territory. It would be difficult to over-estimate the services rendered by this able and gallant officer. His regiment mainly preserved order in that excitable country. In a previous chapter I have referred to his services at Shorápúr. Prior to that event, on the 29th of November, 1857, he had led his cavalry, supported by one company 28th Native Infantry, against the fortified village of Halgalli, which had become the head-quarters of the disaffected. For some days previously these men had been held in check by detachments of the horse, first under Kerr, subsequently reinforced by La Touche, of the same regiment. These officers had, by spirited charges, driven the enemy into the town, and were struggling with them desperately in the streets when Malcolm, with a fresh party, arrived. His men at once dismounted, and assisted by the Sipáhis of the 28th Native Infantry, scrambled over the flat-roofed houses of the village, dashed upon the rebels, and decided the victory. The country, however was still uneasy. Both above and below the gháts British authority had met with resistance, but, except that in some cases the guns and the arms had not been entirely delivered up, the danger from such disturbances was considered to have passed away when Colonel Jacob took charge. Within a very short time of that event, however, a new peril appeared in another quarter.

Colonel
George
Malcolm.

Kerr and
La Touche
attack
Halgalli.

Malcolm
arrives and
the place is
stormed.

State of the
country
generally.

Nárgúnd.

Pressure
exercised
upon its chief
by Seton-
Karr and
Manson.

Of the chief of Nárgúnd I have spoken in the first chapter of this volume.* That this chief was thoroughly disaffected there can be no doubt. Mr. Seton-Karr had even suspected him of treasonable correspondence with the chief of Shorápúr.† But up to May 1858 he had been managed. He had even, under the gentle pressure exercised by Mr. Seton-Karr, sent in a correct list of the guns and ammunition he possessed, and somewhat later, urged by Mr. Manson, had even begun

* *Vide* pages 16 to 28.

† *Vide* page 86.

to despatch them to Dhárwár. Those who are aware of the reverence and affection with which a native chief regards his guns will realise the sacrifice which the Rájah made to meet the expressed wishes of the Government.

Matters were thus progressing, the chief doubtless secretly disaffected, yet complying under gentle pressure with the orders of the Bombay Government, when, about the 25th of May, intelligence reached him that Mr. Seton-Karr had been removed from the political charge of his country, and that Mr. Manson had been gazetted his successor.

The chief hears that Seton-Karr has been replaced by Manson.

This intelligence changed all the good dispositions of the chief of Nárgúnd. Although he did not personally dislike Mr. Manson, he regarded him as the living representative of the hated system of Inám examination—a system which, as I have said, had worked with most disastrous effects on the chiefs of the Southern Maráthá country. At that moment, too, Mr. Manson was specially obnoxious to him, for, only a few weeks previously, whilst still serving under Mr. Seton-Karr, he had arrested and carried off as a prisoner his own dearest friend, the chief of Jámkhándí.* The conviction at once took possession of him that the change was aimed against himself, that he was to be arrested, as his friend had been arrested, and thrown into a dungeon.† In his fear and trepidation, the chief sent a confidential agent to Dhárwár to inquire of the magistrate the meaning of the portentous change.

Reasons why the chief of Nárgúnd dreaded Mr. Manson.

He fears to be arrested.

But, before he could receive an answer, those about him had begun to work on a nature constitutionally timid and nervous. His habitual advisers and companions had not even then despaired of receiving a summons to join the victorious standard of the heir of Peshwá. All seemed yet possible. Tántiá Topí was confronting the British in Bundelkhand, Kalpí was yet held, and one good victory might give them all they desired. These men took advantage of the consternation caused in the chief's mind by Mr. Manson's appointment to inspire him to resist, to cast

Influences which work on the chief of Nárgúnd.

* Only a short time previously the Rájah of Nárgúnd had met Mr. Manson at the chief of Jámkhándí's house, visiting him apparently on friendly terms.

† So penetrated was he with this idea, that he despatched that day a letter to his half-brother at Rúndrúg, in which occurs the passage: "I had rather die than be arrested as Jámkhándí was."

defiance in the teeth of the foreigners who had persecuted themselves and their brethren.

The greatest influence of all, produced by the refusal of the Government to allow the chief to adopt an heir.

These men were not alone in their endeavours. The chief's wife, a lady of great personal attractions, and twenty years younger than he was, had renounced all hopes of a natural heir. She loved power, and the chance of her possessing power after her husband's death rested on the prospect of her becoming the adoptive mother of a reigning boy. And, the British Government having refused to the chief the right to adopt, this prospect was possible only in the event of the British rule being supplanted by that of the Maráthá. This favoured counsellor added, then, her entreaties to those of the chief's companions.

The chief of Nárgúnd submits to those influences and revolts.

The chief of Nárgúnd gave way. That day he recalled the guns which had progressed only a few miles on the road to Dhárwár, began to store provisions, and on the 27th of May, possessing only three obsolete rusty cannon and a swivel gun, declared war, with all the formalities used by the Maráthás, against the British Government!

Manson has set out for the northern districts,

Mr. Manson had taken up his duties as political agent on the 16th of May. From that date till the 26th he had remained with Colonel Jacob at Kohlapúr, transacting business with him. On the 26th he set out for the northern states of the territory, with the view of judging for himself of the state of the country, and of using his influence with the chiefs. Four hours after he had set out, Jacob received a telegram from General Lester, commanding at Belgáon, stating that an insurrection had broken out near to Dhárwár, and that the Nárgúnd chief was believed to be supporting it, as he had recalled some of his guns on their way to be given up. Jacob at once sent a horseman with this news to Manson, informing him also that he had telegraphed to the general to send, if the report were true, a sufficient force to Nárgúnd, and recommending him to return to Kohlapúr.

when Jacob hears of the revolt.

He sends to warn Manson.

Jacob's messenger reached Manson at Kúrúndwád. Englishmen in India are so accustomed to authority, and to all the incense which waits on authority, that, except in rare cases, they judge men and affairs, not as they are, but as, to their

complacent minds, they wish them to be. Now, Manson had always been on the most friendly terms with the chief of Nárgúnd. He had no adequate conception of the depth of bitterness and the dread his connection with the Inám Commission had roused in the mind of that Maráthá noble. It was not possible, then, that he should imagine for a moment that his nomination to the control of political affairs, in place of Mr. Seton-Karr, would rouse the chief to madness. Still believing, then, in the friendly professions of the Rájah, and in the persuasive power of his influence over him, he sent back word to Jacob that from Kúrúndwád he could reach Nárgúnd by a cross road; that he would arrive there in time to prevent, probably, the development of the intended mischief; but that, if too late to prevent such development, he was confident of being able to prevent the chief's half-brother, the lord of Rámdrúg, from joining the rebellion. Having despatched this reply, Manson posted horses along the road to Rámdrúg, and sent off by a horseman a letter to Colonel George Malcolm, commanding at Kaládj, requesting him to push on to Rámdrúg with a body of his regiment, the Southern Maráthá Horse.

Manson.
confident in
himself,

determines
to push on
to Nárgúnd,

and sends to
Malcolm for
military aid.

But, before this missive reached Malcolm, that able and daring officer had taken the field with two hundred and fifty horsemen to attack the insurgents, who had already plundered the treasury of one of the district stations of Dhárwár. Mr. Manson, then, though he rode hard, reached Rámdrúg to find it unoccupied. He had with him the twelve troopers who had accompanied him from Kohlapúr, and these were as fatigued as he himself was. There he learned from the chief the treason of his half-brother; he read the compromising letters from the latter, urging the Rámdrúg chief to follow his example; and, entreated by that chief not to pursue his journey to Nárgúnd, he resolved to join the force in the field under Malcolm.

Malcolm,
meanwhile,
had taken
the field.

Manson
reaches
Rámdrúg.

and resolves
to endeavour
to join
Malcolm.

Tired as he was, Manson set out in a palanquin, escorted by his troopers, that evening. Better had he taken his rest at Rámdrúg and made the journey to Malcolm in one day, for, exhausted by the long day's work, he and his followers stopped about 10 o'clock at a temple near a little village on the way and slept.

He sets out
that evening

and, tired,
stops, near a
temple, to
sleep

A report of all Manson's movements had been duly carried to the chief of Nárgúnd. When the news reached him of the halt at the temple, he reasoned as an untutored Asiatic will always reason. His enemy was in his power; he would slay him.* He conceived that, having declared war against the British, he had a perfect right to destroy the members of that nation wherever he might find them. Accordingly, about midnight, he sallied forth with some hundreds of followers, and, approaching the spot, poured in a volley, which killed the sentry, and then sent in his men to finish the work with the sword. Manson, roused from his sleep, fired his revolver at his assailants, but he was immediately overpowered, his head was cut off, and his body thrown in the fire, still burning, which had been kindled by his followers. Having killed as many of these as he could find, the chief returned with Manson's head to Nárgúnd, and suspended the bloody trophy over a gateway.†

Meanwhile, the insurgents who had plundered the treasury, had marched southwards and joined Bhím Ráo, the chief of Kopuldrúg. There they were attacked by a Madras force from Ballárá, under Colonel Hughes, already mentioned for his soldier-like conduct at Shorápúr, and who, in daring and manly qualities, in the capacity to manage men and to direct operations, yielded to none who came to the front in the mutiny. This gallant soldier pushed forward with an energy surpassing that of the rebels, caught them, as I have said, at Kopuldrúg, and stormed the place, killing Bhím Ráo, the chief of Hémbaji, and many of the defenders.

Malcolm, on his side, had no sooner heard that Nárgúnd was in revolt than he felt that a moment's delay would provoke the rising of the entire Maráthá country. With only two hundred and fifty cavalry at his disposal he marched, then, immediately against the

* It was the reasoning of Jael, wife of Heber the Kenite, whose conduct was infinitely more treacherous.

† Read also Sir George Le Grand Jacob's *Western India before and during the Mutinies*. The account of the suspension of the head over a gateway rests entirely on native testimony. When the place was taken it was found floating in a well.

place, assisted by the wily Brahman officials, who believed he was marching on destruction.

At the same time he wrote to Belgáon, asking for some infantry and some guns. The authorities there sent him two companies of Europeans, one of native infantry, and two guns under Captain Paget. Riding on with these, only five days after the insensate declaration of war, Malcolm appeared before Nárgúnd.

He is reinforced by infantry and guns.

He had scarcely dismounted before news reached him that the rebels were marching to attack him. His heart bounded with joy. "I have them now," he said. Mounting his troopers as quickly as possible, he went to the front. It was true, they were advancing. But

The rebels march to attack him.

when they saw Malcolm and his horsemen they hesitated, then halted, and, in the manner of natives, began to close in on their centre. Then, wavering, they fell back. By this time Malcolm had collected his men. Riding at their head, he charged, overthrew the rebels—who, however, fought well in groups—drove them back, followed them up into the town, and forced the surviving combatants to take refuge in the fort.

Malcolm charges and defeats them,

and captures the town.

There remained now only the fort, a very strong one, so strong, that, if defended, it would have defied the efforts of the small assailing force. But Malcolm knew the natives well "Give them a quiet night," he said, "and they will save us the trouble." He was right. On the morning of the 2nd of June the strongest fort in the southern Maráthá country was found deserted.

The rebels evacuate the fort in the night.

The chief, accompanied by six of his principal advisers, attempted, in the guise of a pilgrim, to escape the fate he had provoked. Every possible ruse was had recourse to by the fugitives to baffle the pursuit which, they soon learned, had been instituted after them. The man who had been deputed for that task, Mr. Frank Souter,* possessed qualities which did not permit him to be easily baffled. He met ruse with ruse, and after a hot pursuit, captured the chief on the night of the 3rd.†

The chief attempts to escape in disguise,

task, Mr.

but is captured by Frank Souter.

* Afterwards Sir Frank Souter, Superintendent of Police in Bombay. He died in 1887.

† The chief of Nárgúnd was tried at Belgáon on the 11th of June. He

On learning of Mr. Manson's death, Colonel Jacob had taken the promptest measures to control the northern states of the territory. He forced the chief of Miraj, the best fortified town in the country, to give a pledge of his fidelity by surrendering his ammunition. Shortly afterwards, the death of General Lester led to the nomination of Colonel Jacob as Brigadier-General in military command in the southern Maráthá country.

Under General Jacob's firm rule the country above the gháts soon subsided into quiescence, but below the mountains, along the Goa frontier, the Sáwant rebels still continued to keep a large number of Madras, Bombay, and Portuguese troops, regular and irregular, in the field. Want of concert, however, naturally resulted from the action of troops serving under commanders independent one of the other. Eventually, in November, the Portuguese Viceroy, at a conference with General Jacob, consented to place the whole of his field detachments under the command of the officer who should unite that of the Bombay troops. Under this agreement Brigadier-General Fitzgerald of the Madras army took command of the united forces, and an organised plan was arranged. This was to hem in the tract occupied by the rebels, and to inform them that unless they surrendered by the 20th November they would be hunted down without mercy. On that date the band had dwindled to the number of eighty persons. These surrendered to the Portuguese commander on the night of that day, and their ringleaders were subsequently transported to the Portuguese possessions in Taimor.

Thenceforward the peace of the Southern Maráthá country was assured.

pleaded guilty, and in his plea stated that it was the fear of arrest that had caused him to commit the bloody deed. He was executed, in the presence of all the troops and of a large number of natives, on the 12th. It remains only to add that the bodies of the wife of whom I have spoken and the chief's mother were found in the Málparba river on the night of the 3rd. Sir G. Le Grand Jacob states, in the work already referred to, that they drowned themselves, unable to bear up against the disgrace.

BOOK XV.—THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH AND THE NORTH-
WEST. REPRESSION OF OUTBREAKS IN THE PANJÁB.

CHAPTER I.

LORD CANNING'S OUDH PROCLAMATION.

IN the preceding volume* I referred to the proclamation issued by Lord Canning regarding the *tálúkdárs* of Oudh, and of its reception in the victorious camp of Sir Colin Campbell; and I promised to deal with the subject more fully later on. I proceed now to redeem that promise.

The Oudh proclamation, despatched by Lord Canning to Sir James Outram in his capacity of Chief Commissioner of Oudh, with a letter bearing date the 3rd of March, 1858, directing that it should not be published until *Lakhnáo* should have fallen, or, at least, until that city should lie at the mercy of the British commander, was at once a sentence, a warning, and a threat addressed to the inhabitants of the rebellious province. That proclamation announced that *Lakhnáo*, after defying and resisting the power of the British for nine months, now lay at the mercy of the conqueror; that in that defiance and resistance the mutinous soldiery who had begun the revolt had been greatly aided by the inhabitants of the city and the province, even by those who owed their prosperity to the British Government; but that the hour of retribution had now arrived. Acting on the principle that, before pronouncing sentence on the guilty, it was just and proper to reward the innocent, the proclamation proceeded to name six men—three of whom were *rájahs*, two *zamindárs*,

Purport of
Lord
Canning's
Oudh pro-
clamation.

and one a *tálúkdár*—who had remained faithful amid great temptations, and who were not only declared “the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which they held when Oudh came under British rule,” but were promised additional rewards. Rewards and honours in proportionate measure were likewise promised to others in whose favour similar claims should be established to the satisfaction of the Government. But, with these exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the province was confiscated to the British Government, which would dispose of that right in such manner as might seem fitting. To the chiefs, *tálúkdárs*, and landowners, however, who should make immediate submission, surrendering their arms and obeying the orders of the Chief Commissioner, the proclamation promised the safety of their lives and of their honour, provided that their hands were “unstained with English blood murderously shed.” For any further indulgence, the proclamation added, and with regard to the condition in which such men might thereafter be placed, “they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Government.” The proclamation promised, in conclusion, that to those amongst the classes referred to who should come forward promptly and give the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, the indulgence would be large, and that the Governor-General would be ready to view liberally the claims which they might thus acquire to the restoration of their former rights. Further, that while participation in the murder of Englishmen and Englishwomen would exclude those who had participated in it from all mercy, those, on the other hand, who had protected English lives would be specially entitled to consideration and leniency.

In the letter to which I have referred as accompanying the proclamation the Foreign Secretary, Mr. G. F. Edmonstone, was, as I have already stated, careful to lay down that it should not be published until Lakhnao should have been conquered or should lie at the mercy of the conqueror. It further prescribed that, when published, the proclamation was to be addressed only to the non-military inhabitants of the province, and in no sense to the mutinous *Sipáhis*. It expressed likewise the conviction of

Rewards it
promises to
the innocent,

punishment
to the
remainder.

manner as

Conditions of
commutation
of punish-
ment.

Participation
in the
murder of
Englishmen
and English-
women to
exclude from
mercy.

Mr. Edmon-
stone's
accompany-
ing letter

Lord Canning that the tone of apparent severity which characterised the proclamation was necessary, inasmuch as the announcement in such a state paper of a liberal and forgiving spirit would be open to misconstruction, and it added that, in reality, the spirit of the proclamation was merciful and even lenient, in that it promised exemption, almost general, from the penalties of death and imprisonment to the rájahs, tálukdárs, and zamindárs, who had fought and conspired against the Government; that even the confiscation of estates was rather a merciful commutation of a severer punishment than a harsh measure of justice. The letter concluded with suggestions to Sir James Outram regarding the manner in which it might be requisite for him to deal with mutineers of varying grades of guilt.

fully explains the mercy that underlies the apparent severity of the terms of the proclamation.

Sir James Outram received the letter and the proclamation on the 5th of March. Reading the latter by the light of its actual contents, apart from the commentary furnished by the letter, he arrived at a conclusion regarding it the very reverse of that which Lord Canning had endeavoured to impress upon him. Lord Canning, when sending him the proclamation, had said in so many words, by the mouth of his Foreign Secretary, "Do not judge the proclamation simply by itself, as a paper dealing out stern justice to conquered revolters. Rather, looking at the measure of punishment which those revolters have brought upon themselves, see whether the proclamation does not in every case, except the case of atrocious murder, pronounce a mitigation of punishment, capable of still further mitigation." But Outram, disregarding this exhortation, looked at the proclamation without sufficient reference to the circumstances which had made it necessary, and condemned it. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated the 8th of March, he declared his belief that there were not a dozen landowners in Oudh who had not, in some way or other, assisted the rebels, and that, therefore, there would be but few exceptions to the sweeping confiscations proposed by the Governor-General; he expressed his conviction that as soon as the proclamation should be made public nearly all the chiefs and tálukdárs would retire to their domains and prepare for a desperate resistance. He proceeded even to

Outram reads the proclamation in a sense different to that intended by Lord Canning,

and condemns it.

Embodies his views in a letter.

urge extenuating circumstances for those who had revolted, by declaring his opinion—which, it must be admitted, was founded on fact—that the landowners had been very unjustly treated in the land-settlement after the annexation; that, apart from this, their sympathy with the rebels had been, in the actual circumstances, only natural; that it was not until the British rule in Oudh had been brought to a virtual end by the mutineers that the rājahs and tálúkdárs had sided against the Government; that they ought to be treated rather as honourable enemies than as rebels; that they would be converted into relentless enemies if their lands were confiscated, maintaining a guerilla war, which would “involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure”; but that, if their lands were secured to them, they would at once aid in restoring order, and would so co-operate with the paramount power as, before long, to render unnecessary the further presence of the large army then occupying Oudh.

To this letter Lord Canning replied, on the 10th, in a brief despatch, the nature of which renders still clearer the really merciful intentions of his proclamation. Referring to the promise of safety of life and honour to the tálúkdárs, chiefs, and landholders, unstained with English blood murderously shed, who should surrender at once and obey the orders of the Chief Commissioner, Lord Canning authorised Sir James to amplify it by an addition which, if not very wide in itself, intimated as clearly as possible the merciful intentions of the Governor-General. “To those amongst them,” ran this addition, “who shall promptly come forward and give to the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, this indulgence will be large, and the Governor-General will be willing to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights.”

Three weeks later Lord Canning replied at greater length to Outram's remarks. In Mr. Edmonstone's despatch, dated the 31st of March, Lord Canning admitted that the people of Oudh occupied a position, with respect to their allegiance to the British Government, differing widely from that of the inhabitants of the provinces which had been longer under British rule. But, in the Governor-General's opinion, that difference constituted no valid ground

Lord
Canning's
first reply

renders his
merciful in-
tentions still
clearer.

His second
and more
elaborate
letter

for treating the chiefs and *tálúkdárs* in the lenient manner suggested by Outram. Arguing in the spirit of the letter of the 3rd of March, he again insisted that, in the presence of a great crime, exemption from death, transportation, and imprisonment were great boons, and that to have offered more lenient terms would have been to treat the rebels—not, as Outram contended, as honourable enemies—but as enemies who had won the day. With respect to Outram's contention that the injustice of the land-settlement after the annexation had impelled the landowners to rebel, Lord Canning simply declined to recognise the hypothesis. Admitting that the policy of introducing into Oudh a system of village settlement in place of the old settlement under *tálúkdárs* might not have been altogether wise, Lord Canning declined to believe that the conduct of the landowners was in any respect the consequence of that policy. He attributed that conduct rather to the repugnance they had felt to suffer any restraint of the arbitrary powers they had till then exercised; to a diminution of their importance by being brought under equal laws; and to the obligation of disbanding their armed followers and of living a peaceful and orderly life. For these reasons Lord Canning adhered to his proclamation.

gives ample
reasons

for adhering
to the pro-
clamation.

That Sir James Outram did not at once realise the statesman-like nature and the really merciful tendencies of Lord Canning's proclamation may at once be admitted. The end of the two men was really the same; the difference was in the manner by which that end should be attained. Sir James would have carried leniency to a point at which leniency would have missed its aim. Lord Canning, maintaining the right to be severe, was prepared to be as merciful as Outram whenever the exercise of mercy should be politically desirable.

Real
similarity
in the
objects at
which Lord
Canning and
Outram
alike aimed.

The real character of Lord Canning's statesmanship at this period might have remained long generally unknown but for the action taken with respect to the proclamation by the then President of the Board of Control, the Earl of Ellenborough. That nobleman had but recently taken over the seals of that office from his predecessor, a member of the Whig Cabinet, Mr. Vernon Smith. In due course he received, about the 20th of March, a copy of Lord Canning's proclamation, unaccom-

Lord
Ellenborough
receives
Lord
Canning's
proclamation

panied by any explanatory document. In point of fact, Lord Canning, in transmitting the proclamation, had written to Mr. Vernon Smith, a member of his own party, and who, in his belief, still held the office of President of the Board of Control, a letter in which he stated that the proclamation required an explanatory despatch which he had not had time to prepare. Unfortunately, Mr. Vernon Smith neglected to pass on that letter to his successor. He thus allowed Lord Ellenborough to believe that the proclamation stood alone, that it required no interpretation, and was to be judged on its merits as an act of policy.

without the
letter
addressed
to his
predecessor,

explanatory
of the
reasons
which
justified it.

It is not surprising that, reading the proclamation in this way, Lord Ellenborough arrived at a conclusion not very dissimilar to that with which Sir James Outram, possessing all the advantages of proximity to, and personal communication with, Lord Canning, had been impressed. He condemned it as likely to raise such a ferment in Oudh as would make pacification almost impossible. In accord with Outram, of whose views, however, he was ignorant, Lord Ellenborough believed that the mode of settling the land tenure when the British took possession of Oudh had been in many ways unjust, and had been the chief cause of the general and national character of the disaffection in that province. He concluded—agreeing in this also with Outram—that the people of Oudh would view with dismay a proclamation which cut them off, as a nation, from the ownership of land so long cherished by them, and would deem it righteous to battle still more energetically than before against a government which could adopt such a course of policy. Lord Ellenborough embodied these views in a despatch to be transmitted to Lord Canning in the name of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, added to them an argument—also an argument of Sir James Outram—to the effect that the people of Oudh ought to be regarded as legitimate enemies rather than as rebels, and concluded it with these stinging words: “Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted on a different

Lord
Ellenborough
arrives at a
conclusion
similar to
that formed
by Outram,

and embodies
his views in
a despatch.

Concluding
paragraphs
of this
despatch.

principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country.

"We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire, therefore, that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landowners of Oudh. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people: there cannot be contentment where there is general confiscation.

"Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong; and, if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a consummation to be desired."

Lord Ellenborough submitted this despatch to the Cabinet of which he was a member. It received an approval which was unanimous. Three weeks later he showed it to Mr. Bright with the view of its contents being made known to the House of Commons.

So far as Lord Ellenborough was concerned, the mistakes he committed—the penning of an acrimonious despatch without waiting for an explanation, and the disclosure of its contents to Mr. Bright with a view to its being presented to the House of Commons—were fatal to his tenure of office. The matter having come under the cognizance of the House of Commons, and having become the subject of a debate which at the outset seemed likely to terminate the existence of the Government, Lord Ellenborough took upon himself the sole responsibility of the despatch, and resigned his office.

This action, when known, compels Lord Ellenborough to resign.

Far different was the effect produced by the receipt of the despatch upon Lord Canning. He received it at Allahábád on the 13th of June. Before its contents became known, rumours circulated that the Government of Lord Derby had written a disagreeable letter to the Governor-General. "I asked him," wrote, at the time, one deeply in his confidence, "if it was true that he had received something disagreeable. He said, almost indifferently, that it was impertinent; but he

Effect produced by the despatch on Lord Canning.

did not care much; he would answer what they wrote." He then entered into a conversation regarding his Oudh policy. The next day, when the despatch had been read by others, the prevailing feeling regarding it was that it was offensively impertinent, with a look of epigrammatic point in the concluding sentences—those which I have quoted—of which the writer was evidently proud. But, above all, there arose a feeling of indignation that a despatch so insulting should have been published for the benefit of the natives, many of them still in revolt, as well as of the Anglo-Indians.

Indignation
it causes
in the minds
of his
entourage.

But Lord Canning had, at this crisis, a support not less grateful than the confidence of the friends about him. The same mail brought him a copy of a resolution of the Court of Directors expressing continued confidence in their Governor-General. Letters were received from Mr. Sidney Herbert, from Lord Granville, from Lord Aberdeen, and from many other leading men, expressing sympathy and regard. In almost all these Lord Canning was urged not to resign, but to carry on his own policy calmly, and to leave to the Government the odium of recalling him. Lord Canning never thought of resigning. He regarded Lord Ellenborough's despatch as Achilles would have regarded a javelin "hurled by the feeble hand of Priam," and, far from allowing it to disturb his equanimity, he sat down coolly and calmly to pen a vindication of his policy.

He had no
thought of
doing so.

Curiously enough, ten days after that vindication had been drafted and despatched—on the 27th of June—Lord Canning received a long private letter from Lord Derby himself on the subject of the point of difference. In this letter Lord Derby expressed a general confidence in Lord Canning's policy; he attributed Lord Ellenborough's despatch to the conduct of Mr. Vernon Smith in withholding the covering private letter which accompanied the Oudh proclamation, and which gave the only intimation that further explanations would be forwarded. Lord Derby concluded by virtually asking, almost pressing, Lord Canning to stay on, and spoke of the probability of Lord Stanley going to the Board of Control. To one in Lord Canning's position such a letter from the chief of the cabinet of which Lord Ellenborough had been a

He receives
a letter from
Lord Derby,

virtually
asking him
to stay on.

member was most satisfactory. It might almost be said that his policy was vindicated by his enemies.

Lord Canning's own vindication was dated the 18th of June. It began by alluding in a dignified manner to the fact that the despatch censuring himself had been made public in England three weeks before it reached his hands, and that in a few days it would be read in every station in Hindustan. Dwelling then upon the pain which the censure of his conduct by the Court of Directors would cause him, and upon the manner in which the publication of it would increase his difficulties, he declared that no taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they might, would turn him from the path which he believed to be that of public duty. Expressing, then, his conviction that a change in the government of India at that time, taking place under circumstances which would indicate a repudiation of the policy pursued towards the Oudh rebels, would seriously retard the pacification of the country, he proceeded to declare his belief that that policy had been from the first merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the Government; that it had made manifest to the people of reconquered districts all over India, including Oudh, that the indulgence to those who should submit and who should be free from atrocious crime, would be large; and that the Oudh proclamation, thoroughly consistent with that policy, offered the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to that province on a stable footing.

Lord
Canning's
reply to the
despatch.

Preliminary.

Stating, then, in dignified language, that although in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger, and toil, he would not lay down of his own act the high trust which he had the honour to hold, yet that if, after reading the vindication of his policy, the Court of Directors should see fit to withhold their confidence from him, he then preferred his respectful yet urgent request that he might be relieved from the office of Governor-General, Lord Canning proceeded to reply to Lord Ellenborough's strictures, and to assert the grounds upon which his convictions of the soundness of his policy rested.

Preliminary.

With respect to the former, Lord Canning referred to the extraordinary manner in which Lord Ellenborough's despatch had almost justified the people of Oudh, as if they were fighting in a righteous cause—a manner quite legitimate in a member of the legislature, but

Retorts upon
Lord Ellen-
borough,

quite unjustifiable in a minister of the Queen of England, who herself was actually Queen of Oudh also. He declined to discuss the policy which, in 1855-56, had dictated the annexation; it was not his act, nor had he ever been empowered to

and points
out the
mischief his
despatch
might have
caused in
India.

undo it. But he felt it incumbent upon him to point out the disastrous results which might follow, should the people of Oudh be encouraged, by such reasoning as that contained in the despatch, to continue their resistance. At the actual moment, the chiefs of the various sections of rebels in Oudh were united neither by a common plan nor by a common sympathy, but, he added, if it should become manifest that the British Government shrank from a declaration of its right to possess Oudh, the Begam, as the representative in the field of the late reigning family, would draw to herself all the sympathies of the country, and all the other factions would merge in hers.

Defence of
his pro-
clamation.

Lord Canning prefaced the defence of his proclamation by stating that he had early in the year proceeded to Allahábád chiefly that he might be able to investigate the state of Oudh; that he soon determined to make a difference in the measures to be adopted for the pacification of the country, between the mutinied Sipáhis and the Oudh rebels; that the latter should not be put to death for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they had committed actual murder; that the general punishment for rebellion in Oudh should be confiscation of estates, a punishment recognised by Native States as the fitting consequence of the offence, and one which in no way affected caste, nor the honour of the most sensitive Bráhmaṇ or Rajpút; a punishment which admitted of every gradation according to the severity or lightness of the offence; which would enable the Government to reward friendly tálúkdárs and zamindárs, and which, in point of fact, would, in many cases, constitute a kind of retributive justice—many of the tálúkdárs having acquired their estates by spoliation of the village communities; that, as a matter of abstract justice, it would only be right to restore those estates to the village communities; but that, as there would be insuperable difficulties to such a course, it would be better to take the forfeited estates of the rebellious tálúkdárs as Government property, out of which faithful villages and individuals might be rewarded.

With this vindication ended practically the crisis caused by Lord Ellenborough's hasty act. The result was to seat Lord Canning, in the presence of a ministry of an opposite party, more firmly in the saddle, and to give him greater strength to carry out the policy which he believed to be adapted to the circumstances. In another way his hands had been strengthened at this crisis.

Final result on Lord Canning of the Ellenborough letter.

The nomination of Sir James Outram to the Supreme Council enabled Lord Canning to place at the head of the Oudh province a man who, imbued with his own views, was certain to carry out his policy with the vigour arising from conviction.

The new Chief Commissioner of Oudh was Mr. Robert Montgomery.* Mr. Montgomery was a man who, with a thorough acquaintance with administrative duties, combined great decision of character, a sound judgment, and a thorough knowledge of native character. He had been the right hand of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjáb, had been the firm advocate of those resolute measures which made the fall of Dehlí possible, and, in the earlier stages of the mutiny, when Sir John Lawrence was absent from Láhor, had himself directed the measures for disarming the native troops, which, carried out in time, had unquestionably saved the province. In questions of administrative policy, Mr. Montgomery, as I have said, agreed in principle with Lord Canning.

Mr. Robert Montgomery.

His character and antecedents.

Such was the man to whom, in the month May 1858, Lord Canning entrusted the carrying out of the policy towards Oudh embodied in his famous proclamation. Mr. Montgomery, without ignoring the proclamation, did not put it into rough action. He used it rather as a lever, by the judicious employment of which he could bring about the results at which the Governor-General professedly aimed. The situation was, for the first three months of his tenure of office, in many respects remarkable. The larger number of the relations, adherents, and dependants of the deposed royal family had their dwellings in, or belonged, by family association extending over many years, to the

Mr. Montgomery's action regarding the proclamation.

The situation in Oudh.

* Afterwards Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.S.I., and till recently a member of the Council of India. He died in 1887.

Lakbnao. city of Lakbnao. Considering the part which that city, and more especially the classes of its inhabitants to which I have referred, had played in the rebellion, it was especially necessary to exercise over it a strict supervision. In the provinces an entirely different feeling prevailed. There the rule of the king of Oudh had planted no seeds of loyalty or devotion. Alien in religion and in race to the great bulk of the people of Oudh, the king and his courtiers had been tolerated, first, because they were there, and, secondly, because they had exercised no strict supervising power, but had been content to be the nominal rulers of the great landowners, permitted to carry on, very much in accordance with their own wishes, their feudal rule. The central power, as exercised by the kings of Oudh, had interfered to put a stop to rapine and oppression only when that rapine and oppression had attained a magnitude so great that to ignore the evil would have produced a national rising. The sentiment felt, then, by the great body of landholders towards the royal family of Oudh was not loyalty; it was not affection; it was not sympathy; it was scarcely contentment. Perhaps the term that best describes it is the term toleration. They had been content to tolerate that family as exercising a kind of normal suzerainty which permitted them to do just as they liked.

Towards the British rule, exercised as it had been by the civilians who had immediately preceded Sir Henry Lawrence, they entertained a different feeling. In strong contrast with the selfish sway of the Muhammadan kings of Oudh, the British rule had made itself felt in every corner of the province. The reforms it had introduced, the inquiries which it made, had been so sweeping, that an almost universal feeling had risen amongst the landowners that it was not to be endured. If the King of Oudh had been King Log, the British rule was the rule of King Stork. The landowners of Oudh, then, had hailed the mutiny, not from affection towards the deposed dynasty, but from hatred of its successor. Indifferent as they were to the persons and the race of their Muhammadan kings, they would have gladly ejected the British to restore them.

When, then, Lakbnao had fallen, the tálúkdárs and the landowners generally were as far as they had ever been from submission to the British authority. Could the Begam show a

strong front, they might yet combine with her for the restoration of the ancient dynasty in the person of one of its members. But, as there did not appear in the field any force sufficiently strong to rally round, the landowners and other rebel leaders fought each for himself, each hoping that some great benefit would accrue to him out of the general turmoil.

But they have
no central
rallying
point.

This disunion greatly diminished the difficulties which Montgomery might otherwise have had to encounter had there been one fixed purpose and concentration of action among the malcontents. But still the task before him was no light one. He met it with all the skill, the temper, and the judgment which might have been expected from so experienced a ruler of men. He exhausted every means of persuasion at the same time that he brought clearly to the view of the landowners the fixed determination of the British Government. He was thus able to restore in some few districts the lapsed British authority. To reorganise that authority in those deaf to his persuasions, he was content to wait until the forcible measures inaugurated by his military coadjutor, Sir Hope Grant, should produce their natural results.

This fact
diminishes
Mont-
gomery's
difficulties,
which are,
nevertheless,
great.

He meets
them ;

restores
British
authority
in some
districts.

What those measures were I shall relate in the next chapter

CHAPTER II.

THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH.

WHEN I last referred to General Hope Grant,* he was marching to the fort of Jalálábád near Lakhnao. The date was the 16th of May. Leaving his force to enter that place, the general, just then nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath for his services in the field, rode into Lakhnao to consult with Mr. Montgomery, the recently appointed Chief Commissioner. Montgomery informed him that the Kánhpúr road was again endangered by Béni Mádhú, an influential tálúkdár, who had likewise caused proclamations to be distributed in Lakhnao, warning the inhabitants to quit that city, as it was to be attacked. On receiving this information, Hope Grant, taking with him the 53rd Foot instead of the 38th, and substituting Mackinnon's battery for Olpherts's, returned to Jalálábád, and started thence in pursuit of Béni Mádhú on the 25th of May.

For some time Béni Mádhú was invisible. Hope Grant followed him to Jasandá, eight miles from Banní, where he had been reported to be "with a force of eighty-five thousand men"; but the tálúkdár and his men had vanished. On the 4th of June the Sikh Rájah of Kapúrthálá joined Sir Hope with nine hundred Sikhs and three brass 6-pounders.

Hope Grant posted this reinforcement at the Banní bridge, and, leaving the pursuit of Béni Mádhú, marched against a body of rebels, less fabulously numerous, but more really formidable—being fifteen thousand strong—who had taken up a strong position at Nawábganj, on the Faizábád road, eighteen miles from Lakhnao. Grant's division was tolerably strong.† Leaving, then, a small force at the other Nawábganj,

Then,
leaving the
pursuit,
marches
against a
rebel force
at Nawábganj.

* Vol. IV. page 349.

† It consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions Rifle Brigade, the 5th Panjáb



on the Kánhpúr road, he marched on Chinhat. There he found another column, twelve hundred strong, under Colonel Purnell. Placing his baggage under charge of that officer, he quitted Chinhat at 11 o'clock on the night of the 12th of June to march against the rebels.

These latter had taken up a position exceptionally strong. They occupied a large plateau, covered on three sides by a stream crossed by a bridge at a little distance from the town. On the fourth side was jungle.

Strong position of the rebels.

Grant halts near the rebels,

Hope Grant, having with him a trustworthy guide, led his force across the complicated country between Chinhat and the plateau during the night, and reached the bridge mentioned about half an hour before daybreak. He halted his column to allow his men to rest and get their breakfast, and then marched on the rebels. His plan was to turn their right and interpose between them and the jungle. His men would do the rest.

At daybreak Hope Grant crossed the bridge and fell on the rebels. He took them completely by surprise. Their forces, divided into four parts, each commanded by a separate leader, had no time to concentrate, and had made no plan to act with unanimity. Hope Grant had struck at their centre, and this move had greatly contributed to their confusion. Still, they fought very gallantly. "A large body of fine daring zamindári men," wrote Sir Hope in his journal, "brought two guns into the open and attacked us in rear. I have seen many battles in India, and many brave fellows fighting with a determination to conquer or die, but I never witnessed anything more magnificent than the conduct of these zamindáris." They attacked Hodson's Horse, who could not face them, and by their unsteadiness imperilled the two guns attached to their regiment. Grant at once ordered up the 7th Hussars, and directed one of the batteries to open on the zamindáris. The fire from four

and surprises them.

Gallantry of the rebels,

Infantry, five hundred Hodson's Horse under Lieutenant-Colonel Daly; one hundred and fifty Wale's Horse, under Prendergast; two hundred and fifty Bruce's Horse Police, under Hill; the 7th Hussars, under Colonel Sir William Russell; two squadrons Queen's Bays; Mackinnon's Horse Artillery; and Gibbon's and Carleton's batteries. The whole of the cavalry was commanded by Colonel Hagart.

* *Incidents of the Sepoy War*, by Sir Hope Grant and Captain Knollys.

guns of this battery mowed them down with terrible effect, but did not force them to retire. After the guns had played upon them some time, the 7th Hussars came up, and, charging through them twice, forced them to give way. The fact that round the two guns of Hodson's Horse there lay, after the combat was over, a hundred and twenty-five rebel corpses, testifies to the valour of these gallant levies. After three hours' fighting, the rebels fell back, leaving on the field six guns and about six hundred dead. The British lost sixty-seven in killed and wounded. In addition, thirty-three men died from sunstroke, and two hundred and fifty were taken into hospital.

This victory had very important results. The rebels had from all sides been flocking to Nawábganj to swell the formidable column already there. But Hope Grant struck dismay all around. The defeat was so crushing that the fugitives left the vicinity of Lakhnao, each of the four parties taking a different direction. The concentrating movement was thus effectually stopped.

Sir Hope left his force at Nawábganj and returned to Lakhnao to consult with Montgomery, whom this victory had allowed for the first time to breathe freely. From Lakhnao he was ordered by Sir Colin Campbell, in the third week of July, to march to the relief of Mán Sing, a famous Rájah,* who, having at one time taken part with the rebels, had listened to the advice of Mr. Montgomery, and returned to his allegiance. For this he had been denounced by his former associates, and at the moment was attacked in his fort by a body of them twenty thousand strong with twenty guns.

It being of great importance to retain the adherence of so powerful a chieftain, Hope Grant at once despatched the 90th regiment, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Brasyer's Sikhs, Mackinnon's troop of horse artillery, and four hundred cavalry to Nawábganj to supply the place of the troops he should take on thence, and with these latter† he set out on the 22nd of July.

* Vol. III. page 267.

† The 1st Madras Europeans, the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 1st Panjáb Infantry, the 7th Hussars, five hundred Hodson's Horse, twelve light guns, and a train of heavy guns.

Before starting with Sir Hope on this expedition it may be convenient to the reader to realise as far as possible the exact position at the moment of the several rebel parties in Oudh. Of these, counting as one the forces of the Begam and her alleged paramour, Mamú Khán, there were nine of great and many of smaller dimensions. The nine greater divisions disposed at the time of sixty or seventy thousand armed men, with forty or fifty guns. More than half of these were said to have their head-quarters under the command of the Begam and Mamú Khán at Chauká Ghát, on the Gághrá, not far from Faizábád; but a considerable body of them were besieging Mán Singh. The remainder—led by such men as Rámbakhsh, Bahúnáth Singh, Chandábakhsh, Guláb Singh, Narpát Singh of Rúiyá notoriety, Bhopál Singh, and Firúzsháh—were scattered all over the province, never long at the same place, hoping that a chance blow might give them victory or plunder.

The position of the rebel parties in Oudh.

Hope Grant, urged by letters from Mán Singh to the effect that, unless speedily relieved, he could not answer for the consequences, pushed on rapidly, so rapidly, indeed, that the rumour of his advance had all, or almost all, the effect of the advance itself. When within a few days' journey of Mán Singh's stronghold of Sháhganj, he learned that the besieging force had melted away!

The rebels abandon the league of Sháhganj on Sir Hope's approach,

It was perfectly true. On hearing that the English army was advancing by rapid marches, the besiegers took fright, and broke up into three divisions. One of these fled towards Gondah, a second to Sultánpúr, on the Gúmtí, a third to Tándá on the Ghágrá.

and break up into three divisions.

Hope Grant moved then, not the less rapidly, on Faizábád; thence he proceeded to the ghát of Ajúdhiá, and found a considerable body of rebels pushing forth in boats to the opposite side of the river. He opened on these and sank all but one. The crews for the most part escaped. The next day he had an interview with Rájah Mán Singh.

Hope Grant moves on to Faizábád,

But he did not rest idle at Faizábád. Sultánpúr having been indicated to him as the next point of attack, Hope Grant detached thither a column composed of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, the 5th Panjáb Rifles, a detachment of 7th Hussars, three hundred Hodson's Horse,

and sends Horsford to Sultánpúr.

and a troop of Horse Artillery under the command of Brigadier Horsford. Horsford was delayed by heavy rain, but at last, on the 7th of August, he set out, and on the 12th arrived within four miles of the town, separated from it by the river Sái.

Horsford, having ascertained by means of a reconnaissance that the enemy were in force, that the river was peculiarly favourable for defence, and that his passage would be disputed, reported that state of affairs to Hope Grant. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of that report, Hope Grant received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief informing him that the Sultánpúr rebels numbered fourteen thousand men, that they had fifteen guns, and that it was advisable that he should reinforce Horsford with the Rifle Brigade.

Nothing loth, Hope Grant ordered up the 53rd from Darya-ábád, and, taking the Rifles with him, pressed forward to reinforce Horsford. He reached that officer on the 24th of August, and, at once changing the position of the British camp, resolved to cross the following morning. The remainder of that day he employed in making rafts. On these, early on the morning of the 25th, he sent over the 1st Madras Fusiliers and the 5th Panjáb infantry, then, though with great difficulty and after one or two mishaps, he landed on the opposite bank two 9-pounder guns. Colonel Galwey, who commanded, then gallantly attacked and carried two villages in his front, at a point where the river forms a bend and where the rebels had a picket. The Rifles were sent over in support of this advanced party.

It was not till the 27th of August that the main body had completed the passage of the river, and even then the heavy guns, artillery park, hospital, and a wing of the 53rd were left on the further bank. Nor did the British force even then attack. On the evening of the 28th, however, the rebels became the assailants, but, after a sharp fight, they were repulsed and fled, abandoning Sultánpúr to the conqueror.

It is difficult to follow the Oudh rebels in their continuous marches and counter-marches. But few of the old Sipáhis, the men who had been the backbone of the mutiny, were now among them. Their fluctuating numbers were composed almost entirely of the ad-

Hope Grant
learns the
strength of
the rebels at
Sultánpúr,

and pushes
on to aid
Horsford.

After
crossing the
river,

and a series
of combats,
the rebels
abandon
Sultánpúr.

The marches
and counter-
marches of
the rebels.

herents and vassals of the *tálúkdárs* and landowners of the province, aided by the scum of the population, the refuse of the gaols. Their movements were extremely irregular. One day they appeared to retire into *Ámethi*, a fort twenty-five miles from *Sultánpúr*, seven miles in circumference, composed of mud walls and surrounded by a jungle, the residence of *Lál Madhu Singh*, a young chief determined in his hostility to the British: then they were heard of near *Muzaffarnagar*, then at *Rámpúr Kasiá*. It became evident to Sir Hope that nothing would drive them to submission but force, and he had full instructions to use it. The season, however, was unhealthy, and, when he entered *Sultánpúr*, he resolved, with the concurrence of Sir Colin Campbell, to postpone further operations till the middle of October.

Sir Hope Grant determines to postpone further operations till after the rainy season

Whilst the gallant soldiers of Sir Hope Grant's force are waiting with anxious hearts for the period of renewed action, it may not be inopportune to take a rapid glance at the events which had been occurring in the meanwhile in other parts of the disturbed province.

The story returns to Rohilkhand.

In the last volume* I recorded the close of the Rohilkhand campaign and the death of the *Maulaví*, the daring *Ahmad Ulla* of *Faizábád*; but, although the campaign was terminated, some time elapsed before the border lands of *Oudh* and of *Rohilkhand* were completely pacified. Many landowners on both sides of the border resented the conduct of the *Rájah* of *Powáin*, and took up arms to punish, if they could, an act which they regarded as treachery in its basest form. It soon appeared, however, that the rebels could not agree amongst themselves, and they soon began to act independently of each other. One leader, named *Nizám Áli Khán*, with a considerable following, threatened the station of *Pilibhit*. Then there appeared in the field the whilom pseudo-vice-roy of the province, the treacherous pensioner *Khán Bahádúr Khán*, with about four thousand followers; the *Nawáb* of *Farrukhábád* with five thousand; and *Waláyat Sháh* with about three thousand. The authorities, however, were on their guard. They sent a small force, including the cavalry com-

Nizám Ali Khán,

Bahádúr

Khán
Bahádúr
Khán,

the
Farrukhábád,
Nawáb.

Wildyat Sháh. manded by the gallant De Kantzow, to protect Powáin, and they urged the corpulent Rájah of that place to keep his levies, two thousand strong, in constant training. This measure saved Powáin; but in other parts of Rohilkhand it was found difficult to put down disorder. Towards the end of August, indeed, Áli Khán Mewátí, acting in concert with the Nizám Áli Khán above alluded to, approached so near Pílibhít as to menace Núríah, a large village ten miles only from that British military post.

The rebels
menace
Núríah.

The force at Pílibhít was commanded by Captain Robert Larkins, 17th Panjáb infantry. It consisted of the 2nd Panjáb cavalry under Captain Sam Browne,* the 17th Panjáb infantry† under Captain Larkins, the 24th Panjáb pioneers‡ under Ensign Chalmers, and a detachment of Kumáun levies under Lieutenant Cunliffe. Both Captain Larkins and the chief civil officer, Mr. Malcolm Low, considered that the occupation of Núríah by the rebels was at all hazards to be prevented. Larkins accordingly detached a hundred men of the 24th pioneers and one hundred 2nd Panjáb cavalry, under Lieutenant Craigie, to hold that village, Mr. Low accompanying the party.

Larkin sends
a body of
men under
Craigie to
hold the
village.

Craigie—who, as senior officer, commanded—reached Núríah on the 28th of August. On the following morning the rebel chiefs I have named came down with three guns, three hundred infantry, and a hundred cavalry to attack the place. Craigie made excellent dispositions to meet them outside the town, and checked their advance. So well did the rebels fight, however, that, when nineteen of their cavalry met in a hand-to-hand encounter a party of the 2nd Panjáb cavalry under Risáldár Hakdád Khán, fourteen of the nineteen were killed fighting. This occurred on the left flank. On the right flank Craigie repulsed them in person. They then fell back on Siipúrah, three miles distant.

Craigie
encounters
the rebels,

and compels
them to fall
back.

Larkins, hearing at Pílibhít the enemy's fire, thought it advisable to reinforce Craigie. Accordingly he directed a hundred and fifty 2nd Panjáb cavalry, and a hundred

* Now Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., K.C.B.

† Now the 25th Native Infantry.

‡ Now the 32nd Native Infantry.

Kumáun levies to proceed at once, under the orders of Captain Sam Browne, to Núriah. Browne set off at once, and reached Núriah at 4 o'clock that evening.

Browne is sent to reinforce Craigie.

He at once reconnoitred the rebel position. It was on a rising ground or mound, amid the *débris* of the ruined village of Sirpúrah, separated from Núriah by an inundated tract of country nearly a mile in width, the inundating water varying from one to two feet. From that side Browne saw that it was impossible to attack. It was possible, however, to assail the position from the other side. The energetic magistrate, Mr. Malcolm Low, having procured him guides in the persons of an old woman and a boy, Browne started at midnight to make the *détour* necessary for the success of his plan.

Browne reconnoitres,

and resolves to make a *détour* and attack the rebels.

Taking with him two hundred and thirty Panjáb cavalry, a hundred and fifty 17th Native Infantry, a hundred 24th pioneers, and a hundred Kumáun levies, Browne worked round the enemy's right flank, and by daybreak reached a position on his left rear admirably adapted for his purpose. The fatigue had been great, and Browne halted for a few minutes to refresh men and horses. Whilst so halting the rebels discovered him, and at once made preparations to resist him, bringing three 9-pounders to bear on his advance, and posting one on their proper right flank. There was no time for further rest, so Browne at once moved forward.

He gains a position on the left rear of the rebels, when he is discovered.

He then advances.

Covering his front with skirmishers, and giving them strict orders not to fire, but to use the bayonet only, Browne pushed his infantry forward through some grass jungle which served to screen their movements. Very soon, however, the enemy's guns began to play on his cavalry on the left, which were marching on the open road. Browne, who was with that cavalry, seeing the effect which one of them, fired with grape at eighty yards, was producing, galloped up to it, accompanied only by an orderly, and at once engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with the gunners, hoping to prevent them working their piece till the skirmishers should come up. Surrounded by the enemy, who attacked him with great fierceness, Browne attained his

The enemy's gun annoying the advance,

object. He did prevent the working of the gun until the skirmishers came up and relieved him. In the fight, however, he was first wounded on the knee; immediately afterwards his left arm was severed at the shoulder. As he received this terrible wound, his horse, struck in the face, reared up and fell back on him. Just then the Wirdi-major of his regiment, followed by two or three others, rushed in, and, though the former was severely wounded, they kept the rebels at bay, and saved their commanding officer. Immediately afterwards the infantry came up, bayoneted the gunners, and secured the gun which Browne had captured.*

To go back for a moment. Whilst Browne was thus engaging the gunners, the skirmishers had advanced steadily without firing a shot until close to the position, when a body of the enemy's infantry lying in the grass jumped up and fired. On this the skirmishers, firing a volley, dashed on, secured the gun, and, aided by the supports and reserve, carried the position.

The cavalry on the right, meanwhile, pushing on, had, simultaneously with their comrades on the left, attacked the enemy's flank, and captured one gun. This completed their discomfiture. They broke and fled into the jungle, followed, as far as it was possible to follow them, by the victorious horsemen. Their loss had been heavy, amounting to three hundred men killed, their four guns, their ammunition, and their stores. The two rebel leaders escaped, though one of them, Nizám Áli Khán, had been wounded.

In eastern Oudh, near Allahábád, there were about this time

* Few more gallant deeds than this were performed during the war. Mr. Malcolm Low, who was near Browne at the time, considered the daring act of prowess to have been the means of preventing the rebel gunners reloading and firing upon the infantry at the most critical period of the whole action. Sir William Mansfield stated that in his opinion and in that of Sir Colin, the affair was "very brilliant," and as "quite one of the best things we have seen of the sort, the attack by you having been made in a most soldierly manner and *secundum artem*." Captain Browne received the Victoria Cross for his daring. The reputation of this gallant officer as a man of great ability and conduct had already been made, and he had subsequently shown himself as qualified to conduct large operations in the field as he was willing to risk his life in the cause of duty.

many bold and daring *tálúkdárs*, the men who had already caused trouble to Longden at *Ázamgarh*, and who were at this time exerting themselves to the utmost to stimulate opposition to the British. They went so far, indeed, as to threaten with condign punishment any member of their class who should submit to or accept the friendship of the common enemy. On these threats they acted. *Bábú Rámparshád Singh*, a *tálúkdár* of *Suráon* who had displayed British sympathies, was attacked by some of these confederated rebels, who burned his house, sacked the town, and took himself and his family prisoners. On the intelligence of this outrage reaching *Allahábád* Lord Canning hastily organised a small force, designated the *Suráon* field force, composed of two hundred and sixty of the 32nd foot, eighty of the 54th foot, the 7th *Panjáb* infantry, seventy men *Brasyer's Sikhs*, fifty-two troopers 6th *Madras* light cavalry, sixty sabres *Láhor* light horse, detachments of horse and foot artillery, and nine guns and mortars, and placed them under the command of *Brigadier Berkeley, C.B.*, with directions to reassert British authority in that part of the country.

Eastern Oudh.

Suráon is
sacked by
the rebels.

to be de-

A British
force is sent
under
Berkeley to
clear the
district.

Berkeley crossed the *Ganges* on the 12th of July, and on the 14th came in sight of a body of rebels at *Daháin*. *Daháin* was not properly a fort. It was rather a large area of jungle surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wall and ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis. In the centre of the enclosure was a square brick-house. On *Berkeley's* approach the rebels retired within the enclosure, allowing the British to occupy the village and the jungle outside without opposition. *Berkeley* awaited for the arrival of his heavy guns, and then opened fire; but the result, owing to the dense nature of the jungle, not being satisfactory, he sent on his infantry to storm. The result was entirely successful. About two hundred and fifty rebels were killed in the ditch alone; as many more, chased through the jungle, were cut down by the cavalry and the horse artillery.

Daháin

is captured
by *Berkeley*.

Resting on the 15th, *Berkeley* proceeded on the 16th to the fort of *Tirúl*, seven miles north of *Suráon*. He found this fort in the middle of an impenetrable thorny jungle, through which a few paths were cut in directions only known to the natives of the place; and it had walls, bastions,

Description
of *Suráon*.

ditches, escarps, like a miniature fortress, with a stronghold in the centre, into which the garrison could retire on being closely pressed. There were only three guns on the bastions, but the walls were loop-holed for musketry. So thick was the jungle around that Berkeley could scarcely gain a view of the fort; he therefore deemed it prudent to employ his mortars and a 24-pounder before sending in his infantry. This plan succeeded. The enemy evacuated the place during the night, leaving behind them their three guns and their gun-ammunition. The fort was then destroyed.

Under
pressure

the rebels
evacuate it.

By a somewhat similar train of operations, Berkeley captured and destroyed a fort at Bhairpúr. Having thus completed the work entrusted to him, he returned with his field force to Allahábád. After a brief interval, he was again sent out to demolish other forts in Oudh at distances accessible from Allahábád. In this manner he extended his force as far as Partábgarh. Pushing on, then, to Sultánpúr, he touched Hope Grant's force, and they united the line of posts direct from Allahábád to Lakhnao.

Berkeley
clears the
forts of Oudh
as far as
Partábgarh,

and touches
Hope Grant's
force at
Sultánpúr.

The force under Rowcroft, and the *Pearl* brigade acting with it under Captain Sotheby, whom we left at Ámórha at the end of April, had fallen back on Captainganj. In the interval there was occasional sharp fighting. On the 9th of June a detachment of both services, led by Major Cox, the sailors commanded by Lieutenant Turnour, and some twenty marines by Lieutenant Pym, marched on Ámórha, where, it had been ascertained, Muhammad Husén had arrived in force. Cox divided his detachments into two parts; one led by himself, the other—to which were attached the sailors and marines—by Major J. F. Richardson. Setting out at 2 o'clock in the morning, and arriving at daybreak within a mile of Ámórha, they were suddenly met by a heavy fire from skirmishers thrown out by the rebels. Pym and the marines drove these in: Cox then opened fire with his guns. Then, foiling an attempt made to outflank him, he drove the rebels out of the place.

Rowcroft's
force and
the *Pearl*
brigade

defeat the
rebels at
Ámórhá

Nine days later a larger detachment of Rowcroft's force again attacked the same rebel leader at the head of four thousand men at Harhá, and inflicted on him a defeat so crushing that he fled from that part of the country.

and Harhá.

A little later Rowcroft moved with his force to Hír, in the Gorákpúr district, to guard the frontier until the advance of Sir Hope Grant in force should sweep the districts below him.

Rowcroft
then falls
back on
Hír.

Isolated actions in the more western part of the province produced results not less beneficial. It happened that on the 7th of August a rebel band, the advance of the force of the rebel Firuzsháh, attacked the station of Mohan, on the river Sáí, seventeen miles from Lakchnao on the road to Fathgarh. Mohan was one of the places in which British rule had been re-established, and was at the time the head-quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the district, Mr. Pat Carnegy, already mentioned in these pages.* At Mr. Carnegy's disposal was a native police battalion. The river Sáí, close to Mohan, was traversed by a bridge. On the evening of the 7th of August the rebel band referred to, numbering two hundred infantry and a hundred and fifty cavalry—the advance guard of a larger force—drove in the police pickets, crossed the bridge, and made every preparation to attack the town the following morning.

The rebels
attack
Mohan.

Information of this attack reached Colonel Evelegh, C.B., commanding at Nawábganj, at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. An hour later Evelegh set off with three hundred Sikh cavalry under Godby, two horse-artillery guns, twenty-five gunners mounted to support the guns, and twelve rank and file of the 20th foot, mounted on limbers, and reached a point three miles from Mohan. Conceiving that were he to continue his direct advance the rebels would acquire information of his approach, Evelegh turned off from that point to the village of Húsénganj—a village between Mohan and Rasúlábád, the general headquarters of Firuzsháh, and the occupation of which would cut the rebels' line of retreat. His foresight was justified; for, on coming within a mile of Húsénganj, he perceived the rebels falling back on that place from Mohan. He immediately pursued them with his small force, but, finding that his guns could not travel fast enough to overtake them, he pushed forward his cavalry under Godby. The result was satisfactory. Godby laid low forty-five of the rebels and cap-

Evelegh
marches
against
them,

and defeats
them.

tured their only gun, a brass 3-pounder, together with one elephant and two camels.*

Nearer to Lakhnao, between the Rohilkhand frontier and that city, a gallant deed performed by the Kavanagh whose immortal heroism was recorded in the last volume,† tended greatly to the pacification of the district in which it occurred.

Of the district of Málíábád, twelve miles north-west of the capital, Mr. Kavanagh was Assistant Commissioner. Eighteen miles further to the north-west, lay the town of Sandéla, occupied chiefly by Patháns, possessing many brick-built houses and a small mud fort, and situated in a level plain. The Patháns of this place had displayed a determined hostility to the British, and had lost no opportunity to threaten their posts and to intercept their communications. It occurred to Kavanagh, a daring man, fertile in resources and full of the love of adventure, that it would be possible to put an end to these excesses by the capture of the town. He proposed, therefore, to Captain Dawson, commanding one of the new police levies, to attack Sandéla. Dawson agreeing, they stormed the place on the 30th of July, and drove out the rebels. Thenceforward the town remained in the occupation of the British. Kavanagh displayed great daring on this occasion. Nor was his tact inferior to his courage. By a ready display of that quality, he won over several zamindárs to the British cause, and even engaged them to maintain a number of matchlockmen at their own expense for its support.

The banks of the Ganges in Oudh, even so far down as Alláhábád, required during these three months of July, August, September, very close watching. They were infested by bands of rebels, some of whom pillaged the villages in Oudh; others, crossing the river, attacked and plundered those in British territory. To remedy this evil, river steamers were employed during the rainy season, when the river was navigable. On one occasion, towards the end of July, information having reached the authorities that the rebels had collected many boats, ready, whenever a favourable opportunity should offer, to cross into

* This action had the effect of clearing the rebels from many of the districts of Unáo and Maláun.

† Vol. IV. page 116.

British territory, a force of a hundred and twenty Sikhs and two guns were despatched in a steamer to destroy the boats. They did destroy some twenty boats, but the forts which the rebels occupied were too well armed and too strong to be attacked. The expedition against these was deferred, but on several occasions in August and September small detachments were sent up the river to check the predatory instincts of the rebels, and in most cases this object was accomplished.

At the period at which we have arrived, the end of September 1858, the position occupied by the British in Oudh was very peculiar. They held a belt of country right across the centre of the province, from east to west; whilst the districts north and south of that belt were either held by the rebels or were greatly troubled by them. North of the belt were the Begam, Mamú Khán, Firuz-sháh, Narpát Singh, and leaders less notorious, with their followers; south of it were Béni Mádhú, Hanmant Singh, Harichand, and others. Besides these, in the north-eastern corner of the province, near the Nipál frontier, Náná Sáhib and his adherents were believed to be actively intriguing.

Position
in Oudh
occupied by
the rebels.

In October the cessation of the rains made the movement of troops again possible. The rebels were the first to take advantage of the change of season. On the third of October Harichand, with six thousand men and eight guns, crossed the Gúmtí ten miles north of Sandelá. His force, increased by the junction of several zamindárs and their following to twelve thousand men and twelve guns, arrived within three miles of that post on the morning of the 4th. Sandelá was occupied by the Captain Dawson already spoken of, with his newly-raised police battalions and other infantry levies, fourteen hundred strong, and five hundred irregular cavalry levies. On the approach of the rebels in such overwhelming force, Dawson placed his infantry in the small mud fort, and sent his cavalry to Máliábád. He kept the rebels at bay till the 6th, when Major Maynard, with a detachment of the 88th foot, two 9-pounder guns, two 2½-inch mortars, two hundred and fifty police cavalry, and six hundred police foot, joined him, taking up the five hundred cavalry on the way. Maynard at once attacked the rebels and drove them to Panú, about four miles distant, where they took up a very strong position. On the evening of

The rebels
attack
Sandelá,

are held in
check by
Dawson,

driven back
by Maynard,

the 7th, Brigadier Barker reached Sandéla with a strong column,* attacked the rebels on the morning of the 8th, and, after a desperate battle, completely defeated them. His loss, however, was severe, being eighty-two of all ranks killed and wounded. Major Seymour, Queen's Bays, Major Maynard, whose charger was hacked to death with talwárs when in the thick of the fight, and Lieutenant Green, of the Rifle Brigade, who received thirteen wounds, including the loss of his left arm and the thumb of his right hand, greatly distinguished themselves on this occasion. The rebels lost a large number of men, especially in the pursuit, which promptly followed on the victory. A few days later, after a hard day's fight, accompanied by many casualties, the victors stormed the fort of Birwah.

About the same time, the 5th of October, Brigadier Eveleigh defeated the rebels at Miárganj, between Lakhnao and Kánhpúr, took two guns, and placed about two hundred of them *hors de combat*; and on the 8th Sir Thomas Seaton added to his former laurels by intercepting a large body of the rebels on the frontier near Sháhjahánpúr, killing three hundred of them and taking three guns. The same day an attack upon Powáin was repulsed by the Rájah of that place, with trifling loss.

These were the small actions which indicated the re-opening of the campaign. The comprehensive plan which the Commander-in-Chief, now become Lord Clyde, had drawn up during his stay at Allahábád, came into operation only on the 15th of October. This plan was devised on the principle of acting by columns in all the districts simultaneously, so that, driven out of one district, the rebels might not be able, as they had previously, to take refuge in another. Thus, by Lord Clyde's plan, one column was drawn from Rohilkhand for operations in the north-west of Oudh, clearing Mohamdí, Náurangábád, and similar places of importance, and proceeding then to establish itself at Sitápúr. For operations in the Baiswára country, four brigades were detailed. Another column was posted to

* Two field batteries, two squadrons Queen's Bays, six hundred and seventy native cavalry sabres, two hundred and fifty 88th Foot, one hundred 3rd battalion Rifle Brigade, nine hundred police battalion.

guard the Duáb; another to guard the Kánhpúr road; whilst other smaller columns, starting from Lakhnao, Nawábganj, Daryábád, and Faizábád, were ordered to be kept movable.

The reader will at once conceive the general purport of the plan. The brigades detailed for duty in the Baiswára country would occupy the whole of the Faizábád district between the Ganges and the Ghághrá. Pushing then northward, they would reconquer the country between the Ghághrá and the Ráptí, holding out a hand to Rowcroft's force, on their right, in the Gorákhpúr district. Simultaneously the Rohilkhand force would reconquer Sitápúr and the places in the Khairábád division. Then, with his right firmly fixed, as a pivot, at Balrámpúr and a point beyond the Ráptí, Lord Clyde would wheel his main force round to the right till its left point should touch the Rohilkhand column, when the whole, sweeping onwards, would clear the northernmost parts of the province, and drive the surviving rebels, who should refuse to surrender, into the jungles of the kingdom of Nipál.

The plan
more in
detail.

On the 23rd of October Lord Clyde despatched instructions in the same spirit to Sir Hope Grant. That officer was directed, in co-operation with Brigadiers Pinckney and Wetherall, to make a circuit, moving up the Gúmtí as far as Jagdíspúr, then, turning sharp to his left and moving southward by Jáis, place himself between Parshadápúr and Ámethí, dispersing any rebels on his way. The brigadiers mentioned received at the same time detailed instructions as to their action, so as to make it co-operate with Sir Hope's movement, and thus ensure the success of the general plan.

Instructions
sent to Hope
Grant.

Hope Grant, in obedience to these instructions, started immediately, arranging with Brigadier Wetherall, who was marching up from Sariám to join him on the 4th of November, and attack the fort of Rámpúr Kasiá, held by an active partisan named Rám Ghúlám Singh. But Wetherall, reaching the vicinity of Rámpúr Kasiá on the morning of the 3rd, resolved, despite of the orders he had received to wait for Sir Hope, to assail the place at once. Fortune greatly favoured him. Rámpúr Kasiá was in very deed a stronghold. Its outer fortifications, formed of mud ramparts, had a circumference of three miles. Within this area, surrounded up to the outer works by a dense jungle,

Wetherall
marches on
Rámpúr
Kasiá.

was another fort, and within this again a stone building. So much for the interior. But beyond, and surrounding the outer ramparts, there was again a dense jungle in every direction save in that of the north-west; and beyond the ramparts was a formidable abattis. The ditch was deep but narrow, and there were rifle-pits in the part which, in fortification, would correspond to the berme.* It happened, however, that on one side the ditch and ramparts had not, for a very small space, been completed, and it fortunately happened that Wetherall lighted on this particular spot. At any other point he would certainly have been repulsed, but at this he effected an entrance, and carried the place and its twenty-three guns, with a loss of seventy-eight men killed and wounded. The rebels lost about three hundred men.

Hope Grant first heard of Wetherall's success on the afternoon of the 3rd. He at once joined him at Rámpúr Kasiá. Thence, in pursuance of his instructions, he proceeded to Ámethí. This fort likewise was almost covered by jungle. It was garrisoned by four thousand men, fifteen hundred of them Sipáhis, and thirty guns. Grant arrived within two miles of its north-eastern face at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 7th of November. A reconnaissance, promptly made, assured him that the rebels were bent on resistance. On returning from this reconnaissance he found a messenger from Lord Clyde, stating that he was encamped three miles to the east of the fort. The Commander-in-Chief, in effect, having failed to induce the Rájah of Ámethí to come to terms, had marched from Partábgarh on the 6th, to bring him to reason. This active measure succeeded. The Rájah rode into camp on the morning of the 8th, and tendered his submission, yielding his stronghold.

Ámethí taken, Grant, carrying out the orders of Lord Clyde, proceeded to Shankarpúr to attack it from the north, whilst Wetherall and Pinckney should invest it on the east and south, and Evelegh on the west. In performing his part of the combined movement, Evelegh was delayed by the bad roads and the opposition of the rebels. He defeated these on the 8th at Moramáu, and on

* Sir Hope Grant's *Incidents in the Sepoy War*.

the 9th he took the fort of Simrí, but these operations so delayed him that he was unable to arrive in time to take up a position to cut off the retreat of the chief of Shankarpúr and his followers.

The chief was no other than Béni Mádhú, and he had with him a following estimated at fifteen thousand men. The Commander-in-Chief, anxious to avoid bloodshed, had offered him very favourable terms if he would surrender. Béni Mádhú had returned the proud reply that he would yield his fort as he could not defend it, but that he would not yield himself as he belonged to his King! That night he and his followers evacuated the fort by its uninvested face. Not, however, with the freedom from molestation they had hoped for. Fleeing hastily to Dúndia Khéra, they were encountered on the way by Evelegh, and defeated, with the loss of three of their guns.

The fort
surrenders,

but Béni
Mádhú
escapes,

and is
encountered
and beaten
by Evelegh
on his
retreat.

Shankarpúr was at once occupied by Grant, who then marched on the Ghághrá, which he crossed in face of the rebels, led by the Rájah of Gondah and Méhndi Húsen, on the 27th of November, pursued the enemy twenty-four miles, and captured four guns. Marching thence towards Rái Bárelí, he beat the rebels again at Machhlígáon on the 4th of December, taking two guns, reached the fort of Banhasiá, whence he extracted five guns, on the 5th, Gondah on the 9th, and Balrámpúr on the 16th. Lord Clyde, meanwhile, having learned the direction taken by Béni Mádhú, took Evelegh's brigade with him, marched on Dúndiá Khérá, and attacked and completely defeated that chief on the 24th of November, taking all his guns. Béni Mádhú, however, escaped. The other columns had by this time formed a complete cordon round the circumference of eastern Oudh. They now closed in, and marching from their different points of departure, and on a common centre, traversed the whole territory, demolishing forts and strongholds, and re-establishing the civil power as they advanced.

Converging
marches
of Grant,

Lord Clyde,

and the
other
columns.

Whilst the east was being thus pacified, the Baréli column, commanded by Colin Troup, employed all its efforts to bring about a similar result on the western side. Crossing the Rohilkhand frontier in the end of October, Troup advanced on Sitápúr, dispersed the tálúkdárs

The column
from Baréli

takes up its
position in
the converg-
ing line,

and sweeps
chiefs
before it.

who attempted to oppose him in the vicinity of that place, captured Mitháuli on the 8th, and gave a final defeat to the rebels at Méhndí on the 18th of November. Columns, meanwhile, under Gordon, Carmichael, and Horsford, were engaged in clearing the country south of the Ghághrá, and before these the irreconcilable chiefs, men of the stamp of Béni Mádhú, and Béni Mádhú himself, fell back.

Hope Grant, I have said, had reached Balrámpúr on the 16th of December. There he learned that Bálá Ráo, brother of Náná Sáhib, had taken refuge in the fort of Túlsípúr, twelve miles distant, with a number of followers and eight guns, and that he had been joined there by Muhammad Húsén and his adherents. Grant at once directed Rowcroft to move from his position at Hír, and, reinforcing him with the 53rd, directed him to attack Túlsípúr. Rowcroft obeyed orders, found the enemy drawn up to receive him, beat them after a feeble resistance, but could not pursue them from want of cavalry. Hope Grant, fearing lest the rebels should escape into the Gorákhpúr country, then took up the pursuit himself, and, cutting off Bálá Ráo from Gorákhpúr, ascertained that he had retreated with six thousand men and fifteen guns along the margins of the jungle to a place near Kandakót, where there was a half-ruined fort at the confluence of two rivers. Manœuvring with great skill, and placing his columns in a position so that escape to any other quarter but Nipál was impossible, Grant moved against them on the 4th of January, 1859, and drove them across the border, taking all their guns.

and sweeps
the rebels
into Nipál.

Whilst Grant was thus engaged, Lord Clyde, sending Eveleigh to the west to join Troup, was engaged in sweeping the country from the points occupied by his troops, towards the Nipál frontier. Moving on to Sikrorá, with Grant's force forming his right, touching, as we have seen, Rowcroft's force on the extreme right, and which formed, as it were, the pivot, Lord Clyde drove the Begam and Náná Sáhib before him from Bondí and Bahraitch; then advancing on Nanpárá, cleared the country between it and the Ghághrá; then marching on Bánki, close to the Nipál frontier, he surprised the camp of the rebels, defeated them with great slaughter, and drove them

On his side,

Lord Clyde
sweeps the
remaining
rebels into
Nipál.

into Nipál. This action and that of Hope Grant at Túl sípúr, referred to in the preceding paragraph, cleared Oudh of the last remnants of the rebels. Sir William Mansfield wrote that he considered the mutiny crushed out, and Lord Olyde, sharing that opinion, left the province under the military care of Sir Hope Grant, instructing him to keep the frontier of the border of Nipál closely shut up, so as to prevent, if possible, the escape of any rebels into the lower country.

Considering the mutiny crushed, he makes over command to Hope Grant and leaves.

The spirit, however, which had animated the rebel chieftains to sustain against the British a struggle which, during six months at least, had offered not a single ray of success, was not entirely extinguished.

The spirit of the rebels is not, however, extinguished

Sir Hope Grant, taking leave of the Commander-in-Chief, proceeded to join Brigadier Horsford's force on the Ráptí. An incident had occurred just before his arrival, which showed the great care required in attempting to ford Indian rivers. Horsford had driven a strong rebel force across that river, and, in fording it in pursuit of them, many men of the 7th Hussars and the 1st Panjáb cavalry had been swept away by the force of the current and lost. Amongst these was Major Home, of the 7th Hussars. After some search his body was drawn out of a deep hole, his hands having a fast grip of two of the rebels, whilst the bodies of two troopers who perished with him were found, each with his hands clutching a rebel sawár ! *

Danger of fording Indian rivers.

From one side only, from the side of Nipál, was further danger to be apprehended. On this side the frontier had a length of about a hundred miles, formed of mixed hill and jungle; and with such a frontier it was always possible that, despite the best dispositions on both sides, the strictest precautions would be evaded.

The Nipál frontier.

At this crisis the real ruler of Nipál, the Maharájah Jang Bahádur, behaved with the loyalty that had throughout characterised his dealings with the British. Not only did he inform the armed rebels who had crossed the border that he would afford them no protection, but he allowed British troops to cross the border to disarm any considerable body there assembled. Under

Loyalty of Jang Bahádur.

* Grant's *Incidents in the Sepoy War*.

this permission, Brigadier Horsford, early in the year, entered the Sonar valley, and, crossing the Ráptí at Sidonia Ghát, came upon a body of rebels and captured fourteen guns; and, later on, Colonel Kelly, of the 34th, caused the surrender of six guns, after having chased the rebels with great loss under the hills. Under the pressure thus exercised, a moiety of the fifty thousand who had crossed into Nipál, one by one threw away their arms, and returned to their homes, trusting they would be allowed to settle down unmolested.

A few, more hardened in crime, and therefore more hopeless of mercy, still continued to hold out, and some of these—the regiments which had perpetrated the Káhnepúr massacre, the 1st, the 53rd, and the 56th Native Infantry, led by Gújádar Singh, a rebel whose hate to the British had not been lessened by the loss of an arm when fighting against them—succeeded in crossing the border, in marching on Sikrorá, and filching thence two elephants, and finally, when pursued from that place by Colonel Walker and the Queen's Bays, with two guns, in taking up a position at Bangáon, a small dilapidated fort on the river Nadí, at the entrance of the Ghúnglé jungles. There, at the end of April 1859, Colonel Walker, reinforced by four hundred men of the 53rd, and sixty of the 1st Sikh cavalry, attacked and completely defeated them.

Notwithstanding that the hot weather had set in, Sir Hope Grant deemed it of pressing importance to drive the remainder of the rebels from the jungles. Learning that the last remnant of their disorganised forces was at the Servá pass, Grant moved against them in person, dislodged them by a turning movement, and then pursued them across the hills. The pursuit gave ample evidence of the state of exhaustion to which the rebels had been reduced. Without food and without arms, without money and without artillery—for they lost here their last two guns—they were thenceforth powerless. Pursuit ceased, and Grant contented himself with posting troops at different points along the frontier as a precautionary measure. His only regret now was that Náná Sáhib and his brother Bálú Ráo had found refuge in Nipái. To the very last the former had been

defiant and daring as became his assumed position. Bálá Ráo, on the other hand, had expressed penitence, and denied participation in the Kánhpúr massacre.

At last, then, Oudh was at peace. The province had become British by a right far more solid and defensible than the pretext under which it had been seized in 1856. Then, the country of the ruler who had ever been true to his British overlord was, in disregard of treaty, seized in the dead of the night, against the wishes alike of the sovereign and the people. Fifteen months' experience of British rule, administered by doctrinaires who preferred the enforcement of their own theories to considerations of justice and policy, far from reconciling the people to their new master, had caused them to regret the sovereigns whom the British had expelled because of their misgovernment of that very people. They hailed, then, the opportunity, ingeniously fomented by the more influential of their countrymen, which seemed to promise them a relief from regulations which perplexed and from changes which irritated them. They joined in the revolt inaugurated by their brethren the Sipáhis—the majority of them Oudh men—and fought for independence. How pertinaciously they waged the contest has been told in these pages. No other part of India gave an example of a resistance so determined, so prolonged, as did Oudh. Throughout the struggle, the sense of the injustice perpetrated in 1856 steeled the hearts of its people and strengthened their resolution. If on some occasion they too precipitately fled, it was in the hope of renewing the struggle with some chance of success another day. When, finally, the sweep made over Oudh by Lord Clyde forced the remnant of the fighting class to take refuge in the jungles of Nipál, the survivors often preferred starvation to surrender.* The agricultural population, the tálúkdárs, the landowners, the traders, accepted the defeat when, after that long struggle, they felt that it was final. Thenceforward Great Britain

Oudh finally
becomes
British.

Defect of
the first
title.

Its conse-
quences.

The title of
1859 better,

* "Further on," wrote Sir Hope Grant, describing his last pursuit, "we discovered two of the rebels in a state of helpless exhaustion, dying from their wounds and from starvation. It was sad to see many of the poor wives of the Sipáhis, who had accompanied their husbands, deserted and left to die on the bare ground," and more to the same effect

possessed Oudh by a title far sounder than that which she had set up in 1856, the title of conquest.. She holds it now on a basis even stronger, on the basis of the affections of a people whom she has conciliated, and of a territorial aristocracy whose rights, whilst defining, and in some instances curtailing, she had made inalienable.

that of the
post-mutiny
period the
best of all.

CHAPTER III.

THE PANJÁB AND THE NORTH-WEST.

BEFORE proceeding to recount the other great military measure with which the story of the mutiny fitly closes, it is necessary that I should ask the reader to accompany me to the Panjáb to see how the fall of Dehlí, made possible by the noble self-denial of Sir John Lawrence, affected that border province. From the Panjáb the reader will return through the pacified provinces of the north-west to Ágra, in close vicinity to that Gwáliár but just reconquered by Sir Hugh Rose. In the succeeding book I shall record the most romantic episode in the history—the pursuit, from many starting points and by many independent columns, of the famous Tántiá Topí.

The Panjáb.

The decision at which Sir John Lawrence had arrived at the end of July 1857 to denude the Panjáb of troops in order to reinforce General Wilson's army before Dehlí, had not been formed without most serious and anxious consideration. On the one side, he had had before him General Wilson's letter announcing that unless he were reinforced from the Panjáb he would not be able to maintain his position, still less to assault the city; and the inner certainty that if General Wilson were to raise the siege of Dehlí the Panjáb would rise in insurrection. On the other, he had the knowledge that the effective force of Europeans at his disposal, including the sick and convalescent, but not including the force under Nicholson, did not exceed four thousand men, and that these were not more than sufficient to maintain order in the Panjáb, even whilst the general feeling of the Panjábís should remain loyal; most insufficient should a striking reverse of fortune, such as the raising of the siege of Dehlí, turn the Panjábís against him. He had before him, in fact, a choice of two risks—the risk of a general rising in the Panjáb, caused by the effect which would certainly be produced in the minds of the Panjábís by a retreat from Dehlí; and the

Sir John
Lawrence's
position
early in
September
1857.

risk of rebellion induced by the knowledge that the Panjáb had been denuded of British.

Of the two risks, the second was undoubtedly really the lesser. To a nervous man, to a man fearing responsibility, however, the second risk would present dangers affecting to such a degree his position, that he would certainly shrink from incurring them. A man of that stamp, charged with maintaining British rule beyond the Satlaj, would have argued that his primary duty was to protect the Panjáb, and that he dare not, for the sake of the uncertain chance of conquering Dehlí, risk the safety of that province. "True," he would have said, "true it is that, if the march of Nicholson's column enable Wilson to take Dehlí, our situation will be ameliorated. But Wilson might be repulsed; Wilson himself thinks it is quite a toss-up whether he will succeed or whether he will fail. And, if he fail, the situation of the Panjáb without Nicholson's column will be a thousand times worse than if I were to retain it.

Comparison of the two risks, one of which he was obliged to run.

Everything, then, depends upon a very doubtful 'if'; and, responsible for the Panjáb as I am, I dare not incur the risk." But Sir John was not a nervous man, and he had no fear of responsibility. He saw clearly that the one chance of preventing the further spread of the mutiny was to strike a blow at its heart. That heart palpitated at Dehlí. Every risk, then, which strengthened the blow to be struck at Dehlí was a prelude to safety.

Reasons for his decision in favour of the bolder policy.

How Nicholson's column successfully worked out the great result aimed at has been already recorded in these pages. Dehlí fell. But in the interval Sir John Lawrence had to meet the other risk of which I have spoken. Nicholson's departure at the end of July had left in the Panjáb about four thousand European troops, including those sick and convalescent. Of these, three regiments were in the Pesháwar valley, but so reduced by sickness, that for the active work of a campaign they could not muster more than a thousand bayonets; one regiment, the 24th, held Láhor; one, sent from Sindh, held Multán and Firuzpúr; another furnished detachments to hold Ráwalpindí, Amritsar, and Jálandhar. Sir John at once made preparations to meet the new situation. He first formed a movable column. For this purpose he drew from the 24th Foot from

The Panjáb when Nicholson left it at the end of July.

How Sir John prepared to encounter the possible evil.

two to three hundred men, and joined with them four hundred Panjáb infantry and a few horsemen. The other troops alluded to being required for the purpose of watching, as at Pesháwar, the frontier, and elsewhere, the disarmed native troops, eighteen thousand strong, this column really constituted the only force which could be used in the event of an insurrection provoked by the hopes which the march of Nicholson's column might inspire in the minds of the disaffected.

The doubts which Sir John Lawrence had entertained regarding a prolonged continuation of the loyalty of the Panjábis were quickly justified. Nicholson had crossed the Satlaj on the 30th of July. Early in September it was discovered that the inhabitants of the lower Hazárah country had conspired to revolt. Mostly Muhammadans, the people of that tract and of the adjoining hills had been tempted by the long successful resistance of Dehlí to plot the downfall of their English masters. They had evidently been close observers of the state of affairs, for they had arranged that their continued loyalty should depend on the turn affairs should take at Dehlí. If that royal city should not fall before the 10th of September, on that day they would revolt.

Disaffection
in the lower
Hazárah
country.

In this case to be forewarned was sufficient. Lady Lawrence, who was then at the hill station at Marri, received the first intimation of the intended revolt. She quickly entered into communication with Mr. Edward Thornton, Commissioner of Ráwalpindí. That gentleman concerted at once with the other officials to baffle the conspirators. In a few hours their leaders were arrested, and the plot was thus nipped in the bud.

Their plot
is discovered
and baffled.

A few weeks later, a conspiracy of a similar nature actually came to a head in the country between Láhor and Multán. On the evening of the 14th of September, the very day on which the assault of Dehlí was delivered, a Muhammadan official of the postal department arrived at Láhor from Gughaira, and, making his way to Sir John Lawrence, reported "with somewhat of a malicious twinkle of the eye," that all the wild tribes inhabiting the jungle country between Láhor and Multán had risen. Questioned further, he declared that the insurgents

Rising in
the country
between
Láhor and
Multán.

numbered a hundred and twenty-five thousand. Though Sir John knew this number to be greatly exaggerated, yet, well aware of the wild and reckless character of the tribes, to whom the tale referred, he felt certain that a rising of a formidable character had taken place, and that it was a case to meet which it was necessary to take prompt and decided action. Within

Sir John
meets

three hours, then, of the receipt of the message, he had despatched one company of European infantry, two hundred Sikh cavalry, and three guns to the headquarters of the insurgents. Small though the force was, totally inadequate to deal with any large body of rebels, the celerity with which it had been organised and despatched compensated for every disadvantage. The very rumour of its

and sup-
presses it.

advance struck terror into the insurgents. They at once took refuge in the almost impenetrable jungles which formed their normal habitation. Their retreat did not in the least relax Sir John's endeavours to crush them. He sent reinforcement after reinforcement to his small column, and very speedily ensured the submission of the disaffected tribes.

Thenceforth,
order
throughout
the Panjáb

This was the last attempt made by any portion of the population of the Panjáb to rise in revolt. The fall of Dehlí occurred about the same time to convince even the most disaffected that the star of England was still in the ascendant. The occurrences that followed seemed to add daily confirmation to this opinion. The relief of Lakhnáo, the capture of that place, followed by the reconquest of Rohilkhand, and accompanied, almost, by Sir Hugh Rose's splendid campaign in Central India, came as proof upon proof that the power which had won India was resolved to maintain it. In the latter half of the year 1858 one or two disturbances occurred which, by their exception to the general rule and by their easy suppression, served to prove the real tranquillity of the province.

is disturbed
but slightly.

First at
Derá Ishmáíl
Khán.

In July 1858 a portion of the 18th Panjáb infantry, stationed at Derá Ishmáíl Khán on the Indus, planned a mutiny. The portion referred to was composed of Sikhs, known as the Malwái Sikhs, and numbered about a hundred. For some cause unknown they proposed, it was said, to murder their officers, to seize the magazine and the fort, and to re-arm the 39th regiment native infantry, which had been disarmed some time

previously. Fortunately, on the 20th of July, the plot was discovered. Major Gardiner of the 18th Panjáb native infantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, proceeded at 10 o'clock in the evening of that day, to the lines of the regiment and summoned two of the Malwáis. One, a Sipáhi, came out at once, when Major Gardiner ordered him to be confined. On hearing the order he ran off, pursued by the guard. Just as the foremost men of the guard had reached him a Malwái Jámadar rushed out, cut down one man and wounded another, and fled with the Sipáhi. A few days later they were captured, and the revolt, of which they had been the ringleaders, was suppressed.

Suppressed
by Major
Gardiner.

At Multán an attempt made, the following month, to dispose quietly and peaceably of some of the disbanded regiments, terminated in bloodshed. At that station there were the 62nd and 69th native infantry and a native troop of horse artillery. These men were a source of great

Multán.

embarrassment to the authorities, for it was considered unsafe to re-arm them; whilst, disarmed, they required European troops to guard them. It was resolved, as a middle course, to disband them by fractions, and allow them to depart quietly to their homes. The Sipáhis acquiesced in the decision when the decision was made known to them. Subsequently, however, they conceived the impression that it was intended to attack and destroy them piecemeal on their way home. Imbued with this idea, they rose in revolt. When the mid-day gun fired on the 31st

Embarrass-
ment caused
to the
authorities
there by the
disarmed
regiments,

of August, they seized clubs and whatever else they could find in the shape of weapons, and rushed to attack the European and Sikh troops. Those troops consisted of a hundred and seventy artillerymen, a wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, the 11th Panjáb Infantry, and the 1st Irregular Cavalry. The men of this small force who happened to be on guard

the men of
which, under
the impres-
sion that
they are
about to be
massacred,
rise in
revolt.

were taken by surprise, and five of their number were beaten to death with clubs. Lieutenant Miles, Adjutant of the Bombay Fusiliers, who came up at the moment, was dragged from his horse and killed in the same manner. As soon, however, as the bulk of the Europeans and Panjábis realised the state of affairs, they came up in strength, and showed no mercy to the assailants. The 11th Panjábis were especially furious at the unprovoked attack.

Suppression
of the revolt.

Of the thirteen hundred men who made it, few lived to return to their native land.

Passing downwards through the territories of the loyal chieftains of the Cis-Satlaj states—of the Rájah of Patiálá, who, at the very outset, cast in his lot with the British, protected the stations of Ambálah and Karnál when the British army marched on Dehlí, guarded the grand trunk road from Karnál to Philur, co-operated with Van Cortlandt in Hisár, and maintained a contingent of five thousand troops for service with the British; of the Rájah of Jhínd, who, emulating his brother Rájah in loyalty, left his own country undefended to march against Dehlí, and in many other ways rendered assistance to the good cause; and of the Rájah of Nabhá, who aided in holding Lodiáná, supplied an escort for the siege-train, gallantly opposed the Jálandhar mutineers, and performed various other excellent services—the reader will traverse the pacified Dehlí territory till he reaches the district of Itáwah. Here he will make a short sojourn before proceeding to Ágra.

The Itáwah district had, in common with other districts in the Jamnah Duáb, been included in the brigade command assigned to Sir Thomas Seaton.* The attention of that gallant soldier was, however, more constantly directed to the side of Rohilkhand than to the more peaceful districts to the south of him. In those districts he had restored order and had generally re-established the civil administration. The only chance of a renewal of disturbance in them arose from the possibility of some fugitive rebel from the country west of the Jamnah endeavouring to restore the fortunes of his followers by a raid into a settled but little-guarded country. It was this possibility which occurred in the Itáwah district.

The defeat of Sindhiá's rebellious troops at Gwáliár by Sir Hugh Rose had let loose on the country a number of turbulent partisans, who, escaping from the battle, had sought refuge in the ravines of the Jamnah. Prominent among these was an adventurer named Rúp Singh. This man, followed by a few soldiers of the regular Gwáliár contingent, a certain number of the fugitives

of Sindhiá's army, and other rabble, crossed the Jamnah and made his appearance at Ájítmal, twenty-five miles from Itáwah, in the month of July. Though he was routed by a force sent from Itáwah and forced to flee, he did not abandon the district. And, what was of more consequence, other adventurers, animated by similar aims, sprang up about the same time, and rivalled him in his endeavours to harass and plunder the newly pacified territories. Amongst all these marauders, however, Rúp Singh Rúp Singh maintained the pre-eminence. Often beaten, he always managed to elude his pursuers. During long periods he was not heard of. But during those periods daily accounts of robberies and stoppage of traffic on the Jamnah reached the authorities. It was then discovered that Rúp Singh had taken possession of a fort at Barhí, near the junction of the Chambal with the Jamnah, and that from this place he levied contributions on travellers by land and water. and his
river
piracy.

The exactions of this adventurer and of others like him reached at last so great a height that, in the month of August, a small force, five hundred and fifty men of all arms,* was despatched from Itáwah to destroy or disperse them. This force, commanded by Lieutenant Lachlan Forbes, of the 2nd Grenadier N. I., accompanied by Lieutenant Gordon of the Madras Engineers, in command of his sappers, and by Mr. Lance, the able and energetic magistrate of the district, embarked in boats, and proceeded down the river towards Barhí. It had reached Garhá Kúdúr, a fortified village three miles from that place, and was still in the boats, when Rúp Singh attacked it. Gordon's men at once disembarked, in spite of opposition, drove away the rebels, re-embarked, dropped down to Barhí, and took the place. A force
proceeds
against him
from Itáwah, After destroying three of the bastions of the fort and rendering it generally indefensible, Lance pushed on to Chakarnagar, the resort of another rebel chief, completely defeated the rebels there, and fixed that place as the headquarters of a small detachment to control the country. In these operations Lance was greatly assisted by Lieutenant Forbes. This destroys
Barhí, and occupies
Chakar-
nagar.

* During 1858-9, the force at Itáwah commanded by Lieutenant Lachlan Forbes, consisted of six companies of infantry, three troops of cavalry, and three guns, called "the Itáwah Yeomanry Levy"; also four companies of infantry and one troop of cavalry, styled "the Itáwah Military Police Battalion."

energetic officer raised, drilled, and led the local levies, and on more than one occasion during the trip down the Jamnah, when the fire was most severe, he landed with a few of his men, drove off the rebels, and thus enabled Lieutenant Gordon and his Madras sappers to pass unscathed. Mr. James Collett, an engineer on the East India Railway, and who volunteered to work a gun on board Lance's boat, displayed likewise great courage and great skill. He was badly wounded. The operations thus gallantly carried on for a time pacified the districts. But in October Rúp Singh reappeared on the Kúárí^{*} with a following of four hundred men, and attacked a British picket on the Itáwah side of that river. Captain Allan, in command of a few levies—a hundred and forty infantry and twenty-five sawárs—happened to be at the moment at Sahson, not very far from the point of Rúp Singh's action. He at once went in pursuit of him, caught him near the village of Kúárí, completely defeated him, and captured all his camels and pack-cattle. The band of the rebel leader then dispersed, and from that time the Itáwah district was undisturbed.

Allan beats
Rúp Singh
on the
Kúárí,

when the
band
disperses.

In Ágra, since the relief of that place by Greathed, matters had remained fairly tranquil. In the early part of 1858 Brigadier Showers had been sent to command the district and to perform in its vicinity the work which he had so successfully accomplished in the Dehlí districts after the capture of the imperial city.† One of Showers's first acts was to work vengeance on some local rebels who had plundered the town of Báh and murdered the authorities. This was done on the 20th of March. Showers, making a long night-march, surprised the rebels at Kachrú and captured the ringleaders. But the task allotted to him and to the civil authorities in the fort was long and difficult. Not only were the districts swarming with small bands of insurgents, but the whole of the

Showers at
Ágra.

Disturbed
state of the
districts.

* The Kúárí rises about sixty miles to the north-west of the fort of Gwáliár, flows first to the north-west, subsequently east, and finally south-east. Its course is semicircular in its general outline and has a length of one hundred and eighty-five miles. The route from Agrá to Gwáliár crosses it at Hingona, and that from Itáwah to Gwáliár, near a village also called Kúárí, forty-five miles above its mouth.

† Vol. IV. p. 75.

country west of the Jamnah was in a state of complete insurrection. Gwáliár lies but sixty-five miles from Ágra, and it is no exaggeration to state that, until the capture of Gwáliár by Sir Hugh Rose in June 1858, the influence of Mahárájah Sindhiá over his own people was not to be counted upon, and that Ágra was at any moment liable to an attack in force from any number of rebels.

This situation was entirely appreciated in Ágra. The guns of the fort remained pointed at the native town—the *focus* of a rebellion which might at any moment break out. Every precaution was, indeed, taken to prevent, or rather to ward off, such an event; but the fact that no European living beyond the range of the guns of the fort felt his life secure for a moment shows how deep was the impression that a revolt was a mere question of opportunity. The slightest event might bring it on. The news of a disaster in the Duáb or in central India, the appearance on the Jamnah of a mutinied contingent or of Tántiá Topí—any one of these eventualities would most certainly precipitate a catastrophe.

Apprehensions at Ágra.

Throughout this crisis the civil authorities at Ágra—Colonel Fraser, Mr. E. A. Reade, and their colleagues—displayed a coolness of judgment and a readiness of resource which left nothing to be desired. The self-denying energy with which they devoted themselves to the task of reorganising where reorganisation was possible, of meeting great and pressing wants from exhausted resources, of providing all the military and civil requirements day by day, and of infusing their own brave spirit into those whose fortunes were at the lowest, deserve a far longer and a fuller notice than I am able to give them in these pages. The history of the occupants of Ágra is the history of men who, deprived of the stimulus of action, of the excitement of the camp, of the joyous sound of the clash of arms, devoted all their energies to their country, and deserved fully the credit and the glory always assigned to deeds more showy but not more meritorious.

Colonel Fraser and Mr. E. A. Reade.

Their great deserts.

Amongst the useful measures carried out during the period of which I am writing was the raising of a corps of cavalry, subsequently known as Meade's Horse. At the end of the year 1857 the want of native troopers and mounted orderlies at Ágra had been greatly felt, and as

Meade's Horse.

there were in the fort officers whom the mutiny had deprived of their employment, it was considered advisable to raise a regiment on a military footing. The task of raising it was, in December 1857, committed to Captain R. J. Meade.

This officer, who will occupy a conspicuous figure towards the close of the next chapter, had been for some years brigade-major of the Gwáliár contingent, and in that office had won the confidence of the officers under whom he had served. He possessed a thorough acquaintance with the language of the people, and he invariably gave all his energies to the duties confided to him. It would have been impossible for a general in command to have had under his orders an officer who would more resolutely carry into execution the orders he received.

A body of a hundred Sikhs and Panjábí Muhammadans formed the nucleus of this new regiment. To them Meade added some forty odd Eurasians and native Christians, chiefly drummers and bandsmen, taken from the disbanded native regiments. These were ultimately increased to eighty-five, and were formed into a Christian troop. As none of these men had ever previously crossed a horse, some of Meade's difficulties may be imagined.

At the end of January 1858 Meade obtained an accession of forty-five mounted Játs, sent from Rohtak under a Jámadar of good family by Mr. J. Campbell, collector of that district; and a little later the new commandant induced Baldéo Singh Thákur of Jhára to raise, from men of his class in the neighbourhood of the Chambal, a troop of seventy horsemen. In this manner the regiment was formed, and Meade was, in a short time, able to form it into six class troops.* The labour of drilling the men and teaching many of them to ride may be imagined when it is considered that none of the men had served in the cavalry or as soldiers at all. Working incessantly himself, and aided by such men as Sergeant Hartigan, V.C., of the 9th Lancers, and who subsequently gained a commission in the 16th; by Cockburn, whose gallantry has been referred to in a previous volume; and by others, Meade was able, by the beginning of March, to show a fair proportion of his regiment fit for service. Brigadier

The regiment
is formed,

* 1. Sikhs; 2. Panjábí-Muhammadans; 3. Játs; 4. Christians; 5. Gwáliár Thákurs; 6. Mixed.

Showers, who inspected them during that month, expressed himself well satisfied alike with men and horses.

From this time up to the beginning of June Meade's Horse were constantly employed in maintaining order in the neighbourhood of Ágra, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the services they rendered in this respect to the administrative and military authorities in the place.

and renders
good service
in the
vicinity of
Ágra.

But in June the aspect of Ágra suddenly changed. How on the 1st of that month Mahárájah Sindhiá was attacked and driven to flight by the rebels under Tántiá Topí, I have recorded in a previous chapter. The Mahárájah, abandoned by all but a few faithful men, fled to Dholpúr, intending to push on to Ágra. The news of his misfortune had, however, preceded him. Showers instantly despatched a squadron of Meade's Horse to escort the fleeing sovereign with all honour into the capital of the north-west provinces. The Mahárájah, who reached Ágra on the 2nd of June, remained there till the 14th, and left it that day escorted by two squadrons of Meade's Horse to Dholpúr, thence to proceed to join Sir Hugh Rose, expected to reach Morár on the 16th. News of Sir Hugh's arrival on that day having reached the Mahárájah, he set out on the morning of the 17th, still escorted by the two squadrons, and made the march, fully sixty-five miles, within twenty-four hours. The events which followed have been recorded in the preceding book.

Sindhia, after
his defeat,
is escorted
to Ágra.

Returning to Ágra, I have only to record the fact that on the defeat of Tántiá Topí on the 17th and 19th of June, at Morár and at Gwáliár, Brigadier Showers sent out a detachment, consisting of the 3rd Europeans and a battery of guns, to cover Bharatpúr, upon which place he believed the rebels to be marching. The demonstration was successful, inasmuch as the presence of the detachment induced Tántiá Topí to bend his steps southwards. As soon as his march in that direction was definitely known, the detachment returned by way of Fathpúr Síkrí to Ágra. Thenceforward that city and the districts east of the Jamnah experienced the full relief caused by the crushing defeat, at a point so close to the British districts, of the one chieftain whose name up to that time had been a beacon of hope to the marauder.

Showers
moves to
prevent
Tántiá Topí
from fleeing
northward

Relief felt at
Ágra by the
recovery of
Gwáliár.

Tántiá Topí had fled from Sir Hugh Rose at Gwáliár; had fled from Napier at Jáorá Alipúr; but whither? All that was known was that when he had fled from the last-named battle-field he had taken a southerly direction. Who could say how long he would maintain that direction? It is time now that we should follow him, and recount in some detail the measures adopted by his pursuers to overtake him.

BOOK XVI.—TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ AND THE QUEEN'S
PROCLAMATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE PURSUIT OF TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ.

TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ, accompanied by Ráo Sáhib and the Nawáb of Bandah, had fled from the field of Jáurá Alipúr on the 22nd of June. The information which had induced Brigadier Showers to send a detachment to cover Bharatpúr was perfectly correct, for Tántiá, as soon as he had ascertained he was no longer pursued, had turned his steps north-westwards. On reaching Sarmathurá, however, he learned the dispositions made by Showers. Foiled on one side, he pushed on directly westwards, hoping to gain Jaipúr, in which city he believed a strong party was prepared to rise in his favour.

Tántiá Topí,
baffled by
Showers,

pushes
towards
Jalpúr.

On this route I propose to leave him, whilst I trace the positions taken up by the several British columns upon which the pursuit of him was to devolve.

I have already shown how on the 29th of June Sir Hugh Rose made over the command of his force to Brigadier-General Robert Napier, and proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that presidency. The season for active military operations on the black and spongy soil of central India had now passed away, and Napier hoped before the country should harden he would be able to afford some rest to his overworked soldiers. With this object he made arrangements for comfortably housing a portion of them at Gwáliár itself. Here he quartered three squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, Meade's Horse, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, the 86th Foot, the 25th Bombay

Napier can-
tons his force
at Gwáliár,

Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Artillery, a company of the Royal Engineers, and a Light Field Battery. To rest at and to hold Jhánsí he detached a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, a wing of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Sappers, and three guns of the late Bhopál Contingent. Brigadier Smith's brigade—which, it will be remembered, took an active part in the operations against Gwáliár—consisting of two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 95th Foot, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of Bombay Horse Artillery, marched to occupy Sípri, whilst Mayne's Irregular Cavalry took up their position at Gúnah.

But these were not the only troops which in the month of July 1858 occupied positions overlooking the area on which only it was likely Tántiá Topí would act. In a previous page I have recorded how General Roberts, commanding the Rajpútáná field force, had detached a column under Brigadier Smith to cover and to aid in the operations of Sir Hugh Rose. Roberts's force, diminished by the departure of that column, still consisted of the 83rd Foot, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, wings of the 12th and 13th Bombay Native Infantry, two squadrons 8th Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, three hundred Bilúchí Horse, a light field battery, and a siege-train of six pieces. At the end of June Roberts lay with this force at Nasirábád.

Upon him it fell to strike the first blow against the fugitive leader. On the 27th of June Roberts learned from Captain Eden, the political agent, that Tántiá Topí had sent emissaries to the disaffected party in Jaipúr assuring them that he was marching on that place, and begging them to be in readiness to join him. Roberts took his measures accordingly. On the 28th of June he set out from Nasirábád, and marching rapidly, reached Jaipúr before Tántiá.

Tántiá, again foiled, turned southwards, and made a raid on Tonk, followed by a light column under Colonel Holmes.* The

* Consisting of cavalry and horse artillery, some native infantry, and two hundred of the 72nd Highlanders.

Nawáb of this place, Wazir Muhammad Khán, was by no means disposed to submit to the dictation of a Maráthá fugitive with English troops at his heels. He, therefore, shut himself in his citadel with the men he could depend upon. The remainder of his force, with four guns, he left outside with orders to face the rebels. But, instead of facing them, this force received them as brethren, and made over to them the four guns. With this addition to his army Tántiá started off southwards to Madhupúrá and Indragarh, forty-five miles north-east of Kotá, still pursued by Holmes, and at a longer interval by Roberts.

Tántiá moves on Tonk followed by Holmes's light column.

Tántiá takes four guns at Tonk and moves off.

The flight and the pursuit were alike retarded by the rains, which fell during this month with remarkable force, so much so that the river Chambal, swollen to a torrent, barred Tántiá's passage from Indragarh to the south-eastward. Changing his course, then, he took a south-westerly course to Búndí, capital of the native state of the same name. The Maháráo of Búndí, Rám Singh, had more than once displayed a disposition to strike for independence, but even he was not prepared to link his fortunes with those of Tántiá Topí. He shut, therefore, the gates of Búndí in the face of the fugitives. Tántiá, pursued, as he thought, by Holmes, had no time to stop to use force, but marched a few miles southward, then, making a sudden tour westward, crossed the Búndí hills by the Kínah pass, and made for the fertile country between Nasirábád and Nímach, a country which had already been the scene of warlike operations, and the larger towns in which had more than once shown a disposition to favour the rebellion. Tántiá was able to change his course without fear of being disturbed by Holmes, for on leaving Búndí he had loudly asserted his intention to continue his course due south, and he counted that information thus disseminated would deceive his pursuers.

Tántiá, baffled by the rise of the Chambal, moves towards Búndí,

then turns to the country between Nímach and Nasirábád.

Pushing on, then, Tántiá took up a position between the towns of Sanganír and Bhílwará, both in the Udaipur state, on the Nasirábád and Nímach road.* Roberts, meanwhile, had been obliged, in consequence of the continuance of the

* Sanganír is seventy-four miles north of Nímach, sixty-nine south of Nasirábád, and eighty miles south of Ajmir: Bhílwará is more than a mile from it.

heavy rain, to halt at Sarwár, an elevated plateau about thirty miles from Ájmir. On the 5th of August, however, the roads having been reported passable, Roberts broke up and marched towards Nimach. On the 7th, when at Dáblá, Roberts follows on his track, ten miles from Sanganír, he received information regarding the position taken up by Tántiá close to that place.

The town of Sanganír is on the left bank of the little river Kotáriá. On the other side, and more than a mile up the stream, is the town of Bhílwará, in the front of which Tántiá lay encamped.* Roberts was well aware that all his cavalry and a portion of his infantry under Holmes were following on the track of the rebels. He himself was in front of them. The opportunity was too good to be thrown away. He resolved, though he had no cavalry, to attack.

The rebel infantry and guns had taken up a position in front of Bhílwará. Their horse, however, were thrown forward on the left, across the Kotáriá up to Sanganír, and on the right to the other side of that town, the whole forming a horseshoe figure of about a mile and a half, connected by skirmishers. Their elephants and baggage were in the rear on the line by which they must retire if beaten.

Roberts advanced his infantry, covered by skirmishers a short distance in front, cleared Sanganír of the few rebels who had penetrated within it, forced the rebel horse across the river, and, bringing his guns to the river-bank, opened on the enemy's right. Under this fire his infantry, played upon by the rebel batteries, crossed the river, and took up a position on a rising ground, their right on a village, their left on a small tank. The guns then were sent across. Seeing this, Tántiá attempted no further resistance; he withdrew his guns and infantry, massing his cavalry on the intervening plain to cover the retreat. He retired unscathed, except by the guns, for Roberts had no cavalry to send after

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860. This number contains an admirably written account of the operations of Generals Roberts and Michel against Tántiá Topí. It is difficult to exaggerate the obligations under which the author lies to the writer of this article, himself an actor in the scene.

him,* and proceeded to a village called Kotrá in the Údaipúr country.

The next day Roberts was joined by his much-required cavalry, which had made a march of thirty miles. He then set out in pursuit of the rebels, doing twenty miles daily till, on the afternoon of the 13th, he came up with their advanced guard at Kankráulí,† a town seventy-nine miles to the north-west of Nímach and a hundred and seventy-one to the north-east of Díśá, situated on a lake not far from the Arávalí hills. On driving in the rebel outposts, Roberts learned from prisoners and villagers that their main force was occupying a position on the Banás river, seven miles distant.

Roberts is joined by his cavalry, and pursues

and overtakes Tántiá.

Tántiá Topí, who was, according to his lights, a religious man, had devoted that 13th of August to a visit to the shrine of Náthdwára,‡ reputed one of the most sacred in India. On his return at midnight he heard for the first time of the close vicinity of the English. Dreading an attack, he determined to decamp at once. But his infantry refused to move. They said that they were worn out by the long marches, and must rest; that they would march in the morning, and the guns should march with them; that the cavalry might act as they pleased. Under

Tántiá loses an important day in religious exercises.

His infantry refuse to move.

* Tántiá merely records of this action: "We were there" (Bhílwára) "attacked by the English force, and I fled during the night accompanied by my army and guns."

† The excellent information obtained by General Roberts enabled him, in more than one instance, to traverse the chord of a circle whilst the rebels had gone round by the arc. The method employed by Roberts to obtain this accurate information is thus succinctly described by the author of the article in *Blackwood*, already referred to. "The method which General Roberts adopted for obtaining information was to have about twenty cavalry in advance, close to the rebels. They left connecting links of two or three men every few miles, so as to keep up the chain of communication. The advance party was composed, half of Balúch horse, who had no sympathy with the rebels, but could not communicate very well with the villagers, and half of horsemen belonging to the Rájah of Jaipúr, who were supposed, as Rájputís, to be on good terms and able easily to communicate with the villagers, but not to be very warm partisans of the British. By this mixed party correct and immediate intelligence was constantly supplied."

‡ Náthdwára is a town in the Údaipúr State, situate on the Banás river, twenty-two miles from Údaipúr. The shrine there attracts countless multitudes of pilgrims.

these circumstances, Tántiá had no other alternative but to fight.

At daybreak, then, he ranged his men as skilfully as the nature of the ground would allow. His position was strong. In front of him flowed the Banás, which, covering his centre, then made a bend which protected his right; his left rested on some steep hills. The ground he occupied was a low, steep ridge, which formed the bank of the river. Before him, on the opposite bank, was an open plain, eight hundred yards wide, across which his enemy must march.

At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 14th Roberts marched across it. In vain did Tántiá's four guns, well protected by a natural parapet, sweep that plain. In spite of the effect they produced—and it was considerable—the British and Native infantry reached the left bank, forded the river, and scaled the heights on the enemy's left and centre. The right, where the guns were posted, being thus left unsupported, abandoned the pieces under a volley from the 13th Bombay Native Infantry.

The cavalry, led by Colonel Naylor, then dashed across the stream, and came upon the rebels scattered over the plain. Naylor pursued them for two miles his men dealing and receiving death. He then formed up his men, and, under orders from the general, kept up a steady and orderly pursuit for fifteen miles, killing numbers of stragglers, and capturing three elephants and a quantity of baggage. Two miles

further on, the rebels, having reached a village surrounded by jungle, determined to make a stand. Naylor, finding that the number of men whom he could then muster amounted only to a hundred and fifty, and that the country was quite unfit for cavalry, upon this abandoned the pursuit.*

Tántiá Topí, having shaken off his pursuers, pressed, now without guns, eastward, hoping to find the Chambal fordable, and to place that river between himself and the English. Roberts, divining his intention, followed in the same direction, and the fourth day

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860. Tántiá Topí writes thus of this action: "The next morning we moved towards Patan, and, after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled."

after the action reached Puná, a town north of Chitor, not far from the high road between Nímach and Nasirábád. Here he met Brigadier Parke, commandant of the Nímach brigade, who, some days before, had started from that place in anticipation of orders to cut off Tántiá from the south. Roberts now made over to him the 8th Hussars and the Balúchís, and begged him to continue the pursuit.

pursued by
Parke.

Parke set out at once, but, some of the horses of the 8th Hussars being knocked up, he deviated from the exact course followed by Tántiá to proceed to Nímach, where he knew he could obtain about fifty fresh horses. Here he was met by conflicting news regarding the fugitives. On the one side he was assured by experts that it was absolutely impossible that Tántiá could cross the Chambal at that season of the year, and that he was bent on pushing southwards; on the other, Captain Showers, the political agent at Udaipúr, who was then at Nímach, had received information from the spot that Tántiá was determined to cross the river. Unfortunately, Parke believed the experts. Proceeding to Morásá, fifteen miles from Nímach and thirty from the Chambal, he halted there a few hours to obtain more exact information. When it came it told him that the informant of Captain Showers was right, and that Tántiá was attempting the Chambal. Parke hurried after him, reached the river after a hard march, only to find it just fordable, but rising rapidly, to see "a few disabled ponies standing on the left bank, and the rebels disappearing among some mango-trees in the west horizon." Tántiá had escaped. Parke returned to Nímach to refit.*

Parke makes
a divergence
to Nímach
for fresh
horses,

and is
deceived by
false in-
formation,

in conse-
quence of
which Tántiá
escapes.

Tántiá, meanwhile, having crossed the Chambal, pushed for Jhálra Patan, thirty miles distant. Jhálra Patan is a handsome town in the Jháláwar State, ninety miles to the east of Nímach and two hundred and sixteen to the north of Ságara, built on the model of Jaipúr. The Ráná of that state, Príthi Singh, great-grandson of the famous Zálím Singh, the founder of the principality, was loyal to his British over-

Tántiá
moves on
Jhálra Patan.

The Ráná,
loyal to the
British,

is deserted
by his troops. lord. He had no idea of yielding without a struggle; but his troops, when drawn up to repel the Maráthá invader, behaved precisely as Sindhiá's troops had behaved at Gwáliár on a similar occasion—they fraternised with the rebels. Tántiá at once took possession of the Ráná's

Tántiá takes
possession of
Jhálra Patan
and levies a
heavy contri-
bution.

guns, more than thirty in number, his ammunition, bullocks and horses, and surrounded the palace. The next morning he visited the Ráná, and demanded a contribution in money. The Ráná offered five lakhs; but, this sum not being deemed sufficient,

Ráo Sáhib, acting as representative of the Peshwá, sent for him and demanded twenty-five. Ultimately the Ráná agreed to give fifteen. Of these he actually paid five, but, having been insulted and ill-treated, he escaped that same night and fled to Máu, leaving some barrels of powder handy for his wife and family to blow themselves up if threatened with insult.*

Tántiá
conceives
the idea of
marching on
Indúr,

Tántiá, freed by the rising of the Chambal from all chance of immediate pursuit, halted five days at Jhálra Patan. He states that he employed the money taken to issue three months' pay to his troops, at the monthly rate of thirty rupees to each trooper, and twelve rupees to each foot soldier. Whilst so

halting, he and his comrades, Ráo Sáhib and the Nawáb of Bandah, conceived a very bold idea. This was no less than to march on Indúr, and summon Holkar's troops to join the representative of the liege lord of the Maráthás. Could he succeed in reaching the capital of Holkar before the small body of troops which the news of his approach would probably bring to the same spot from Máu, the fraternisation would be certain, and the result would spread to all Holkar's subjects. Impressed

and tries to
carry it out.

with this idea, Tántiá marched with his army, now reinforced by the Jháláwar levies and all the Ráná's guns,† nearly direct south to Rájgarh.‡

* This account is taken mainly from Tántiá's memoirs. The writer in *Blackwood* states that the war contribution amounted to sixty thousand pounds, whilst forty thousand pounds more was collected from Government property. As Jhálra Patan was a very rich town, this was very likely the case.

† Tántiá says eighteen, but as he had no guns when he arrived, and as three were abandoned and twenty-seven captured a few days later at Rájgarh, he must have taken all.

‡ There are thirteen well-known towns of this name, and probably many more. The Rájgarh referred to in the text is in Málwá.

But, whilst Tántiá had been resting at Jhálra Patan, the officer commanding in Málwá, Major-General Michel, had, as if reading his thoughts, despatched from that place a force,* under Colonel Lockhart, to cover Ujjén, due north of Indúr. Lockhart, proceeding further northwards, reached Súsín, a place about seventeen miles to the west of Rájgarh. Not believing himself strong enough to attack Tántiá, he intrenched himself, to await the arrival of a small reinforcement, under Colonel Hope, coming from Máu. He met this reinforcement at Nálkérah, about three miles to the south of Súsín. At the very time of this junction Tántiá was marching on Rájgarh, within a few miles of him.

Lockhart
moves on the
line on which
Tántiá is
advancing.

At this period, the end of August 1858, a change took place in the *personnel* of the British command. Major-General Roberts, who had up to that time commanded in Rajpútáná, was transferred to the military and political control of the Gújrát division. His place was taken by Major-General Michel of the Royal army, commanding in Málwá, a command which he was now to hold in conjunction with that in Rajpútáná. Michel was a zealous, active, resolute, and capable officer, thoroughly impressed with the necessity of pursuing the fugitive chieftain without cessation.

Michel
succeeds
Roberts.

Michel joined the united columns of Lockhart and Hope at Nálkérah. He had no information regarding Tántiá Topí, but a vague rumour prevailed that he was moving in a north-easterly direction. Marching was, in every sense of the word, difficult. Although the month of September had arrived, heavy rain, the precursor of the break-up of the monsoon, was falling, and the saturated cotton soil of Málwá resembled a sea of black mud. Still it was necessary to move, and Michel moved in the right direction. With great difficulty he transported his little army to Chápairá, about midway to Rájgarh. The following day, the rain having ceased, Michel pursued his march towards that place. The heat was so great and the sun's rays were so terrible that some of the artillery horses dropped

Takes
command at
Nálkérah,

and,
pursuing,

* Three hundred and fifty 92nd Highlanders, four hundred and fifty 19th Bombay Native Infantry, one squadron Bombay 3rd Light Cavalry, and two guns Le Marchand's battery Bengal Artillery.

dead in the traces. Still Michel pushed on, and, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, halting on a rising ground, he had the gratification of beholding Tántiá Topí's army encamped near the walled town of Rájgarh.

To traverse three miles of black soil and then, at the approach of night, to attack with a tired army a fresh body of men in the position they had chosen, was not for a moment to be thought of. Michel, then, waited for the morning; but, when morning dawned, Tántiá and his men had disappeared. Michel at once sent his cavalry on their track. This track was distinguished, first, by the marks of the gunwheels and the elephants, then, more decidedly by three guns lying abandoned on the road. A little further on the rebel force was descried, drawn up in two lines, the second on higher ground than the first, and the guns on ground above both. The cavalry then halted to await the approach of the infantry and guns.

The infantry and guns did not let Michel wait long. As soon as they came up the action began with an artillery fire from both sides. Then the English infantry, deploying, went at the rebels. The latter did not wait the conflict, but gave way and fled. Getting entangled in intersecting roads, they fell into inextricable confusion. The British horse artillery, galloping forward in alternate divisions of two guns, kept up a fire on the retreating masses, whilst the cavalry, threatening their left flank, forced them to incline towards the north.* In the pursuit, twenty-seven guns were taken.

Tántiá, driven towards the north, wandered about for some time in the jungly country on both sides of the Betwá, and eventually made for Sironj—in an easterly direction. But, whilst thus seeking a place of security, new enemies were gathering round him.

* Of this action, Tántiá writes: "On reaching Rájgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled." It would be incredible, were it not true, that a force so large, numbering at least eight thousand, with thirty guns, should allow itself to be defeated by less than one-sixth of its number in men and guns, without drawing a drop of blood. Yet so it was. It is the more strange, as about half the rebels had been trained and disciplined by Europeans; their guns were effective pieces of larger calibre than the English 9-pounders, their muskets bore the Tower mark, and their swords were excellent, yet not one man of the British force was killed or wounded!

To Brigadier Parke, who had left Nímach on the 5th of September, was entrusted the duty of covering Indúr and Bhopál, thus leaving Michel's force to follow Tántiá from the west, whilst Smith's brigade should advance from the north, and the Jhánsí column under Colonel Liddell from the north-east.

With this disposition opens a new phase of the pursuit. The defeat of Tántiá Topí near Rájgarh almost coincided in time with the conclusion of the rainy season; for, although rain continued for some days to fall, further operations had become possible. We are now entering upon the cold weather campaign. In this new actors appear upon the scene. The Central India field force once more invites the attention of the public. It seems fitting, then, that before describing the events of that cold-weather campaign I should trace the operations of General Napier and of Brigadier Smith from the period when we left them up to the middle of September. Meanwhile we must suppose Tántiá Topí to be making the best of his way, by circuitous paths, from Rájgarh to Sironj.

The story
reverts to
Napier and
Smith.

At the beginning of July we left General Napier's division at Gwáliár and Jhánsí, Brigadier Smith's brigade at Sírí, and Mayne's Irregulars at Gúnah, all resting after the extraordinary fatigues and exposure of the Central India campaign. To the superficial glance, order had been restored in Sindhiá's dominions. The Mahárájah, grateful to the English, more fervent than at any previous period in his desire for their success, was doing his utmost to forward the views of the army administrators for the success of the troops. Sir Robert Hamilton, located at Gwáliár, was engaged in re-establishing political relations with the petty states around. The situation was full of promise; and yet, all the time, it was hollow and unsound.

The situation
at Gwáliár
apparently
peaceful.

During the whole of July the European troops had rest. The comparatively trifling matters which required attention in the districts were easily disposed of by the employment on detached duty of the men of Meade's Horse, a regiment daily rising in estimation.

Revolt of
Mán Singh,
Rájah of
Narwár.

But on the 2nd of August an incident occurred which led to very serious complications. A chief of Sindhiá's territory, named Mán Singh, Rájah of Narwár, had quarrelled with his liege lord. To avenge the wrong which, he conceived, had been inflicted upon him by Sindhiá, and which will presently

be related, and encouraged possibly by Tántiá's action in the south, this chieftain, summoning his followers, twelve thousand strong, surprised on the 2nd of August the strong fort of Páurí, eighty-three miles by the Síprí road south-west of Gwáliár, and eighteen to the north-west of Síprí, but recently supplied with six months' provisions and ammunition. Now, Smith's brigade was at Síprí. On the 4th he learned of the act of rebellion perpetrated by Mán Singh. On the 5th he started from Síprí with a force composed of two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, a wing of the 95th, and three field guns; and, marching as rapidly as the roads would permit, reached the vicinity of Páurí early on the morning of the 7th. On approaching the place, Mán Singh sent a messenger with a flag of truce to the brigadier, to assure him that he had no quarrel with the English; that his contention was with the Mahárájah alone, and to supplicate earnestly for an interview. Smith granted the request and saw the chief that day. In an earnest manner, totally devoid of pretension, Mán Singh told his story to the brigadier. He and his family, he said, had ever been loyal servants to the Mahárájah. During the lifetime of his father, nothing had occurred to mar the good feeling which had previously existed. But, on his father's death, the Mahárájah had insulted and robbed him by refusing to recognise his right to succeed to the principality of Narwár* and the estates adjacent. It was to recover these, or, at all events, to avenge himself on the Mahárájah, that he had drawn the sword and seized Páurí, which formed a part of his ancestral possessions, but, he added earnestly, "I have no connection with the rebels, and no quarrel with the English." The plea, though true, and convincing the listener of its truth, was not of a nature which, in those times, could be accepted by an English commander. Smith was responsible for the peace of the country near Síprí; that peace had been violated by Mán Singh, and Smith had but one plain duty,

He seizes
Páurí.

Smith starts
from Síprí
to recover
the place.

Interview
between
Smith and
Mán Singh.

Grievances of
the latter.

Smith
rejects his
plea,

* Narwár is a very important place, with an interesting history. It lies forty-four miles south of Gwáliár. In 1844 Narwár, with the lands pertaining to it, was assessed by the Gwáliár Government at 2,250,000 rupees annually. Little wonder, then, that the despotic ruler of the native State in which it lay should covet it.

to see that the violators were punished and that peace was maintained. He informed Mán Singh of this necessity. Mán Singh was obstinate, and expressed his determination to resist.

and prepares
to besiege
Páurí.

Páurí was strong, well supplied with provisions and ammunition, and its garrison, originally only two thousand, had been increased during the few days since the capture to nearly double that number. Amongst the new-comers was a chief, Ájit Singh by name, uncle of Mán Singh. Smith's force amounted only to eleven hundred men of all arms, and his three pieces were field-pieces. He was thus far too weak to undertake a siege; and the place was too strong to be carried by a *coup-de-main*. Under these circumstances he deemed it prudent to maintain his position near the place, while he sent to Gwáliár an earnest request for reinforcements. On receiving this requisition Napier felt the enormous importance of settling the matter with as little delay as possible. Examples of that sort in a country long under Maráthá rule are apt to be contagious, and there was every probability that, if Mán Singh were allowed for any length of time to parade his defiance of the British, chieftains more powerful than he might follow his example. Napier, then, determined to take the matter into his own hands. He started accordingly on the 11th with five guns and four mortars, escorted by six hundred horse and foot, reached Síprí on the 17th, and joined Smith on the 19th of August. He began operations the next day. For twenty-four hours he poured a vertical fire into the fort from his mortars, and then began to use his breaching batteries. This demonstration quite satisfied Mán Singh. On the night of the 23rd he, Ájit Singh, and their followers evacuated Páurí, and made their way southwards through the jungles. Napier entered Páurí, the following morning, then equipped a light column under Robertson, 25th Bombay Native Infantry—an officer whose gallantry and soldierlike conduct have often been mentioned in these pages—and sent him in pursuit of the rebels. Napier himself having destroyed the fortifications of Páurí and burst the guns, retired to Síprí to make arrangements for the further pursuit of Mán Singh should Robertson fail to capture him.

Strength and
garrison of
Páurí.

Smith sends
to Gwáliár
for reinforce-
ments.

Napier sets
out from
Gwáliár to
reinforce
him.

Mán Singh
evacuates
the place.

Robertson
pursues.

That zealous officer left Páurí on the 26th of August, on the track of Mán Singh. He had with him a squadron of the 8th Hussars, a squadron of Meade's Horse, two 9-pounders, one 6-pounder, one 5½-inch howitzer, a hundred men of the 86th, a hundred and twenty of the 95th, two hundred 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and two hundred 25th Bombay Native Infantry. Pushing on by forced marches through the jungles, crossing difficult rivers, and conquering every obstacle, Robertson on

Robertson
overtakes
Ájít
Singh's
troops at
Bijápúr,

the 3rd of September ascertained that the rebels were at Bijápúr, near Gúnah, twenty-three miles distant. His determination was instantly taken.

Leaving the bulk of his troops to guard the camp and baggage, he mounted on elephants and camels seventy-five men of the 86th, ninety of the 95th, and a hundred each of the 10th and 25th Native Infantry, and with these and fifty men of the 8th Hussars, and a hundred and fifty of Meade's Horse, he set out that night. At daybreak the following morning he came in sight of the rebels occupying a rising ground on the opposite bank of the Parbatí river. They

surprises
them,

had no scouts, and, the light being still grey, Robertson was able to cross the river unperceived and to send his cavalry round to take up a position

in rear of the rebel camp. These movements were executed with so much care and precision, that, when the cavalry were taking up the position indicated, the rebels were actually stripping to bathe in the river, preparatory to their morning meal. The surprise was complete. Of organised

and cuts
them up.

resistance there was none; but the casualty list showed that the rebels, though taken unawares,

defended themselves bravely. Lieutenant Fawcett, 95th, was killed; Captain Poore and Lieutenant Hanbury, 18th Hussars, and Lieutenants Stewart and Page, of Meade's Horse, were wounded. The remaining casualties in killed and wounded amounted to eighteen.

It was discovered after the action that it was not Mán Singh's but Ájít Singh's band which had been routed. The astute Mán Singh, on learning that he was pursued, had divided his partisans into three divisions, with instructions to traverse separate roads and to combine at an appointed place. It was one of these divisions, six hundred strong, and composed, as was ascertained after the action, of men from the Mahárájah's bodyguard, from the

Composition
of the routed
force.

Gwáliár contingent, and from the 3rd, 40th, 47th, and 50th regiments native infantry which had been encountered. They were all dressed in red, and had percussion firelocks. About three-fourths of them were killed,* but Ájít Singh escaped.

Robertson marched from the scene of action to Gúnah, where he arrived the middle of September. With this march may be said to terminate the campaign of the rainy season in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwáliár bordering on Rajpútáná. It is now fit that we should follow the various columns in the cold-weather campaign against Tántiá Topí and his allies. Of these that against Tántiá Topí demands precedence.

Close of the rainy season campaign.

I left that chieftain making his way about the jungly country on both sides of the Betwá towards Sironj. He duly reached that place about the middle of September, he and his men utterly exhausted. A rest of eight days, made sweeter by the absence of all fear—for the heavy rain that was falling would, they well knew, make the roads impassable to their enemy—set them on their legs again, and even restored to them their former audacity. On the conclusion of that period, the rains having ceased, Tántiá led his men, with the four guns he had taken at Sironj, against Íságarh, a town with a fort, belonging to Sindhiá, in the hilly and difficult country south of Síprí. Here he demanded supplies; but, the townspeople refusing them, Tántiá stormed and plundered the place, and took seven guns. He and his associates halted there for a day to consider their further plans. Their deliberations then culminated in a determination to divide their forces, Tántiá proceeding with the bulk of them and five guns to Chandéri, the Ráo Sáhib with six guns and fewer followers making his way to Tál Bahat by Lalatpúr: this plan was carried out.

The story reverts to Tántiá Topí,

who rests at Sironj.

Takes guns and supplies from Íságarh.

What Chandéri was, the reader will recollect who has followed the history of Sir Hugh Rose's central Indian campaign.† It was now held for Sindhiá by a loyal soldier, a man who had no sympathy with

Tántiá is repulsed at Chandéri,

* The number of killed is often exaggerated, but on this occasion between four and five hundred dead bodies were actually counted on both sides of the river.

† Pages 103-5.

rebels. He repulsed, then, Tántiá Topí's appeals, and when the Maráthá chief attempted to storm the place he repulsed his attacks. Tántiá wasted three days in an attempt to gain a place the possession of which would have been of incalculable use to him, and then, baffled though not dispirited, made for Mangráulí, on the left bank of the Bétwa, about twenty miles south of Chandéri. He was marching, though he knew it not, on defeat, for the English were to meet him there!

I must now return to his pursuers. I have already stated the position of the several English columns; how Brigadier Parke was covering Indúr and Bhopál; how Colonel Liddell with the Jhánsí force was covering the country to the north-east. I have now only to add that Brigadier Smith, released by the capture of Páurí, had taken up a position north of Sironj. In the inner part of the circle, the outer rim of which was occupied by these columns, General Michel was acting.

Enabled at last, towards the end of September, by the cessation of the heavy rains, to act freely, Michel, believing he should find Tántiá in the Betwá valley, went in pursuit of him in a north-easterly direction. As he marched, he heard of the various depredations committed by the fugitives, and he felt sure he should find him. On the 9th of October, marching towards Mangráulí, information reached him that Tántiá had occupied the high ground near the place, and was waiting for him.

Tántiá had arrived there that very morning. He had not sought a battle, but as the ground was favourable he resolved to risk one. His position was strong, and the five guns he had placed in the front of his line commanded the ground along which the English must advance. When, then, Michel sent his men forward, Tántiá's guns opened a destructive fire. Grown bolder by despair, Tántiá at the same time sent his cavalry to menace both flanks of the few assailants. For a moment the position of these seemed critical, the more so as some of the outflanking horsemen penetrated between the main body and the rear-guard. But whilst they still hesitated to come on, to risk a hand-to-hand encounter, the British troops advanced steadily, and, gaining the crest,

charged the guns. Then all was over. Tántiá and his men abandoned their guns and fled. The want of sufficient cavalry did not allow Michel to pursue them.*

who, however, is beaten, and flees.

Tántiá crossed the Betwá and fled first to Jakláun, and then, next day, to Lálitpúr, where he rejoined Ráo Sáhib, who, it will be remembered, had six guns. Tántiá remained here, but Ráo Sáhib, with the bulk of the troops and the guns, set off the following day, and marched in a south-easterly direction. Michel meanwhile, ordering Smith to watch the left bank of the Betwá, followed Ráo Sáhib, and, making his way with great difficulty through the dense Jakláun jungle, came suddenly upon him at Sindwáha, about thirty miles east of the Betwá. Warned by the inopportune sound of a bugle in the British camp, Ráo Sáhib had time to draw up his men on a rising ground, with the guns in front. Then followed a scene almost similar to that at Mangráulí. The English, threatened on both flanks, advance and capture the guns, when the rebels flee. In their flight, however, they were, on this occasion, less fortunate than at Mangráulí. Michel had his cavalry handy; the ground, too, was unfavourable for rapid flight. In a pursuit which covered twelve miles, the rebels then suffered severely. Ráo Sáhib, however, escaped. The English lost five officers and twenty men killed and wounded.

Tántiá and Ráo Sáhib join, and then separate.

Michel totally defeats Ráo Sáhib,

who, however, escapes.

Ráo Sáhib rejoined Tántiá at Lálitpúr, and again the two held counsel as to the future. The country north of the Narbadá seemed about to close on them. The circle was gradually lessening, and in a few days they would be in the folds of the destroyer. They saw this clearly, saw that their only chance was to break through the circle and march to the south, putting the enemy, if possible, on a false scent. This was the difficult part of the programme, but they laid their plans to attempt it.

The rebel chiefs unite and resolve to cross the Narbadá.

It is impossible to withhold admiration from the pertinacity with which this scheme was carried out. Leaving Lálitpúr,

* Of this action Tántiá writes: "On our march to Mangráulí we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled."

Tántiá and the Ráo, whose design was to escape southwards, marched to Kajúria, with the intention of recrossing the Betwá near that place and turning thence southward. But, the ford being guarded by Colonel Liddell, Tántiá turned north-eastward, and made once more for Tál Bahat. There he halted to rest his men. The following day, moving direct southwards, he penetrated into the Jakláun jungles, still to the east of the Betwá. He halted one day at Jakláun, and the next at Itáwah (in the Ságár district). There he heard that the English army was on his track, so he at once broke up and pushed on towards Kurai.*

Whilst he is making that march I must return to General Michel. From the field of Sindwáha that general had marched to Lálitpúr, keeping always to the westward of Tántiá with the view of baulking the intention he believed he might entertain of breaking through to the south. On reaching Lálitpúr, however, a messenger from Brigadier Smith reached him with the information that Tántiá had been met marching southwards, and had probably gained the west side of the general. No time was to be lost. Michel, sending off an express to warn Parke, and pressing southwards by forced marches, came upon Tántiá by a cross road just as that chief was approaching the village of Kurai. Instantly the battle joined. The British cavalry separated from one another the two wings of the rebels' forces. But, whilst the British were engaged in annihilating the left wing, the right, with which were Tántiá and Ráo Sáhib, favoured by the jungle, managed to escape westward. Not that the left wing fought to save their comrades; they had fled in the direction from which they had advanced, and the whole of Michel's force had pounced upon them, leaving the other wing to escape. Tántiá and Ráo Sáhib, in fact, purchased their retreat with the sacrifice of one-half of their followers.†

This happened on the 25th of October. Tántiá pushed on to Rújgarh, molested on his way, four miles from Bagrod,‡ by

* Itáwah lies thirty-eight, Kurai thirty-two, miles to the north-west of Ságár.

† Tántiá writes of this action: "The English force came up in the morning and our army became separated, I accompanied the Ráo Sáhib," &c. Not a word about the sacrifice of the wing.

‡ Bagrod lies thirty-nine miles to the north-west of Ságár

Colonel Charles Becher, one of the most gallant officers of the Indian army, who, at the head of a newly-raised regiment,* did not hesitate to attack his whole force. Becher inflicted considerable loss (upwards of forty men killed), but Tántiá pressed on, and, proceeding *viâ* Rájgarh, crossed the Narbadá into the Nágpúr territory at a point about forty miles above Hoshangábád.

Tántiá,
molested on
the way by
Becher,

crosses the
Narbadá.

Thus in the dying agony of the mutiny was accomplished a movement which, carried out twelve months earlier, would have produced an effect fatal for the time to British supremacy; a movement which would have roused the whole of the western Presidency, have kindled revolt in the dominions of the Nizám, and have, in its working, penetrated to southern India. It was the movement to prevent which Lord Elphinstone had adopted the policy of aggressive defence till then so successful, which Duraud had exerted all his energies, had used entreaties of the most urgent character with the Government of India, had stretched to the utmost the powers entrusted to him, to hinder. And now it was accomplished! The nephew of the man recognised by the Maráthás as the lawful heir of the last reigning Peshwá was on Maráthá soil with an army!

Effect which
would have
been pro-
duced by the
at twelve
months
earlier.

I have said that, had that event occurred but fifteen months previously, British authority in western India would, for the time, have succumbed. As it was—the event happening in October 1858, when the sparks of the mutiny in every other part of India, Oudh excepted, had been extinguished, and when, even in Oudh, they were being surely trampled out—the event caused alarm of no ordinary character to the Governments of Bombay and Madras. Although Lord Elphinstone had shown, to a remarkable degree, a true appreciation of the character of the rebellion and of the manner in which it should be met, even he could not view without grave concern the arrival of Tántiá Topí and Ráo Sáhib in the country of the Bhonslás, that country the annexation of which but a few years previously had moved the Maráthá heart to its core. He could not but remember that a large proportion of the population of the Bombay Presidency was Maráthá, and he could not foresee—

Alarm which
it caused
even in
October
1858,

in Bombay.

* Now one of the regiments Central Indian Horse.

who, indeed, could foresee?—the effect which might be produced on the easily kindled minds of a susceptible people by the presence of the representative of the man whom many amongst them regarded as their rightful ruler.

Nor could Lord Harris, who, throughout the trying times of 1857–58, had shown himself prompt to meet every
In Madras.

difficulty, listen with an indifferent ear to the tidings that the Maráthá leader had crossed the Narbadá. True it was that the Madras Presidency was separated from the country now chosen by Tántiá as his campaigning-ground by the vast territories of the Nizám. True it was that the Nizám, guided by his able and far-seeing minister Sálár Jang, had displayed to the British a loyalty not to be exceeded. But the times were peculiar. The population of the Nizám's territories was to a very considerable extent Hindu. Instances had occurred before, as in the case of Sindhiá, of a people revolting against their sovereign when that sovereign acted in the teeth of the national feeling. It was impossible not to fear lest the army of Tántiá should rouse to arms the entire Maráthá population, and that the spectacle of a people in arms against the foreigner might act with irresistible force on the people of the Dakhan.

Fortunately, these fears were not realised. Six years' experience of British rule had produced a remarkable effect upon the feelings of the Central Provinces. Whatever might be the feelings of the landowners, of the courtiers, and of those Bráhmans who, by means of their influence in a court where Bráhmanical influence was supreme, were able to live a life of luxury, of intrigue, and of pleasure without having recourse to industry and toil, this at least is certain, that the peasantry had no desire to recur to their old masters. In this respect the Central Provinces presented a remarkable contrast to Oudh and Bundelkhand. With all its faults, the people of this part of India preferred the substantial justice of the rule of their alien lords. It is, indeed, a remarkable fact that whilst, in the dominions of Sindhiá and in the principalities governed by Rajpút princes, Tántiá and his followers enjoyed the sympathy of the villagers, and always obtained from them, without pressure and without payment, supplies in abundance, in the Maráthá country beyond the Narbadá the peasantry regarded them as pests in whose face the door was to be closed and the gates were to be barred,

The people
of the
Central
Provinces
manifest a
marked
antipathy to
Tántiá and
his followers.

who were to receive no supplies without payment, and, if it could be managed without injury to themselves, no supplies at all.

To return to the story. Tántiá, crossing the Narbadá forty miles above Hoshangábád, proceeded *viâ* Fathpúr to Multáí* in the direction of Nágpúr, but, learning that a British force from that place had anticipated him, he turned sharp westward, hoping to penetrate to the country southward by an unguarded pass in the hills. He found this impossible, for Brigadier Hill of the Haidarábád contingent was watching at Melghát and Ásírgarh; further westward, Sir Hugh Rose had made preparations to prevent Tántiá from crossing into Khándesh, and, further westward still, General Roberts was bringing up troops to bar Gujrát against him. Nothing could have been more tantalising, for south of the Taptí river, from the banks of which he was separated only by the narrow Sátpura range, lay the country to which Náná Sáhíb laid claim as his rightful inheritance.† Across this, under the circumstances, Tántiá dared not venture. Shut out, then, from further progress west or south, Tántiá made a turn north-westwards into Holkar's possessions, south of the Narbadá, hoping to recross the Narbadá unperceived and to penetrate thence into the territory of the Gáikwár. On the 19th November he reached Kargún, a decayed town in Nimár. Here was stationed a detachment of Holkar's troops, consisting of two troops of cavalry, a company of infantry, and two guns. These Tántiá forced to join him, and then pushed on westward. On the 23rd he crossed near Thán, the great high road from Bombay to Ágra, just as it was being traversed by carts laden with mercantile stores for the use of the English. Plundering these, taking with him the natives who had been escorting the carts, and destroying the telegraph wires, he pursued his course, feeling confident of success if only he could reach the Narbadá before the English, whom he believed he had outmanœuvred, should molest him.

Tántiá finds the country to the south and west barred against him.

He turns to the north-west with the intention of recrossing the Narbadá and marching on Barodah.

* Multáí is a town in the Betúl district, twenty-eight miles east of Bednúr. its chief attraction is a large tank which is revered by the natives as the source of the river Taptí.

† *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860.

But Fortune did not favour him. Michel, indeed, after defeating Tántiá at Kuráí, had pushed on in pursuit, though not on the same track, and, with his cavalry, had reached Hoshangábád on the 7th of November. There he joined Parke, whom he had previously ordered to meet him.

Michel, left without information, Leaving Parke at Hoshangábád, Michel crossed the Narbadá and found himself in the wild country about Betúl, with no accurate maps, no information of his own regarding the movements of the rebels, with no prospect of obtaining any from the local authorities. Left thus to the resources of his own intelligence, Michel came to the conclusion that the roads to the south and due west would certainly be barred to Tántiá, and that, although there was but little prospect of his attempting to recross the Narbadá, yet that it would not be wise on his part to move too far from that river.

divines, Tántiá's intentions, Impressed with this idea, he ordered Parke to cross the Narbadá at Hoshangábád, to march in a direction south-west by west, and take up a position at Chárwah, eighty miles south-east from Indúr, a town forming the angle nearest the Narbadá of a triangle of which Melghát and Ásirgarh, both occupied by British troops, formed the other angles. In that direction, though more slowly, he moved himself.

Whilst General Michel was making these preparations south of the Narbadá, the British authorities at Máu, to the north of it, were receiving disquieting rumours regarding the continued and persistent movements of Tántiá westward. Dreading lest that chief should get possession of the grand trunk road, intercept supplies, and destroy the telegraph wires, Sir Robert Hamilton and Brigadier Edwards, who commanded at Máu, deemed it advisable, before

The British authorities at Máu Tántiá had pillaged the carts in the manner already related, to post two small infantry detachments to watch the fords above Akbarpúr. A day or two later, when intelligence was received that the westerly movement was being prolonged, Major Sutherland, who commanded one of these detachments, consisting of a hundred men of the 92nd Highlanders and a hundred of the 4th Bombay Rifles, received instructions to cross the river at Akbarpúr and keep clear the grand trunk road. Sutherland obeyed his orders, and passing through Thán—the village

already spoken of—seventeen miles from Akbarpúr, proceeded to Jilwánah, thirteen miles further on, nearer to Bombay. There he was when, on the afternoon of the 23rd of November, Tántiá and his troops passed through Thán, plundered the carts and cut the telegraph wires, as already described.

Sutherland crosses the Narbadá to a point below that traversed by Tántiá.

Tántiá having taken the precaution to carry off with him all the men accompanying the carts, Sutherland remained for some hours ignorant of this occurrence. He had been reinforced on the morning of the 23rd by fifty Europeans, sent on camels from Máu. The evening of that day, the report regarding the plundering reached him. The next morning, taking with him a hundred and twenty Europeans and eighty natives, riding alternately on camels, Sutherland proceeded to Thán, and inspected as far as possible the damage done.* Learning there that the rebels had taken a westerly direction, he followed hastily and came in sight of them as they were passing through the town of Rájpúr, nearly midway between Thán and the Narbadá. Pushing on, his men in advance still riding camels, disregarding the enemy's stragglers and the quantities of abandoned baggage and baggage-animals, Sutherland, in half an hour, had approached near enough to force a battle. He ordered, then, his men to dismount; but the delay thus caused gave Tántiá an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to retire. Before Sutherland could set out in pursuit, he had the satisfaction of being joined by his rear-guard—the men who had not been mounted, and who, in their desire for combat, had marched at a great pace. Keeping the whole of his force dismounted, Sutherland resumed the pursuit, and after marching two miles came up with the rebels, formed in order of battle on a rocky ridge, thickly wooded, with their two guns, the

Sutherland learns the vicinity of Tántiá and pursues him.

Catches him only to see him retire.

Resumes the pursuit.

* "The road for eight miles was strewed with articles, taken by the rebels the previous day from some merchants' carts on the main road; several carts had been brought on and abandoned when the bullocks got tired. The soldiers filled their water-bottles with port or sherry, of which there was enough to have stocked a large cellar, but not a man got intoxicated. A cart-load of books had been opened by the rebels during a halt—the contents were torn up and strewed in a circle, with a Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary left intact in the middle."—*Blackwood*, August 1860.

Comes upon
them formed
in order of
battle,

guns of Holkar found at Kargún, pointing down the road. Tántiá had with him from three to four thousand men. Sutherland had just two hundred.

After a little skirmishing, the smaller number charged the larger. Dashing up the road under a shower of grape, they captured the guns, Lieutenant Humfries, adjutant of the 92nd, receiving a sword-cut from their commandant, who was killed at his post. The rebel infantry then fled. The casualties on both sides were trifling.*

attacks and
puts them
to flight.

Sutherland, whose men were too tired to pursue,

encamped on the ground he had gained.

The presence of the two guns with Tántiá's force had neces-

Tántiá, re-
lieved of his
guns, re-umes
his flight,

sitated that slow march over rough ground which had allowed Sutherland to overtake him. Now that the guns were lost his men were able to display that capacity for rapid marching in which the natives of

India are unsurpassed, I might almost say unequalled, by any troops in the world. So quickly did they cover the ground that, when at sunset the following day Sutherland reached the banks of the Narbadá, he beheld the rebel force comfortably encamped on the opposite bank. Between him and

and places
the Narbadá
between him-
self and his
pursuers

their camp flowed the waters of the Narbadá, at that point five hundred yards broad, its banks high and difficult. To cross it in the face of an enemy twenty times his strength would have been an

impossibility even for the troops he commanded.

That Tántiá had been able to cross the Narbadá can only be

How it was
that Tántiá
had been able
to cross the
Narbadá

accounted for by the fact that he had marched the previous afternoon, and the whole of the night, and had thus at least twelve hours' start of his pursuers.

It was well for him that he had that start. When he reached the left bank of the Narbadá Tántiá had

beheld on the bank opposite a party of a hundred sawáns under an officer.† Under other circumstances the sight of these men might have made him hesitate. But he knew that Sutherland

* Regarding this action, Tántiá writes (after referring to the capture of the carts): "We then left the high road and proceeded westward. The next day we were surprised by the English force, and, leaving our two guns, we fled and reached the Narbadá."

† So states Tántiá himself, and I have usually found his statements corroborated by other writers. But I have been unable to ascertain who were these troopers or who was the officer. Probably he was a native officer.

was behind him. He, therefore, plunged boldly in. The sawárs then took to flight.

At midnight Tántiá, having plundered a village called Chiklá, broke up his camp on the Narbadá, and marched in the direction of Barodah. It was his last chance, but it was a great one could he but arrive before the English. Barodah was the seat of a Maráthá dynasty, and it was known that a large party at the court sympathised deeply with Náná Sáhib. There were in the city only one company of Europeans and two native regiments, besides the troops of the Gaikwár, who were almost sure to join the rebels. Full of the hope raised by the prospects before him, Tántiá pushed on rapidly, marching from the banks of the Narbadá thirty-four miles straight on end. He halted at Rájpúrá, took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the chief of that place, and marched the next day for Chhotá Údaipúr,* only fifty miles from Barodah and connected with it by a road. Could he arrive at and quit that place unmolested, his future, he thought, would be assured.

Tántiá pushes
towards
Barodah

full of hope,

arrives within
fifty miles of
Barodah.

But his pursuers were too many. I left General Michel and Brigadier Parke, in the second week of November, at Chárwah, south of the Narbadá, confident that Tántiá's progress to the south was barred, and that he would endeavour to seek some means of recrossing into Malwá. Some days elapsed before an accurate account of his movements reached Michel. That able officer displayed then not a moment's hesitation as to the course to be followed. Recrossing the Narbadá at the Barwáni ford, he marched himself on Máu, while he despatched Parke with a flying column of cavalry, mounted infantry, and two guns, to pursue Tántiá with the utmost speed that was possible.

Michel
discovers
Tántiá's
intentions,

and
despatches
Parke in pur-
suit of him.

Parke carried out these instructions to the letter. Marching, in nine days, two hundred and forty-one miles, for the last twenty of which he was forced to thread his way through a dense jungle, he came up with Tántiá on the morning of the 1st of December, at

Parke catches
Tántiá at
Chhotá
Údaipúr.

* Chhotá Údaipúr is a state in the Rewá Kanthá district, the chief of which pays an annual tribute to the Gaikwár. It possesses an area of about eight hundred and seventy-three square miles

Chhotá Údaipúr, just an hour or two after he had reached that place. Considering the climate, the nature of the country, and the other difficulties of the route, this march must be considered as rivalling any of which history makes record.

The force commanded by Parke consisted of two 9-pounder guns Bombay Artillery, fifty men 8th Hussars, fifty of the 2nd Bombay Cavalry, a party of the Maráthá horse under Kerr—which, after having disarmed the southern Maráthá country, had been sent from the

Force under
Parke.

west to join Michel—Moore's Aden Horse, a hundred of the 72nd Highlanders, mounted on camels, and a hundred and twenty-five Gujrátí Irregular Horse. For the last twenty miles before reaching Chhotá Údaipúr, this force had, as I have stated, threaded its way through a dense jungle, skilfully piloted by Moore with his Aden Horse. On emerging

Discovery of
Tántiá's
force.

from the jungle Moore perceived the rebels. He instantly surprised their outlying picket. The ground beyond the jungle was covered with large trees, brushwood, and tents still standing,* and was so broken as to be very difficult for cavalry and artillery. As

Parke sets
his force in
battle array.

Parke's troops debouched on to it, he deployed his force, placing some of the 8th Hussars, of the Maráthá Horse and the Aden horse on his right; the rest of the Maráthá Horse, under Kerr, on his left, the 72nd Highlanders flanking the two guns in his centre; the remainder of the cavalry in the rear. His whole front scarcely covered two hundred yards. The rebels meanwhile, roused to action, had formed up about six hundred yards distant. They numbered three thousand five hundred men and outflanked the

Tántiá's
aggressive
action is
checked.

British force on both sides. Tántiá first endeavoured to turn the British left, but Kerr, changing his front, charged with great impetuosity, and, driving the rebels from the field, pursued them for a considerable distance, laying sixty of them low. A similar attempt on the British right was met with equal success by the cavalry stationed there, Bannerman, of the Southern Maráthá Horse, greatly distinguishing himself and killing four men with his own hands. In the pursuit a standard of the 5th Bengal Irregulars, borne by the rebels, was captured. Whilst the wings were thus engaged, the two British guns had kept up

* Tántiá admits that he was surprised on this occasion.

a heavy fire on the centre. But it was not long needed. With the repulse of the flanking attacks the action terminated. A pursuit along the whole line then followed.

Tántiá defeated and cut off from Barodah.

This engagement was fatal to Tántiá's hopes regarding Barodah. Leaving his route to the westward, he fled northwards into the jungles of Bánswára, the southernmost principality of Rajpútáná. These jungles, extremely dense in their character, are inhabited principally by Bhíls, a wild and uncivilised race, much given to plunder. Hemmed in on the south by the Narbadá, now for ever abandoned, on the west by Gujrát, now completely guarded by General Roberts, and on the north and east by difficult ranges which separate it from Udaipúr and Sirohí, and the passes across which are few and difficult, Tántiá might have been excused if he had despaired of escape. But he did not despair. Ráo Sáhib was now his only companion, the Nawáb of Bandah having in November taken advantage of the Royal Proclamation to surrender.* But these two men were, in this hour of supreme danger, as cool, as bold, as fertile in resource, as at any previous period of their careers.

Flies to the Bánswára jungles.

Desperate position of Tántiá and Ráo Sáhib.

They remain undaunted.

And yet the British commanders had done their utmost to hem in Tántiá. They really believed that at last they had him. The troops of Roberts's division were echeloned along the roads and paths and passes leading from Bánswára to the west. On that side escape was impossible. A force detached from Nímach under Major Rocke guarded the passes to the north and north-west. Another column sent from Mán, under Colonel Benson, commanded at the moment by Colonel Somerset, watched the passes leading eastward and south-eastward, whilst Tántiá was cut off from the south by his recent pursuers, greatly strengthened by flying detachments, from Burhánpúr and from Khándesh. To add to his difficulties, the Bhíl inhabitants of the jungles of Bánswára, far from aiding him, followed his track as the vulture follows the wounded hare, anxious for the moment when she shall lie down and succumb.

The cordon about them is apparently complete.

But, undaunted, Tántiá pressed deeper into the jungles. On

* To be hereafter referred to.

Tántiá, after many movements in the jungles, reaching Déogarh Báriá * he found that but a small portion of his force was with him. He halted there two days, to allow his men to reunite. This result having been obtained, he, on the 10th of December, entered Báuswára. Here he halted a day, his men plundering sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth from Ahmadábád. He probably would have halted here longer but that information reached him that Colonel Somerset's brigade was closing up from Ratlam.† Disturbed by this information, he marched in a nearly north-westerly direction to Salúmba, an isolated fort belonging to the Ráná of Údaipúr, encircled by hills, in the heart of the Arávali range. It was a strong position, commanding the approaches to Údaipúr. Here Tántiá obtained some supplies, of which he was greatly in need, and set off the following day in the hope of surprising Údaipúr. But the British had received information of his movements, and Major Roche's column had taken up a position at Bhánsrór, whence it would be easy for him to cover Údaipúr or to fall on Tántiá as he emerged from the northern passes. Discovering this obstacle before he had committed himself too far, Tántiá turned sharply to the north-east and took up a position at the village of Bhilwára,‡ in the densest part of the jungle. Here, it is said, Tántiá and his followers debated the advisability of surrendering. But the intelligence which reached them during their deliberations that Mán Singh was at hand, and that Prince Firuzsháh was advancing to their assistance, induced them to persevere in their resistance, to give one more chance to Fortune.

Tántiá halted two days at Bhilwára and then made for Partábgarh, the capital of the Rájah of the state of that name. His probable line of route had been well divined by the English general. But he, too, had received information of Firuzsháh's movements, and it was necessary to arrange to meet him also. For this purpose, Somerset had been despatched with

* Déogarh Báriá is the capital of a state of the same name as Rewá Kanthé, in the province of Gujrát.

† Ratlam lies fifty miles to the west of Ujjén.

‡ Not the town of the same name on the road between Nímach and Nasirábád

a light column to Ágra, Roce had been moved to take his place at Partábgarh, whilst Parke, plunging into the jungles from the westward, was rapidly following on the track of the fugitives.

It thus happened that when, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th of December, Tántiá and his followers emerged from the jungles close to Partábgarh, he found himself face to face with Major Roce. That officer, not having a sufficient number of men at his disposal to close the three passes, had taken up a position about two miles from the jungles, whence he could march to any point at which the rebels might threaten to debouch, provided he had any information of their movements. On this occasion he had no such information. His force, too, was, as I have said, small, consisting only of two hundred infantry, two guns, and a handful of native cavalry. He had no chance, however, of assuming the offensive. Tántiá marched straight at him, and kept him engaged for two hours, a sufficient time to enable his elephants and baggage to clear the pass. Seeing this result gained, Tántiá, who had thus, in spite of his many foes, escaped from the trap, marched in the direction of Mandesar, and halted for the night within six miles of that place. Thence he marched very rapidly—in three days—to Zirápúr, a hundred miles east-south-east of Nímach, thus returning to the part of the country almost directly south of Gwáliár.

Tántiá
emerges from
the jungles,

baffles Major
Roce,

and marches
towards Man-
desar and
Zirápúr.

But the English were at his heels. Benson, who had resumed command of the Máu column, had received excellent information regarding Tántiá's movements from Captain Hutchinson, one of the assistants to Sir Robert Hamilton. He pushed on after Tántiá, then, marching thirty-five miles a day, caught him up at Zirápúr the very day he had arrived there. Tántiá, completely surprised, fled without fighting, leaving six of his elephants behind him, and pushed northwards to Bárod.

Benson
catches him
at Zirápúr.
Tántiá flies
to Bárod:

Here another surprise followed him. Somerset had reached Zirápúr the morning after Tántiá had left it. He had two horse artillery guns with him. Taking fresh horses from the ammunition wagons, he attached them to Benson's two guns. With these four guns, and the ammunition contained in the limber, Somerset started at once, and, marching seventy miles

is caught
there by
Somerset
and beaten.

in forty-eight hours, came upon Tántiá at Bárod. After an action fought in the usual Tántiá Topí style, the rebels fled to Náhargarh in the Kotá territory. Here Tántiá was fired at by the Kiladár.*

Moving out of range, he halted for the night. Ráo Sáhib then sent a messenger to summon Mán Sing, the chief to whom I have referred in an earlier portion of this chapter as having rebelled against Sindhiá, who had appointed to meet him at this place. On Mán Singh's arrival the rebels moved to Parón, where they halted two days. They then pushed northwards towards Indragarh.

Tántiá meets
Mán Singh

On reaching the banks of the Chambal, Mán Singh, for some unexplained reason, left them. On the 13th of January they reached Indragarh,† where Firuzsháh, with his bodyguard and the mutinied 12th Irregulars, met them. To ascertain how this had been possible, I must return to the movements of General Napier and the Central Indian force.

and
Firuzsháh.

The story
reverts to
General
Napier.

I left General Napier just after he and his lieutenants had, at the end of September, expelled Mán Singh from the Gwáliár territory. His detached parties still continued to operate in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwáliár, bordering on Rajpútáná, and the work which those parties accomplished was of a most useful character. In this manner passed the months of October and November, but in December Gwáliár was invaded by a new enemy.

The pseudo-prince, Firuzsháh, already mentioned in these pages, had, after his expulsion from Mandesar by Durand in November, 1857, proceeded with his followers to Rohilkhand to try conclusions with the British in that quarter. Expelled from Rohilkhand by Lord Clyde, he entered Oudh, and cast in his lot with the irreconcilables who, to the last, refused submission to the paramount power. It was only when the native cause was absolutely lost in that province that Firuzsháh, reading the glowing accounts of his achievements which Tántiá Topí regularly transmitted from the

* *Kiladár*—the commandant of a fort.

† Indragarh is a fort and town in the Bundí state, forty-five miles north-east Kotá.

Chambal and the Narbadá, determined to march to the assistance of one whom he could not but consider as a worthy ally. At the time that he arrived at this resolution he was at a place called Bisúah, not far from Sitápúr. Marching rapidly from that place, he crossed the Ganges on the 7th of December, cut the telegraph wire on the grand trunk road, and spread the report that he was about to proceed north-westwards. Instead of that, he took the road to Itáwah, baffled a gallant attempt made by Lieutenant Forbes,* accompanied by Mr. Hume and Captain Doyle—who lost his life—to stop him at Harchandpúr, out-marched a column led by Brigadier Herbert from Kánhpúr to pursue him, crossed the Jamnah on the 9th, and moved off in the direction of Jhánsí. He marched with such speed that on the 17th he had arrived in the vicinity of Ránód, a large town fifty miles north-east of Gúnah. It was here he encountered his first check.

resolves to
join Tántiá
Topí;

leaves Oudh,
baffles
pursuit,

and crosses
into Sindhiá's
country.

General, now become Sir Robert, Napier, had received timely intimation regarding the course pursued by Firuzsháh, and he had sent out detachments to watch the roads which that chieftain would probably follow. On the morning of the 12th of December he received from the commander of one of these, Captain McMahon, 14th Light Dragoons, located near the confluence of the Jamnah, Chambal, and Sind rivers, information to the effect that the rebels had passed into the Lohar district of Kuchwaghar, a tract of country often under water. Believing, from this, that their course would be up the jungles of the Sind river, Napier marched at 2 o'clock that day with a lightly-equipped force,† intending to proceed to Dábra on the Jhánsí road, thence, according to the information he might receive, to intercept the enemy.

Napier is in-
formed of his
movements,

and pursues
him.

* For his services in the Itáwah district Lieutenant Forbes received the thanks of the Governor-General, published in General Orders. At the close of the war he was gazetted to be major if as soon as he should attain the rank of captain.

† Two Bombay light field-battery guns, Capt. G. G. Brown; a hundred and fifty men 14th Light Dragoons, Major Prettijohn; a hundred men 2nd Gwáliár Máraṭhá Horse, Captain Smith; a hundred and seventeen men 71st Highlanders, Major Rich; fifty men 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Lieutenant Forbes; forty camels, Gwáliár Camel Corps, Captain Templer.

Napier halted that evening at Ántri. At 2 o'clock the following morning, however, he was roused by an express message from the political agent at Gwáliár, Charters Macpherson, to the effect that information he had received led him to believe that the rebels would pass by Gohad, north of Gwáliár. Instead, then, of pushing on to Dábra, Napier halted till the post should arrive with letters containing the grounds for the belief expressed by Macpherson. He did well not to act upon it without due caution, for at half-past 10 o'clock the tahsildár of Ántri came to him to state that he had just ridden in from Dábra, and had seen there the smoke of the staging bungalow which the rebels were then burning, and that they were taking a south-westerly direction. The express from Gwáliár had just come in time to baffle the accurate conceptions of Napier's brain, for, had it not arrived, he would have caught them at the very spot he had selected.

Napier's
accurate con-
ceptions re-
garding the
enemy's
movements

are baffled
for the mo-
ment by a
despatch
from the
political
agent.

There was nothing for it now but to march southwards. Leaving Ántri, then, immediately, Napier proceeded with great rapidity in that direction. At Bítáur, which he reached on the 14th, he learned the rebels were only nine miles in front of him. He pressed forward, then, and at that place, the Gwáliár Maráthá Horse, for the first time under fire, came in contact with the rear-guard of the enemy, and greatly distinguished themselves.

Napier
pursues
and ap-
proaches
the rebels.

Napier continued the pursuit through Narwár, and leaving there the greater portion of the infantry and all the artillery, who could not keep up with him, took with him only thirty-eight men of the 71st Highlanders on camels, all his cavalry, including twenty-five of the Balandshahr horse he found halted at Narwár, and, proceeding with the utmost speed, reached Ránód on the morning of the 17th before the rebels had arrived there. His divination that they would make their way through the jungles of the Sind river had proved to be perfectly accurate.

Catches them
at Ránód.

Firuzsháh, indeed, had preferred the more circuitous and difficult road through the jungles to the easier but more open route followed by Napier. Naturally he wished to make his way unseen, and thus to effect, with an unbeaten force, the contemplated junction

Firuzsháh.
Ignorant that
Napier is at
Ránód,

with Tántiá Topí. As it was, he had marched on a line almost parallel to that followed by the English leader, and it was only the temptation to leave the jungle cover to sack Ránód which had saved him from an attack the previous day. But Napier had now reached Ránód before him, and the sacking of the place was likely to be more difficult than he had anticipated. Full, however, of confidence, and utterly ignorant of the arrival of the English, Firuzsháh marched on that eventful morning against Ránód, guided by a zamindár of the locality, his army forming an irregular mass extended in a front of nearly a mile.

marches on
that place.

Napier had scarcely time to form up the 14th Light Dragoons, when the rebels were within a few yards of him. The Gwáliár Maráthá horse had been impeded in crossing a deep ravine by the riding-camels, and were a little behind. The force actually engaged consisted of a hundred and thirty-three 14th Light Dragoons under Major Prettijohn, sixty of the Maráthá Horse under Captain F. H. Smith, and thirty-eight of the 71st Highlanders under Captain Smith, mounted on camels, and guided by Captain Templar.

Napier's
force.

As soon as the rebels had arrived within charging distance, Prettijohn and his hundred and thirty-three light dragoons dashed into their midst. The blow completely doubled them up. Though individuals amongst them fought bravely, the mass made no stand whatever. Their one thought seemed to be to try and escape. They were in full flight before the Maráthá Horse could come upon the scene, in time only to participate in the pursuit. That pursuit was continued for seven miles, the rebels losing six elephants, several horses and ponies, and many arms. They left a hundred and fifty dead bodies on the ground before Ránód, including those of some native officers of the 12th Irregulars, the murderers of the gallant Holmes. Prettijohn having been severely wounded before the pursuit began, the command of the dragoons devolved on Captain Need, and that officer estimated the loss of the rebels in the pursuit at three hundred. On the British side the wounded amounted to sixteen; one of these died subsequently of his wounds.

Prettijohn
charges
them, and

to try and

completely
defeats,

and pursues
them.

Firuzsháh led the fugitives in the direction of Chándéri.

Firuzsháh makes for the Aróni jungles. Learning, however, that one British force * had moved towards Ránód from Jhánsi, and another † from Lálitpúr to Chándéri, he suddenly turned westward, passing Íságarh and Púchar, and made for the jungles of Ároní. Passing near Rámpúr, between Gúnah and Síronj, he came suddenly upon forty men of the 1st Bombay Lancers, under Lieutenant Stack, escorting clothing and re-mounts to Brigadier Smith. He at once attacked the leading files of those forty men. His followers had in fact captured the clothing and made prisoner of one trooper, when Stack gallantly brought up the rest of his men, and, skirmishing with the rebels, carried the remainder of his charge to Gúnah. The rebels then pushed on to Aróní.

Gallantry of Stack. Meanwhile, Captain W. Rice, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, a noted tiger-slayer, had been ordered with a small column ‡ from Gúnah to intercept their retreat. At Baród, on the 22nd of December, he learned from a horse-dealer, who had been robbed by them, that the rebels were encamped near the village of Sarpúr, eleven miles distant. Leaving his camp standing under charge of forty-two men, Rice set off that night, and, outmarching the guns with his infantry, surprised the enemy at 11 P.M. The surprise was so complete that the rebels made no resistance, but ran off at once, leaving a hundred horses, several camels, many arms, and much clothing. From this point Firuzsháh made the best of his way, unmolested, to Rájgarh, hoping to meet there Tántiá Topí. He lingered there for a few days waiting for his ally, but, learning that Brigadier Smith was on his track, he made for Indragarh, where, on the 13th of January, he effected the junction in the manner already related. §

Rice marches from Gúnah against Firuzsháh, and drives him off. leaving a hundred horses, several camels, many arms, and much clothing. From this point Firuzsháh made the best of his way, unmolested, to Rájgarh, hoping to meet there Tántiá Topí. He lingered there for a few days waiting for his ally, but, learning that Brigadier Smith was on his track, he made for Indragarh, where, on the 13th of January, he effected the junction in the manner already related. §

Firuzsháh then makes for Indragarh, where he joins Tántiá Topí.

I left Brigadier Somerset at Baród, having, after his march of seventy miles in forty-eight hours, driven Tántiá from that place. Brigadier Smith, who had been posted at Síronj, had, after Napier had driven Firuzsháh southwards, moved in pursuit of him from that

Disposition of the British columns.

* Under Brigadier Ainslie.

† Under Colonel Liddell.

‡ Two 9-pounders, ninety Royal Engineers, fifty-five 86th Foot, a hundred and fifty 25th Native Infantry, a hundred and forty Meade's Horse.

§ Page 250.

place, and had been near Baród when Somerset beat Tántiá there. He was now moving on Indragarh in pursuit of Firuzsháh. General Michel was at this time—early in January 1859—at Chaprá, ten or twelve miles due north of Baród. Thence he directed Colonel Becher to join him with all the cavalry under his command. He had previously ordered Brigadier Honner, commanding the Nasirábád brigade, to march in a north-easterly direction towards Indragarh, watching whilst he did so the fords between that place and Kotá. To complete the investment of the rebels, Brigadier Showers, moving with a light column from Ágra, had taken up a position at Kúshalgarh, north-east of the Banás river.

Escape now seemed absolutely impossible. Hemmed in by Napier on the north and north-east,* Showers on the north-west, Somerset on the east, Smith on the south-east, Michel and Benson on the south, and Honner on the south-west and west, how was it possible for the man who had so long defied pursuit to break through the net closing around him? It did, in very deed, seem impossible. It will be seen, nevertheless, that the resources of the rebel leader were not yet entirely exhausted.

Desperate
position of
the rebels.

Tántiá had joined Firuzsháh at Indragarh on the 13th of January. But Indragarh was no safe resting-place. He had sure information that two English columns were marching on it. Strange it was, however, that, whilst he received the fullest details regarding the movements of the various columns which had so long pursued him, and of Napier's troops, he had heard not a word of Showers' movement. Believing, then, that a way of escape in a north-westerly direction lay before him, he made a forced march to Dewásá, a large fortified town about midway between Jaipúr and Bharatpúr.

Tántiá,
knowing
himself to
be almost
surrounded,

endeavours
to creep out
by a north-
westerly
path.

Showers heard of Tántiá's arrival at Dewásá as soon as the speed of his scouts could convey the news. A message to the same effect was conveyed over a longer distance to Honner. Both brigadiers set out

Showers sur-
prises him at
Dewásá.

* Amongst those who penned him in was a flying column under Colonel Scudamore, consisting of two guns, one squadron 14th Light Dragoons, fifty men of Meade's Horse, and a hundred men of the 86th, commanded by the daring Brockman. This column scoured the jungles for three weeks, chasing, but never coming up with, Tántiá Topí or Mán Singh.

immediately; but Showers, starting from Kúshalgarh and having the shorter road to traverse, arrived first. Showers entered the town on the morning of the 16th, just as Tántiá, Ráo Sáhib, and Firuzsháh were holding a council of war. How they escaped was a miracle—they were completely surprised. "The English force surprised us there," writes Tántiá in his journal. About three hundred of his followers were killed or disabled, the remainder succeeded in escaping.

Whither? Every pass seemed closed to them. But the English columns from the south-west closing too rapidly on Dewásá, had just left one opening—the opening which, turning as it were the Jaipúr territory, led into Márwár. Of this Tántiá and his followers availed themselves, and marched with all the speed of which they were capable towards the city which gives its name to the principality. Passing by Alwar they turned westwards, and reached Sikar on the 21st. They were encamped there that night when Holmes, who had been sent from Nasirábád with a small party of the 83rd and the 12th Bombay Native Infantry and four guns, fell upon them, after marching fifty-four miles through a sandy country in twenty-four hours. The surprise was complete. The rebels abandoned horses, camels, and even arms, and fled in the utmost confusion. A few days later six hundred of them surrendered to the Rájah of Bikánír.

This defeat inaugurated the break-up of Tántiá's army. On that very day Firuzsháh and the 12th Irregulars separated from him. Since his wanderings in the Bánswará jungles, Tántiá had been on very bad terms with Ráo Sáhib, and the day after the defeat their quarrel came to an issue. "I told him," writes Tántiá, "that I could flee no longer, and that, whenever I saw an opportunity for leaving him, I would do so." Some Thákurs related to Mán Singh had joined Tántiá that morning, and with them Tántiá left the force to proceed in the direction of Parón, having as followers only "two pandits to cook his food, and one sáis" (groom), two horses and a pony." In the Parón jungle Tántiá met Rájah Mán Singh. "Why did you leave your force?" asked the Rájah. "You have not acted right in so doing." Tántiá replied, "I was tired of running

* "The groom," adds Tántiá, "left me and ran off after coming two stages."

away, and I will remain with you whether I have done right or wrong." In fact, after the long chase, he felt that he was beaten.

Meanwhile, Ráo Sáhib, still with some three or four thousand followers, pushed first westwards, then to the south, and reached Kushání, west of Ajmír, about eighty miles east of Jodhpúr, on the 10th of February. But the avenger was on his track. Honner, who had arrived too late for the rebels at Dewásá, had, after some inevitable delay, discovered the route they had taken. He set out in pursuit on the 6th, and, marching very rapidly, reached Kushání on the morning of the 10th, having accomplished a hundred and forty-five miles in four days. Finding Ráo Sáhib there, he attacked and defeated him, killing about two hundred of his followers. Ráo Sáhib fled southwards to the Chhatarbuj Pass and reached it on the 15th. Somerset, coming from the east, arrived within a few miles of it the same day. Unfortunately, no one with him knew the country, and many precious hours were spent in reconnoitring, hours which the Ráo utilised in threading the pass. Finding, however, that the British were still close to him, the Ráo turned down to the Bánswára jungles, closely pursued. Finding the passes leading to the south and east closed, the Ráo then moved to the north-east and passed by Partábgarh, where Tántiá had encountered Major Roche only a few weeks before. As he fled before Somerset, who followed closely on his track, there occurred a great diminution of his followers. Like Tántiá, these were "tired of running away." The majority of them fell out of the line during the retreat, threw away their arms, and quietly took the road to their homes. Some of them, Muhammadans from Kánhpúr and Baréli, about two hundred in number, gave themselves up. The chiefs and the other irreconcilables made their way to the Síronj jungles, where, sometimes disguised as mendicants, sometimes acting as marauders, they tried to obtain food from the villagers. Organised opposition to the British Government had disappeared.

The rebels
break up and
disperse.

Of the chiefs of this long campaign, five still remained in whose fate the reader is naturally interested. These five were Ráo Sáhib, Firuzsháh, Mán Singh, and Ájít Singh, and last and greatest of all, the leading spirit of the drama, the Maráthá Tántiá Topí. Ráo Sáhib wandered from place to place till the year 1862. In that year he was arrested in the hills north of the Panjáb, disguised as a pilgrim

Ráo Sáhib.

and was sent down to Kánhpúr. There he was tried and found guilty on four separate charges of instigating, and having been accessory to, the murder of Europeans, and on a fifth of having been a leader of the rebellion. He was hanged on the 20th of August of the same year. Firuzsháh was more successful in

Firuzsháh. eluding the vigilance of his pursuers, for he fled, in the disguise of a pilgrim, to Kurbehla, where, ten years ago, he was still living. The fate of the other two differed in some respects from theirs; their case constitutes in itself an episode.

The Parón jungles, in which Tántiá Topí and Mán Singh were hiding, constituted a portion of the large family estates of Narwár, of which Sindhiá had unjustly deprived the latter. Here they were safe, safe absolutely, so long as each should remain true to the other, for no mere retainer of Mán Singh would betray his master or his master's friend. The clear and acute intellect of Sir Robert Napier had recognised this fact the moment he received the

Sir Robert Napier endeavours to gain Mán Singh. report that the two chiefs in question had separated themselves from their army and taken refuge in the jungles. He had at once felt certain that to capture Tántiá Topí the preliminary step was to gain Mán Singh. No star of lesser magnitude would suffice. Now, there were strong grounds for believing that it might be possible to gain Mán Singh. He was a chief of ancient lineage, of lofty birth, born to great possessions. To avenge himself on Sindhiá for confiscating a portion of those possessions, he had lost everything except the affection of his dependants and the ground on which he slept; he had imperilled his head. Thenceforward, so long as he remained unreconciled to his liege lord, there was no prospect in the present—no hope in the future. On such a man, driven to desperation, become from a feudal lord an outcast, what might not be the effect of an offer of free and absolute pardon, with the prospect of intercession with Sindhiá for the restoration of some portion of his property?

Impressed with this idea, Napier resolved to try the experiment. It happened that on the 27th of February Sir Robert had directed Meade, of Meade's Horse, who then commanded a detachment* at Bijráon, to

Napier sends Meade to Sirsimáo

* A hundred men 3rd Bombay Europeans, a hundred men 9th Bombay Native Infantry, a hundred men 24th Bombay Native Infantry, fifty men Meade's Horse.

finally proceed to Sirsimáo, to dislodge thence any party of rebels in the vicinity, to keep open his communications with Gúnah, and, in conjunction with Major Little's force at Párawant, to clear the roads to Amroa, Ágar, Thánah, Rájgarh, and Sípri. Napier further instructed him to attack Mán Singh and Tántiá Topí, then wandering in the jungles, whenever opportunity should offer.

to open the
jungles.

Meade reached Sirsimáo on the 3rd of March, found the place deserted, opened a communication that evening with Little, and, in co-operation with him, was engaged from the 5th to the 8th of March in clearing a road-way up the rugged and densely-wooded pass. But, before leaving Sirsimáo, Meade had ascertained that the old thákur who held that village, Naráiyán Singh by name, was connected with Mán Singh, and possessed much influence in the neighbourhood. On the morning of the 8th this man and his followers came to a village some four or five miles distant from the pass up which the English troops were working, and showed an evident desire to communicate with Meade. Meade, feeling the great importance of obtaining the submission of so influential a personage, proceeded to the village, reassured the old man, who was at first nervous and alarmed, by his tact and kind manner, and induced him to return to Sirsimáo with his followers. He saw the thákur again that evening at the village, and drew from him a promise to bring the díwán or confidential agent of Mán Singh to him within two or three days, and to do all in his power to induce Mán Singh himself to surrender.

Meade gains
the confi-
dence of an
influential
friend of
Mán Singh.

The old man kept his word. On the 11th Meade had a long interview with the díwán. Through him he offered to Mán Singh the conditions he was empowered to offer—a guarantee of life and subsistence. He further requested the díwán to find out the Rájah's family and household, to invite them to come to his camp, to promise them, should they comply, to do everything in his power for their comfort, to assure them that they should not be molested by the officials of the Gwáliár Durbár or by any one else. With the díwán he likewise sent one letter addressed to the family, reiterating his invitation and his promise, and another addressed to Rájah Mán Singh himself, inviting him to surrender. He impressed, moreover, upon the díwán the primary necessity of

Meade offers
terms to
Mán Singh,

and assures
him of safety
and honour
for his family.

bringing in the ladies first, feeling sure that the Rájah would follow.

It is at this point of the story that the action of Sir Robert Napier comes in. That officer, acquainted with Meade's proceedings in the matter just described, and fully approving of them, had become naturally impatient when day followed day and no result issued from a beginning so promising. He waited a week after the interview with the díwán, and when, at the expiration of that time, no tidings had been received regarding the Ránís or the Rájah, he determined to put greater pressure upon the latter. He wrote, then, on the 18th of March to Meade, directing him to leave his road-work, as "it is of great importance that the pressure upon Mán Singh should not be relaxed till he comes in. Your letter of the 11th inst. gave hopes of certain parts of Mán Singh's family coming in, but, as your letter of the 13th makes no allusion to the subject, the Brigadier General concludes that the proposals have not been renewed."*

Sir Robert added that, notwithstanding that Meade had no information on the subject, he had grounds for believing that Mán Singh had frequently been in the vicinity of the British force; that he had frequented places called Gárlá, Hatrí, Bhirwán, and Mahúdrá; that he had been supplied with provisions from the last-named place. He accordingly directed Meade to move on Agar, and to make a road up the Múshairí Pass through the jungles from that place by Gárlá and Hatrí to Mahúdrá; and at the same time to exercise pressure upon the díwán at Sirsimáo by threatening to quarter his force there.

In conformity with these instructions Meade marched to the Múshairí Pass. He found the people in that part of the country extremely hostile to the British. Not a man would give him information. His surprise was great, then, when, on the 25th of March, the Rájah's díwán and his own confidential servant conducted into camp the ladies of the Rájah's household and their attendants, some seventy persons. Meade received them kindly, and sent them on to one of the Rájah's villages near Síprí. His servant likewise informed him that he had seen Mán Singh four times, and

* From Assistant Adjutant-General to Captain Meade, dated 18th March, 1859.

that he had expressed his intention to give himself up in two or three days—a statement which was confirmed by the *díwán*.

Meade continued his march to Mahúdrá, sending a party of horse in front of him with the Rájah's *díwán* and a *munshí*,* whom he instructed to open at once a communication with Mán Singh. On the 31st he received at Mahúdrá the Rájah's final offer to surrender on certain conditions. To some of these Meade declined to agree. Finally he induced him to come in on the following conditions:—1st, that he should be met at some distance from the camp by a native of position—a ceremony the omission of which is, to a native of rank, an insult; 2nd, that he should not be made over to the Gwáliár Durbár, but should remain in the English camp; 3rdly, that, after staying two or three days in camp, he should be allowed to proceed to his home at Máurí, near Síprí, whither the females of his family had gone, to re-equip himself in a manner befitting his rank. On the 2nd of April Mán Singh entered the British camp.

Mán Singh
agrees to
Meade's
conditions,

and sur-
renders.

Tántiá Topí was still at large; but Tántiá, without Mán Singh, Mán Singh reconciled to his enemies, was assailable. Now had arrived the time to play upon the more selfish instincts of the Rájah. He had life, and security for his life; but what was life to a born feudal chieftain without consideration, without esteem, without position? What was life to a vassal lord of Sindhiá, disowned and hated by his sovereign? The first feeling of satisfaction at escape from death passed, and life to such a man in such a position would become a burden. But could not the position be ameliorated? Yes—a signal service—a deed for which men would be grateful—that would remove the still remaining obstacles to a return to his position among the nobles of his country.

Feelings
which coursed
through the
mind of Mán
Singh.

On feelings such as these Meade worked with tact and skill. In many conversations which he had with the Rájah during the 2nd and 3rd of April he urged him to perform some service which should entitle him to consideration. His reasoning had so much effect, that when, at 11 o'clock on the night of the second day—the

Meade works
upon those
feelings.

* A "munshí" is, literally, a writer or secretary. It is often used in India to signify a tutor, an instructor. Here it is used in its literal sense.

3rd—information reached Meade that the uncle of Mán Singh, Ájít Singh, already mentioned in these pages, lay, with a band of men, fifteen miles distant, in the jungle, Mán Singh volunteered to accompany the force of a hundred and fifty men, at the head of which Meade immediately started. The little force reached at daybreak the place where Ájít Singh had been marked down, only to discover that he and his band had moved off during the night. Meade pushed on in search of him, some seven miles further, to a place where the jungle was so dense that cavalry were useless. Ájít Singh and his men were actually in this jungle, but, before Meade could surround them, they became aware of the presence of enemies, and succeeded in getting away.* No one was more mortified than Mán Singh. Ájít Singh was his uncle; Ájít Singh had been his comrade on the battlefield, his abettor in his revolt against Sindhiá, and, although in his fury at Mán Singh's apostasy, as he regarded it, in surrendering to the English, he had threatened to take his life, yet he stood to Mán Singh in a relation than which there can scarcely be a closer between man and man—friend, comrade, uncle,—and yet Mán Singh grieved bitterly that this man had not been captured by his enemies. It was a first step in moral debasement—a prelude to one still lower!

Mán Singh volunteers to accompany Meade in an attempt to capture his uncle.

The uncle escapes, to Mán Singh's mortification.

His first step in moral debasement.

During the three days which followed, close observation satisfied Meade that Tántiá Topí was in the Parón jungles, and, working daily on Mán Singh's longing desire for restoration to his former position,† he persuaded him to acknowledge that he knew where Tántiá was. From this moment he had made up his mind to betray him. His only anxiety now was lest Tántiá should slip through his fingers. At that very time, to his knowledge, Tántiá was debating whether or not he should rejoin Firuzsháh. Tántiá had

* Ájít Singh and his band were so terrified by their narrow escape, that they marched seventy or eighty miles on end, not halting till they joined the other rebels near Síronj.

† "I have done all I could by kind and encouraging counsel to urgo him to establish, by so signal an act of service" (the betrayal of Tántiá Topí), "his claim to the consideration of Government, promised him by Sir R. Hamilton in his telegram of the 27th ultimo."—Major Meade to Sir R. Napier, the 8th of April, 1859. Sir R. Hamilton's telegram was to the effect that, if Mán Singh surrendered, his life would be spared and his claims would receive consideration.

even sent his emissaries to Meade's camp to consult him on the subject. Were Tántiá to go, the chance would be lost. No thought of old comradeship, of the ties of honour, weighed with him for a moment. He would at once betray him, if—

He resolves
to betray
Tántiá Topí,

Yes,—if he could himself recover his position. That was his one thought. "In the course of this forenoon" (the 7th of April), wrote Meade, "I learnt from Pribhú Lál that he thought Mán Singh would do as I wished, but that he was desirous of having Sir R. Hamilton's general assurance of 'consideration' for such a service reduced to some specific promise, and that his ambition was to have Sháhábád, Páurí, or some other portion of the ancient ráj of Narwár, guaranteed to him in the event of his efforts to apprehend Tántiá Topí being successful."

for a consi-
deration ;

It was quite out of Meade's power to make any such promise ; he could only assure him that he "might rely on any claim he might establish being faithfully considered by Government." Unable to extract more, Mán Singh clutched at the prospect which this vague promise offered, and consented to betray his friend.

even for the
chance of a
considera-
tion.

Then came Meade's difficulty. To seize such a man as Tántiá Topí great caution was required. Tántiá had many spies in the British camp, and to have sent a European on such a duty would have been sufficient to warn the victim. Eventually Meade decided to send a party of the 9th Bombay Native Infantry on the service, under an intelligent native officer. The orders he gave to this native officer were simply to obey the directions of Mán Singh, and to apprehend any suspicious characters he might point out. The name of Tántiá Topí was not mentioned, and the men had no idea of the actual duty on which they were proceeding.

Meade sends
a party of
Sipáhís accom-
panied by
Mán Singh.

Whilst Meade was thus negotiating with Mán Singh, Tántiá Topí had lain quiet in the Parón jungles. Shortly after his arrival there, and some days before Mán Singh had surrendered, Tántiá had, with the approval of that Rájah, sent to obtain information regarding the position of his old comrades. The reply brought to him was that to the number of eight or nine thousand men they were in the Síronj jungles ; that Ráo Sáhib had left them, but that Firuzsháh, the Ámbapáuí Nawáb, and

Tántiá Topí,
all the time,
reposes abso-
lute faith in
Mán Singh.

Imám Álí, Wírdi-major of the 5th Irregulars, were there. The last-named also sent him a letter begging Tántiá to join them. It was on the receipt of this letter that, on the 5th of April, Tántiá sent to consult Mán Singh as to the course he should adopt. Tántiá was well aware that Mán Singh had surrendered, yet he trusted him implicitly. He had placed himself quite in his power, and had chosen his actual hiding-place on the recommendation of the retainer to whose care Mán Singh had consigned him with these words: "Stop wherever this man takes you!"

To Tántiá's message Mán Singh replied that he would come in three days to see him, and that then they would decide on the action to be taken. Mán Singh more than kept his word. At midnight on the third day, the 7th of April, he came to the hiding-place—followed at a distance by the Bombay Sipáhis. Tántiá was asleep. Asleep he was seized, roughly awakened, and conveyed to Meade's camp. He arrived there by sunrise on the morning of the 8th.

Meade marched him into Síprí and tried him by court-martial. He was charged with having been in rebellion and having waged war against the British Government between June, 1857, and December, 1858, in certain specified instances. No other charge was brought against him.

His defence was simple and straightforward. It ran thus: "I only obeyed, in all things that I did, my master's orders, *i.e.*, the Náná's orders, up to the capture of Kalpí, and, afterwards, those of Ráo Sáhib. I have nothing to state, except that I have had nothing to do with the murder of any European men, women, or children; neither had I, at any time, given orders for any one to be hanged."

The defence displayed the existence of a feeling very common among the Maráthás. To many of these men the descendant of the Peshwá was their real lord: they knew no other. Tántiá Topí was born and bred in the household of Bájí Ráo, who had been Peshwá of the Maráthás. From his earliest childhood he had been taught to regard the adopted son of Bájí Ráo, Náná Sahib, as his master, his liege lord, whose every order he was bound to obey. Of the English he knew nothing, except they were foreigners who had robbed

Mán Singh
surprised
Tántiá asleep,

and conveys
him to
Meade's
camp.

Tántiá is
brought to a
court-martial.

Tántiá's
defence.

Position, in
his own eyes
and in the
eyes of the
natives of
India, of
Tántiá Topí,
with respect
to the Eng-
lish.

his earliest master of the country he had ruled, and his son of the pension guaranteed to his first master in lieu of his ancestral dominions. To them he was bound by no ties. The English Government, by depriving the heir of the Peshwá's of the income that had been allotted to his father by adoption, had forced that heir to be a conspirator, and had compelled all his dependants to be free-lances.

Notwithstanding this reasoning, which was not put before the court, and which probably did not present itself to the minds of any of its members, Tántiá Topí was sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried into effect at Síprí on the 18th of April.

Tántiá is
sentenced to
be hanged,
and is hanged.

Public opinion at the time ratified the justice of the sentence, but it may, I think, be doubted whether posterity will confirm that verdict. Tántiá Topí was no born servant of the English rule. At the time of his birth—about the year 1812—his master was the independent ruler of a large portion of western India. He was under no obligation to serve faithfully and truly the race which had robbed his master. When that master, unbound equally by any tie to the English, saw the opportunity of recovering the territories of the Peshwá, Tántiá Topí, who was his *musáhib*, his companion, obeyed his orders and followed his fortunes. He declared that he committed no murder. He was not charged with committing any. He, a retainer of the ex-Peshwá's family, was charged with fighting against the English.* On that charge alone he was convicted and hanged. Surely, under the circumstances of the case, the punishment was greater than the offence. The clansman had obeyed his lord, and had fought with fair weapons.

Reflections on
the sentence.

Doubts
whether a
reflecting
posterity will
confirm it.

* Since the first edition appeared, Mr. G. Lance, late Bengal Civil Service and formerly Magistrate of Kánhpúr—himself a distinguished actor in the mutiny (pages 215-6)—has written to inform me that in the records of the Magistrate's Court at Kánhpúr there exists ample evidence to show that Tántiá Topí was one of the most bloodthirsty advisers of Náná Sáhib, and that, if he did not first plan the massacre of the garrison, he assisted in it, by posting his men in ambush at the Satí Chaorá Ghât, or by giving orders to that effect to Jawála Parshád. Further, that by his presence on the spot he excited the ardour and fanaticism of the assassins. Although the fact stated by Mr. Lance is sufficient to prove that Tántiá Topí fully merited the penalty that was meted out to him, it yet does not justify the sentence referred to in the text. No charge relative to the massacre of the Europeans at Kánhpúr was brought against Tántiá Topí on his trial. He was simply charged with waging war against the British. On that charge alone he was convicted and sentenced to be

Posterity has condemned Napoleon for causing Hofer to be shot. There is considerable analogy between the cases of Hofer and Tántiá Topí. Neither was born under the rule of the nation against which he fought. In both cases the race to which each belonged was subjugated by a foreign race. In both cases the insurrection of the subdued race was produced by causes exterior to its own immediate interests. In both cases the two men cited rose to be the representatives of the nationality to which each belonged. In both—Hofer in the one, Tántiá Topí in the other—they resisted the dominant race in a manner which necessitated the calling forth of extraordinary exertions. In both cases the leader was a hero to his own countrymen. The one, the European, is still a hero to the world. The other, the Maráthá—well—who knows that in the nooks and corners of the valleys of the Chambal, the Narbadá and the Parbatí, his name, too, is not often mentioned with respect, with enthusiasm, and with affection?

One word, before we dismiss him, regarding his character as a general. For nearly nine months, from his defeat at Jáurá Alipúr by Sir Robert Napier, to his capture by an officer serving under that general, Tántiá Topí had baffled all the efforts of the British. During that period he had more than once or twice made the tour of Rajpútáná and Málwá, two countries possessing jointly an area of a hundred and sixty-one thousand seven hundred square miles, had crossed the Narbadá, and had threatened the more vulnerable parts of western India. The qualities he had displayed would have been admirable, had he combined with them the capacity of the general and the daring of the aggressive soldier. His marches were wonderful; he had a good eye for selecting a position and he had a marvellous faculty for localities. But, when that has been said, everything has been said. Unable to detect the weak points of his adversaries, he never took advan-

hanged. And it is this sentence, which, I believe, posterity will not confirm. But little evidence regarding his participation in the Kánhpúr massacres existed at the time. "Though there was some," writes Mr. Lance, "more was afterwards elicited by me when trying numerous cases connected with the Kánhpúr atrocities." That eventually he would have been hanged seems certain. But it would have been better that he should have been punished for being a murderer than that, by a premature and scarcely merited sentence, he should have gained the martyr's crown.

tage of their mistakes or their too great daring; he never exposed himself in action, and he was the first to leave the field. On many occasions a judicious use of his cavalry, always superior in numbers, would have so crippled the English that further pursuit by them would have been impossible. With a little more insight and a little more daring he could, whilst retreating before them, have harassed the flanks and the rear of his pursuers, have captured their baggage, and cut up their camp-followers. But he never attempted anything of the sort. Provided he could escape from one place to harass them in another, with the chance of striking at Indúr, at Barodah, at Jodhpúr, or at Jaipúr, a blow similar to that which he had struck successfully at Gwáliár, he was satisfied.

Then, again, the fact that the enemy marching against him were English sufficed, no matter how small their numbers, to scare him. A striking proof of this occurred when Major Sutherland attacked him with two hundred men, three-fifths of whom were Highlanders. Tántiá had a strong position, two guns, and three or four thousand men. Had the natives been well led, their numbers must have prevailed. But fighting was repugnant to Tántiá. He did not understand it. He was a guerilla leader, content to fire at his enemy and then to run away. For the lives of his followers he cared nothing.

The fact that his enemies were English scared him.

Too much praise, on the other hand, can scarcely be awarded to the English generals and officers who conducted the pursuit. Sir Robert Napier, first defeating Tántiá, drove him into Rájputáná and then shut him out from the north. Roberts, then in Rájputáná, and later, Michel, in Rajpútáná and Málwá, pursued him in a circle, bounded on the south by the Nizám's territory or by Khándesh, and on the west by Gujrát. His attempts to break the rim of that circle were baffled by General Hill, by Sir Hugh Rose, and by General Roberts. Finally, all but surrounded as the circle became smaller, he broke away to the north and penetrated once more into the territories guarded by Sir Robert Napier. The English officers who pursued him showed, on more than one occasion, that they could march as quickly as he could. Witness the remarkable performances of Brigadier Parke, two hundred and forty miles in nine days; of Brigadier Somerset, two hundred and thirty

The English leaders,
Napier;
Roberts;
Michel.

Remarkable marches

Brigadier
of Parke,

of Somerset, miles in nine days, and, again, seventy miles
 of Holmes, in forty-eight hours; of Holmes, fifty-four miles
 of Honner, through a sandy desert in little more than twenty-
 four hours; and of Honner, a hundred and forty-
 five miles in four days. Becher's daring, too, in assailing
 Tántiá's whole force with a newly-raised regiment
 of troopers, and driving it before him, was a glorious
 act, vying in daring with Sutherland's attack above
 referred to.

But these acts, daring as they were, do not stand out
 markedly from the achievements of other officers engaged in
 this pursuit. Where all did nobly it is impossible to draw a
 contrast. The historian, however, is bound to call attention to
 the skilful strategy which gave to the pursued no rest, which
 cut them off from the great towns, and which forced them to
 seek the jungles as their hiding-place. This result
 General Michel accomplished in Rajpútáná and
 Málwá, by distributing his forces in lightly equipped
 columns at salient points in those two divisions,
 with orders to pursue the rebels without intermission.* It has
 been calculated that the whole distance they were pursued
 between the 20th of June, 1858, and the 1st of March, 1859,
 exceeded three thousand miles; that Michel himself marched
 seventeen hundred and Parke two thousand.† There can be no
 doubt that this system, thoroughly well carried out, was the
 cause of the break-up of the rebel army. When Honner beat
 it at Kúshání on the 10th of February, and the pursuit was
 taken up at once by a fresh force under Somerset, the campaign
 was virtually over. The rebels lost heart, abandoned their
 standards, and crept to their homes. It will be understood
 that these rapid pursuits were made without tents. These
 followed in the rear under charge of a small guard. They did
 not often come up for days, during which time the troops had
 to bivouac under trees.

With the sur-
 render of
 Mán Singh
 tranquillity
 returns to
 the country.

To return. Tranquillity was restored. With the
 surrender of Mán Singh the rebellion collapsed in
 Central India. So long as he was at large and
 hostile, the entire population held aloof from the
 British. The rebels could always find security in

Nicholson's Magazine, August 1860.

† Mán Singh's troop, 8th Hussars, was with Parke the whole time.

jungles in which they could not be tracked. The sense they had of security was so great, that at one time Tántiá Topí and Mán Singh remained for days within five miles of the English army, then searching for them, their position known to the natives, not one of whom would betray them. But with the surrender of Mán Singh an entire change was inaugurated. The people of Central India surrendered with him.*

* For Tántia Topí's diary of the events of the campaign, *vide* Appendix B.

CHAPTER II.

THE TRIAL OF THE KING OF DEHLÍ, AND THE QUEEN'S
PROCLAMATION.

THE capture of Mán Singh and Tántiá Topí produced all over western and southern India an effect similar to that realised by the pacification of Oudh in the north-western Provinces. The mutiny was now stamped out. The daring of the soldier had to give place to the sagacity and breadth of view of the statesman.

Some months before the final blow had been struck, when the rebels had lost every stronghold and been driven to take refuge in the wooded hills and the dense jungles which abound alike on the northern frontier of Oudh and in central India, Her Majesty the Queen had deemed it advisable to issue a proclamation to her Indian subjects, a message of mercy to those who still continued to resist, of promise to all. Before referring more particularly to this proclamation, it will be advisable to refer to some of the events which rendered its issue at the end of 1858 particularly advisable.

The titular sovereign of India, the King of Dehlí, had been brought to trial in the Privy Council Chamber of the palace, the Díwání-Kháss, on the 27th of January, 1858. Four charges were brought against him.

The first accused him, when a pensioner of the British Government, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting the Sipáhis in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State; the second, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting his own son and other inhabitants of Dehlí and the north-west Provinces of India, to rebel and wage war against the State; the third, of having proclaimed himself reigning king and sovereign of India, and of assembling forces at Dehlí, and of encouraging others to wage war against the British Government; the fourth, of having, on the 16th of May, feloniously caused, or of having been accessory to, the death of forty-nine people of

The Queen's
proclamation.

Trial and
sentence of
the King of
Dehlí.

European and mixed European descent, and of having subsequently abetted others in murdering European officers and other English subjects. After a trial conducted with great patience, and which extended over forty days, the king was found guilty of the main points in the charges, and sentenced to be transported for life. Eventually he was taken to Pegu, where he ended his days in peace.*

Meanwhile it had been necessary in England to find a scape-goat for all the blood which had been shed in crushing the mutiny—an event, which, though it seemed at first to give a shock to the prestige of England, had been the means of displaying a power greater and more concentrated than that with which the world had credited her. The reconquest of India is, indeed, the most marvellous military achievement of any times, ancient or modern. If India had at that time been under the rule of the Crown, the natural scape-goat would have been the Ministry of the day. As it was, the blow fell upon the grand old Company which had nursed the early conquests on the eastern coast of Hindustan until they had developed into the most magnificent empire subject to an alien race which the world has ever seen. The East India Company had not deserved its fate.

A scape-goat
required.

Its rule had been better and purer, more adapted to the circumstances of the great dependency than would have been possible had its acts and orders been subject to the fluctuations of party feeling. True, it had committed some faults; but it is a remarkable fact, especially in later years, that it had been driven into the commission of those faults by the Ministry of the day.

The East
India Com-
pany,

This remark especially applies to the "crime," so to speak, of the mutiny. I call it a crime, because the Court of Directors were summoned before the bar of public opinion to answer for it, and were condemned upon it. Now, if, as I believe, the mutiny was due in a great measure to the acts of the Government of Lord Dalhousie, to the denial of the right to adopt, to the shock to public morality caused by the annexation of Oudh and especially by the manner in which that annexation was carried out, then, the Government of England was equally guilty with the Court

though the
faults she
had were
more than
shared in by
the Ministry
of the day,

* For report of the statement made for the prosecution at the trial and Sir John Lawrence's report, *vide* Appendix C.

of Directors, for it was that Government which more than sanctioned the annexation and the antecedent acts to which I have referred. But in times of excitement justice almost always sleeps. The scape-goat was of the very kind which suited the public humour. He was old-fashioned, pursy, and defenceless. Against him every interest was arrayed. The Ministry, which wanted his patronage; the outsider, who saw an opening to the 'covenanted' services; the doctrinaire, on whose mind the

is made that
scape-goat,

and doomed
to death.

idea of a double government grated harshly; these and other classes combined to cast stones at him. The great Company was unable to withstand the pressure. It fell, but it fell not without regret and with an honoured name. On the 2nd of August 1858

the Queen signed the Act which transferred its functions to the Crown.

No sooner had this act been accomplished than it devolved

Lord Derby
draws up a
proclamation
for submis-
sion to the
Queen.

upon the first Minister of the Crown, the late Earl of Derby, to draw up for submission to the Queen a proclamation, forthwith to be issued by Her Majesty in Council, in which should be set forth the principles on which the administration of India should in the future be conducted. The circumstances

which followed the preparation of the first draught of the proclamation by Lord Derby have been given to the world on the highest authority in a work which has brought home to every Englishman and every Englishwoman the enormous loss sustained by the country in the premature death of the illustrious prince whose noble life it so touchingly and so gracefully records.* There were expressions in that draught

Objections
taken to the
original
draught by
the Queen and
Prince Albert.

which seemed to Her Majesty and to Prince Albert in one case to invert, in another to express feebly, the meaning they were anxious to convey. In the memorandum with which the objections to these points were conveyed to Lord Derby, Her Majesty

expressed in noble language the sentiments by which she was animated towards the great people of whom she was about to become the Empress, Empress in reality, though not then actually in name. "The Queen would be glad," continued the memorandum, after referring to the objections taken to the original draught of the proclamation, "if Lord Derby would write

* *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. page 284.

it himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is a female sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions of Eastern people on assuming the direct government over them, and, after a bloody war, giving them pledges which her future reign is to redeem, and explaining the principles of her government. Such a document should breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the prosperity following in the train of civilisation."

Before the memorandum containing these noble words had reached Lord Derby, that minister, warned by a telegram from Lord Malmesbury, then in attendance on the Queen, that Her Majesty was not satisfied with the proclamation, had turned his attention to the draught, and discovering in it instinctively the faults which had been noticed by the Queen and Prince Albert, had recast it. In its amended form it met every objection, and corresponded entirely to the wishes of the august Lady in whose name it was to be issued to the people of India.

Those objections anticipated by Lord Derby.

The proclamation, as finally approved by Her Majesty, ran as follows:—

"Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

The Queen's Proclamation.

"Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the Government of the territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company:

"Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government, and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

"And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment, of our right trusty and well-beloved

cousin and Councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our First Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our said territories, and to administer the government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf, subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State.

“And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

“We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained ; and we look for the like observance on their part.

“We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions ; and, while we will permit no aggressions upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

“We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects ; and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

“Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law ; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.

“And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially

admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.

“We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.

“We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

“Already in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:—

“Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects.

“With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

“To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but, in appointing the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance, and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

“To all others in arms against the Government we hereby

promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

“It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with their conditions before the first day of January next.

“When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.”

On the 1st of November, 1858, this noble proclamation was published to the princes and people of India. At Calcutta, at Madras, at Bombay, at Láhor, at Ágra, at Allahábád, at Dehlí, at Rángún, at Lakhnao, at Maisúr, at Karáchí, at Nágpúr, and at every civil and military station in India it was publicly read on that day with every accompaniment of ceremonial splendour which could give importance to the occasion in the eyes of the natives. Translated into all the languages and many of the dialects of India, it was, at the same time, transmitted to all the native princes, and was distributed by thousands for the edification of those of lower rank and position. The first Viceroy of India used all the means in his power to acquaint the native princes and people that, transferred to the suzerainty and rule of the Queen, they might rely upon the strict observance of all engagements entered into with them by the Company; that her Majesty desired no extension of her dominions, but would respect the rights, the honour, and the dignity of the princes of her empire; that, while their religion would not be interfered with, the ancient rights, customs, and usages of India would be maintained; that neither caste nor creed should be a bar to employment in her service. Lord Canning took every care, at the same time, that the rebels still in arms should have cognizance of the full and gracious terms offered them, terms which practically restored life and security to all

The proclamation published throughout India,

and distributed.

Communications made to the native princes,

and to the rebels still in arms.

those who had not taken part in the murder of British subjects.

The proclamation was received by all classes throughout India with the deepest enthusiasm. The princes and landowners especially regarded it as a charter which would render their possessions secure, and their rights—more especially the right, so precious to them, of adoption—absolutely inviolate. The people in general welcomed it as the document which closed up the wounds of the mutiny, which declared, in effect, that bygones were to be bygones, and that thenceforward there should be one Queen and one people. Many of the rebels still in the field—all, in fact, except those absolutely irreconcilable—took advantage of its provisions to lay down their arms and to submit to its easy conditions. In the great towns of India, natives of every religion and creed, the Hindus, the Muhammadans, the Pársís, met in numbers to draw up loyal addresses expressive of their deep sense of the beneficent feelings which had prompted the proclamation, of their gratitude for its contents, and of their loyalty to the person of the illustrious Lady to whose rule they had been transferred.

Its reception
in India
by princes
and land-
owners;

by rebels.

The natives
draw up loyal
addresses
expressive of
their grati-
tude.

With the issue of the proclamation the story of the mutiny should fitly close. But those who have accompanied me so far will have seen that in Oudh and in central India the work of warfare was prolonged for six months after its promulgation. In this there is, however, only a seeming misplacement. In the jungles on the Oudh frontier and of central India there survived for that period men who were more marauders than soldiers—men whose continual rebellion was but remotely connected with the original cause of the mutiny, who had offended too deeply to hope for forgiveness. In one notable instance, indeed, that of Mán Singh, the quarrel was in no sense a consequence of the mutiny. It was a quarrel between a baron and his feudal lord. Yet it was that quarrel, not the mutiny, nor any fact connected with the mutiny, which kept the dominions of Sindhiá in continual disturbance for more than six months. When Mán Singh surrendered, those disturbances ceased.

The mutiny
had really
terminated
when the
proclamation
appeared.

As far as related, then, to the actual mutineers, with but a

few exceptions to the Sipáhis, and to all the landowners in British territories, the proclamation of the Queen was, in very deed, the end and the beginning—the end of a conflict which had deluged the country with blood, the beginning of an era full of hope, alike for the loyal and the misguided, for the prince and the peasant, for the owner and for the cultivator, for every class and for every creed.

The proclamation the beginning of a new era.

One word more. The history of military events has necessarily almost entirely monopolised the pages of a work the object of which was to record the rise, the progress, and the suppression of the Great Mutiny. In the course of the narrative I have followed so closely the movements of the military combatants that I have been unable to devote to occurrences in districts purely civil the attention which the heroic officers who maintained those districts deserved. The time has arrived when this defect should be remedied. In the volume which follows this, then, will be found a record of the events which occurred, so far as I have been able to ascertain them, in the several divisions and districts which formed the provinces under the rule of the several governors, lieutenant-governors, and chief commissioners who held office in 1857-8.

BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY.

EVEN before the last embers of the mutiny had been trampled out, the question which had from the first puzzled every man, from the Governor-General in Council to the subaltern in his modest bungalow, the question as to the original cause of the mutiny became the burning question of the day. It was a question which required a complete and accurate reply, because prompt reorganisation was necessary, and to carry out a complete scheme of reorganisation a knowledge of the circumstances which had caused the collapse of the system to be reorganised was indispensable.

What caused
the mutiny?

On this question the opinion of no man was looked forward to with so much eagerness, so much anxiety, and, I may add, with so much curiosity, as the opinion of the great Indian official whose daring and unselfish policy had made possible the storming of Dehli. It was very natural that this should be so. Few men had associated more with the natives than Sir John Lawrence; few men had more thoroughly pierced to the core the national character, and few men possessed a more complete power of mental analysis. People, for the most part, did not stop to remember that, with all his gifts, Sir John Lawrence had ever been the partisan of a school—a school opposed to the tenure of land by great families; that he had favoured Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation; and that, although he was thoroughly acquainted with the feelings of the agri-

Anxiety to
know the
opinion of
Sir John
Lawrence

Reasons why
his opinion
should be,

and why it
might not be,

cultural class, he contemned those of the large proprietors, and that he knew little of the Sipáhis. Furthermore, and especially, that he possessed no personal knowledge of Oudh and of its people.

It will readily be believed, then, that when the opinion of Sir John Lawrence was published it gave satisfaction only to the heedless many, none at all to the thinking few.

He attributes the mutiny to the greased cartridges only.

After an exhaustive argument, Sir John Lawrence arrived at the conclusion that the mutiny was due to the greased cartridges, and to the greased cartridges only. The public applauded a result so beautiful in its simplicity, so easy of comprehension. It chimed so entirely with the ideas of men who never take the trouble to think for themselves, that by the masses, which are mainly composed of such men, it was promptly and thankfully accepted. With them it remains still the unanswerable reason for the mutiny of the Indian army. They did not stop to consider that to declare that the greased cartridges caused the mutiny was

Reasons why the conclusion cannot be accepted.

in all respects similar to the declaration of a man who, if asked what causes a gun to discharge, should reply—the powder. True it is that the powder, when exploded, forces out the bullet: but who ignites the powder? That the greased cartridges were the lever used in many instances to excite the Sipáhis is incontestable; they were explosive substances. But, though explosive, they had been perfectly harmless had the minds of the Sipáhis not been prepared to act upon them in the same manner that the percussion-cap acts upon gunpowder.

The greased cartridges not the only instrument employed to create discontent.

It should never be forgotten that the greased cartridges were not the only instrument employed to create discontent in 1856-7. Before a greased cartridge had been issued the chapátis had been circulated by thousands in many rural districts.

The chapátí was, it is true, a weapon far less perfect than the greased cartridge. It was, nevertheless, sufficiently adapted to the comprehensions of the class to whom it was addressed—the class given to agriculture. To minds,

The chapátis.

simple, impressionable, suspicious, prompt to receive ideas, the chapátí acted as a warning of an impending calamity. A Hindu can conceive nothing more dreadful than a violation of his caste and his religion. The conclusion was a foregone one. The receipt of the

chapátís foreshadowed a great attempt to be made to upset the national religion.

Though we might even grant, then, for the sake of argument, that the greased cartridges were not in themselves harmless, yet the chapátís certainly were so. But it was these harmless chapátís which stirred up the rural populations, especially those in Oudh and in Bundelkhand, to participate in the rebellion. What becomes, then, of Sir John Lawrence's conclusion? It simply vanishes. The greased cartridges became dangerous only when used by others as a means to an end. Before the plans of the leaders of the revolt were ripe the cartridges and the chapátís were nothing more than gunpowder stored in a magazine. When the opportune moment arrived, when the minds of the Sipáhis and the agricultural classes had been instructed to receive any ideas, however absurd, then the cartridges and the chapátís were rammed into them, and were exploded.

The cartridges and the chapátís alike a means to an end.

But what was it that made the minds of the Sipáhis, what was it that made the minds of the agricultural classes prone to conceive suspicions alike regarding the greased cartridges and the chapátís? The answers to these two questions will bring us to the real cause of the mutiny. Sir John Lawrence's conclusions were not pushed to their legitimate issue. He named only one of the means. I must go back to the cause.

The real cause of the mutiny.

Before I express my own opinions on the matter I think it only proper that I should state the views of some thoughtful and well-educated natives, with whom I have had the opportunity of discussing the subject. I may premise that it is not an easy matter to obtain the real opinions of native gentlemen on matters regarding which they know, not only that those opinions would be distasteful to the listener, but that his ignorance of aught but the superficial life of a native of position, his absolute want of knowledge regarding the religious obligations which affect every thought of his life, act as a bar to comprehension. There are few Englishmen, for instance, even amongst those who have served long in India and who have obtained credit there for understanding the native character, who will not be amazed at the revelation regarding the origin of the mutiny, or rather of the causes which led up to it, which I am about to place on record

Native opinion as to the cause of the mutiny.

as the real opinion of thoughtful and educated natives of India. That it is their real opinion I, who enjoyed special opportunities of conversing with them without restraint, and who possessed their confidence as far as an Englishman can possess it, know most certainly. And, what is more, there are living men, Englishmen, whose opportunities have been even greater, and who have communicated to me impressions absolutely confirming my views on the subject. From one of these gentlemen, a perfect linguist, and whose opportunities have been unrivalled, I have received the following reply to my query as to the cause to which the educated Hindus with whom he was in the habit of associating attributed the mutiny. "In the opinion of the educated natives of India," was his answer, "the gross wrongs inflicted on Náná Sáhib; the injustice done to Kunwar Singh; the injuries inflicted on the Rání of Jhánsí; the seizure of the kingdom of Oudh; the fraudulent embezzlement perpetrated with regard to the Ráo of Kírwí, and the scores of lesser wrongs done in reckless insolence to the landowners under the administration of the north-west provinces. Were Indians ever to write their account of the causes of the mutiny, it would astonish many in this country."

These views may be disputed. Indeed, I am confident that not one ex-Indian official among a hundred will read them with aught but a contemptuous smile. It requires that a man shall have lived with the educated natives as intimate friends associate together in Europe that he should be able to understand it. There is too little of such intercourse in India. In fact, it is only those officers who have enjoyed the opportunity of a long residence at a native court to whom the chance of such intercourse is available.

In the first edition of this volume I expressed as my own an opinion in entire conformity with the general views I have just quoted as the views of the natives of India as to the origin of the great outbreak. I wrote—and I may say that time, and a subsequent visit to India, have confirmed my view—"The real cause of the mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form in two words—bad faith. It was bad faith to our Sipáhis which made their minds prone to suspicion; it was our policy of annexation, of refusing to Hindu chiefs the permission to adopt, with them, a necessary religious rite; of suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex

Bad faith,
and the
attempt
to force
western
ideas on an
eastern
people.

rules to which they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in the Sagar and Narbadá territory, and in Bundelkhand, and our breaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws, which roused the large landowners and the rural population against the British rule." This was my opinion then, and it is, if possible, more strongly my opinion now. I shall proceed to support it by examples.

The bad faith towards the Sipáhis goes back so far as the period immediately succeeding the first Afghán war.

In that war the Sipáhis had behaved splendidly; they had fought well, they had suffered privations without a murmur, they had borne with cheerfulness absence from their country and their families, in a cause which was only theirs because it was the cause of their foreign masters. I recollect well meeting in 1844 at Allahábád a political officer whose conduct during his mission at Herát can never be mentioned without admiration—the late D'Arcy Todd. Speaking to me of the difficulties of his position at Herát, D'Arcy Todd stated that but for the zeal, the energy, and the fidelity of the few Sipáhis who were with him he could not have stayed at Herát; he added,

Bad faith
towards the
Sipáhis;

their devo-
tion when
properly
managed.

"When properly treated the Bengal Sipáhi will go anywhere and do anything." Well, these men returned from Afghánistán. Immediately afterwards we annexed Sindh. The Bengal Sipáhis were sent to garrison a country then notoriously unhealthy. How were they treated? The time-honoured rule which provided that they should receive a fixed extra food allowance on proceeding to certain localities was rescinded, in one instance after the men had reached one of the indicated

Breach of
faith towards
them in the
double batta
question.

localities, in another instance when the regiment was in full march to it. Is it to be wondered at that the men grumbled and then actually refused to march? They committed no violence. They simply said, "You are guilty of bad faith; we contracted to enter your service and to perform all the duties entrusted to us on certain conditions, of which the payment to us of food allowance under certain circumstances was one. We have fulfilled our share of the contract, and now you refuse to fulfil your share. We decline to work until you fulfil it." In equity the Sipáhis were right; but the Government, instead of soothing them,

The Govern-
ment punish
the Sipáhis
for declining
to fulfil a
contract
which the
Government
had broken.

acted in a high-handed manner, disbanded one regiment and severely punished the men of another.

This conduct produced a very bad effect throughout the Indian army. It was felt in every regiment that the word of the Government could no longer be depended upon. Nevertheless, no open indignation was manifested. The Satlaj campaign ensued, and again the Sipáhis fought well. The annexation of the Panjáb followed. Then succeeded a long period of quiescence—a period during which seeds, sown some time before, took root, sprang up, and blossomed into regulations fraught with danger to the discipline of the Indian army.

The natives of India serve a master well when once he has shown himself capable of wielding authority. But should that authority slacken, or, worse still, should they find out that the Government they serve has placed at their disposal the means not only of shaking but even of upsetting it, then the nominal master wielding it ceases to be their real master; the substance of his power vanishes; the shadow only remains. The occurrences in the Indian army during the several years immediately preceding 1857 completely illustrate this assertion. In former days, in the time of Lake, in the time of Hastings, and even later, the commanding officer of a native regiment was supreme in all matters of discipline. Responsible immediately to his divisional commander, he could promote, he could reduce, he could punish. But, as time passed on, men were appointed to the general staff of the Indian army whose visions became clouded and whose brains became turned by the air of the new regions to which they had been transferred. Forgetting their own regimental experience, not caring to know that the routine system which suits a British regiment formed of men taught to obey the law, no matter by whom administered, is not applicable to a regiment composed of Asiatics bred to obey the man in whose hands they see authority centred and him only, these men began, step by step, to introduce the British system into the native army. It would take too long to tell how gradually the real power of the commanding officer was undermined; how the Sipáhi was, by degrees, taught to look upon him, not as a superior who must be obeyed, but as a very fallible mortal, peculiarly liable to err, and against whose lightest exercise of authority he had the right to appeal to the one central power,

Bad effect
produced on
the Indian
army.

Gradual pro-
gress of the
weakening
the power of
command-
ing officers

the Commander-in-Chief. Suffice it to say that this process of sapping the powers of the commanding officer was carried to so great an extent that immediately prior to the mutiny the Sipáhis had lost all respect for the authority he only nominally wielded. Nor had the Sipáhi imbibed for the Commander-in-Chief the feeling which he had ceased to entertain towards his commanding officer. To him the Commander-in-Chief was but a name; he was a lay figure, living in the clouds of the Himálayas, rarely, often never, seen, but whose interposition enabled him to defy his own colonel and to set discipline at naught! The extent to which this interposition was exercised before the mutiny was dangerous in the extreme. It succeeded before 1857 in weakening the influence of all the regimental officers, and in undermining the discipline of the army.

Disastrous result of this policy.

It undermines the discipline of the army.

I have said that the refusal of the Government of India in 1843 to act up to their contract with regard to the Sipáhis sent to occupy Sindh had been felt throughout the Indian army. Immediately subsequent to that event, the process of undermining the powers of commanding officers had made swift progress. When, then, in 1852, the Government most unadvisedly again attempted another breach of contract, the Sipáhis, demoralised by the process I have alluded to, were even more inclined to resent it.

The progress of demoralisation between 1843 and 1852.

The breach of contract referred to occurred in this manner. With the exception of six or seven regiments the Sipáhis of the Bengal army were enlisted for service in India only; they were never to be required to cross the sea. But with the view of supplying the necessities of the state in Árakán and the Tenasserim provinces, six or seven regiments had been specially raised for general service, and these regiments were invariably despatched thither by sea whenever their services were there required. Lord Dalhousie, however, who had ridden roughshod over so many native customs, considered that he might set aside this one also. Accordingly, when, during the Burmese war, he wanted to send an additional regiment to Burmah, instead of despatching a general service regiment or of inviting a regiment to volunteer, he ordered a regiment stationed at Barrackpúr to proceed

A proportion of the regiments of the Bengal army alone enlisted for service across the sea.

thither. The men of the regiment refused to go. "You ask us," they said, "to embark upon a service for which we have not enlisted, and which many of us regard as imperilling our caste. We will not do it." Lord Dalhousie was forced to submit. He was very angry, but there was no help for it.

Lord Dalhousie attempts to break contract with the Sipáhis.

But the result on the minds of the Sipáhis was most disastrous. For the first time in the history of India the orders of the Governor-General had been successfully resisted. It was little to the purpose to argue that the Governor-General had exceeded his powers: the blow to the discipline of the native army was not the less deadly.

The result most disastrous to discipline.

The minds of the Sipáhis were under the influence of this blow, and by the insane action of the head-quarter staff they were becoming more and more released from the bands of discipline towards their own officers, when the annexation of Oudh took place. How this affected them I shall state as briefly as possible.

The annexation of Oudh.

A very large proportion of the army of the Bengal Presidency, and a smaller proportion of the army of the Bombay Presidency, were recruited from the kingdom of Oudh. It is scarcely too much to affirm that there was not a single agricultural family in that country which was not represented by at least one of its members in the Indian army. Service in that army, in fact, offered no inconsiderable advantages to the subjects of the king of Oudh. It made them clients, and favoured clients, of the paramount power. Every Sipáhi was, so to speak, represented at the court of Lakhnao by the British Resident. His commanding officer was authorised to frank any petition he might present addressed to the Resident, and the fact that the Resident had received such petition ensured substantial justice to the claims of the petitioner at the hands of the court of Lakhnao. Every one familiar with the workings of a native court will at once recognise the value at which service in the Indian army was rated by the natives of Oudh. By accepting such service they obtained an all-powerful advocate to plead their cause whenever their property might be threatened, or their civil rights endangered.

Reason why service in the Company's army was popular with the men of Oudh, when Oudh had her own king.

The Nawábs and Kings of Oudh had from the time of Warren Hastings shown a loyalty to the British Government not to be

surpassed. During the Afghán disasters, the Gwáliár campaign, the battles on the Satlaj and in the Panjáb, Oudh had been the milch-cow of the paramount power. She had lent that power money, she had given her her best sons as soldiers, she had done all that she could do to maintain unimpaired the relations between the prince independent only in his own country and the paramount overlord.

Persistent loyalty to the paramount power of the Nawábs and Kings of Oudh.

"But," exclaimed the advocates for annexation, "she has misgoverned." Misgovernment is a relative term. There can be no question but that in the English sense of the term there had been no good government in Oudh. But a kind of administrative system had, nevertheless, prevailed which induced the Sipáhis, after the term of their service under the British flag had expired, to settle in their native country. More than that, after the natives of Oudh had had one year's experience of British government as administered by Mr. Coverley Jackson and Mr. Martin Gubbins, they, one and all, evinced a strong preference for the native government which had been superseded.

The plea of misgovernment one not to be sustained

as a justification for annexation.

It is necessary to take all these circumstances into consideration when one analyses the effect which the annexation of Oudh produced upon the Sipáhis of the Bengal army. In my belief that annexation gave them the greatest shock they had felt since the occurrences, already adverted to, of 1843-4. It was the last and the most fatal blow to their belief in British honesty. That belief had been greatly shaken by the proceedings of Lord Dalhousie with respect to Karáulí, the dominions of the Bhonslá, and Jhánsí. The annexation of Oudh pressed them still more closely. It made them ready to become the tools of any adventurer.

Disastrous effect produced on the minds of the Sipáhis by that annexation.

It was not only that they beheld in that annexation a lowering of their own position as men represented at their sovereign's court by a British Resident, though that was a blow under

* We ask the attention of the reader to the recent exposure of bribery and corruption by officials appointed by Government made in the year 1888-9 by the Crawford Commission. If this had occurred under a native administration, it would have been called "misgovernment." By what euphonious term Lord Reny characterises it I have not yet heard.

which the Indian army yet reels, for it accounts for the difficulty of procuring recruits, which subsequently embarrassed the Government. They beheld in that act, and in the manner in which it was carried out, a deliberate infringement of promises they had ever looked upon as sacred—a repayment for the good services of nearly a century, such as even the most abandoned amongst their own princes would have hesitated to enforce.

They regarded it as another breach of faith.

These are not statements made at random. I was myself an eye-witness to the effect produced upon the Sipáhis by the order to annex Oudh. It devolved upon me, as Commissariat Officer of the Kánpúr division, to supply carriage and provisions for the force which, under Outram, crossed the Ganges into Oudh at the end of 1855. Over my house and office, which were in the same compound, was a Sipáhi guard—a háwalदार's party. Contrary to custom and to departmental instructions, no written orders were given to me for the requisitions. The expedition was to be a secret, I was told, and I must obey verbal orders. But, in spite of this mystery, the destination of the force became known before it set out to every Sipáhi in the cantonment—to every native in the town. The effect was alarming. The natives had no doubt whatever as to the real meaning of the demonstration. For the first time in the memory of man an English regiment was about to march on Lakhnáo, and an English regiment would march on Lakhnáo with but one object. The agitation of the Sipáhis of my guard was most marked. It was with the greatest difficulty that I was able to control them.

Fury of the Sipáhis stationed at Kánpúr when Outram crosses into Oudh to annex it.

The authorities are warned,

Had they had any warning of the intended movement they would, I am confident, have broken out then and there. The subordinates of the Commissariat Department, themselves greatly moved, assured me that a similar feeling was manifesting itself in every regiment in the place. I made no secret of these manifestations. I reported them in the proper quarter. I communicated them even to one of the officials, a man of remarkable gifts, who had accepted a high post in Oudh, but my warnings found no more credence than did the warnings of Cassandra. They were remembered afterwards.

but in vain.

The annexation of Oudh, keeping in view the way in which it was carried out, was, in very deed, the act which

broke the trust of the Sipáhis in their English masters. The perpetration of that deed prepared their minds to receive and to believe any matter, however absurd in itself, which might betoken English perfidy. How their minds were played upon I shall show presently. Meanwhile, it is necessary that I should indicate how it was that the landowners and agricultural classes of India became impressed with the "bad faith" of their rulers.

The annexation of Oudh removes the last remnant of confidence in the British.

The internal annexation policy inaugurated by Lord Dalhousie was, in many instances, based upon his refusal to recognise a right which the Hindus hold as an essential part of their religion—the right to adopt an heir on the failure of children lawfully begotten. In the early part of this volume I have spoken of the disaffection, the terror, the hatred of the English which this policy produced in the southern Maráthá country. Carrying out this principle, Lord Dalhousie had annexed the territory of the Bhonslás; he had annexed the state of Jhánsí, he had endeavoured to annex the state of Karáulí, and had only been prevented by the interference of the Home Government on a threatened motion in the House of Commons. Still he continued to hold the principle *in terrorem* over the heads of the princes and chiefs of India, and the fact that the policy of "grab all" was the policy, the paramount power, and might, on the occurrence of death without natural heirs, be applied to any coveted territory, produced, it is not too much to say, "a terror" in the minds of the Hindu princes throughout India.

The mode in which the princes, chiefs, and landowners of India lost faith in the British.

But in another and a far more guiltless manner the Government had sown the seeds of hatred in the minds of the representatives of great families whose ancestors they had deprived of their dominions. Two instances of the action of this policy will occur at once to the reader—Náná Sáhib and the Ráo of Kírwí. Náná Sáhib was indubitably the lawful representative, according to Hindu law, of the last of the Peshwás. When, in June, 1818, Bájí Ráo surrendered to Sir John Malcolm, the Court of Directors considered that an annuity of eighty thousand pounds was more than an adequate compensation for the loss of an empire. Bájí Ráo lived in the enjoyment of this pension nearly thirty-five years. When he died, in January 1853, Lord

The principle of granting a life annuity in exchange for a kingdom.

Dalhousie refused either to recognise his adopted son or to continue the pension.

According to European ideas this ruling was perfectly just. It strictly carried out the agreement as understood by Sir John Malcolm in 1818. But neither Bájí Ráo nor his retainers had so understood it. Such a settlement would have been so repugnant to the ideas and customs of the races of Hindustán, that they could not be expected to understand it. As the son of Bájí Ráo would have succeeded that prince as Peshwá had he remained Peshwá, so would he succeed naturally to all the rights for which Bájí Ráo had exchanged the dignity of Peshwá. With them it was a point of honour to recognise in the son, whether begotten or adopted, the successor to the titles and estates of his father. Whether the English recognised him or not, Náná Sáhib was still Peshwá in the eyes of every true Maráthá.* The refusal to recognise him and the stoppage of the pension forced the heir of the Peshwá to conspire. It can easily be conceived how readily such a man, occupying a fortified palace close to the Oudh frontier, would hail and encourage the discontent which the nefarious annexation of Oudh, as the natives considered it, could not fail to produce.

Totally
repugnant
to Hindú
ideas.

That prin-
ciple made
Náná Sáhib
a conspi-
rator.

The story of the Ráo of Kírwi,† whilst reflecting still more disadvantageously on the conduct of the British Government, is similar in character and in application.

We see, then, how many of the princes and the chiefs of

* I recollect well, when I was at Banáráś in 1851-52, the Governor-General's agent, Major Stewart, a man of great culture and information, told me that there was living then, in extreme poverty, in the Mirzápúr jungles, near Banáráś, a man recognised by the natives as the lineal descendant of Chéit Singh, Rájah of Banáráś, expelled by Warren Hastings in 1781, and that to that day the natives salaamed to him and treated him with the respect due to the ruler of Banáráś.

† *Vide* page 138-42, and Appendix A. I may be permitted to note here another instance in which the British Government has applied the same unjust principle. When in 1848-49 a war broke out with the Sikhs, the King of Láhor was a minor, under the guardianship of the British Government, and in no respects responsible for the occurrences which led to the war. Yet, although his irresponsibility was officially admitted, he, the ward of the British Government, a guiltless child, was treated as though he was in all respects the guilty party. The British annexed his kingdom and gave him in exchange some kind of provision, which up to this day has never been clearly defined. The matter has only to be seriously examined for the injustice to become apparent. Most of the nobles of the Panjáb, who secretly fomented the wars of 1845 and 1848, were

India in possession, and all the chiefs not in possession, were predisposed to view with at least indifference any troubles which might assail their British over-lord. Incidents like that of the Rájah of Dilhéí,* of Kúnwar Singh of Jugdispúr, driven into revolt by the action of a revenue system which he did not understand, came at uncertain intervals to add to the general mistrust. Such incidents affected alike chieftain and retainer, noble and peasant, for, in almost every part of the country, the retainers considered their interests as bound up with those of the former.

The Western principle pushed to its logical extreme alienates an Eastern race

It was when the minds of all were thus distrustful that the annexation of Oudh—of Oudh which had ever been faithful, always true and loyal—came to startle them still more. It is just within the bounds of possibility that, if the system introduced by the English into Oudh had been administered in a conciliatory manner, the result might have been similar to that which was produced in a few years in the central provinces. But the Englishmen to whom the administration of the newly-annexed province was intrusted were men with fixed ideas, which they rode to death, the slaves of a system which had sown disaffection all over the North-Western provinces and in Bundelkhand, and which they carried out without regard to the feelings and previous habits of those with whose lands and property they were dealing. In less than twelve months the result was disaffection and dismay; the new settlement made every man in Oudh an enemy to British rule.

The annexation of Oudh is made doubly odious

by the principle of forcing Western notions on an Eastern people

With Oudh thus disaffected, the chiefs and the territorial interest doubting and trembling, with the Sipáhis alienated and mistrustful, there needed but one other element to produce insurrection. The country, the army, the newly-annexed province were alike ready for the machinations of conspirators.

At the close of 1856 all classes are ready for the machinations of conspirators

secured in the possession of their estates, and their position, under English rule, has become trebly secure. But Mahárájah Dhulíp Singh, who was, I repeat, a mere child, innocent of intrigue, and the ward of the British Government, was granted in exchange for his kingdom and its princely revenues, and for his large private estates, a life annuity only. Can we wonder that treatment of this sort, when fully realised by him, should upset the equilibrium of his mind to the extent recently witnessed by the world?

* Page 63-L

The conspirators, too, were ready. Who all those conspirators were may never certainly be known. Most of them died and made no sign. It is, however, a fact beyond question that the Maulaví of Faizábád—the man who was killed at Powáin—was one of them. I have already given a sketch of the previous career of this remarkable man.* I have shown how, after the annexation of Oudh, he travelled over the north-western provinces on a mission which was a mystery to the Europeans, how he was suspected even then of conspiring. Abundant proofs were subsequently obtained that a conspiracy had been formed by some influential people in Oudh in the interval between the annexation and the outbreak of the mutiny. Of this conspiracy the Maulaví was undoubtedly a leader. It had its ramifications all over India—certainly at Ágra, where the Maulaví stayed some time—and almost certainly at Dehlí, at Míráth, at Patná, and at Calcutta where the ex-King of Oudh and a large following were residing.

For some time there was one thing wanting to the conspirators—the means, the instrument—with which to kindle to action the great body of their countrymen. Especially were they at a loss how to devise a scheme by which the minds of the Sipáhis serving throughout the Bengal Presidency should be simultaneously affected. They were in this perplexity when they heard of the new cartridge—a cartridge smeared with animal fat and which they were told was to be bitten.

It was easy for them to make this discovery. Their spies were everywhere. The cartridges were openly manufactured at Damdamah. Eagerly looking out for a novelty to be introduced from Europe into the native army, they were the most likely men of all to detect the instrument they required in the greased cartridge. They had no sooner found it than they realised that it corresponded exactly to their hopes. It was the weapon they wanted. Instantly the chapátís were distributed by thousands to the rural population, whilst means were employed to disseminate in every military station in Bengal suspicion regarding the cartridge.

To tell a body of Hindús, already suspicious of their foreign master, that they would be required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of their sacred animal, and to tell Muhammadans that they would be required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of an animal whose flesh was forbidden to them, was tantamount to tell them that their foreign master intended to make them break with their religion. Certainly that result was produced. When the new cartridges were issued, suspicion and calumny had done their work. The Sipáhis even believed that cartridges made of paper had been feloniously tampered with; and, when they were issued to them, they broke into revolt.

Natural effect on the minds of Hindú and Muhammadan Sipáhis.

In this lesser sense, then, and in this only, did the cartridges produce the mutiny. They were the instruments used by conspirators; and those conspirators were successful in their use of the instruments only because, in the manner I have endeavoured to point out, the minds of the Sipáhis and of certain sections of the population had been prepared to believe every act testifying to bad faith on the part of their foreign masters.

The cartridge only the instrument.

I have said that the mistrust of the British faith had, towards the year 1857, become as great in the minds of the princes and chiefs and landowners of India as in the minds of the Sipáhis. There were, however, a few exceptions, and, when the country rose, those exceptions saved us. I will briefly refer to the most prominent amongst them.

The exceptions which proved the rule.

In four great provinces of our empire—in Oudh, in Rohilkhand, in Bundelkhand, and in the Sagar and Narbadá territory—the great bulk of the people rose against British rule. In western Bihár, using that geographical expression as inclusive of the districts subordinate to the Commissioner of Patná; in many districts of the Allahábád division, of the Ágra division, and in many parts of the Míráth division, the risings of the people and the Sipáhis were almost simultaneous in point of time. Had the revolt been universal, had the chiefs, the people, and the Sipáhis risen at one and the same moment, India could not have been held. Fortunately for British interests, the great prince who occupied the most central position in India, and whose action, had he risen,

The provinces which rose against us.

The loyalty of Sindhya.

would have been felt to the extremities of western India, was, throughout the crisis, loyal to his suzerain. Throughout the period between the 12th of May and the 1st of September, 1857, Sindhiá held the fate of India in his hands.

In another volume * I have described very briefly how it was that, in an unexampled crisis in the fortunes of the people with whom his ancestors had contended for empire, Sindhiá did remain loyal. I have shown that the loyalty did

His loyalty
was not
based upon
affection for
the British
as a people.

not proceed from affection towards the English. His minister and confidant, Dinkar Ráo, had no love for our nation. Sindhiá's people were, almost to a man, against us. Yet Dinkar Ráo used all his great influence in favour of a loyal policy, and his

representations, backed by the solid arguments of the able representative of the British power at the court of Sindhiá, Major Charters Macpherson, prevailed over national sentiment, the solicitations of other courtiers, and the boisterous demonstrations of the people. The importance of the result to English interests cannot be over-estimated. Sindhiá's loyalty alone made possible Havelock's march on, and the retention of,

Yet it saved
us.

Kánhpúr. It acted at the same time on the rebels like a wedge which pierces the centre of an army, dividing the wings, and preventing concentrated action. Nor, when, after the back of the rebellion had been broken, Sindhiá's army revolted against himself, was the effect much lessened. Sindhiá's great influence was still used for the English.

In considering Sindhiá's loyalty in connection with the risings of others—of all, or almost all, the rájahs and tálúkdárs, of Oudh, of the chiefs in Bundelkhand, in the Ságar and Narbadá territory, in the southern Maráthá country, and in western Bihár—it is impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that there had been a marked difference in the behaviour of the British Government towards Sindhiá on the one side, and towards the rájahs and landowners of the countries mentioned on the other. Under circumstances of a peculiarly tempting character, Lord Ellenborough had behaved with the greatest generosity and forbearance towards Sindhiá in 1844. The Government had kept faith with him ever since. The

The loyalty
really based
on the fact
that we had
dealt faith-
fully and
generously
with him.

* Vol. III. pp. 100-1.

reader of this volume will see that towards the rājāhs and landowners of the other provinces mentioned the British Government had shown neither generosity nor forbearance. In some instances they had not even kept faith. It is scarcely necessary to point the moral.

It is, indeed, a very remarkable fact, and one which the rulers of India at the present moment would do well to bear in mind, that in the several provinces and districts traversed by our troops in 1857-8-9, the behaviour of the people corresponded to the character of our rule. Thus, in the central provinces, to which the regulation system had never penetrated, the people were loyal and contented, and refused all aid to Tántiá Topí. In the Sagar and Narbadá territories, in Oudh and in the districts bordering on that province, in the Ágra division—in all of which the British hand had been heavy, and the British acts opposed to the national sentiment—the people showed a spirit of opposition, a resolution to fight to the last, and in many cases a detestation of their masters, such as no one would before have credited. Cases similar to that of the Rājāh of Dilhéri, referred to in the earlier part * of this volume, had sown far and wide the seed of disaffection and revolt.

The remarkable instances in which the behaviour of the people of India corresponded to the faith we had kept with them.

If these facts are, as I believe them to be, correct, we have not to go far to seek the conclusion. The mutiny of the army and the insurrection in the provinces I have named were the natural consequences of an attempt to govern a great Eastern empire according to purely Western ideas.

The mutiny the result of a rude attempt

The civilisation, over-refined though it might be, of thousands of years was ridiculed by the rougher race which, scorning sentiment, regarded utilitarianism as its foundation-stone. The governing members of that race failed to recognise the great truth upon which their forefathers had built their Indian empire, that the Western race can gain the confidence of the Eastern only when it scrupulously respects the long-cherished customs of the latter, and impresses upon it the conviction that its word is better than its bond. This is just the conviction which, during the thirty years immediately antecedent to 1856, the

to govern an Eastern people according to pure Western ideas.

majority of the Hindús and Muhammadans of India had been gradually losing, and which in 1857 they had lost.

If Lord Canning had had any idea in the early part of 1857 that the isolated outbreaks which then disturbed the general serenity were part of an organised plot, he would, I believe, have at once taken measures to meet the difficulty. Not that, at any time in 1857, he could have prevented a mutiny, but he could easily have made better arrangements to meet one. I am far, however, from imputing any blame to Lord Canning in this respect. He had but recently arrived in India. His predecessor, when making over to him charge of the empire, had expressed his conviction that new to India, never had the country been in so satisfactory a condition. All the time the ground was undermined, the train was being laid, the miners were at work. But how was Lord Canning to know this? He inherited inherits Lord Dalhousie's councillors, Lord Dalhousie's councillors. They were as satisfied, and as ignorant of the real state of the country, as was Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie had quitted India in a blaze of glory; and the new Governor-General, unused to the currents of Indian thought, could for some months only steer the vessel by the advice of the officers who had helped to bring to Lord Dalhousie a renown far-reaching and seemingly well deserved.

But, in fact, upon no men did the news of the mutiny descend with so startling a surprise as upon the councillors of Lord Canning. They could not comprehend it. The councillors of Lord Canning. Weeks and weeks elapsed before they could bring themselves to believe that it was anything more than a fortuitous explosion at various points, each having no concert and no connection with the other. The Home Secretary's assurances that the apprehensions expressed regarding its nature were "a passing and groundless panic," that "there is every hope that in a few days tranquillity will be restored throughout the presidency," testify to the ideas that filled the minds of these men. The admission at least is due to them that they were honest—they believed what they said. But those sayings betrayed a complete ignorance of the country and of the situation. This ignorance, their utter ignorance of the India outside Calcutta, this blindness to the fact that it was more even than a mutiny of the Bengal army, and not merely a series of isolated revolts, with which they had to cope, was

illustrated in a thousand ways, but in none more strongly than in the refusal to disarm regiments which were known to be mutinous. The consequences of this refusal were most serious. In the case of the regiments at Dánápúr, the reader will have seen that it brought revolt into western Bihár, added enormously to the dangers of Havelock, and even imperilled Calcutta.

How great Lord Canning really was, how small were his councillors. was shown when, having completely shaken off their influence, he stood alone and unshackled at Allahábád in the early part of 1858. A different man was he then from the Lord Canning of April and May 1857. His nature then displayed its real nobility. His grasp of affairs, at Calcutta apparently so small, excited at Allahábád the admiration of all who came in contact with him. He showed a truer insight into the military position than the Commander-in-Chief himself. It was entirely owing to Lord Canning's insistence that the campaign in Rohilkhand followed close upon the capture of Lakhnao. Sir Colin Campbell would have postponed it. But Lord Canning was too convinced of the danger of allowing a province to continue to flaunt rebellion, unchecked, in the face of the Government, to permit the delay. He insisted with all the determination of a man whose resolution, based on the logic of facts, was not to be shaken. It was Lord Canning at Allahábád who sent Lord Mark Kerr to Ázamgarh; who gave his fullest support to Sir Hugh Rose, and to the generals engaged against Tántiá Topí; and if, in one respect, to which I have adverted, his judgment was faulty, his companion in error was the Commander-in-Chief, and the error was a solitary one.

Lord Canning's real greatness evident when he stood unshackled at Allahábád.

His military acumen.

Nor is lesser praise due to him for the measures inaugurated at Allahábád to heal the wounds caused—he must then have seen—in a great measure by the mistakes of his predecessor. His Oudh proclamation, despite of the apparently harsh terms which it promulgated, was intended as a message of mercy, and, in its application, was a message of mercy. It gave every landowner in Oudh a title better, safer, more valid, than the title he had lost. It insured mercy to all except to those who by their crimes had forfeited all right to it. Interpreted, as Lord Canning meant it to be interpreted, by one of the ablest administrators in

His legislation in regard to Oudh.

India, it became the charter upon which the position now occupied by the people of Oudh has been built up and secured.

Never was the real greatness of Lord Canning's character more completely displayed than when the galling strictures of Lord Ellenborough's despatch were published to the world. At the moment the insult, the breach of etiquette, were lost sight of in the fear lest the condemnation of his policy proceeding from so high a quarter should afford encouragement to the rebels or weaken the attachment of the native tributaries. As soon as he ascertained that the despatch had not produced that result he was calm. He could not help seeing that it was designedly impertinent, that it was intended to provoke him to resign. Conscious of the rectitude of his motives and of the soundness of his views, he laughed at the pettiness of the display. In his calm and statesmanlike answer he sought neither revenge nor triumph. But both soon came to him. The news that Lord Ellenborough had been hoisted with his own petard, the receipt of Lord Derby's almost imploring letter not to resign, followed the insulting missive with a rapidity almost startling.

Towards the men who served under him, Lord Canning displayed generosity, kindness, and forbearance. He knew that in many departments he had been badly served, yet he would rather bear the burden himself than dismiss the incapable minister. But so low did he rate the abilities of the men about him, that when he had resolved to appoint Mr. Edmonstone, till then his Foreign Secretary, to be Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, he cast his eyes far from the men surrounding him to select a successor to that official. He had actually resolved to offer the post to Herbert Edwardes when the publication by that officer of a letter, violently polemical, caused him to reconsider his resolve. For the moment he was cast back upon the clique about him, but finally he made an admirable choice in Colonel Durand.

Judging Lord Canning's conduct after his arrival at Allah-ábád, it is difficult to find a fault in it. He was then the lofty-minded English gentleman, the trained and skilful statesman. Every day made it more clear that the mistakes of the Calcutta period, mistakes which have been fully recorded in these

His reception
of Lord El-
lenborough's
strictures.

His conduct
towards his
colleagues
and subordi-
nates.

The lofty-
minded
English
gentleman,
the trained
statesman.

volumes, were due to the inexperience of a generous nature guided by men whom he had been told to look upon as masters of the situation, but who were in fact hopelessly ignorant and incapable. That Lord Canning came to know this himself was evidenced by the generosity he displayed, after the mutiny had been quelled, to those who had ventured to express very boldly their disagreement with his policy of 1857.

But, if Lord Canning was to be admired from the time of his arrival at Allahábád, Lord Elphinstone deserves the fullest meed of praise that can be accorded to him from the very first. Lord Elphinstone possessed this advantage over Lord Canning—his previous experience in India had given him a thorough knowledge of the country and the people. When the mutiny broke out at Mírath he saw it as it really was; he saw that it was no isolated outbreak, no local discontent, but part and parcel of an organised rebellion which had its main roots, indeed, in the North West Provinces, but the development of which, especially in the direction of Bombay, was certain, unless it could be promptly stopped. The Bombay Presidency, in fact, with an army partly recruited from Oudh, and composed mainly of a conglomeration of Maráthá states, was in a peculiar degree susceptible. Lord Elphinstone understood the situation at once. He dealt with it in a manner possible only to a statesman of high and lofty courage, of clear intellect, and of far-seeing views. The idea of waiting for the mutiny within his own borders, if, indeed, it ever occurred to him, came only to be promptly rejected. To mass the greatest number of men on the decisive point of the scene of action—that Napoleonic motto became at once his guiding principle. For that purpose he denuded his own Presidency, highly sensitive as it was, of European troops, and despatched them, as fast as he could force them to move, to the threatened points outside of it. He, too, like Lord Canning, had colleagues in his government, but here again his previous experience saved him from the mistakes which marred Lord Canning's administration during the first seven months of the mutiny. Knowing his counsellors thoroughly, he listened to them with courtesy—but he acted on his own convictions. To the men who were the instruments of his policy he gave the most complete and generous confidence. How large was his trust when he once

Lord
Elphinstone

compre-
hended the
full extent of
the mutiny
from the
very outset.

His policy of
offensive
defence.

gave it Mr. Forjett is a living evidence. Mr. Frere in Sindh, Mr. Seton-Karr and afterwards Colonel Le G. Jacob in the southern Maráthá country, Mr. John Rose in Satárah, and Colonel Malcolm, are instances of a similar import. When, in spite of all his measures to keep the mutiny from Bombay by a policy of offensive defence, the poison crept in and infected the regiments of the regular army in the southern Maráthá country, how vigorous, how decided is his policy! We see here none of the hesitation, of the half-heartedness, the halting between two extremes, which enabled the mutinous regiments of Dánápúr to disturb all the plans of the Government and to imperil the safety of the empire. Promptly, without an hour's delay, Lord Elphinstone sent for the fittest man at his disposal and told him to go to Kolhapúr and at all costs quell the mutiny. Le Grand Jacob went and disarmed the rebellious Sipáhis. How Lord Elphinstone was occasionally thwarted by men not immediately under his orders has been shown in the case of Woodburn. But his firmness was proof even against opposition of this description, and, after some vexatious delay, he carried out his policy.

Only those who have enjoyed the privilege of reading his voluminous correspondence during 1857-58 can form an idea of the remarkable perspicacity which characterised Lord Elphinstone's views on every point connected with the stirring events of those years. The strong and the weak points of a case, the true policy to be pursued, the proper time for putting it in action, when to withhold the blow, when to strike, the reasons for withholding or for striking, are laid down in clear and vigorous language in his letters. Reading them after the event, it seems marvellous how a man standing alone should have judged so clearly, so truly. Many of the military movements which tended to the pacification of the country had their first inspiration from Lord Elphinstone, and the smallest of the tardy tributes that can be paid him is this—that no man in India contributed so much as he contributed to check the mutiny at its outset; no man contributed more to dominate it after it had risen to its greatest height.

In the glory of the victory, amid the bestowal of well-merited rewards for military services, the great deserts of Lord Elphinstone received but small notice from the public. But it is a

The generous confidence he placed in his subordinates.

His quick decision.

His correspondence evidences his foresight.

remarkable fact that after the death of Sir Henry Lawrence he was nominated by three successive Secretaries of State—by Mr. Vernon Smith, by Lord Ellenborough, and by Lord Stanley—to be successor to Lord Canning in the event of a vacancy occurring in the office of Governor-General. It now becomes the duty of the historian to place him on the lofty pedestal to which his great services and his pure and noble character entitle him.

Lord Elphinstone is appointed by three successive Secretaries of State to succeed Lord Canning.

The southern Presidency was never invaded by the mutinous spirit. But not the less is a large share of credit due to its governor, Lord Harris. The responsibility which weighed upon this nobleman was very great indeed. The immunity of Madras depended upon the loyalty of the Nizám, and, at the outset, the Nizám had much to apprehend from his own people. It was in the height of the crisis that Lord Harris denuded his own Presidency to send troops to Haiderábád, and it cannot be doubted but that their opportune arrival tended greatly to the pacification of the Nizám's dominions. The formation of the Kamthí column, of Whitlock's force, of the brigade which fought under Carthew at Kánhpúr, the despatch to Bengal of the regiments which kept open the grand trunk road in western Bihár and which afterwards co-operated against Kúnwar Singh, of the troops who rendered good service in Chutiá Nágpúr, testify to the energy, the foresight, the devotion of the Governor of Madras. He used all the resources of his Presidency to crush outside the rebellion which never penetrated within his own borders.

Lord Harris

displays foresight, energy, and devotion.

Of other actors in the rise, progress, and suppression of the rebellion I have written in the body of this history, not always, perhaps, in as full detail as their splendid services demanded, but, I would fain hope, in full proportion to the scope and requirements of the work intrusted to me. It may be that some incidents have escaped me. I shall regret it much should such prove to be so, for my chief anxiety has been to render full justice to every man. This, at least, I may say, that, however ineffectively the History of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny may have been told, the character of our countrymen must be seen to emerge from the terrible ordeal of 1857-58 in a form that would gratify the most exacting people. We are, fortunately, as a nation,

The deserts of Englishmen in the crisis of 1857-8-9.

accustomed to success in the field, but on no occasion in our history has the nerve and fibre of our troops, the fortitude and manliness of our countrymen of all ranks, been more conspicuous—often in the face of death itself, and under circumstances which would have seemed to justify despair. But with life they never despaired. They endured all that had to be endured, with a patience and cheerfulness never to be surpassed, and sought victory when it was possible with a determination before which the strongest opposition had to yield. And in all this they were sustained and animated by our countrywomen, who, in positions and under trials to which few gently-nurtured women have been subjected, showed all the noblest and most lovable aspects of woman's character. The History of the Indian Mutiny is, in fact, a record of the display of all the qualities for which Englishmen have been famous—of the qualities which have enabled the inhabitants of a small island in the Atlantic to accumulate the noblest and largest empire in the world, and which, so long as they remain unimpaired in their descendants, will enable them still to maintain it.

APPENDIX A.

(Pages 138-42.)

IN addition to the fact stated at page 138 that Mádhava Ráo, Ráo of Kírwí, was only nine years old when the mutiny broke out, and that the money paid for the maintenance of the Banáras Temples had been alienated before he sat on the gadí, and therefore never formed part of his estate and could not be liable to seizure, whatever he might do, it may be added that at the time of the Mutiny the Government of India appointed a Special Commissioner, Mr. F. O. Mayne, to inquire into the conduct of Mádhava Ráo, and that that Commissioner fully absolved him from all blame (*vide* his report, dated September 8, 1858).

Not only so, but the same gentleman gave a special certificate to the Regent of Kírwí (who was also trustee of the Banáras Temples), dated February 4, 1859. A copy of that document, now before me, states: "Rám Chandrá Rám, Painsday, has always borne a high character for loyalty and respectability during the Mutiny of 1857. Being a relation of the Kírwí Peshwá, he was placed in a difficult position, and discharged his duty both towards the British Government and towards his master most faithfully, at the risk of his life, and with frank and open loyalty to Government. It was he who saved the life of Mr. Cockerell, joint-magistrate of Kírwí. Though he has at present frankly refused any reward for his loyal and faithful services, yet he must be well paid whenever he stands in need." This was signed by Mr. F. O. Mayne. Yet the reward Rám Chandrá Rám received was the pillage of the Banáras Temples of which he was trustee.

There is thus complete evidence that a Special Commissioner exonerated Mádhava Ráo from all blame, and gave a certificate of loyalty to his adviser: we have the non-age of the Ráo, and the fact that the Temple money had been seized by the Government two years before the Mutiny; and yet we are asked to believe that all these seizures took place in consequence of the Ráo's rebellion.

With reference to the statement made in the first edition that General Whitlock found in the palace-yard of Kírwí more than forty pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of shot, shell, and powder, &c., a friend, who has investigated the subject of the Kírwí tragedy, writes me as follows: "As to the statement made by Whitlock and repeated by you about the active gun factories and powder mills and stands of arms, the whole is a shameless lie put forward to warrant the grant of prize money. That 'lucky' column had a keen scent for booty. Listen to a few words of

truth. On the death of Venáyak Ráo, the 6th July, 1853, Mr. Ellis, the Resident, went to Kírwí, disbanded all the forces there, and carried away all the weapons of war. A prudent, though despotic, use was made of the change of *ráj* to disarm this petty native State. The agent to the Government of India had full information of all that was going on at Kírwí up to the outbreak of the Mutiny. Is it consistent with common sense to suppose that a petty State like Kírwí could establish gun foundries and powder manufactories during the short period of the Mutiny? No money, however vast, and no hatred, however bitter, could possibly create such things, without the time necessary for their establishment. Your military knowledge will make the monstrous impudence of Whitlock's assertion more apparent to you than it can be to me. He probably scraped together a few old relics and curiosities, with a few mutineers' guns and belts—hundreds of which must have been available at such a time—and on the like trumpery the lie must have been built up."

I give this statement for what it is worth. To me it seems that there was, at least, great exaggeration in Whitlock's narrative; and that there were no grounds whatever for treating the Ráo of Kírwí as an enemy to be plundered.

APPENDIX B.

(Page 269.)

Translation of Tántiá Topí's Voluntary Deposition or Statement taken in Camp Múshairí on the 10th of April, 1859, in presence of Major Meade, commanding Field Force.

My name is Tántiá Topí; my father's name is Pándurang, inhabitant of Jolá-Parganah, Patoda-Zillah, Nagar. I am a resident of Bithúr. I am about forty-five years of age, in the service of Náná Sáhib in the grade of companion or aide-de-camp.

In the month of May 1857 the collector of Kánhpúr sent a note of the following purport to the Náná Sáhib at Bithúr, viz. that he begged him (the Náná) to forward his wife and children to England. The Náná consented to do so, and four days afterwards the collector wrote to him to bring his troops and guns with him from Bithúr (to Kánhpúr). I went with the Náná and about one hundred Sipáhis and three hundred matchlockmen and two guns to the collector's house at Kánhpúr. The collector was then in the intrenchment, and not in his house. He sent us word to remain, and we stopped at his house during the night. The collector came in the morning and told the Náná to occupy his own house, which was in Kánhpúr. We accordingly did so; we remained there four days, and the gentleman said it was fortunate we had come to his aid, as the Sipáhis had become disobedient, and that he would apply to the general

in our behalf. He did so, and the general wrote to Ágra, whence a reply came that arrangements would be made for the pay of our men. Two days afterwards the three regiments of infantry and the 2nd light cavalry surrounded us and imprisoned the Náná and myself in the Treasury, and plundered the magazine and Treasury of everything they contained, leaving nothing in either. Of the treasure the Sipáhis made over two lakhs and eleven thousand rupees to the Náná, keeping their own sentries over it. The Náná was also under charge of these sentries, and the Sipáhis who were with us also joined the rebels. After this the whole army marched from that place, and the rebels took the Náná Sáhib and myself and all our attendants along with them, and said, "Come along to Dehli." Having gone three coss from Kánhpúr, the Náná Sáhib said that, as the day was far spent, it was better to halt there then, and to march on the following day. They agreed to this and halted. In the morning the whole army told him (the Náná) to go with them towards Dehli. The Náná refused, and the army then said, "Come with us to Kánhpúr, and fight there." The Náná objected to this; but they would not attend to him, and so, taking him with them as a prisoner, they went towards Kánhpúr, and fighting commenced there. The fighting continued for twenty-four days, and on the twenty-fourth day the general raised the flag of peace, and the fighting ceased. The Náná got a female who had been captured before to write a note to General Wheeler to this effect, that the Sipáhis would not obey his orders, and that, if he wished, he (the Náná) would get boats and convey him and those with him in the intrenchment as far as Allahábád. An answer came from the general that he approved of this arrangement, and the same evening the general sent the Náná something over one lakh of rupees, and authorised him to keep the amount. The following day I went and got ready forty boats, and, having caused all the gentlemen, ladies, and children to get into the boats, I started them off to Allahábád. In the meanwhile the whole army, artillery included, having got ready, arrived at the river Ganges. The Sipáhis jumped into the water and commenced a massacre of all the men, women, and children, and set the boats on fire. They destroyed thirty-nine boats. One, however, escaped as far as Kolá Kankar, but was there caught and brought back to Kánhpúr, and all on board of it destroyed. Four days after this the Náná said he was going to Bithúr to keep the anniversary of his mother's death; they (the Sipáhis) allowed him to go, and some of them also accompanied him. Having kept the anniversary, they brought him back to Kánhpúr, and they took for their pay the money they had first made over to the Náná's charge, and made arrangements to fight against Husan Fathpúr, where they heard some Europeans had arrived from Allahábád, and they told the Náná to accompany them there. The Náná refused. I and the Náná remained at Kánhpúr, and sent Jawála Parshad, his (the Náná's) agent, along with them to Fathpúr. Having arrived there and been defeated, they retreated to Kánhpúr, and the aforesaid European force pressed them the whole way to Kánhpúr, when there was a battle for about two hours, and the rebel army was again defeated, and

ran away from Kánhpúr. Under these circumstances the Náná and I fled to Bithúr, arriving there at midnight, and the rebel army followed us. The next morning the Náná, taking some cash, &c., with him, went to Fathpúr. The rebel army followed, and looted the place. The Náná, Bálá Sáhib, Ráo Sáhib, and myself, with all our wives, crossed the Ganges in boats, and arrived at Fathpúr in the Lakhnao territory, and put up with the Cháodrí Bhopal Singh. Some days passed, when the 42nd Native Infantry arrived at Sheorájpúr, and wrote to the Náná to send them some one to take them to him. I went and told them that the Náná had sent for them. In the meanwhile the English army arrived, and the said 42nd regiment Native Infantry went to Bithúr, and fought there. I accompanied the said regiment, and, having been defeated, we fled from Bithúr and crossed the Ganges, and came to the Náná. Some days after, I received orders from the Náná to go to Gwáliár, and to bring back with me to fight the English such of the contingent as were at Morár. According to his order, I went to Morár, and brought back the contingent with me to Kalpí. The Náná had sent his brother, the Bálá Sáhib, to Kalpí, and, according to his order, I went with the army to fight against Kánhpúr, leaving a small force and magazine at Kalpí. Having arrived at Kánhpúr, there was a battle which lasted eleven days. After eleven days the rebel army was defeated, and we all ran away. The next day after this we fought at Sheorájpúr, and there also, having been defeated, we ran away, having with us fifteen guns (including one horse-artillery gun). I and the Bálá Sáhib and the Ráo Sáhib, who had been sent by the Náná to Kánhpúr, all crossed the Ganges at Náná Máu-ki-Ghát. We remained at a place called Kherá for the night. I got orders from the Ráo Sáhib to go and take charge of the small force and magazine left at Kalpí, in obedience to which I went there. After my arrival at Kalpí, I received orders from the Náná to go and attack Chirkhári, and that the Ráo Sáhib should be sent after me. Accordingly I, with nine hundred Sipáhis, two hundred cavalry, and four guns, went to Chirkhári, and fighting commenced. Four days afterwards the Ráo Sáhib came to Kalpí. I fought at Chirkhári for eleven days, and took it. I took twenty-four guns and three lakhs of rupees from the Rájah. The Rájahs of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh, and Dewán Despat and Dáolat Singh, the Kuchwáyá Kharwálá, and a great gathering of people joined me there at this time. I received a note from the Queen of Jhánsí to the effect that she was waging war with the Europeans, and begging me to come to her aid. I reported the news to the Ráo Sáhib at Kalpí. The Ráo came to Jaipúr, and gave me permission to go to the assistance of the Queen of Jhánsí. Accordingly I went to Jhánsí, and halted at Barua Ságar. There Rájah Mán Singh came and joined me. The next day, about a mile from Jhánsí, the whole of our army had a fight with the English army. At this time we had twenty-two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. In this battle we were defeated. A part of the rebel army, with four or five guns, fled to Kalpí, and I went to the same place, *viá* Bhándéri and Kunch, with two hundred Sipáhis. The Queen of Jhánsí arrived there the same evening as myself, and begged

the Ráo Sáhib to give her an army that she might go and fight. The following morning the Ráo Sáhib ordered a parade of all the troops, and told me to accompany the Queen to battle. Accordingly I, with a force, accompanied the Queen, and there was a battle at Kúnych which lasted till noon. We were again defeated, and fled, and I fled to "Chirkí," which is about four miles from Jaláur, and where my parents were. The Queen of Jhánsí and the force which fled with her arrived at Kalpí. The Ráo had a battle afterwards at Kalpí and was defeated, and he and his whole army arrived at Gopálpúr; we all marched thence towards Gwáliár. We had one day's fight with Mahárájah Sindhiá, and defeated him. Three days afterwards all Sindhiá's army joined the Ráo Sáhib, and having procured from the Gwáliár treasury, through Amarchand Batíá (the Mahárájah's treasurer), the requisite funds, pay was distributed to the army. Rám Ráo Govind was also with us. Some days afterwards the English army arrived at Gwáliár from Kalpí, and a force also came from Sirpúr. Fighting again took place, and continued for four or five days, during which the Jhánsí Rání was killed. Rám Ráo Govind had her corpse burnt, and we were all defeated and fled, taking twenty-five guns with us. We reached Jáurá-Alipúr and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked, and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots, the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns. We crossed the Chambal, and reached Tonk *viâ* Sirimuthia. The Nawáb of Tonk fought with us, and we took four guns from him. With these guns we proceeded to Bhilwára *viâ* Mahdípur and Indragarh. We were there attacked by the English force, and I fled during the night, accompanied by my army and guns. At that time I had eight or nine thousand men and four guns with me. We all proceeded to a village called Kotrá (about four miles from Náthduwará) and halted there for one night. The next morning we moved towards Patan, and, after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived, and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled, reaching Patan as fugitives. (The Nawáb of Bandah, who had come with us from Kalpí, and the Nawáb of Kumona, who had joined us at Indúrkí, were both with us.) On our arrival at Patan fighting commenced between us and the Rájah of that place; we conquered, and got possession of all the Rájah's guns and magazines, and surrounded his palace, in which he was. The next day I went and told the Rájah to give some money to pay the expenses of my army. He said he could give me five lakhs of rupees, but not more. I returned and told the Ráo Sáhib this. The next day the Ráo Sáhib sent for the Rájah and demanded twenty-five lakhs from him. The Rájah declared he could not give more than five lakhs; but, after some discussion, it was settled that he should pay fifteen lakhs. The Rájah said he would go to his palace and send this sum. He went accordingly, and sent two and a quarter lakhs in cash, and promised that the rest should follow. By the next day he had paid up five lakhs.

Imám Ali, Wirdi-major 5th Irregular Cavalry, ill-treated the Rájah very much, and the latter fled during the night. We remained there five

days, and issued three months' pay to our troops at the rate of thirty rupees each sawár, and twelve rupees to each foot-soldier per mensem.

We then marched for Sironj, taking eighteen guns with us. On reaching Rájgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled, and reached Sironj *viâ* Nija Kila. We halted at Sironj eight days, and, having taken four guns from the Tonk Nawáb's agent at Sironj, we proceeded thence to Ísághar. On arrival there we demanded supplies; but the Íságarh people would not give them. We therefore attacked Íságarh, and plundered it. The following day we halted, and the Ráo Sáhib told me to go to Chandéri, and that he would come round by Tál Bahat. I accordingly went to Chandéri, and the Ráo Sáhib came to Lálitpúr from (or by) Tál Bahat. On my reaching Chandéri, four shots were first fired on us from the fort, which we attacked and fought with Sindhiá's agent. After three days we marched from Chandéri towards Mangráulí, taking with us eleven guns, viz., seven which we had brought from Íságarh and the four we had got from Sironj. On our march to Mangráulí, we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled. (Of the eleven guns five were with me and six with the Ráo Sáhib. I lost my five in this fight, but the Ráo kept his six).

(NOTE.—It would appear that the Ráo was not in this action.)

I reached Jakláun, and the next day went to Sultanpúr, where the Ráo Sáhib also arrived. After three days the English force arrived, and the Ráo Sáhib took his army to Jaklaun (about five miles from Lalatpúr), and some firing took place there. I was not present in this fight. The Ráo Sáhib returned to Lálitpúr, and the following day proceeded to Kajúriá (ten miles from Sultanpúr) and halted there. The next day the English army came up just as we were going to march, and an action commenced which lasted an hour and a half. We then left all our guns and fled, and reached Tál Bahat. We halted there, and the following day went to Jaklaun, and thence to a village called Itáwah, twelve miles distant, where we stopped. We there heard that the English army was coming to surprise us, and marched at night. The English force came up in the morning, and our army became separated. I accompanied the Ráo Sáhib, and we proceeded, *viâ* Rájgarh, and crossed the Narbadá, and got to Kagáon Bátis *viâ* Kandulá. The troops who were with us burned the Government *tháná* * and bungalow at Kandulá. The Ráo Sáhib forbade their doing so, but they would not obey him. This was about four months ago. At Kaugáon Bátis there were some of Holkar's troops—one hundred and forty sawárs, one company of infantry, and two guns. These we forced to join us, and took them with us when we marched the following day towards Gujrát, crossing the high road where the telegraph-wire ran. The Sipáhis broke the wire and plundered seven hackeries which were on the road proceeding with Government property towards Gwáliár, and seized the

* "Tháná," a station.—G. B. M.

chaprásís and chaukídárs* who were with the hackeries, and took them with them. Some of the chaukídárs belonging to the chaukí were hanged by them. We there left the high road and proceeded westward. The next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two guns, we fled, and reached the Narbadá. An officer, with a hundred men, was on the opposite bank. Our force commenced to cross, and this officer and party of sawárs ran off. We plundered a village there called Chiklá, and marched thence at midnight. After proceeding thirty-four miles, we halted at Rájpúra. The next day we took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the Rájah of that place, and from it went on to Chotá Udaipúr. The following day the English force surprised us; some of them were killed, and some of ours. From Chotá Udaipúr we went on to Déogarh Bári, and our army became separated. There was jungle at that place, and I halted there two days. Our troops having been collected again, we started, and went to Bánswára. Our men plundered there sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth (some of Ahmadábád) belonging to a mahájan† which they found there. We thence went to Salomar, and I called on Kaisar Singh, agent for the Udaipúr Rájah, to furnish us with supplies. He sent us some, and the following day we again started with the intention of going to Udaipúr. However, *en route* we received tidings of the English force, and retraced our steps to Bhilwára. We remained there two days, and then proceeded to Partábgarh, where we fought for two hours with a body of English troops which had come from Nimach. About 8 o'clock P.M. we ran off, and proceeded about six miles to the east of Mandesar, and halted there. We then went on to Zirápúr, making three stages *en route*. An English force surprised us there, and we were again surprised by another force at Chaprá Baród. We fled thence to Nahargarh, the agent of the Kotá Rájah, at which place nine shots were fired at us from guns. We moved out of range, and halted there during the night; and the Ráo Sáhib sent Risáldár Nannú Khán to call Rájah, Mán Singh. The Rájah came and accompanied us—i.e. the Ráo Sáhib, myself, and our force—to a place about two miles from Parón, where we halted. We remained there two days, and on the third went on to a place about eight miles beyond Kilwári, whose name I do not remember. Rájah Mán Singh accompanied us as far as a river which we crossed *en route*, and then left us. We made two stages thence to Indragarh; and Firuzsháh, with the Khás Risálá (bodyguard) and 12th Irregulars, met us there. The next day we went on, making two stages to Dewás, which is fourteen miles from Jaipúr. The English force surprised us there; some men on both sides were killed, and, flying thence towards Márwár, we reached a village about thirty koss from Márwár, whose name I do not remember. At 4 o'clock that night we were surprised by the English force, and the 12th irregular cavalry separated from the Ráo Sáhib's army.

* "Chaprásí," a belted attendant or messenger. "Chaukídár," a watch man. "Chaukí," a post, in this sense; also a chair.

† "Mahájan," banker, merchant.—G. B. M.

The next day Thákur Naráyan Singh, Ajít Singh, uncle of Rájah Mán Singh, and Thákur Gangá Singh joined us at that place (? to which the Ráo's army had fled). They were coming in this (the Parón) direction. I had been quarrelling with the Ráo Sáhib all the way from Déogarh Bári, and told him I could flee no longer, and that, whenever I saw an opportunity for doing so, I should leave him. The opportunity for doing so here offered, and I left him and accompanied the (three) above-named parties in this (the Parón) direction. When I left the Ráo Sáhib he had about six thousand men with him. But three men (two Pandits to cook my food and one sáis) and three horses and one tattú accompanied me. The names of the two Pandits were Rám Ráo and Naráyan. The sái's name was Gobind, but he left me and ran off after coming two stages. We reached the Parón jungle and met Rájah Mán Singh. Ajít Singh took leave of Rájah Mán Singh, and went to his home. Naráyan Singh and I remained with Rájah Mán Singh. The Rájah said, "Why did you leave your force? You have not acted right in so doing." I replied that I was tired of running away, and that I would remain with him whether I had done right or wrong. I heard after this that the Ráo Sáhib's army had gone to Patan, and thence towards Sironj. I told Rájah Mán Singh I would send a man to get intelligence of them, and he approved of my doing so. I sent accordingly, and got information that the Ráo Sáhib was not there; but Imám Ali, Wírdí-major, Firuzsháh, and the Ambapání-wálá Nawáb, Adíl Muhammad, were there with eight or nine thousand men. Imám Ali, Wírdí-major of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, wrote to me to come and join them. I had lost my master's (the Nana's) seal, and had another made up at Parón.

When I heard, as above, from the Wírdí-major, I sent a man to Rájah Mán Singh, who was at Mahúdiá in Major Meade's camp (he had then been there three days), to inform him that I had received a note of this purport, and to ask him if I should go or remain. Rájah Mán Singh had consulted me before giving himself up to Major Meade, and had left one of his men with me, saying, "Stop wherever this man takes you." Rájah Mán Singh replied to my message that he would come in three days to see me, and we should then settle what to do.

He came accordingly on the third day, at night, and spoke a great deal to me, and told me that he had met Major Meade, and that his disposition was good. When I asked him what he advised—whether I should go or remain—he said he would reply in the morning. I then went to sleep, and during the night some of the Sipáhis of the Government came and seized me, and took me to Major Meade's camp.

Signature of Tántiá Topí,
Agent of the Náná Sáhib.

Question by Major Meade.—Have you made this statement of your own free will and without compulsion? and has any promise been made, or hope held out to you, to induce you to give it?

Answer.—I have, of my own free will, caused this statement to be

written; and no one has forced me to do so, or held out hope or promise of any sort to induce me to do so.

Signature of Tántiá Topí,
Agent of the Náná Sáhib.

Signature of Witnesses,

(Signed) Gangá-Parshád Múnshí, Meade's Horse.
Ruhúlál Náib-Kaíndár of Sípri.

The above deposition or statement was made by the prisoner Tántiá Topí in my presence on the 10th of April, 1859, at Camp Múshairí, of his own voluntary act and without compulsion of any sort, or promise made, or hope held out to him as an inducement to make it.

(Signed) R. J. MEADE, Major,
Commanding Field Force.

Certified that the above is a true and correct translation of the original deposition or confession of Tántiá Topí appended hereto.

(Signed) J. J. M. GIBBON, Lieutenant,
Adjutant Meade's Horse.

(True copy)
(Signed) R. MEADE.

APPENDIX C.

(Page 271.)

TRIAL OF THE EX-KING OF DEHLÍ.

THE Judge-Advocate-General then addressed the Court as follows:—

GENTLEMEN,—It will be my object, in the present address, to collect the different facts which have been elicited in the course of these proceedings, and to furnish them to you, as far as possible, in the order in which they originally occurred. Our investigation has involved inquiry over a period of several months, when rebellion was rampant in this city; and I trust we have succeeded in tracing, with considerable minuteness, many of the different events as they evolved themselves during the time to which I have referred. Our labours, indeed, have not had this limit, or we should only have accomplished what might, I think, be termed the least important part of our duties. In immediate connection with the facts elicited are the charges on which the prisoner has been arraigned; and, though his former rank and royalty will doubtless add somewhat of temporary importance to the verdict which you will this day be called upon to record, yet whether it be one of acquittal or conviction, it must, I imagine,

prove light in the balance when weighed against those more monstrous points to which so much attention has been, and for a long time will still be, directed. I, of course, allude to the causes, either remote or immediate, which gave rise to a revolt unparalleled in the annals of history, either for the savagery which has been its distinguishing feature, or for the suddenness with which elements, hitherto deemed utterly discordant on the score of religion, have united themselves in a common crusade against a faith which, as regards the inhabitants of this country, whether Muhammadan or Hindu, was certainly a most unaggressive one. I fear, however, the subject is still but imperfectly elucidated, and I may, perhaps, be in error in attributing to a religious influence a movement which, after all, may prove to have been merely a political one; a struggle of the natives for power and place, by the expulsion from the country of a people alien in religion, in blood, in colour, in habits, in feelings and in every thing. Whatever the final opinion on this subject may be, the questions which, as far as I am aware of, have not as yet found a satisfactory solution, are, by what circumstances was this most atrocious revolt, with its series of massacres, brought about, and who were its prime original instigators? I feel sure the members of this Court will join with me in deeming that our proceedings do not furnish a full and complete answer to such questions; and why do they not? I believe it is simply owing to the circumstance that any merely local investigation must be inadequate to collect evidence from the different quarters and sources, which are no doubt available elsewhere. We may still, however, hope that our efforts on this point have not been fruitless or unavailing; if we cannot congratulate ourselves on an entire success, we may perhaps be allowed credit for a near approach to it. Few, I imagine, will peruse these voluminous proceedings without coming to the conclusion that intrigues and conspiracy have long been rife at this fostering court of Dehli. Insignificant and contemptible as to any outward show of power, it would appear that this possessor of mere nominal royalty has ever been looked upon by Muhammadan fanaticism as the head and culminating star of its faith. In him have still been centred the hopes and aspirations of millions. They have looked up to him as the source of honour, and, more than this, he has proved the rallying point not only to Muhammadans, but to thousands of others with whom it was supposed no bond of fanatical union could possibly be established. To throw the fullest light on a subject like this is not the work of a day or of a month. Time, the great revealer of secrets, will doubtless, sooner or later, lay bare the springs from which a stream of so much evil and misery has flowed; but, till then, we must be content with such views as our present investigation affords. That we have been able to unravel many of the secret workings of the conspirators will, I believe, be conceded; but let me not anticipate. This is a point of our inquiry on which I purpose to offer some observations hereafter; but a concise narrative of events will perhaps best suit the commencement of this address.

I may state, then, that 85 men, non-commissioned officers and troopers

of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who were tried by general court-martial at Mirath in May last, for refusing their cartridges, had their sentence read to them and were ironed on the parade-ground early on the morning of the 9th of May, and that the mutiny of the three native regiments at Mirath first openly developed itself at about half-past six o'clock on the evening of the 10th of May, during which interval of nearly 36 hours there were, of course, plenty of opportunities for interchange of communications between the native troops who first rebelled at Mirath, and those who joined them at this station. To travel from one place to another by coach used ordinarily to take about five hours; and that the mutineers availed themselves of this facility of mutual intercourse has, I think, been clearly established by the evidence of Captain Tytler. It appears, from his statement, that a coach full of these Mirath mutineers, came on Sunday evening to the lines of the 38th Native Infantry, doubtless to prepare the Sipáhis of this station for the arrival and suitable reception, on Monday morning, of their rebel comrades; and, although we may not possess positive evidence to the fact, yet it may fairly be presumed that Sunday evening was not the first occasion that these plotters of evil held their secret and sinister councils together. Indeed we have it on record that, even before the Court, which tried the mutinous cavalry at Mirath, had come to any decision on their case, a compact had been entered into to the effect that, if the use of greased cartridges was persisted in, the troops at Mirath and Dehli would unite, and at once unfurl the standard of revolt; and so fully had this arrangement been perfected and agreed on, that it is related that the Sipábi guards at the gate of the palace on Sunday evening made no secret of their intentions, but spoke openly among themselves of what they expected to occur on the morrow. To understand the merits and demerits of the whole transaction, it must be recollected that, at the time when these resolutions were arrived at, there was not a single greased cartridge in the magazines of either of the three native regiments at Mirath, nor, as far as I have been informed, of those at Dehli either. It must be further borne in mind that the native soldiers themselves were the persons who were perhaps the best informed on these points; that the cartridges for practice had, from time immemorial, been manufactured in the regimental magazines by persons of their own colour, creed, and religious persuasion; that it was absolutely impossible to palm off on them a spurious article; that the regimental khálásis, who were employed in making these cartridges, must have at once discovered their impurity, if such had really existed; that, in fact, objectionable cartridges (I mean such as would affect the religious prejudices of either Musalmán or Hindu), could not possibly have been made in their regimental magazines, as in such case the very men to be employed in their manufacture would have refused their work; but, more than this, let it be remembered that the Muhammadan has no caste, that even the hybrid such as the Muhammadan of Central India has become, half Musalmán and half Hindu, does not pretend to a loss of religion, even from touching pork. Who is there amongst us that has not and does not almost daily witness these Muhamma-

dans, in the capacity of table servants, carrying plates and dishes which openly contain the very substance which, in reference to the cartridges, has been made the pretence and the stumbling block of their offence? Even if we were to admit that all the cartridges were thoroughly saturated with pig's and with cow's fat, still what real valid objection on the score of their religion could the Muhammadan Sipáhis have had in using them? Their brothers and other relatives in the private service of officers never hesitate to handle or cook the dishes which they are required to bring to our tables. The objections of the Muhammadan Sipáhis on this head are so transparently false, that it can hardly be a matter of wonder that not one man of sense or respectability among them appears ever to have come forward to seek information or satisfy himself as to the truth or falsity of rumours so industriously circulated about these cartridges that were to be the means of depriving them of their faith. Some few—very few—honourable exceptions have certainly held aloof from and openly repudiated the conduct of their brethren; but such men have wanted neither guarantees nor explanations in regard to a matter which was patent to all, but have come to their own conclusions on a subject where error had no abiding place and mistake is incredible. That neither Musalmán nor Hindu had any honest objection to the use of any of the cartridges at Mirath or at Dehli is sufficiently proved by the eagerness with which they sought possession of them, and the alacrity with which they used them, when their aim and object was the murder of their European officers, or when, united under the banners of the prisoner at your bar, they for months constantly went forth to fight against the power to which they owed fealty and allegiance. Among the very numerous petitions which have been brought under your notice during these proceedings, it may have struck the Court as very strange that there is not a single one in which the slightest allusion is made to what the Sipáhis would have us believe to be their great and particular grievance. We have had upwards of 180 petitions before the Court, written on all possible subjects, from the tinkering of a cooking pot to the recovery of a mule or a crack in a horse's hoofs; and each thought worthy of the sign manual of royalty; but in the free indulgence of such correspondence, when they evidently unburthened their minds to their adopted sovereign, and were certainly not restrained by any delicacy of language or of feeling from venting their acerbity against their quondam European masters, we can find no trace of the original sin, no grease spot staining these effusions of disloyalty. How instructive is it that, among themselves, and when applying to us such language as "damnable, hell-doomed infidels," they apparently forego the first specific offence, which they would have us believe has led them to mutiny and rebellion, and the perpetration of crimes at which humanity shudders. When with each other, and, as they conceived, safe from the intrusion and inquiries of British officers, that insurmountable obstacle to their fidelity and allegiance, the greased cartridge, is apparently altogether lost sight of. Not a whisper is heard of a grievance which, if a substantial one, must ever have been uppermost in the memories of all; must have been con-

tinually rankling in their minds and embittering their thoughts; must have influenced them in their blood-thirstiness; and to themselves have been their only extenuation for crimes such as may well exclude them from mercy. What a contrast this to their speeches when uttered with a prospect of reaching European ears. Greased cartridges are then always brought forward; the use of them forms the one continuous night-mare of the Sipáhi's existence. Really, if we reflect seriously on this—if we remember that in reality there was not a single greased cartridge among either of the three regiments which first broke out into mutiny, murdering not only men, but unoffending women and children, and that the Sipáhis were perfectly aware of this; when we call to mind that, even if greased cartridges had existed, and the use of them been required at the hands of these miscreants, not one of the Muhammadans at any rate could possibly have been injured thereby in any caste prejudice, or placed even in temporary difficulty with regard to his religious tenets—when to this we add, what is well known to every one in India, whether Hindu, Muhammadan, or European, viz., that the native soldier has but to ask for his discharge, and that in time of peace it is at once granted to him, without inquiry or difficulty of any kind, it seems beyond the bounds of reason to imagine that these men were drawn into acts of such revolting atrocity by any grievances either real or imagined. Let the chimeras, the disturbed dreams of fanaticism, of wickedness, or of folly have been what they may; let the instigations to evil have been as industrious as possible, and then allow that the Sipáhis to be worked upon were as credulous as the grossest ignorance could make them, still, if the greased cartridge had been the only weapon the tamperer had to work with, but the one envenomed shaft in their quiver, how easy was the remedy. It required no depth of knowledge, no philosopher to inform them that they could at once escape from every possible perplexity by simply applying for their discharge. I know not, gentlemen, what conclusion you may arrive at on this much-vexed question, but, after pondering it in every way in which my reason has presented it to me, I am obliged to infer that something deeper and more powerful than the use of greased cartridges has been resorted to.

The machinery that has set in motion such an amount of mutiny and murder, that has made its vibrations felt almost at one and the same moment from one end of India to the other, must have been prepared, if not with foreseeing wisdom, yet with awful craft, and most successful and commanding subtlety. We must recollect, too, in considering this subject, that in many of the places where the native troops have risen against their European officers there was no pretext even in reference to cartridges at all; numbers of these mutinied, apparently, because they thought there was a favourable opportunity of doing so; because they were a hundred to one against those in authority, and fancied that they might pillage, plunder, and massacre, not only with impunity, but with advantage. Is it possible that such fearful results as these could have at once developed themselves had the native army, previous to the cartridge question, been in a sound and well-affected state? Can any one imagine that that rancorous, wide-

spread enmity, of which we have lately had such terrible proofs, has been the result of feelings suddenly and accidentally irritated? Does it appear consistent with the natural order of events that such intense malignity should start into existence on one single provocation? Or can it be reconciled with the instincts, the traditions, or the idiosyncrasies of the Hindus, that they should recklessly, without inquiry, and without thought, desire to imbrue their hands in human blood, casting aside the pecuniary and other advantages that bound them to the cause of order and of the Government? Or, more than this, can it be imagined that the three regiments at Míráth, even when joined by those at Dehlí, could have conceived an idea so daring as that of overthrowing, by themselves, the British Government in India?

I think, gentlemen, every one must allow that if we had no other evidence of a plot, no testimony indicative of a previous conspiracy, the very nature of the outbreak itself must have convinced us of the existence of one. In the moral, as in the physical world, there must be cause and effect; and the horrible butcheries of the past year would remain an anomaly and a mystery for ever, could we trace them to nothing more occult and baneful than a cartridge of any kind. It will be observed, that this point of the cartridges, so openly and frequently insisted on, at Míráth and elsewhere, before the 10th of May, gradually becomes more and more indistinct as the plot gathers strength and matures itself, and, after furnishing the mutineers with their first war cry at Dehlí, it seems to have answered its purpose, and thenceforward was allowed to sink into disuse and neglect. With little or no vitality at starting, it soon died a natural death, and was succeeded by a reality of purpose, and a fixedness of resolve, that would have been worthy of a better cause. If we review the actions and whole conduct of these mutineers, we shall soon see that, from the very commencement, they bear the impress of cunning and of secret combination. For instance, 85 of their comrades were ironed before them and sent off to jail in their presence on the morning of the 9th of May; but this occasioned no outbreak of fury. Not a sound or tone of dissatisfaction escaped from the men, who, then and long before, must have had rebellion in their hearts; no gesture indicative of sympathy with the culprits was exhibited by any; in fact, as far as appearances could be trusted, the infantry regiments at Míráth, and the remaining portion of the 3rd Cavalry, were as obedient and loyal as could possibly be desired: and this deception was successfully resorted to till their plans were matured, and the moment for open revolt had arrived. The night of the 9th of May, twelve hours after the imprisonment of the 3rd Cavalry mutineers had taken place, was as favourable an opportunity as the night following, for a march upon the nearest magazine; but there had not then been time for preparing the Dehlí Sipáhis for a movement which the progress of events at Míráth had doubtless precipitated sooner than their first calculations had led them to expect. Hence the necessity for communicating afresh with Dehlí, and acquainting the Sipáhis there with the drama that was to be enacted on Monday the 11th. That such was done is established by the evidence of

Captain Tytler; for it would be difficult to assign any other motive for a carriage full of Sipáhis coming over from Mirath on Sunday evening, and driving straight into the lines of the 38th Native Infantry.

Again, we can perceive, in the very hour chosen for the outbreak at Mirath, the same evidence of cunning and of craft. The plan, too, of the Mirath cantonments gave considerable facilities for carrying out their plot. The native lines are so completely separated from that portion of the cantonments where the European troops reside, that the disturbance and uproar attendant even upon open mutiny could not be heard, or even known, from one to the other until specially communicated. Officers may naturally have been too intent on quelling the rebellion of their men to think of officially reporting it. Be this as it may, there would be some delay in turning out and supplying the Europeans with cartridges, assembling their officers, and marching down a distance of not less than two miles: so that, taking one delay with another, the mutineers might fairly calculate, considering it was an utter surprise to all, on $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours of safe and uninterrupted progress, and, as the outbreak commenced at half-past six, this would have secured them darkness and comparative security for their further operations. This was what, in effect, actually took place. On the Europeans reaching the native lines, it was already dark; no Sipáhis were to be seen, and no one could tell whither they had gone. Subsequent inquiry revealed that, guided by the instinct of cunning, the rebels had not, at first, taken the direct or main road to Dehli, neither had they left Mirath in military formation, but, as dusk set in, had gone forth in parties of five, six or ten, to their fixed place of assembly. This was judicious for their departure from Mirath, but would have been highly impolitic for their entry into Dehli, where there were no European troops to avoid. Something more imposing and demonstrative was required here, and accordingly we find them crossing the bridge simultaneously massed in columns, and in complete military array, with a portion of the cavalry sent forward as a regular advanced guard.

It is on this occasion that we first prove the mutineers in immediate connection with the prisoner at your bar. The first point to which they turn, the first person to whom they address themselves, is the titular majesty of Dehli. This circumstance has much significance, and, at any rate, tends to show that previous concert existed between them. The prisoner's complicity, however, was, immediately after, openly to commence. Scarcely had the very serious nature of the outbreak had time to develop itself, than his own special servants—in the very precincts of his palace—and almost, as it were, before his own eyes, rush to imbrue their hands in the blood of every European they can meet with; and, when we remember that two of these were young and delicate women, who could have given no offence, whose sex and age might have tamed any hearts less pitiless than those of the human demons who destroyed them, we are able to realise some slight portion of the horribly unnatural influences that appear innate to Muhammadan treachery. How otherwise was it possible that education, the pride of royal ancestry, a life of tranquil ease and com-

parative refinement should not have exempted this old and grey-headed man from all connection with deeds which seem too barbarous for the very outcasts of humanity, or even for the untamed but less savage denizens of the jungle?

We stop to inquire whether it has been proved in this court, and will be repeated in after years, that the last king of the imperial house of Taimur was an accomplice in this villany. The circumstances shall now be fairly stated. These murders were committed in the broad glare of day, before dozens of witnesses, and without the slightest attempt at concealment. They were perpetrated, as has been already stated, by the prisoner's own retainers and within the limits of his palace, where, be it remembered even under the Company's Government, his jurisdiction was paramount. I shall not, however, attempt to infer that these murders must have been previously sanctioned by the prisoner; mere inferences on such a point cannot be accepted in a court of justice. I prefer to quote from the evidence. It is Ahsan Ulla Khán, the physician, who is speaking, and who says, that at the time referred to, he and Ghulám Abbas, the attorney in court, were with the king, when it was told them that the troopers had killed Mr. Fraser, and had gone up to Captain Douglas to kill him, and that this was instantly confirmed by the return of the palkí bearers, who told them that they had witnessed Mr. Fraser's murder; that his body was in the gateway, and that the troopers had ascended to the upper building for the purpose of murdering those there. Why the witness suppresses all mention of the prominent part the king's own servants took in these massacres can easily be imagined. In a subsequent part of his examination he even asserts that he never heard that any of the king's servants joined in these murders, nay, more, that it was not generally known who committed them. Such is the evasion of the king's own physician, who doubtless was aware of the importance that would necessarily attach to this point. It was not generally known who committed these murders, and yet, at this lapse of time, we have had no difficulty in tracing the individuals, and ascertaining their names. It was not generally known that the king's own servants were the murderers, and yet we find this very circumstance prominently and specifically mentioned at the time in the native newspapers of the city. I need not, after this, recapitulate the evidence of all those who have clearly and satisfactorily proved that the king's servants were the murderers; for their testimony stands unshaken and unrefuted. It will amply suffice if I quote the statement of one of them, and which is as follows: "At this time Mr. Fraser remained below trying to suppress the disturbance, and while thus engaged, I noticed that Haji, lapidary, cut him down with a talwár, and almost at the same instant, some of the king's servants cut at him with swords till he was dead. One of Mr. Fraser's murderers was an Abyssinian. After this they made a rush to the upper apartments, when I immediately ran round by another door and closed the door at the top of the stairs. I was engaged in shutting all the doors, when the crowd found entrance by the southern stair, and, having forced one of the doors on that side, came and gave admission to the men who

had assisted in murdering Mr. Fraser. These immediately rushed into the apartments where the gentlemen, viz., Captain Douglas, Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Jennings, had retired, and attacking them with swords, at once murdered them and the two young ladies. On this I ran down the staircase. As I got to the bottom, I was laid hold of by one Mundoh, a bearer in the service of the king, who said, 'Tell me where Captain Douglas is ; you have concealed him.' He forced me upstairs with him ; I said, 'You have yourselves killed all the gentlemen already ;' but, on reaching the room where Captain Douglas was, I saw that he was not quite dead. Mondoh, perceiving this also, hit him with a bludgeon on the forehead, and killed him immediately." Having now established that the murderers of these ladies were the special servants of the prisoner, it will be well to revert to the testimony of the physician, Ahsan Ulla Khán, and to ascertain from him the steps the prisoner took on the murders being reported to him. The only order he gave on this occasion appears to have been to close the gates of his palace ; and we naturally inquire whether this was for the purpose of preventing the escape of the murderers. The evidence distinctly proves that it was not. The physician, being further interrogated, is obliged to confess that the prisoner took no steps whatever either to discover, to secure, or to punish the guilty, and attributes it to there being much confusion at the time ; but if the king's authority had actually been set aside, and by his own servants too, this would have been the most forcible of all reasons for immediately re-establishing it, by at once bringing the offenders to justice. That this was not done we have been already informed, and we can only account for it on the supposition that these acts of the prisoner's servants, if not instigated by himself, had yet actually anticipated his wishes. We are thus perfectly prepared for what is to follow, viz., that no servant was ever dismissed, and not the slightest investigation or inquiry was ever instituted ; in fact, in the words of the question put to the witness, the king continued these murderers both in his pay and in employment, and this too, as we have seen, when the very newspapers of the day gave information against them. After this, is it necessary to question whether he adopted these deeds as his own or not ? I need not quote what may be the law of the land on such a point, for there is a yet higher law which must acquit or condemn him, the law of conscience and of sense ; that law which every one who hears me can apply, and which carries with it a verdict more terrible than that which is pronounced in mere conformity to legal codes or military legislation : it is a law that does not depend upon local constitutions, upon human institutes, or religious creeds : it is a law fixed in the heart of man by his Maker ; and can it now here be set aside ?

Perhaps it may now be time to turn our attention to what was doing at the magazine, and to trace the further steps of the mutineers in that direction. Captain Forrest has told us that it was about 9 o'clock in the morning when the main body of the native troops from Míraih was passing over the bridge in military formation (that is, in subdivisions of companies), with fixed bayonets and sloped arms, the cavalry being in front. It was

actually in less than one hour after this that a subahdar of the 38th Native Infantry, who was commanding the magazine guard outside the gate, informed them that the King of Delhi had sent a guard to take possession of the magazine, and to bring all the Europeans there up to his palace, and that, if they did not consent to this, none of them were to be allowed to leave the magazine. Captain Forrest adds that he did not see the guard at this time, but that he saw the man who had brought this message, and he was a well-dressed Musalmán. Nor was this all, for, shortly after the above, a native officer in the king's service arrived with a strong guard of the king's own soldiers in their uniform, and told the above-mentioned subadar and the non-commissioned officers that he was sent down by the king to relieve them of duty.

We thus see with what alertness and despatch this most important object, the seizure of the magazine, was attempted. Is it, however, to be believed that such was the ready, immediate, and, as it were, impulsive decision of the king, or of those who formed the court? To attribute to them anything of this nature would be to give them credit for a coolness of calculation, combined with a quickness of apprehension, such as pertains only to the more gifted of mankind. The scope and entire progress of the scheme speak loudly of a plan previously arranged, and of deliberations long matured by the counsels of many. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that any one, not previously initiated in the secret, could, on the moment, so promptly and so effectually have entered upon and adopted the details necessary for carrying it out. You will recollect the extreme importance of the decision, the magnitude of the interests at stake. You will call to mind the cogent reasons and the numerous arguments that would naturally array themselves against adopting so headlong and precipitate a measure. It was, in fact, an invitation to a king to league himself with ruffians and with cut-throats. Any inducement or prospective advantage that they could hold out to him was faint and almost imperceptible, compared with the open risk which he was to encounter. By embarking in so forlorn a cause he imperilled everything; his own life, and those of all belonging to him, and for what? The distant glimmer of a crown, which common reason, or the slightest consideration, would have convinced him was a mere *ignis fatuus*—a mockery of a sceptre, that would evade his grasp. Are we to imagine that it was under such circumstances that this weak and tremulous old man seized and improved his occasion, and with all the rapid instinct of determination directed his own troops upon the magazine, to establish himself there as the one point of primary and most vital importance: and this too in the first moment of a surprise when nothing but riot and disorder reigned supreme? Or are we to suppose that there was a secret and a deeper knowledge of what the other portions of the army were already ripe for, and that the five or six regiments to commence with were but the instalments of those that were to follow? Or, if such previous understanding and collusion did not exist either with the king or any of those immediately about him, are we to attribute to superstition and the pretended revelation of dreams, circumstances which scarcely admit of

satisfactory solution by any more sober process? We have all heard, in this court, of the vision of a hurricane that was to arise from the west with a great flood of water, devastating the whole country, but bearing up on its surges this descendant of ancient royalty, and that this vision, as interpreted by Hasan Askari, the priest, signified annihilation to the English infidels by the power of the King of Persia, who was to restore sovereignty to the heirs of the throne of Hindustan. Was it a reliance upon this that expedited the otherwise tardy movements of these Asiatics, and gave breadth and boldness to their decisions? I am aware that under other circumstances, and in any but an eastern land, such unmeaning flights of a bewildered imagination would be too trivial to dwell upon, too unsubstantial for the gravity of comment; but here, in seriously considering the nature and progress of an extensive military revolt, they obtrude themselves on the mind as subjects capable of influencing for evil the destinies of thousands.

These observations have been elicited by the marked and unusual energy displayed in making the magazine the point of instant attack. It seems to me that such cannot be accounted for by conspiracy among the Sipáhis alone, for it was the king's own troops who were the first to seek possession, and the military and systematic way in which this was done betrays the authority by which the orders were issued. There was no confusion here, no attempt at pillage: non-commissioned officers were appointed to the separate guards for the different gates of the magazine, while another guard superintended the labourers who were removing the stores that happened to be outside. How could such decision, such instant transformation from chaos to system and to order, have resulted had not the king or some of his officials been intrusted with a sort of programme of events? How, in fact, could the king's troops have been in readiness and preparation for such work without warning of some kind?


If I have not succeeded in tracing to the king himself a foreknowledge of the leading events that were to take place on Monday the 11th of May, I trust it has been made obvious that the secret was in the possession of some influential inmates of the palace. The babbling garrulity of the prince Jawan Bakht sufficiently indicates this, for such is his joy at the anticipation of murdering the English, that he is unable to restrain his expressions of it. My chief object, however, has been to render clear what I believe to be the truth, viz., that the conspiracy, from the very commencement, was not confined to the Sipáhis, and did not even originate with them, but had its ramifications throughout the palace and the city: and do not the murders which we have already adverted to tend to corroborate this fact? We have evidence that the rutineers of the 11th and 20th regiments of Native Infantry, before the magazine was exploded, proceeded to attack and escalate it, and it is then, for the first time, that we find the king, through his troops, acting in open alliance with these traitors to their government. From that moment there is no further disguise, and no attempt at concealment. Fairly launched into the stream of sedition, he is hurried onward by the swollen flood, which was not, however,

to bear him, as he imagined, to the throne of Hindustan, but to leave him in its ebb a mere helpless wreck upon the sands.

I would here pause for a second, to refer to Lieutenant Willoughby, and to the brave men under him, who for so long a time held, against unnumbered odds, the magazine intrusted to them. One hardly knows which to admire most, the penetration and sagacity which, at a glance, foresaw the possible necessity for its destruction, and made arrangements accordingly; or the undaunted resolution with which the final sacrifice was accomplished. To do justice to such heroism will be the pleasing duty of the historian. I can merely give it a passing notice, having to dilate on other matters more immediately connected with the proceedings before us.

With the explosion of the magazine at Dehli, every hope of stemming the torrent of rebellion seems to have vanished; resistance had been there protracted to its utmost possible extent; the sacrifice was a final one; and thenceforward the European community, if, in isolated spots, still preserving the appearance of government authority, were left without one vestige of real power, so that it soon became a duty to the state and to themselves to save their lives by a timely retreat. Dehli was consequently abandoned to the miscreants who had, in the short space of 24 hours, stained themselves with crimes which can scarcely be equalled in all the catalogues of bygone iniquity. It is now that we find the king coming personally forward as the chief actor in that great drama which had more than England and Europe for its spectators, the progress of which was watched with such absorbing interest everywhere by the antagonistic powers of civilisation and of barbarism. The evidence shows that on the afternoon of the 11th of May, the king, having entered the hall of special audience, seated himself in a chair, when the soldiery, officers and all, came forward one by one and bowed their heads before him, asking him to place his hands on them. The king did so, and each then withdrew, saying whatever came into his mind. The witness, viz., Ghulam Abbas, the prisoner's attorney in court, informs us that this ceremony of the king putting his hands on the heads of the soldiery was equivalent to accepting their allegiance and services; and he further states, that though he is not aware of any regular proclamation having been made in Dehli in reference to the king assuming the reins of government, yet that such may have been done without his hearing of it; but that on the very day of the outbreak the king's authority was established, and that night a royal salute was fired of about 21 guns.

These matters bring us to the charges against the prisoner, and it may perhaps be as well now to consider them, not so much in regard to dates as the sequence in which they have been drawn up. The first charge against Muhammad Bahádur Sháh, ex-king of Dehli, is: "For that he, being a pensioner of the British Government in India, did, at Dehli, at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encourage, aid, and abet Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, and divers others, native commissioned officers and soldiers unknown, of the East India Company's Army, in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion



against the State." I am not going to weary the Court by repeating even a tenth part of the evidence which has been brought forward to establish these charges, but it is perhaps necessary to show that proof of them has been recorded. Mr. Saunders, Officiating Commissioner and Agent to the Lieutenant-Governor, has explained under what circumstances the prisoner became a pensioner of the British Government in India, viz., that his grandfather, Sháh Álam, after having been kept in rigorous confinement by the Maráthás, on their defeat by the English in 1803, applied to the British Government for protection. This was accorded, and from that moment the titular kings of Dehli became pensioned subjects of the British. It will be seen, then, that, as far as this family is concerned, there was no wrong to be complained of, and nothing but benefits to be remembered. The prisoner's grandfather, Sháh Álam, had not only lost his throne, but had his eyes put out, and been subjected to every species of indignity, and was still kept in most rigorous confinement, when the English, under Lord Lake, appeared as his deliverers, and, with generous sympathy for his misfortunes, bestowed on him rank and pension which, continued to his successors, have maintained them in honour and in influence, till, like the snake in the fable, they have turned their fangs upon those to whom they owed the very means of their existence. The evidence that connects the prisoner with Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the artillery, and which of itself will be sufficient to establish the charge, is a document from beginning to end in the prisoner's own handwriting:

"To the especial Slave, the Lord Governor, *Muhammad Bakht Khán Bahádur*.

"Receive our favour, and understand that, whilst the Nimach force have reached Alapur, its baggage is still here, and that you are therefore directed to take 200 troopers and five or seven companies of infantry, and have all the baggage alluded to, such as tents, &c., together with commissariat supplies, conveyed by the gharis to Alapur. You are further directed not to allow the infidels staying near the Ídgah to advance. Be it known to you further, that if the army returns without victory, and divested of its appliances of war, the consequence must be disastrous. You have been admonished, and you are to consider these orders stringent."

It is true there is no date to this communication, but the allusions in it leave no possible doubt as to its having been written within the period embraced by the terms of the first charge.

Perhaps this will be the best place for the few observations I have to offer on the defence. The prisoner, like every other that we have tried, has, according to his own showing, been the mere victim of circumstances; declares that he had no intelligence on the subject previous to the outbreak; that the mutinous soldiery surrounded him completely, and placed sentries on all sides; and that, fearing for his life, he kept quiet, and went

to his own private apartments; that the mutinous soldiery kept the men, women, and children prisoners; that he twice saved their lives by entreaty and persuasion, and that the third time he did all in his power to save them, but that the rebellious soldiery would not heed him, and eventually carried out their purpose of slaying those poor people against his orders. Now the chief objection to all this is, that it is not only unsupported by evidence, but is directly in the teeth of all the testimony, whether oral or written, and whether given by his own servants or by others. The entire defence indeed is a mere tissue of denials of guilt; assertions of his not having been a free agent; and an endeavour to put the onus of his misconduct upon others. He cannot challenge the authenticity of the documents against him, or the evidence of his own handwriting, or his own seal; and his only expedient consists in asserting, that what he wrote was by compulsion, and that his seal was affixed in the same way. The only dilemma that he appears unable to extricate himself from, to his own satisfaction, in this way, is the going out to Humáyun's tomb, and coming in again. It was, of course, necessary to state that the last was by his own choice and free will; and this would scarcely have been possible had his going out been represented as compulsory; for, if the Sipáhis had forcibly taken him out, they would hardly allow him voluntarily to return, so we are treated with the following curious account:—"When the revolted and rebellious troops prepared to abscond, finding an opportunity, I got away secretly under the palace windows, and went and stayed in Humáyun's mausoleum." One would have thought that if he wished to separate himself from the rebellious troops, his best plan would have been to have stayed in Dehli, when they were preparing to abscond, instead of secretly planning to go out with them. However, I do not mean to take the defence, paragraph by paragraph, and thus refute it. My best reply to it, I believe, will be by showing how fully and completely the charges have been proved, and to this task I now again address myself, and proceed to the consideration of the second count, which is, if possible, still more fully established than the first. It runs as follows:—"For having at Dehli, at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encouraged, aided and abetted Mirzá Mughul, his own son, a subject of the British Government in India, and divers others unknown, inhabitants of Dehli, and of the North West provinces of India, also subjects of the said British Government, to rebel and wage war against the State." The documents and other evidence in support of this charge are so numerous that it would be tedious even to reckon them. The newspapers speak of the appointment of Mirzá Mughul to the office of commander-in-chief; of his investiture with a dress of honour; and other matters relating thereto. The oral testimony is very strong on the same subject, while the discovered correspondence shows that Mirzá Mughul, the son, was perhaps, next to his father, the leading chief of the rebels in Dehli. I shall for form's sake give a short extract from a petition of Maulavi Muhammad Zohar Ali, police-officer of Najafgarh. It is as follows:—

“To the King! Shelter of the World!

“Respectfully sheweth,—That the orders of the royal missive have been fully explained to all the Thakurs, Chaudhárís, Kanúngos, and Patwáris of this township of Najafgarh, and that the best arrangements have been established. Further, that, agreeably to your Majesty’s injunctions, steps are being taken to collect horsemen and footmen, and it is explained to them, that their allowances will be paid from the revenue of this division of the district. Your slave’s assurances on this point, however, will not be believed till some Gházis, recently engaged, shall have arrived. As regards Nagli, Kakraula, Dachau Kalan and other adjacent villages, your slave has to represent that, unrestrained by the dread of consequences, and bent on all sorts of excesses, the inhabitants have commenced plundering travellers.”

This might, I think, be sufficiently conclusive as to the words of the charge in reference to “aiding and abetting in rebellion Mirzá Mughul, his own son, and divers other unknown inhabitants of Delhi, and of the North Western Provinces of India, inasmuch as the petition from which I am quoting bears the autograph order of the prisoner referring it to his son Mirzá Mughul, and directing him quickly to send a regiment of infantry with its officers to Najafgarh, in accordance with the wishes, and for the purpose of aiding and abetting the petitioner’s schemes of raising horsemen and footmen to fight against the English. But there is another petition, which has not yet been submitted to the Court, having only lately come to hand, and which may appropriately be introduced here. It is from Amir Ali Khan, son of the Nawáb of Khurajpura, and is dated 12th of July. It runs as follows :—

“To the King! Shelter of the World!

“Respectfully sheweth,—That your petitioner has come to your royal court, at which Darius might have served as a doorkeeper, having left his house animated by the ambition to stake his life in your Majesty’s cause, and laments that he has lived to see the day when the accursed English have presumed to direct their cannon against your royal dwelling, the guardians of which are the angels of heaven. From the first dawn of the powers of discernment, your petitioner has been trained, like the lion, to conflicts and war, and has not, like the fox, been concerned for his life—

“Leopards destroy their prey on the summits of mountains,
Crocodiles devour theirs on the banks of rivers.”

“Your petitioner submits that if his prayer is accepted, and the plans and stratagems necessary in this war are entrusted to his judgment, aided by your Majesty’s august auspices, he will, in three days, totally exterminate these people with white skins and dark fortunes. It was necessary,

and I have therefore submitted it. (Prayers for the prosperity of the reign, and curses in bitter and filthy language against those who may wish it harm.) Petition of the slave Amir Ali Khán, son of Nawáb Dulál Khán, son of Nawáb Najábat Khán, chief of Khurajpura."

Autograph Order of the King, in Pencil.

"Mirzá Zohuruddín will make inquiries, and will give the petitioner service."

The third charge is—"For that he, being a subject of the British Government in India, and not regarding the duty of his allegiance, did at Dehli, on the 11th May, 1857, or thereabouts, as a false traitor against the State, proclaim and declare himself the reigning king and sovereign of India, and did, then and there, traitorously seize and take unlawful possession of the city of Dehli; and did moreover at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, as such false traitor aforesaid, treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirzá Mughul, his own son, and with Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, and divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy, and make insurrection, rebellion, and war against the State; and, further to fulfil and perfect his treasonable design of overthrowing and destroying the British Government in India, did assemble armed forces at Dehli, and send them forth to fight and wage war against the said British Government.

That the prisoner was a pensioned subject of the British Government in India has been already shown in treating of the first charge; and as the British Government neither deprived him nor any member of his family of any sovereignty whatever, but, on the contrary, relieving them from misery and oppression, bestowed on them largesses and pensions aggregating many millions of pounds sterling, the duty of their allegiance will, I think, be readily admitted; yet, as we have already seen, this traitor rushes to seize the first possible opportunity of overthrowing and destroying the government of his benefactors. On the afternoon of the very first day of the outbreak in the hall of special audience, he receives the obisances of the revolted Sipáhis and by laying his hands on their heads unites with them in a common brotherhood of infamy. It is perhaps difficult to realise such a scene. An enfeebled tremulous old man striving with palsied hand to reach a sceptre far too powerful for his puny grasp, and, while bent by age and infirmity, inducting a monarch's garb, to give, as it were, a benison and a blessing to the cause of the foulest treachery and murder! Dead to every feeling that falls honourably on the heart of man, this shrivelled impersonation of malignity must have formed no inapt centre-piece to the group of ruffians that surrounded him!

a There are several witnesses who speak to the circumstance of the offender having been proclaimed. It is variously stated as occurring on different days, and it is more than probable that such was actually the case. One or two proclamations would hardly be sufficient to carry the

information through all the suburbs of so large a city as Dehli. The prisoner's attorney allows that the king's authority was established on the 11th of May; and Guláb, messenger, being asked, "Was the king proclaimed as the reigning sovereign immediately after the outbreak?" answered, "Yes, the proclamation was made by beat of drum on the very day of the outbreak, about three in the afternoon, to the effect that it was now the king's Government;" while Chuni, pedlar, another witness, declares that, "On the 11th of May, about midnight, some 20 guns were fired in the palace. I heard the reports at my house; and next day, at about noon, a proclamation was made by beat of drum that the country had reverted to the possession of the king." The next paragraph in the charge is in reference to traitorously seizing and taking unlawful possession of the city of Dehli; but this is a point that I need not quote evidence to establish. It is difficult to turn our eyes in any direction without having convincing proofs of it. The charge then goes on to assert that the prisoner "did at various times, between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirzá Mughul, his son, and with Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, and divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy, and make insurrection and war against the State." Mirzá Mughul was publicly appointed commander-in-chief, and a special state procession in honour of his being so took place a few days after the outbreak. The witness who deposes to this is Chuni Lál, pedlar; but he is unable to specify the exact date on which he witnessed it. Mirzá Mughul's authority after this seems to have been uncontrolled, at any rate in all matters immediately relating to the army, until Subahdar Bakht Khán, of the artillery, arrived, and was appointed both Lord Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief. The date of his arrival was the 1st of July, and after that some jealousy and clashing of authority between the two Commanders-in-Chief is observable, for, on the 17th of July, Mirzá Mughul writes and informs his father, that on that day he had formed up the army and taken it outside the city to attack the English, when General Bakht Khán interfered, and for a long time kept the whole force standing inactive, wanting to know by whose orders it had gone out, and, saying it was not to proceed without his permission, caused it to return. Mirzá Mughul adds, "that having his orders reversed cannot but cause vexation to any officer, high or low, and begs that definite instructions may be given as to whom the real authority over the army belongs." There is no order on this letter, nor have we any intimation what decision was come to, but that some better arrangement was the consequence is evident, for on the very next day, the 18th of July, we find Mirzá Mughul and General Bakht Khán acting in concert, as the following letter from Mirzá Mughul to his father will show. It is dated the 19th of July, and runs as follows:—"Since yesterday the arrangements have been completed for carrying on active offensive operations both by night and day. If aid could be afforded now from the direction of Alapur, with the divine blessing, and through the influence of your Majesty's ever-during prestige, a final and decisive victory, it is to be

expected, would soon be obtained. I therefore pray that positive orders may be issued from the throne to the Baréli general to afford the aid in question; that is, that he be directed to proceed with troops to Alapur, and to make an attack on the infidels from that direction, while your slave, with his division of the army, makes another on this side, so that the two forces co-operating in the fight may in one or two days consign all the damnable hell-doomed infidels to hell. Moreover, it is to be expected that the force going to Alapur will cut off the enemies' supplies. It was necessary, and has therefore been submitted." On this letter there is an autograph order of the king to the following effect: "That Mirzá Mughul will make whatever arrangements may be proper;" and also an after order, apparently by Mirzá Mughul,—“That an order be written to the Baréli general.” I think this is conclusive of the three conspiring, consulting, and agreeing together; but it may be as well to enter here two documents which have not as yet been submitted to the Court. One is a proclamation from General Muhammad Bakht Khán, dated 12th of July, and is to the following effect. It has, I should observe, been extracted from the “Dehli Urdu News”:—“Let it be generally known to the persons living in the city and country, such as chiefs of freeholds, pensioners, landholders of rent-free estates, &c., that if, from anxiety for their incomes, they have hitherto continued on the side of the English, and have in any way colluded with them by conveying intelligence or furnishing them with supplies, their having done so will not be considered inexcusable. It is accordingly now proclaimed, that all those who have been alluded to are to cherish full confidence that when final and complete victory shall have been obtained, provided their title-deeds, former and recent, shall on inspection be fully verified, they will have the present provisions in their favour continued to them, and that they will also receive compensation in full for the entire period during which their incomes may have been suspended owing to the present disturbances; but if, after receiving knowledge of these orders, any person shall, notwithstanding, forward intelligence or furnish supplies, &c., to the English, he will be severely punished in the way Government may determine. The chief police officer of the city is, therefore, ordered to have the signatures of all chiefs of freeholds, of rent-free estates, and pensioners residing in his jurisdiction, written on the reverse of this notification to them in this matter, in acknowledgment of their having been duly informed, and then to send the notification immediately to his Excellency.” The other document is an order from the king, dated the 6th of September 1857, and is addressed to the chief police officer of the city. It runs as follows:—“You are directed to have proclaimed throughout the city by beat of drum, that this is a religious war, and is being prosecuted on account of the faith, and that it behoves all Hindu and Musalmán residents of the imperial city, or of the villages out in the country, as well as those natives of Hindustan who are arrayed against us on the ridge, or are anywhere employed on the side of the armies of the English, whether they be men of the eastern provinces, or Sikhs or foreigners, or natives of the Himaláya Hills or Nipális, to continue

true to their faith and creeds, and to slay the English and their servants ; and you are directed to have it further proclaimed, that those who are now present with the English force on the ridge, whether they be people of Hindustan, or foreigners, or hillmen, or Sikhs, or whatever country they may be natives of, or whether they be Muhammadans, or Hindus born in Hindustan, they are not to entertain any fears or dread of the enemy. Whenever they come over to this side, kind provision will be made for them, and they will be allowed to continue in their own creed and religions. You are directed to have it proclaimed further, that all who will join in the attacks on the enemy, whether they be or be not servants, will be allowed to keep themselves whatever property they may take from the English in plunder, and that they will beside receive additional rewards from his Majesty, and will be amply provided for." This paper, which I have just perused, is an office copy, and was found recently among other documents in the office of the king's chief police station. It bears the seal of that office, and is actually attested as a true copy by the signature of Bháo Singh, assistant to the King's chief police officer. A more trustworthy and convincing document could hardly be laid before a Court. It seems to me fully to complete the proof of the third charge, and to render further quotation from the numerous other documents unnecessary. It also tends to establish the latter portion of the fourth charge.

To this charge I will now turn my attention. It accuses the prisoner "of having, at Dehlí, on the 16th of May, 1857, or thereabouts, within the precincts of the palace at Dehlí, feloniously caused and become accessory to the murder of 49 persons, chiefly women and children of European and mixed European descent." As far as the murder of these poor victims is concerned, I have nothing to allege; the facts have been detailed before the Court in all their horrid minuteness, and they are not such as to be easily forgotten. The cold-blooded, hardened villany that could revel in leading women and young children to the shambles, and this, too, without the miserable apology of imagined wrong, or to the mistaken zeal of religious frenzy, is something so inhuman that the mind might well refuse to accept it as truth, did not all the force of concurrent ideas, of direct testimony, of circumstantial proof, and elsewhere repeated reactings of the same dreadful tragedies, enforce it upon our convictions. It is not, then, such admitted facts as the above that I am here called upon to establish. They are unhappily but too prominently and painfully shaped forth to require further illustration. It remains, however, to show how deeply the prisoner stands implicated in this revolting butchery, and whether, as averred in the indictment, he did "feloniously cause and become accessory to the murder of these 49 persons." I shall not, in so doing, attempt to avail myself of that law which makes all persons joining in insurrection and sedition individually responsible for every act of violence that may be committed by those with whom they stand leagued in illicit combination, even though such acts may have been against their wishes or without their cognisance. I mean, however, separately to consider each

fact connecting the prisoner with the deaths of these women and children. I will revert to the evidence of their capture, the place of their imprisonment, the fearful privations to which they were subjected, and the more than cruel treatment which they experienced from the commencement of their confinement, all of which were but too prophetic of the ultimate doom that awaited them. The first person whose testimony I shall have to quote is Ahsan Ulla Khán, the physician. When asked—"How was it that so many English women and children were brought to the palace and placed in confinement?" he replied—"The mutineers took them in and about the city, and, having established their own quarters in the palace, they brought their prisoners in with them too." Being further interrogated, he declares that the mutineers did not retain the custody of their prisoners, but, as each successive one was brought in, reported the circumstance to the prisoner, and were told to take the Europeans to the kitchen, and keep them confined there. Being again questioned, he asserts that the king himself appointed the kitchen as the place of their confinement, and observed at the time that it was a large, capacious building; so that it appears that the prisoner not only fixed upon the building himself as the place for herding indiscriminately together men, women and children, but from its being in his own palace, and from his volunteering a description of it, it is evident that he had some personal knowledge of what it was like. He terms it a large, capacious building, but these are not very definite terms, and when used in reference to different objects may relatively have widely different meanings. To obviate any misconception on such a point, I have, since Ahsan Ulla Khán gave this evidence, visited the place myself, and taken its measurements and description. The building is 40 feet long, 12 broad, and about 10 high. It is old, dirty, and dilapidated, and without the vestige of plaster; but it is worse than this, for it is dark, has no made flooring, no windows, and is entirely without the means of ventilation or of light. There is but one aperture to it, a miserable, small wooden door; but I will now let Mrs. Aldwell describe it in her own words:—"We were all confined in one room, very dark, with only one door, and no windows or other opening. It was not fit for the residence of any human being, much less for the number of us that were there. We were very much crowded together, and in consequence of the Sipáhis, and every one who took a fancy to do so, coming and frightening the children, we were obliged frequently to close the one door that we had, which thus left us without light or air. The Sipáhis used to come with their muskets loaded, and bayonets fixed, and ask us whether we would consent to become Muhammadans and also slaves, if the king granted us our lives; but the king's special armed retainers, from whom the guard over us was always furnished, incited the Sipáhis to be content with nothing short of our lives, saying we should be cut up in small pieces, and given as food to the kites and crows. We were very indifferently fed, but on two occasions the king sent us better food." Such was the return made by this traitor for the millions of pounds sterling bestowed by the English on himself and on his family! Having, as one of the witnesses has specifically stated,

"abundance of room where these English women and children would have been safe in the apartments occupied by the females of his own establishment," where, it is said, "there are secret recesses in which 500 people might be concealed, and where, even had the rebels dared to violate the sanctity of the zenana, all search would have been fruitless;" and there being, according to another witness, no scarcity of vacant buildings in the palace in which the ladies and children could have been kept in confinement, and in which they might have had every comfort; this minion of English generosity preferred to select for them the very den set apart for culprits and for felons, and where they even received far worse than a felon's treatment, for they were crowded into a small space, and were daily exposed to the insult and cruelty of all who chose to molest them. Such was the requital to the English for a princely pension and an imperial palace! It will be observed, from the statements of Ahsan Ulla Khán and Mrs. Aldwell, that both agree in attributing these measures personally to the king; and when we recollect the trifling matters which were, on every occasion, referred to him, and which, as has been fully demonstrated in this Court, received not only his attention but were endorsed by his own autograph instructions, is there any room left for doubt, that the more important concerns were under his special control also? Indeed, the concurrent testimony of many witnesses, and the irrefutable evidence of his own handwriting, incontestably prove that such was the case. It is thus we find the king appointing the prison; that the king's special armed retainers were always on guard over the prisoners; that it is the king who supplies them with their very indifferent food, and on two occasions sends them some of better quality; and thus, too, the Sipáhis asked them whether they would consent to become Muhammadans and slaves if the king granted them their lives; and who, on perusing even thus much of the evidence, can doubt that he had the power of doing so? Has there been one single circumstance elicited that shows that the prisoner even wished to save them, or that he even extended to them one act of common courtesy or kindness? Very far from it; for, whilst no check was given to those who showed the prisoners every species of unmanly brutality, the ordinary charity of giving food and water to a Christian was severely punished, and a Muhammadan woman, simply on this account, was actually immured with the prisoners. Can the bitterness of rancour go further than this? Or is it possible to contemplate the place and nature of the confinement fixed for these tender women and children, without coming to the conclusion that a cruel death was from the first moment reserved for them, and that, in the words of the witness, Mukund Lál, "they were but being collected?" Indeed the edge of the sword seems to have been but a merciful deliverance from the lingering death which confinement in so loathsome a den, at such a season of the year, must eventually have inflicted on all exposed to it.

Might I not here stop, and confidently on this point await the decision of the Court against the prisoner? The proof, however, swells in volume as it proceeds, and I mean to leave no portion of it untraced. Guláb, a

chaprásí or messenger, has distinctly stated that, a couple of days before the massacre took place, it was known that the Europeans would be killed in two days, and that, on the day fixed for the slaughter arriving, great crowds of people were flocking to the palace. Every witness to the scene who has spoken of it in Court has alluded to the crowds assembled, both as spectators and actors, on the morning in question; and, as this was at the early hour of between eight and nine, there seems no doubt that previous information of what was to take place must have been given. Nothing indicates that an outburst of fury, either on the part of the populace or military, in any way led to a catastrophe so awful. On the contrary, the witness distinctly says that without orders it could not have happened, and that there were but two sources from which such an order could have emanated, viz., the king and his son, Mirzá Mughul; adding, that he does not know which of them gave the order. He, however, distinctly states that he was present at the murder of these European prisoners, and that he saw them all standing together, surrounded on all sides by the king's special armed retainers, or what you may term his body-guard, and some of the infantry mutineers; and that, though he did not observe any signal or order given, yet, on a sudden, the men just mentioned drew their swords, simultaneously attacked the prisoners, and continued cutting at them till they had killed them all. A second witness, viz., Chuni Lál, the news-writer, when asked by whose orders these Europeans were murdered, distinctly replies that "it was done by the king's order: who else could have given such an order?" He and other witnesses concur in stating that Mirzá Mughul, the king's son, from the top of his house which overlooked the court-yard, was a spectator on this occasion, this Mirzá Mughul being at that time second only to the king himself in authority. Is it credible, then, under such circumstances, that the king's own body-guard, his special armed retainers, could have dared to perpetrate this frightful butchery without his order and against his wishes? If a doubt could be entertained on such a subject, it would, I think, be speedily dissipated on a perusal of the writings evidently approved by the prisoner, in which bloodthirstiness and sanguinary ferocity against the English are so glaringly conspicuous. In reference to the presence of Mirzá Mughul, and in further proof that it was by the king's own orders that these unhappy women and children were massacred, I shall quote the testimony of the king's own secretary, Mukund Lál. To the question, "By whose order were the ladies and children that were prisoners in the palace murdered?" he replies, "These people were being collected for three days; on the fourth day, the infantry and cavalry soldiers, accompanied by Mirzá Mughul, came to the entrance of the king's private apartments, and requested the king's permission to kill them. The king was at this time in his own apartments. Mirzá Mughul and Basant Ali Khán went inside, while the soldiery remained without. They returned in about 20 minutes, when Basant Ali Khán publicly, and in a loud voice, proclaimed that the king had given his permission for the slaughter of the prisoners, and that they could take them away. Accordingly, the king's armed

retainers, in whose custody the prisoners had been, took them from the place of confinement, and, in connexion with some of the mutinous soldiery, killed them." It appears, then, Mirzá Mughul had just come from the prisoner's presence, and was armed with his authority for carrying out this most hideous deed of blood. It may seem almost superfluous to add anything to the above; but the proof furnished by the extract from the prisoner's diary is so important and convincing that I feel bound to quote it. The evidence of the physician, Ashan Ulla Khán, regarding it, is as follows: "Was a Court diary of occurrences at the palace kept by order of the king during the rebellion?"—*Answer*. "The Court diary was kept up as usual, according to the custom which had long preceded the outbreak." *Question*. "Look at this leaf, and see whether you can recognise the handwriting on it?"—*Answer*. "Yes; it is in the handwriting of the man who kept the Court diary, and this leaf is a portion of it."

TRANSLATION of an Extract from the Court diary, for the 16th of May, 1857.

"The king held his court in the Hall of Special Audience; 49 English were prisoners; and the army demanded that they should be given over to them for slaughter. The king delivered them up, saying, 'The army may do as they please,' and the prisoners were consequently put to the sword. There was a large attendance; and all the chiefs, nobles, officers, and writers presented themselves at court, and had the honour of paying their respects."

Here, then, we have oral as well as most unimpeachable written testimony, all concurring on this point, and it would seem nearly impossible to make the proof clearer, had we not the prisoner's written confession of the crime. I do not mean in his defence, which is simply a document framed for this Court, and is but a mere tissue of false denials, without an effort at refuting what stands so prominently against him. I allude, of course, to his long letter to his son, Mirzá Mughul, in which he actually makes merit of the slaughter of his Christian prisoners, and urges it as a reason why the soldiery should be more attentive to his commands. After this, to prolong any argument on the subject would be improper. There is, then, but the last portion of the fourth charge uncommented on; and to establish it we have copies of circulars addressed from the King to Ráo Bhara, the Ruler of Kach Bhuj, to Ranjit Singh, Chief of Jasalmír, and to Rájah Guláb Singh, of Jammu. The following extracts will be sufficient, viz.:—

To *Rao Bhara*, Ruler of Kach.

"It has been reported that you, ever-faithful one, have put the whole of the infidels to the sword, and have thoroughly cleansed and purified your dominions of their unclean presence. We have been extremely gratified to hear of such conduct on your part, and you are therefore

honoured with this address, to the intent that you will institute such arrangements through your territory as that none of the creatures of God may in any way be aggrieved or oppressed. Further, should any number of the infidels reach your dominions by sea, you will have them slain. In doing this you will act entirely in accordance with our pleasure and wishes."

To Ranjit Singh, Chief of Jasalmír.

"It is clear to our belief that throughout your dominions the name and trace of these ill-omened infidels, the English, must not have remained; if, however, by any chance or possibility some have escaped till now by keeping hidden and concealed, first slay them, and after that, having made arrangements for the administration of your territory, present yourself at our court with your whole military following. Considerations and friendliness a thousand-fold will be bestowed on you, and you will be distinguished by elevation to dignities and places which the compass of your qualifications will not have capacity to contain."

To Rájah Guláb Singh, Ruler of Jammu.

"I have been made acquainted, by your petition, with all the particulars of the slaughter throughout your territory of the accursed unbelieving English. You are considered worthy of a hundred commendations. You have acted in this matter as all brave men ever acquit themselves; may you live and prosper." Again: "Come to the royal presence, and slay the accursed, unbelieving English, and all other enemies, wherever you may find them on the way. Whatever may be your hopes and expectations, the dignity and elevation to which you will be promoted amongst your equals will surpass all that you may be able to imagine; and you will further be rewarded and dignified with the title of Rájah." On one of the petitions to the king from a duffadar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, boasting of having murdered his officers at Mazaffarnagar, the order for an appointment in return is in the prisoner's own handwriting.

"I herewith conclude my observations on the charges, and it will now remain, gentlemen, for you by your verdict to determine whether the prisoner at your bar, in retirement and seclusion, may yet claim the respect due to deposed majesty, or whether he must henceforth rank merely as one of the great criminals of history. It will be for you to pronounce whether this last king of the imperial house of Taimur shall this day depart from his ancestral palace, bent down by age and by misfortune, but elevated, perhaps, by the dignity of his sufferings and the long-borne calamities of his race, or whether this magnificent hall of audience, this shrine of the higher majesty of justice, shall this day achieve its crowning triumph in a verdict which shall record to this and to all ages that kings by crime are degraded to felons, and that the long glories of a dynasty may be for ever effaced in a day.

"The consideration of the specific charges against the prisoner being now

closed, I trust it may not be thought presumptuous if I offer some observations on the evidence elicited as to the cause of the late rebellion, and of the existence of previous conspiracy. I have, in a former part of this address, argued that if the native regiments, previous to the cartridge question being mooted, had been in a sound and well-affected state, such a frightful and all but universal revolt could not have occurred; that there must have been some other and more latent power at work to have thus operated on a whole army scattered in different cantonments from Calcutta to Peshawur. I think that such could not have been accomplished without some secret mutual understanding, and some previous preparation, the establishment of which may appropriately be termed conspiracy. I have stated also that it seems as if it was not owing to a cartridge of any kind that such an amount of mutiny and murder has solely to be attributed, but I should be more than blind to all that has appeared on these proceedings and elsewhere if I failed to recognise in the cartridge question the immediate means or instrument adopted for bringing about a much-desired end. It seems to have been the spark, not accidentally shot forth, but deliberately chosen to explode a mine previously prepared. In alluding then, to the existence of a conspiracy, I do not mean to imply that we have come upon traces of a particular gang of men, specially banded together for the fixed definite object of causing the late rebellion in the native army, in any manner similar to that in which we have seen it developed, but such evidence as we have been able to obtain does appear to me to point out that, for a considerable time antecedent to the 10th of May, agitation and disaffection to British rule among the Muhammadans was more than ordinarily prevalent, and that such disaffection had been stimulated by active and designing men, who have most craftily taken advantage of every circumstance that could be made suitable for such a purpose. The annexation of Oudh to British rule was, perhaps, one of these. It seems to have been particularly displeasing to the Muhammadans, as annihilating the last throne left to them in India; and, for some other reasons, it would appear to have been almost equally unpalatable to the Hindu Sipáhi. It may, perhaps, have interfered with his position there as a privileged servant of the Company: for, instead of having to rely on the influence and prestige of the British Government in dealings or disputes with the native landholders of that province, he found himself brought at once under direct European control. One of the witnesses, Ját Mall, draws a marked distinction between the Hindu Sipáhi and the Hindu tradesman in reference to their feelings for the British Government; and perhaps the annexation of Oudh, with other causes, may tend to account for it. Being asked whether there was any difference between the Muhammadans and Hindus in this respect, he replies, "Yes, certainly, the Muhammadans as a body were all pleased at the overthrow of the British Government, while the merchants and respectable tradesmen among the Hindus regretted it." He, however, says that the general feeling throughout the army was the same both among the Hindus and Muhammedans, and that they were both equally bitter; and this view of the case is, I think,

supported by our experiences of both. The great bulk of the infantry portion of the native army was undoubtedly Hindu, but we have not found this any check or restraint upon their revolting barbarity; and, as far as the army has been concerned, Hindus and Muhammadans appear to have vied with each other only in the enormity of their crimes. But, apart from the army, the revolt has perhaps assumed many of the features of a Musalmán conspiracy, and it is, I think, probable that to Musalmán intrigue may eventually be traced those false and fabricated rumours which, adroitly mixed up with some small portion of truth, have been so instrumental in effacing the last vestiges of fidelity in an army whose faithfulness was at one time perhaps its very chiefest pride and boast. It does not belong to such an occasion as this to revert to past years, and step by step to trace the causes which have combined to destroy the reliance once placed upon those who are now so notorious for their perfidy. Some of these causes doubtless have been beyond Government control, and were, perhaps, inherent to a state of continued progress on the one side, and an inveterate priestly opposition to it on the other. It will be sufficient if I here merely allude to several previous occasions, not of very distant date, when some regiments of the native army showed how little they were to be depended on. On those occasions also it was evident that a unity of purpose and a singleness of feeling were in a short time organised by some process not immediately patent to their European officers; a mutual correspondence either by emissaries or letters was perhaps then initiated, and the lesson thus learnt was not easily forgotten. I do not mean to argue that from that time the native Indian army became one large debating society; very far from it; I believe that in their own fashion most of the Sipáhis were good and well-meaning servants of the Government. I say, in their own fashion, because it appears to me they are always deficient in natural firmness, and have no idea of strong moral rectitude; their fidelity, as long as it exists, is more of a habit than of a principle, upheld by superstition, but wanting the sustaining power of true religion. Among such a body as this there must always be some discontented intriguers; and who that knows anything of Asiatic character will not readily admit, especially with reference to Hindus, that the few are more potent for evil than the many for good? Let but three or four leaders come forth in all the open audacity of crime, or mix themselves up in the secret intrigues of sedition, and the rest, if not immediately panic-struck, never think it their duty to check or oppose them. They may excuse themselves for a time, by holding aloof from what they do not approve, but active interference, even in prevention of mutiny and murder, seems to form no part of their creed, either religious or political. The most serious crimes are thus passively encouraged; and, temporary immunity securing proselytes, all are eventually engulfed in the same depths of infamy: thus the crimes of a few lead to the ruin of many. That these influences have been vigorously at work in extending the late rebellion I think few will be inclined to deny. I am aware that no correspondence, and perhaps little direct evidence to such a point has been brought

before the Court; indeed, in reference to the Sipáhis, we have not been in a position to obtain either one or the other; still, if, as has been currently and, I believe, truly reported, that the number of letters passing among our native soldiers, for a month or two prior to the outbreak was very considerably larger than usual, this circumstance, combined with such facts as have come under our notice, would lead almost irresistibly to the conclusion that some sinister agitation had been extensively at work, and that increased disaffection and subordination would necessarily be the result; moreover, that in such a state revolt would reduce itself to a mere calculation of time. In the above remarks I have attributed much of what has occurred to the pernicious influence of evil intriguers, and it may naturally be inquired why these should have had greater effect at the present juncture than at any former one. Some of the causes I have already hinted at, such as the annexation of Oudh and the progress of European civilisation, outstriding, and in its natural course threatening to sweep away the puny barriers upraised by priestly cunning for the preservation of the grossest ignorance, and thus commencing the subversion of religions that are unable to bear the lights of even natural science. I believe, too, that the propagandists of sedition may artfully have availed themselves of some recent acts of the Government to spread panic and alarm in reference to future forcible interference with caste prejudices. I allude to the agitation about the remarriage of Hindu widows, the enlistment for general service, the cartridges, &c. I do not mean in this to offer the slightest apology for men whose conduct excites nothing but loathing and disgust. Pampered in their pride and besotted in their ignorance, they had as a body become too self-sufficient for military subordination and unhesitating obedience. Experienced, as they were, in mutual combination, they appear again easily to have entered into schemes for dictating to the Government their views in reference to imagined grievances; but that open, defiant mutiny had been generally resolved upon by the army—or, at any rate, by the Hindu portion of it, prior to the trial of the 3rd Light Cavalry troopers—is more, I think, than has been established. Up to that time there was, no doubt, a feeling of uneasiness, a restless apprehension, and an air of respectful mutiny pervading the native ranks. The Sipáhis in many instances appeared to imagine that disobedience to military command was scarcely criminal if accompanied by a salute and a submissive demeanour. Habituated to combination, and well aware of the strength of numbers, they latterly had seldom lost an opportunity of bringing forward their grievances, not individually, but in masses. On such points there was no difference between Musalmán and Hindu; they could both readily unite, and had already done so, for the purposes of insolent dictation. Indeed, if we search back into history, I believe we shall find that this has ever been what I may term the normal condition of Asiatic armies; and it is, perhaps, the necessary result of giving unity and power to large bodies of men without the checks furnished by education, loyalty, and religious principle to control them: military discipline without these auxiliaries is

but a dangerous weapon, and one that has frequently been turned against those who have sharpened and prepared it. As a corollary to this, it may be observed that rebellion and insurrection among the unarmed and untutored people of Asia is rare indeed; even the forcible conversion of the Hindus to Muhammadanism under former emperors of India seems to have been insufficient to rouse them to resistance. It is, then, the attempt at domination by the Sipáhi alone that has to be guarded against. The distinctions of caste may, to a certain extent, at former periods have proved serious obstacles to any very extensive combination of men of different sects, either for political or other purposes, but we should remember that this very circumstance of caste companionship has necessitated the existence of a number of distinct self-governing societies, has habituated the people of Hindustan to meetings among themselves where publicity is avoided, and thus, giving them their primary lessons in uniting for particular objects, has endowed them with a natural facility for more extended combinations, of a secret and sinister character. Under these circumstances, there wanted but the means and the occasion for carrying them out; and who does not perceive that the native army afforded the one, and a variety of incidents have favoured the other? Brahman and Musalmán here met, as it were, upon neutral ground; they have had in the army one common brotherhood of profession, the same dress, the same rewards, the same objects to be arrived at by the same means. They frequently joined each other in their separate festivals, and the union encouraged by the favour of the Government was finally resorted to as a measure to subvert it. I do not, however, intend to dwell on all of the many influences which may have assisted in bringing about the recent catastrophe; such a discussion in this place might not be approved of.

It seems to me, however, apparent that it was not and could not have been the greased cartridges alone that effected it. There was previous preparation among the Sipáhis; and there was also a general unsettling of men's minds throughout the country, and among the Muhammadans in particular. I believe, indeed, that the facts elicited on this point may be ranged appropriately under the head of "Muhammadan conspiracy," the chief object of which seems to have been to spread disaffection and distrust of British rule, and, by the dissemination of false and evil reports, and by fabrications of the most insidious kind, to prepare all the people for change and insurrection. As far as can be traced, the commencement of this must have originated with the prisoner, or with some of those such as Hasan Askari and others, who were admitted to his most secret and confidential councils. Be this as it may, there cannot, I imagine, be a doubt that in sending Sidi Kambar to Persia and Constantinople as an ambassador with letters to the sovereign of that country, soliciting aid and elevation to a throne, the prisoner became the principal in a conspiracy which indirectly, at any rate, must have been auxiliary to the recent frightful outbreak and its attendant horrors. It is worthy of particular notice, as connecting the two together, that this Sidi Kambar's departure took place, according to the most reliable account, just two years before

May 1857, and that his promised return, with the aid sought for, was fixed for the time when the outbreak actually took place. Coupling this with the prophecy among the Muhammadans that English sovereignty in India was to cease 100 years after its first establishment by the battle of Plassey in 1757, we are able to form something more than conjecture as to the causes which have given to Muhammadan fanaticism its delusive hope of recovering all its former prestige. I have already alluded to the dream of Hasan Askari the priest, and its interpretation so plausibly contrived to correspond with the wishes of the king, and of those about him. The circumstance may seem trivial to us, but it was doubtless a means well calculated to make a deep impression upon the superstitious minds of those to whom it was addressed, and to cause expectation and belief in what was predicted by one said to be possessed of miraculous powers, and accredited with holding direct communication with Heaven. We learn too from the petition of Muhammad Darwesh to Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor, dated 27th of March, 1857, that Hasan Askari had, at this time, assured the King of Dehli that he had certain information that the prince royal of Persia had fully taken possession of and occupied Bushir, and that he had entirely expelled the Christians, or, rather, had not left one alive there, and had taken away many of them prisoners, and that, very soon indeed, the Persian army would advance by the way of Kandahar and Kabul towards Dehli. He, moreover, adds, "That in the palace, but more especially in that portion of it constituting the personal apartments of the king, the subject of the conversation night and day was the early arrival of the Persians. Hasan Askari has, moreover, impressed the king with the belief that he has learned, through a divine revelation, that the dominion of the King of Persia will to a certainty extend to Dehli, or rather over the whole of Hindustan, and that the splendour of the sovereignty of Dehli will again revive as the sovereign of Persia will bestow the crown on the king." The writer goes on to say that throughout the palace, but particularly to the king, this belief has been the cause of great rejoicing, so much so that prayers are offered and vows are made, while, at the same time, Hasan Askari has entered upon the daily performance, at an hour and a half before sunset, of a course of propitiatory ceremonies to expedite the arrival of the Persians and the expulsion of the Christians. It has been arranged that every Thursday several trays of victuals, wheat-meal, oil, copper money and cloth should be sent by the king in aid of these ceremonies, and they are accordingly brought to Hasan Askari."

We thus see how early and how deeply the priesthood interested and engaged themselves in this matter, and how completely and exclusively Muhammadan in character was this conspiracy. If we could but have stepped behind the scenes, and witnessed these ceremonies at which superstition presided, and have heard these prayers and vows offered up for the arrival of the Persians and the expulsion of the Christians, we should doubtless have had depicted to us the foreshadowings of those dreadful tragedies which, to all time, will render the past year so painfully memo-

nable. We may imagine and faintly conceive to ourselves some portion of the rancour of these Muhammadans, when we recollect not only their deeds, but the concentrated hatred which breathes through their petitions, and does not stop with this world, but rejoices in the idea of eternal torments for us hereafter. One cannot help inquiring whether there are really many millions of human beings in Hindustan imbued with these feelings for Europeans. I will leave those who hear me to form their own opinions on this subject without venturing to proffer mine. We learn, however, from Mrs. Aldwell that during the Muharram festival she heard the Muhammadan women praying and teaching their children to pray for the success of their faith, and these prayers were generally accompanied by execrations against the English. Nor did even accomplishing the cruel death and sufferings of helpless women and children tend in any way to abate the ferocity of their malignity, or to waken one chord of mercy or commiseration in their breasts, for we find from the local newspapers that at the time this most hideous massacre was being perpetrated about 200 Musalmán were standing at the reservoir, uttering the coarsest abuse against the prisoners. Were it not too well attested, such demoniac malignity would scarcely be credible.

The next point to which I shall advert, is the circulation of the chapaties, in the form of ship biscuits. Now, whether they were sent round under the fiction of a Government order, signifying that in future there should be but one food and one faith, or whether, according to another interpretation, they were meant to sound a note of alarm and preparation, giving warning to the people to stand by one another on any danger menacing them, the contrivance was a most insidious one, and calculated to breed distrust and suspicion in the hearts of many who were strangers to such feelings before. That it created no stronger impression on the native mind than it did, is perhaps attributable only to the early check it received at the hands of authority, and it would doubtless be both interesting and important if we could discover how and by whom such a proceeding was initiated. This and the false rumour about mixing ground bones with the flour had doubtless one common origin, and it is not going beyond the bounds of fair indication or reasonable inference to attribute both one and the other to the unceasing wiles of Muhammadan conspiracy. We perceive that the Hindu Sipáhis, under the impulse of a first reaction in their feelings, reproached the Muhammadans with misleading them, and it is a most significant fact on these proceedings, that though we come upon traces of Musalmán intrigue wherever our investigation has carried us, yet not one paper has been found to show that the Hindus, as a body, had been conspiring against us, or that their Brahmans and priests had been preaching a crusade against Christians. In their case there has been no king to set up, no religion to be propagated by the sword. To attribute to them, under such circumstances, the circulation of these chapaties or the fabrications about ground bones in the flour, would be to ascribe to them acts without a meaning, and a criminal deception without any adequate motive. A very marked feature in this

Muhammadan conspiracy is the activity and persistence with which it has been carried out; the circulation of the chapaties having been early prohibited by authority, and thus rendered non-effective for the purpose of extensive sedition, some other expedient was necessary to replace it, and we at once find the tale of the "bone-dust mingled with flour" very adroitly selected as the substitute. It was, in fact, still adhering to the material of chapaties, and continuing the symbol of "one food, one faith." It was indeed the chapaty without its form, and without its inconveniences. The schemers had apparently learnt that the chapaty was too specific and too tangibly open to European interference to be largely availed of as an agent for evil, and hence its transformation into flour, the bone-dust being added to the one as the equivalent of the form of the ship biscuit to the other. To give out, then, that such was the nature of the flour stored at all the depots of supplies along the Grand Trunk Road, for from them, during their marches, the Sipáhis are in a manner compelled to get their food, was to attain the very object the conspirators must have most desired. If true, the Government had already commenced what would be deemed forcible conversion to Christianity. If they could, then, but establish a firm and general belief in this, their game was in their own hands; and that they did succeed in doing this to a very great extent is, I imagine, undeniable. I must own that to me this apparently natural transition from the chapaties to its component parts seems a master stroke of cunning, and evidenced most able leadership in the cause the conspirators were embarked in.

To prove, moreover, that no mean order of talent was at work, and that all the appliances that craft and treachery could avail themselves of were resorted to, we have only to refer to the extracts from the "Authentic News," and also to the other native publications of that period, and we shall perceive with what steadfast consistency the ulterior aim is always kept in view. The chapaties, the bone-dust in the flour, the greased cartridges, were all most appropriate for the Hindus; but a different pabulum was requisite for the Musalmáns, and we shall now see with what subtlety it was administered. The first paper commences by announcing that the King of Persia had ordered a concentration of most of his troops at Teheran, and then, declaring it to be currently reported that such a demonstration against Dost Muhammad Kháu was only a strategic move to cloak the King of Persia's real design of fighting against and conquering the English, the editor makes certain that, at any rate, some change of feeling has taken place amongst the three powers. The next extract is dated the 26th of January, 1857, and commences by asserting that all the newspapers agree in declaring that the King of France and the Emperor of Turkey had not as yet openly avowed themselves the allies of either the English or the Persians, but that their ambassadors were secretly visiting and presenting their gifts to both belligerents. "Some people," says the editor, "think that the King of France and the Emperor of Turkey will not mix themselves up in the quarrels between the Persians and the English; but most people," he adds, "say that they will both side with

the Persians. As for the Russians, however, they make no secret of the readiness with which they are assisting, and will continue to assist, the Persians, whether it be with funds or with forces. It may be said that virtually the Russians are the cause of the war, and that, using the Persians as a cloak, they intend to consummate their own designs regarding the conquest of Hindustan. It is to be believed that the Russians will soon take the field in great force." Here, then, we have not only Persia and Russia advancing immediately upon India with immense armies, but France and Turkey to assist them, while the forsaken and devoted English are represented as by no means sure even of the alliance of the Afghans under Dost Muhammad. Well might the editor, after announcing such formidable coalitions, somewhat dramatically exclaim, "Let the readers of the 'Authentic News' be prepared to see what the veil of futurity will disclose." Accordingly, in the next extract, we perceive that "the King of Persia had solemnly promised to his courtiers the governorships of the different presidencies and places: one is to get Bombay, another Calcutta, and a third Puná, "while the crown of Hindustan is plainly spoken of as reserved for bestowal on the King of Dehli, this very prisoner before us. You will recollect, gentlemen, that several copies of this paper, the "Authentic News," used to be sent to the palace, and one can imagine the joy and exultation with which such passages must have been perused, especially when added thereto is the assertion that the Emperor of Russia had sent an effective and thoroughly appointed army of 400,000 men with abundant munitions, to assist the King of Persia in his hostile designs upon India. But it was not in the palace, and by the princes alone, that such paragraphs were read with avidity; the whole population was intent on them. Sir Theophilus Metcalfe has told us that the subject of the advance of the Persians upon Herát was much discussed among the natives, and frequently in connexion with the idea of Russian aggression upon India, every newspaper having at this time its correspondent in Kabul. Nor indeed did the discussion and interest excited by these concocted hostile movements cease here, for the same witness declares that agitation about this time prevailed among the Sipáhis and that about five or six weeks before the outbreak it was currently reported in their lines, and much discussed among them, that 100,000 Russians were coming from the north, and that the Company's government would be destroyed, and in fact that the idea of a Russian invasion was universally prevalent. The venom and virus of these false publications were then taking their intended effect, and it would seem a mere perversion of reason longer to blind ourselves with the idea that the outbreak was fortuitous, or that a greased cartridge occasioned it. In a former article of the "Authentic News," we have seen Dost Muhammad alluded to as but a doubtful ally of the English. In this one, however, as events progress, he is spoken of as being secretly in league with the King of Persia, and, that superstitious aid may not be lost sight of, it is remarked how wonderfully four distinct unexpected coincidences had impelled the King of Persia to declar war against the

English. The first was that Herát, in another place described as the key of India, had so easily fallen into his possession; the second, the unforeseen coming of the Russians to assist him; the third, the nobles of Persia unanimously counselling an advance on India, and predicting that God would bestow victory; and the fourth, the simultaneous rising and assembling of the whole of Persia for the prosecution of a religious war. Portents and miracles were likewise brought forward still further to excite the Muhammadan mind, as the following extract from the "Authentic News," dated 15th of September, 1856, will sufficiently prove. It is headed—

"Local News from the Hânsí District.

"A man just come from the country tells the editor that, unlike other places, the Huli is being burnt there at this season of the year, and the saturnalia attending the festival are now going on. The man who states this ascertained, on inquiry, that the reason for the unseasonable observance of this festival is, that three girls were born at a birth, and the three spoke immediately. The first said: 'The coming year will be one of great calamities; various calamitous visitations will afflict the nation:' the second said: 'Those who live will see;' and the third, in an impressive and forcible tone, said: 'If the Hindus burn the Huli in the present season, they will escape all these evils. God alone is omniscient.'"

It is too much, I am afraid, the case, with persons accustomed to European habits of thinking to view such statements and articles as these merely in reference to the impression they would be likely to make on themselves. The taking of Herát, the predictions of the nobles, &c., and the fabulous prophecies of these girls would, in that case, receive hardly passing attention. But we should commit a grievous and most fatal error if we were to gauge Asiatic thoughts and understandings by the same measure that would be applicable to our own. If, avoiding this mistake, we proceed to consider the above editorials in relation to the people they were written for, we shall find that they are not only most insidiously worked up to meet their peculiar prejudices, but are also made to bear a striking affinity to the fulfilment of their prophecies; to the dreams of Hasan Askari; to the negotiations of Sidi Kambar, and to the ancient traditions of Muhammadanism. Are we, then, to suppose that in all this there was no connexion between the palace and the press? Were all these concurrences fortuitous? Can it be that the dreams of the priests, the plots of the court, and the fabrications of the newspapers worked accidentally together? We have already seen the decoys by which the Hindu Sipáhis were to be gained; and is it not the same spirit of evil that we can recognise here? Are the circumstances appealing to Muhammadan pride, to their superstitious bigotry, to their lust for religious war, and to their hatred for the English, dwelt upon with a less perfect knowledge of their peculiar inherences? In an extract from the 'Authentic News,' dated the 19th of March, it is stated that 900 Persian soldiers, with some officers of high rank, had entered India, and that 500 more

were then staying in Dehlí itself in various disguises. It is true that this is given out on the authority of one Sadik Khán, a person whose identity not being established, was evidently in disguise even to his name; but this very circumstance was no doubt a part of the scheme. It gave an air of greater mystery to the announcement of the paper, and seems to have been purposely contrived to let the imagination of the readers supply an exaggerated idea of his real rank and importance. How, it may be asked, even under this cloak of a false name, could such a statement be given forth in the leading newspaper of the city without some deep and ulterior object? It not only assigns deep conspiracy to the Persians, but, if false, as we know it to have been, is proof of conspiracy in the editor and those who employed him. This name of Sadik Khán, be it remembered, was the one attached to the proclamation purporting to be from Persia, and put up in the Jammi Masjid. The proclamation, then, and the assertion about these 900 Persian soldiers, were evidently parts of one and the same scheme, and seem to have been thus linked together that the one might, in a measure, support the other. If, for instance, any questioned the authority of the proclamation, there was the answer ready that the bringer of it was actually in the city with 500 other Persians also in disguise, and *vice versâ*. If the advent of the Persians was disbelieved, was not the proclamation a voucher for its reality? The same depth of artifice is apparent everywhere; and the more we consider the subject the more fully convinced we shall be of the wiles and stratagems so systematically resorted to. For instance, what would such a proclamation as that attributed to the King of Persia have been without some demonstration, feigned or real, to support it? The sword depicted on one side, and the shield on the other, would have been equally meaningless but for the story of the men in disguise, and the officers of high rank who evidently must have been deputed to carry it through. The proclamation, so evidently false, is, for that very reason, one of our truest and most reliable expositors of conspiracy, and of Musalmán conspiracy too. It is, in fact, impossible to account for it under any other hypothesis. Who, then, was it that designed and wrote the proclamation? This question, I believe, could be answered in every detail by the editor of the paper, who has recurred to it so frequently. It is evidently a pet subject of his, one on which he seems to be thoroughly at home. He has the exact transcript of it, is able to epitomise it, and no doubt was equally well informed as to the preparation of it.

I do not mean to wade through and to quote all the extracts from the newspapers that bear out the fact of a Muhammadan conspiracy. That appears to me unnecessary, for I believe I shall have no difficulty in establishing it by other testimony. However, there is one other extract, which it would be wrong to leave unnoticed. It bears date the 13th of April, and must have been the origin of the report that Sir Theophilus Metcalfe alludes to, when he says that, about fifteen days before the outbreak, it was currently reported that an anonymous petition had been presented to the magistrate, stating, "that the Kashmir gate would be

taken from the English. This being the chief stronghold in the city and main connexion with the cantonments of Dehli, it would naturally be the first point seized in any attempt at insurrection in the city, and, being the only gate at which there was any military guard, the importance of it, in a strategical point of view, must have been obvious to all." Sir Theophilus Metcalfe proceeds to say, "that this petition was never received; but that the current report about it was indicative of what was then occupying the thoughts of many of the natives." So, no doubt, it was; but it was also much more than this, for it was the real exposition of an article which the editor dare not, without disguising it, put into print. With what ingenuity and craft the idea is worked out, so as to become intelligible only to those who were meant to understand it, must now be obvious to all. The editor says several petitions have been given into the magistrate's court, and in these it is also mentioned that "a month hence from this date an overwhelming attack will be made on Kashmir, of the salubrity and beauty of which a poet has said, 'that should a parched and burnt-up soul reach Kashmir, though he might be a roasted fowl, he would recover his wings and feathers,' and that this cool and heavenly country will come into the possession of the writers of the petition." How, it may be asked, were the writers of the petitions given into the magistrate's court at Dehli to take Kashmir, and who does not now perceive that the Kashmir gate of the city of Dehli was thus indicated by the country from which it derives its name, and that the salubrity and beauty of the former were to represent the importance, and its fitness for their objects, of the latter? I shall not here pause to consider whether, under the simile of a parched and burnt-up fowl, the prisoner before us was intended. He no doubt expected to recover some of his lost plumage by seizing the gate, and with it was meditating a flight to a higher elevation. In declaring, on the 13th of April, that in one month from that date, an overwhelming attack would be made on this very point—for it was here the officers were shot down—the editor of the "Authentic News" was either the confidant and accomplice of conspiracy, or had soared into the regions of actual prophecy.

The coincidence of the above cautiously worded announcement of the editor, and the indiscreet revelations of Jawan Bakht, are certainly startling. The doubly foretold attack took place on the 11th of May, and, after what has been proved in regard to Muhammadan treachery, is there any one who hears me that can believe that a deep-planned and well-concerted conspiracy had nothing to do with it?

The proofs of the intimate connexion of the prisoner with it do not, however, rest here, for Mujud, the Abyssinian, who was not merely in the service of the king, but was his private special attendant, and was always near his person, takes Mr. Everett aside and tells him that he had better leave the Company's service, and, with his troop, go over to the king, as this hot weather the Russians would be all over the place. Mr. Everett seems to have laughed at this, and to have thought it but the man's foolishness; but we have now direct proof that it was something far

But why multiply instances of this sort? I would gladly cite some of a different tendency, and the petition of Muhammad Darwesh, in his admirable letter to Mr. Colvin, must not be passed over. It is one noble instance of faithfulness from a Muhammadan to the British. I am sorry I cannot class with it the petition purporting to be from Nabi Baksh Khan to the king, pronouncing it unlawful to slay women, and calling for a decree to that effect from the doctors of the Muhammadan religion; for since I delivered the paper into Court considerable doubt has been thrown on its having been written at the time indicated, and it seems by no means improbable that it was fabricated after the capture of Dehli, for the purpose of obtaining rewards and other advantages. Indeed, a further attentive perusal of it has convinced me that it is so; for no one in the situation of Nabi Baksh Khán would have dared to advise or propose to the king to let the soldiery first wreak their rage on his own royal person, as Nabi Baksh Khán pretends to have done. There are certainly a few instances in which the Muhammadans have behaved with kindness to the English, and not the less pleasing on account of the humble grades in which these instances occur. We may, perhaps, deduce from this, that the teachings such as are prescribed by their prophet have no softening effects on the hearts of his followers; nay, more, that education in such doctrines leads to ferocity and revolting crime, and is utterly incompatible with feelings of even ordinary humanity.

In the course of this address I have dwelt, long and frequently, upon those circumstances which appear to demonstrate that to Musalmán intrigue and Muhammadan conspiracy we may attribute the dreadful calamities of the year 1857. I have endeavoured to point out how intimately the prisoner, as the head of the Muhammadan faith in India, has been connected with the organisation of that conspiracy, either as its leader or its unscrupulous accomplice. I have alluded to the part taken by the native press and Muhammadans, in general, as preparing the Hindus for insurrection, and the native army, in particular, for revolt; and perhaps, in further corroboration of such facts, it may be as well to advert to the share that may be assigned to the Muhammadans in getting the cartridges refused on the parade ground of the 3rd Light Cavalry. Out of these 85 troopers the far larger moiety was Muhammadan. These men had no caste, and to them it could not possibly have mattered whether pig's and cow's fat was smeared on the cartridges or not. Captain Martineau tells us that at the Ambálah depot, as far as the cartridge question was concerned, the Muhammadan Sipáhis laughed at it, and we thus perceive that these men initiated open mutiny without one pretext for so doing, or the shadow of an excuse. They had not even the extenuation of a pretended grievance; yet they at once leagued themselves in rebellion against us, and induced the Hindus to join them, by speciously exciting them on that most vulnerable of points, the fear of being forcibly deprived of their caste. I say, induced the Hindus to join them, for such is the evidence before us, and this too on a pretext in which the Muhammadans could have had no possible sympathy with them. Nor indeed were the Hindus long in dis-

covering this, for as a witness, who has been frequently quoted, informs us, "immediately after the battle of the Hindan they spoke with much regret of the turn that affairs had taken, reproached the Muhammadans for having deceived them, and seemed to doubt greatly that the English Government had really had any intention of interfering with their caste. Great numbers of the Hindu Sipáhis at this time declared that, if they could be sure their lives would be spared, they would gladly go back to the service of the Government; but the Muhammadans, on the contrary, used to assert that the king's service was much better than that of the English; that the nawabs and rajahs would supply the king with large forces, and that they must eventually conquer." If we now take a retrospective view of the various circumstances which we have been able to elicit during our extended inquiries, we shall perceive how exclusively Muhammadan are all the prominent points that attach to it. A Muhammadan priest, with pretended visions and assumed miraculous powers—a Muhammadan King his dupe and his accomplice—a Muhammadan clandestine embassy to the Muhammadan powers of Persia and Turkey resulting—Muhammadan prophecies as to the downfall of our power—Muhammadan rule as the successor of our own—the most cold-blooded murders by Muhammadan assassins—a religious war for Muhammadan ascendancy—a Muhammadan press unscrupulously abetting—and Muhammadan Sipáhis initiating the mutiny. Hinduism, I may say, is nowhere either reflected or represented; if it be brought forward at all, it is only in subservience to its ever-aggressive neighbour.

The arguments in reference to a Muhammadan conspiracy are now closed. I do not mean that many others might not be deduced from the proceedings before us, for I have selected only those that appeared to me the most prominent. I would wish, however, before sitting down, to quote one question and answer from Captain Martineau's evidence: "Did you ever hear any of the Sipáhis speak complainingly of the efforts of English missionaries to convert natives to Christianity?" *Answer*.—"No, never in my life, I don't think they cared one bit about it." I believe there is no officer whose duties have given him much experience of the Sipáhi character or any insight into his feelings and prejudices but will readily confirm the correctness of this opinion. There is no dread of an open avowed missionary in India. It is not the rightful conversion to Christianity that either Sipáhis or natives are alarmed at. If it be done by the efforts of persuasion, of teaching, or of example—the only means by which it can be done—it offends no caste prejudice, excites no fanatical opposition. A candid, undisguised endeavour to gain followers to Christ has never, that I am aware of, been viewed with the slightest sign of disapprobation by any portion of the natives, and, were it more constantly before their eyes, who can doubt that it would remove this present dark and debasing error that Christianity is itself a caste, and its only distinguishing tenet the privilege of eating everything? If this degrading idea were removed, the chief fear of the Hindus would vanish with it. Let them see that it is impossible to make converts to Christianity by force,

and you deprive the seditious of their most potent weapon of mischief. Christianity, when seen in its own, pure light, has no terrors for the natives. It is only when kept in the shade that its name can be perverted to an instrument of evil. But I may, if I proceed further, be trenching on questions of State policy. I beg, then, to tender my thanks to the Court for the patient hearing they have given me, and to Mr. Murphy, the interpreter, for the able assistance he has, in that capacity, afforded me on this and the other State trials. His very high attainments as an Oriental scholar have been most conspicuous. In the fluency of *vivâ voce* examinations; in the quick readiness with which all kinds of papers, in different hands, have been deciphered and read; and in the correctness and spirit of the written translations of documents of no ordinary difficulty his complete knowledge both of Urdu and Persian has been thoroughly attested. The notes appended to many of these papers are valuable in themselves, and speak more forcibly than I can do of Mr. Murphy's very high proficiency as an interpreter. I should be wanting, both to him and myself, if I did not thus record my obligations to him.

FINDING.—The Court, on the evidence before them, are of opinion that the prisoner Muhammad Bahádur Sháh, ex-King of Dehli, is guilty of all and every part of the charges preferred against him.

M. DAWES, Lieut.-Colonel, President.

Dehli, 9th March, 1858.

F. J. HARRIOTT, Major,
Deputy Judge Advocate-General.

Approved and confirmed.

N. PENNY, Major-General,
Commanding Meerut Division.

Camp Saháran, 2nd April, 1858.

COPY of a LETTER of the CHIEF COMMISSIONER of the PANJÁB FORWARDING to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA the PROCEEDINGS on the TRIAL of the KING of DEHLÍ.

From R. TEMPLE, Esq., Secretary to Chief Commissioner of the Panjáb to
G. F. EDMONSTONE, Esq., Secretary to Government of India with the
Governor-General.

Láhor, 29 April, 1858.

SIR,—I am now directed to forward for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor-General, the proceedings* and papers in the trial of

* See Parliamentary Paper, No. 162 of Session 1859.

Muhammad Bahádur Shah, ex-King of Dehli. As a supplement to the above, I am also to transmit translation of evidence of Ahsun ulla Khán, late confidential physician of the ex-King, taken before the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner. It will be in the recollection of his Lordship that the physician's life was guaranteed on the condition of his answering satisfactorily such questions as might be put to him.

2. The trial was commenced on the 27th January, 1858, and was concluded on the 9th of March, 1858. The proceedings are very voluminous, and have only recently been received from the General commanding Mírath division. The evidence relates not only to the specific charges on which the prisoner was arraigned, but also to the origin and character of the outbreak; and it lays bare the policy of the king's government and the internal economy of the rebel army during the siege of Dehli. On the whole, it is deeply interesting and instructive, whether viewed practically, politically, or historically.

3. In brief terms, it may be said that the documentary evidence comprises the system in which the general government was conducted; the raising of loans; military arrangements; the communication with foreign powers and neighbouring chiefs; the passages in the native newspapers relating to the war between the English and the Persians. There are also, of course, many papers of a miscellaneous character. The oral evidence describes the occurrences of the outbreak, and the sad circumstances connected with the massacre of the Christians in the palace; it also throws some light on the origin of the mutiny and the rebellion. The general effect of the evidence, documentary and oral, is to present to the mind a wonderfully vivid picture of all that happened at Dehli during the eventful months between the 12th May and 20th September, 1857.

4. The papers referring to the system of the king's government exhibit in a remarkable manner the active personal share which the king himself took in the conduct of affairs. However wrongly he had assumed his position, it must be admitted that his orders were not unworthy of the situation. He did make some effort to preserve order in the city, to repress rapine and murder in the villages, to check malversation, to restrain the excesses of the soldiery; but it is clear, from first to last, he was unable to establish an administration either within or without the city. In the tracts nominally ruled by the king there was scarcely the semblance of authority; nor was there any protection for life or property. In but few cases did the king's agents succeed in collecting revenue from the districts. From its own records, the Mughul rule, while it lasted, seems to have been a reign of terror, and a period of intolerable anarchy to the people. Then the papers show the financial straits to which the king was driven, and the numerous forced loans and other contributions exacted from the moneyed classes in Dehli. The military papers do not materially elucidate the plan of the operations, but they show that the mutinous army was utterly insubordinate to the government it had set up, and that its discipline was entirely relaxed. The papers comprising the correspondence with other powers indicate the deputations despatched by the King of

Dehli to the Sháh of Persia; but they do not show an actual connexion between these intrigues and the Bengal mutinies. Whether, in the absence of any proof, there is reason to infer such connexion will be considered presently. The correspondence with Indian chiefs proves that the chiefs round Delhi were in subjection to the king; but there is nothing to show that any considerable number of princes gave in their adhesion, nor that any sovereign or powerful prince intrigued with the king. The extracts from the native newspapers at Dehli certainly breathe a hostile spirit to the British, and abound with absurd stories of the successes of the Persians in the war then waging, and their probable advance upon India.

5. The oral evidence goes far to show, that while the troops at Dehli were prepared for the outbreak, and the palace retainers were in some measure ready for mischief, yet the king himself and his counsellors had not contemplated taking the lead in so serious a movement. Consequently, when the mutineers first arrived, the king's conduct was most vacillating. He asked them why they had come to him, for he had no means of maintaining them. They replied that, unless he joined them, they could not make head against the English. He immediately yielded, however; and by his subsequent behaviour he identified himself with the cause of the rebels, and made their acts his own. As regards the massacre of forty-nine Christians within the palace walls, it is probable that the king himself was not a prime mover in that dreadful deed, and that, if left to his own devices, he would not have had the prisoners murdered. There is little doubt that he could have saved them had he been so minded. It is quite certain that he made no effort to do so, and, from his own subsequent letters, it is clear that he was a consenting party to the murder.

6. Upon all this evidence, the Court have found the prisoner guilty of four charges, which may be thus epitomised:

1st. Aiding and abetting the mutinies of the troops.

2nd. Encouraging and assisting divers persons to wage war against the British Government.

3rd. Assuming the sovereignty of Hindustan.

4th. Causing and being accessory to the murder of the Christians.

Concurring in the justice of the verdict, and considering the prisoner to have been guilty of these grave felonies, the Chief Commissioner has to recommend, that the said prisoner shall be dealt with as a felon, regard only being had to the guarantee of his life, which was granted to him at the time of his capture. And the Chief Commissioner has arrived at the deliberate opinion of the prisoner's guilt, after having carefully examined the evidence adduced at the trial, and after having tested it by all the information which he has obtained since the commencement of the outbreak, and by his personal knowledge of the character both of the prisoner and of the Muhammadan population of Dehli.

7. After the above brief analysis of the proceedings in this most remarkable trial, I am now to submit the Chief Commissioner's opinions on the real causes and origin of the mutiny and rebellion. A right under-

standing of this matter is of the last importance to the future stability of the empire.

8. In the first place, it is to be observed that the prisoner was not charged with any offence previous to the 11th May, 1857. Whatever may have been the king's participation in the events subsequent to that date, nothing has transpired on the trial, or on any other occasion, to show that he was engaged in a previous conspiracy to excite a mutiny in the Bengal army. Indeed, it is Sir John Lawrence's very decided impression that this mutiny had its origin in the army itself; that it is not attributable to any external or any antecedent conspiracy whatever, although it was afterwards taken advantage of by disaffected persons to compass their own ends; and that its proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and nothing else. Sir John Lawrence has examined many hundreds of letters on this subject from natives, both soldiers and civilians. He has, moreover, conversed constantly on the matter with natives of all classes, and he is satisfied that the general, and indeed almost the universal, opinion in this part of India is to the above effect.

9. It may be true that discontented Sipáhis worked upon the minds of their less guileless comrades, and persuaded them that a sinister but systematic attempt was about to be made on their ceremonial religion; and that in many regiments the majority was misled by designing individuals. But, as a body, the native army did really believe that the universal introduction of cartridges destructive of their caste was a matter only of time. They heard (and believed as they heard) that the measure had been resolved on, and that some Sipáhis had been punished even by death for refusing to use the objectionable cartridges. They thought, therefore that their only chance of escape was to band together, to refuse the cartridges, and to resist if force should be attempted by the Government; and the incendiary fires at the different stations were intended by the Sipáhis as a warning to their officers and to their Government of the feelings which had taken possession of the native army. Such truly was the origin of the mutiny; and this, I am to repeat, is the one circumstance which has forced itself upon the Chief Commissioner's conviction in all that he has seen and heard. This is the one fact which stands out prominently in all the native letters which he has examined, in all the statements of the natives whom he has cross-questioned, and in all the conversations between the natives themselves which have been reported by our spies in Dehli and elsewhere.

10. As against the above conclusion, it might perhaps be urged that the mutiny first broke out at Mirath, where the new cartridges had never been used; and it is no doubt true that the men of the 3rd Light Cavalry had never been asked to use the new cartridges, and were imprisoned for refusing cartridges of the old description, and perfectly unobjectionable. But the Chief Commissioner has always understood that the cartridges which these men did refuse happened to be enveloped in paper of a colour different from that generally used before, and he believes that this unfortunate circumstance would account for the bitter mistrust which was

excited in their minds. Indeed, a similar circumstance produced the same effect upon the 19th Native Infantry and other regiments in Bengal. Any person conversant with native character can understand how easily such a thing might be misinterpreted by men whose imagination and feelings had been wrought up to the belief that an attempt was in contemplation to injure them in so vital a point as that of caste and religion. Again, it has been said that the Sipáhis after the mutiny fired off some of these impure cartridges against our loyal troops during the siege of Dehlí; but it is very doubtful whether this really took place. If it did, however, still the men might have escaped the fancied pollution by the refraining from biting the cartridges, or they might have had the cartridges remade in a manner which would obviate the supposed impurity; or the cartridges might have been used only when the mutineers were becoming desperate, as their final defeat drew near. On the whole, the Chief Commissioner considers that neither of the above arguments is at all sufficient to weaken a conclusion so strong upon other grounds.

11. As an instance of the evidence which might be produced in favour of the above conclusions, I am to mention an important and interesting conversation which the Chief Commissioner and Brigadier General Chamberlain recently held at Ambálah with a jámadar of the 3rd Panjáb Native Infantry. This man, a Bhajpuria Rajput by caste, and a native of Hindustan, was at Gházipur on furlough when the mutiny broke out; he and his two brothers joined an English indigo planter, and during seven months were of great use to that gentleman on several occasions of difficulty and disturbance. He was on his way thence to rejoin his regiment in the Panjáb when he met the Chief Commissioner's camp at Ambálah. Though holding a certificate of his good conduct and services at Gházipur, he still, even at Ambálah, seemed doubtful of the reception he would meet with. He was reserved at first, and it was only during a lengthened examination that he by degrees described what he had heard and seen. In this conversation he affirmed that there was a general belief among the Hindustáni Sipáhis that the destruction of their caste and religion had been finally resolved on by the English. "So strong was this belief" he said, "that when I talked with the relations and friends of Sipáhis, and endeavoured to combat their views, I ended in almost believing that they were right. Then, again, when I talk to you and hear what you say, I see how foolish such ideas were." He added that the English officers little knew how strong this impression had become in the native army; that more than five years ago the belief had existed, and had nearly brought on an *émeute*; that the caravansarais for travellers and the supply depots (*saráis* and *bardáshtkhánas*) erected by Government on the Grand Trunk Road were said to be devised with the object of destroying castes, and that before long impure kinds of food would be prepared in them which the people would be forced to buy and eat.

12. Such was the prevalent belief in the native army before the outbreak. The first excitement, according to the Chief Commissioner's belief, the first feeling of disaffection, arose among the high caste Hindus,

Brahmans, and Rajputs of both the infantry and the cavalry; this disaffection then spread to the Muhammadans of the same regiments. With them also the feeling was at first a desire to resist the infringement of their caste and religion. Then, when they saw that the mutiny, which had now settled deep in the minds and hearts of the Hindu, might be expanded into a political movement calculated to subserve Musalmán interests, they sedulously fanned the flame. But, while thus the Hindus and Muhammadans of the line had united to mutiny, the Chief Commissioner's impression is, that in the first instance the Hindustáni Irregular Cavalry did not join in the combination. While the regular army chiefly came from Oudh and the districts surrounding it, the irregular troopers were drawn from the districts within a circle of a hundred miles round Dehlí. They had, therefore, no personal connexion with the line; and, except the mutual bond of religion, they had little or nothing in common even with the Muhammadans of the regular cavalry. In the many native letters which he examined at the outset of the disturbances the Chief Commissioner found nothing to implicate the irregulars, though the misconduct of the 10th Irregular Regiment at Naúsháhrá is a grave exception to what has been said above in regard to this branch of the service. But, of course, when Dehlí had been seized by the mutineers, and when rebellion spread to the very districts whence the irregulars came, then very many of them also joined the movement. From that time the Muhammadan soldiers and the Muhammadan population became more actively hostile than the Hindus. This, indeed, it is easy to understand, fanaticism and ferocity being especially inculcated by the tenets of their religion.

13. But although stories against the British were fabricated and circulated by persons with ulterior designs; although individual intrigues were rife within and without the army; though the Muhammadans very frequently breathed a spirit of fanatic ferocity against the British, yet all their influences could not have drawn our native army from its allegiance, if it had not been already penetrated by that unfortunate belief about the cartridges. Nor would such an ill-feeling have so speedily arisen, nor would it have produced such a desperate disaffection, if the army had not been in an unsound and unsatisfactory state for some years past. That this state of things actually existed can now be ascertained from the natives themselves. At the time it would have been extremely difficult to discover as much from them, owing to their extraordinary reticence on matters which they fear to reveal. It is only by attentive observation, by study of their character and their conduct, and by the collating of their casual remarks, that their real opinions and feelings on such subjects can be discerned. It were needless to allude to the several causes which brought about this condition. There is, however, one essential and original cause which cannot be too prominently mentioned, nor too attentively considered. This cause was, that the Sipáhis were imbued with a sense of their own strength and of our weakness; and that our system consequently placed in their way temptations which en-

couraged them to revolt. They were, as they themselves said in their own phrase, the right arm, the hands and feet of the British Government. Their strength consisted in their great numbers; in their unexampled power of combination from their being one vast brotherhood, with common fatherland, language, religion, caste, and associations; and their possession of most of our magazines, many of our forts, and all our treasuries, while our weakness consisted in the paucity of European troops. Moreover, while the native regiments were kept up to their full strength, while our already overgrown native army was being gradually increased, it so happened that we had not been so weak for many years past in European troops as we were in 1857. Some regiments had been subtracted from our complement during the Russian war; two regiments were in Persia. Those regiments we had were numerically weak; some corps had not received any fresh draughts for two years. These and all the other weak points of our system were patent to a native army, having many intelligent men in its ranks, employed promiscuously from Calcutta to Pesháwar, and consequently well acquainted with our military arrangements. In short, it was a sense of overwhelming power acting upon men exasperated by a fancied wrong that led the Bengal army to mutiny. In the face of this grand motive cause for the mutiny existing in the army, why need we look abroad for foreign causes?

14. The real causes of the outbreak having been discussed, I am now to advert to certain circumstances which are sometimes said to be causes, but which in the Chief Commissioner's judgment were probably not so.

15. In the first place, with reference to conspiracies, which have been so frequently adduced as proximate causes of the outbreak, I am to state that, in the Chief Commissioner's belief, there was not any conspiracy in the army irrespective of the cartridge affair, and no really organised conspiracy even in respect to that. The Sipáhis had corresponded in order to unite in refusing the cartridges; they had probably engaged to stand by one another in resistance to the supposed oppression; and being a fraternity with hopes, fears, prejudices, feelings, all in common, they all felt that such an engagement would be acted up to by the whole body. No doubt the course of affairs at Mirath precipitated the outbreak, and it is vain to speculate as to what could have been designed if that outbreak had been postponed. But it seems certain that no regular rising had up to that time been planned. A mass of Sipáhi correspondence has been inspected, the common talk of the mutineers in Dehli has been reported, the records of the palace have been ransacked, and yet no trace of any such detailed plan has been found. To show how little the course to be followed had been pre-arranged at the time of the Mirath outbreak, one or two significant circumstances may be cited. The well-known moonshee, Mohan Lal, who was at Dehli, stated that some men of the 3rd Light Cavalry told him that when the regiment broke out at Mirath they had scarcely left the cantonments when they held a council of war as to what should be done next. The general voice at first was for taking refuge in Rohilkhand, but one of the men pointed out that Dehli

was the proper place to make for. There, he said, were the magazine and the treasury; there the strong fortifications; there a large city population; there the king for a fitting instrument; and there, above all, an important point without European troops. This account of what took place on that occasion was corroborated by minute and extensive inquiries made by Brigadier-General Chamberlain after the fall of Dehli. Again, it is ascertained from Mr. Ford, Magistrate of Gurgáon, that a large party of the 3rd Cavalry troopers actually fled through Dehli onward to the Gurgáon district on the very next day after the outbreak, and that 10 men of this party and 20 of the horses were seized by the magistrate. At the same time there is no doubt that the troops at Dehli were prepared for the occurrence of an outbreak at Mirath, and were fully resolved to stand by their comrades.

16. It was when the native army at large saw the immense success of the Mirath and Dehli mutineers, and the disasters of the British in the first instance, that they resolved to convert what had been a combination against supposed oppression into a struggle for empire and for a general military domination. The Sipáhis had the command of all the public treasuries; no attempt was made to secure the treasure at out-stations; the temptation to plunder was too great for the virtue even of our best disposed regiments; each corps acquired great wealth as it mutinied; as regiment after regiment fell away the power of resistance on the part of the Government lessened; in short, so manifold were the inducements, so certain the spread of infection, so powerful the effect of example, that no man acquainted with India could fail to see that such a mutiny and rebellion, unless trampled out at once, unless quenched in the blood of the soldiers who first revolted, must extend everywhere like wild-fire.

17. Next I am to state that Sir John Lawrence does not believe that there was any previous conspiracy, Muhammadan or other, extending first through the influential classes in the country, and then to the native army. If there were such a thing, how comes it that no trace has been discovered in this part of India, the very quarter where any such conspiracy must have been hatched? How can it reasonably be explained, why none of those who have adhered to our cause were acquainted with such a conspiracy? The number of those who were with us in Hindustan may have been small, as compared with the number of those who were against us; but still the number of our adherents was considerable. Of these, many remained true to us under all trials; others again died fighting on our side, yet not one of these has ever been able to speak of any general conspiracy previous to the outbreak. Again, none of the mutineers and rebels who paid for their guilt the forfeit of their lives ever confessed in their last moments a knowledge of any such conspiracy, though they knew that any revelations on this subject would have saved them from death. Again, many papers of various kinds have come to hand, revealing important secrets, implicating many persons, jeopardising many lives, yet in all these there has been no allusion to such a conspiracy. In all his inquiries the Chief Commissioner has never heard a word from a native

mouth, nor seen anything in any native document, that could convey even the impression that any general plot had existed.

18. Furthermore, the Chief Commissioner considers that the conduct of the people generally negatives the supposition of a general conspiracy. If the people had conspired with the army, why was not the first outbreak immediately followed by a general insurrection? If there was concert and premeditation, then, why did not the population obey the first signals of revolt, such remarkable and encouraging signals as they were? Why did not all Hindustan rebel directly that Dehli had fallen to the mutineers, when the English there had been massacred, when the troops had raised the bad characters of the city, and with their aid had seized the treasure, magazines, and fortifications; when the king's sons, courtiers, and retainers had joined, and when the king himself had consented to head the movement? Why had not the population everywhere taken advantage immediately of our weakness? Our power in a large portion of Hindostan was temporarily paralysed. Our means were small; and those means we had were so placed as not to be capable of being at once brought to bear against the insurgents. And the Mirath force did nothing. The fact is, that at first our enemies were not prepared to profit by such unforeseen and tremendous events. It was not till afterwards that the Muhammadans of Hindustan perceived that the re-establishment of the throne of Dehli, the gradual rising of the Muhammadan population, and the losses of the British at so many stations, presented an opportunity when they might again strike for empire with some prospect of success. The fact that afterwards in many districts the people threw off or ignored our authority, and that many individuals, and some classes openly rose against us, will by no means prove a preconcerted conspiracy, but, on the contrary, will admit of much explanation. In no case did popular tumult precede the military outbreak; but, invariably where it occurred at all, it ensued upon a mutiny, like cause following effect. The population generally were passive at first. Then, as it appeared that the British were being swept off the face of the land, every village began to follow its own course. In most districts there was, of course, more or less misconduct. But through the whole time the people, even in the worst districts, never embarrassed us half as much as they would have done had they been rebels at heart. Large masses of people were coerced by the mutineers into insurrection, if insurrection it could be called; where, again, the mutineers were beaten and expelled, the country rapidly settled down to peace and order. Wherever our officers were able to hold their own, the people remained wholly or partially tranquil; when British rule ceased, utter disorder necessarily followed. And certainly the common belief in Hindustan was that the British dominion had been extinguished. Furthermore, it is to be remembered that in India, as indeed in almost every other country, there exists a discontented class ready for any change, in the hope of its improving their condition. Moreover, in India especially, there are tribes by nature predatory, who before our rule subsisted on plunder and rapine. These were subdued more than half a century ago by our arms and our

policy. But the characteristics of those people survive in their descendants. The existing generation cling to the predatory traditions of their forefathers. They long for a return of the days of misrule—the good old times, when those might take who had the power, and those might keep who could. Most of them had indeed never seen a shot fired, and, living under the shadow of a strong Government, had become unwarlike. But, when our power became eclipsed and our prestige dimmed, the old instinct, the innate love of plunder revived, and the strong began to prey upon the weak. Then, again, a considerable section of the people, and especially the Muhammadans, are fanatical. This fanaticism, loosed from the bands of half a century, became a powerful engine against us. Whatever may be the intrinsic merits of our rule, the people of India can never forget that we are an alien race, in respect of colour, religion, habits, sympathies; while we, on the other hand, practically forgetting this, and wrapping ourselves up in our pride, self-reliance, and feeling of superiority, neglect the most ordinary precautions for our own security, and throw off even the slightest restraints on our freedom of action, though our very safety may depend upon such precautions.

19. The preceding observations convey, in the Chief Commissioner's judgment, a fair idea of the condition of the people after the outbreak in the Dehli territory, the Duáb, of the Ganges and the Jannah, and Rohilkhand. In Oudh, however, the case was different; there the population had been long inured to danger and warfare; their martial pride had been fostered by constant success in resistance to their own rulers, and by the vast numbers employed in foreign military service under the British. They had always lived free from civil restraint, and they had never felt the weight of our military power. After the province was annexed, we had not at all a strong military position. We were virtually attempting to hold the province by troops drawn from itself; we had but one European regiment, and some European artillery, while we had upwards of 11,000 indigenous troops, and while we had no European troops ready at hand in adjacent provinces. Yet, notwithstanding all this, we did, while acting with the best intentions, carry out some measures which had the effect of irritating various influential classes. As a counterpoise to such disaffection, we might have produced contentment and loyalty among other classes; but our tenure of dominion had been too short to effect this when the outbreak burst upon us. When the influential classes, whom our policy had provoked, found that the native army were ripe for revolt, they added fuel to a rising fire; and, when the crisis arrived, mutiny was immediately followed by insurrection. Had we been able at once to march European or other reliable troops into Oudh in sufficient numbers, we might even then have beaten down opposition. But this we could not do; and many months passed away. During that interval our enemies consolidated their power, and even those most friendly to our rule were, from sheer necessity, driven to swell the ranks of our opponents.

20. It may be that the Supreme Government have received information from other parts of India; but the foregoing conclusions regarding the

absence of any conspiracy, and the general conduct of the people, are based upon Sir John Lawience's knowledge and experience of the countries from the Jamnah to the borders of Afghanistan, a tract of full 100,000 square miles, with a population of 30,000,000, and comprising the very centre and focus of rebellion; the place of all others where such a conspiracy, if it had existed at all, would have been most likely to be discovered.

21. It will be seen that in the Deputy Judge Advocate General's summing up at the trial much stress is laid on the overtures made by the king to the Shah of Persia; but, as already remarked, nothing was elicited at the trial to show that these referred to a revolt either of the Bengal army or the people of Hindustan. The physician Ahsan Ullah declares, that these communications were indeed treasonable; that the king was dissatisfied chiefly because he was not allowed to set aside his eldest son in the succession to the title; and that he had an idea of obtaining help from Persia and from Oudh, to which latter Court also he despatched an emissary; but the physician adds, that although the subversion of the British Government was mentioned in these despatches, yet a revolt of the Sipáhi army was never referred to as a means of accomplishing this. During the Persian war there is reason to know that intrigues were carried on between the Courts of Persia and Dehli; but it were hardly reasonable to suppose that if the Shah had really intended to give the King of Dehli any aid, or had even believed that a violent attempt would be made to subvert the British power in India, he would have made peace with us just at the critical time of our fortunes, thereby releasing, for the succour of India, the troops which would otherwise be locked up in Persia. Again, if the Shah had really been cognisant of such an attempt, would he not have sent his emissaries to Peshawar and into the Panjáb? Had he done this, some signs of intrigue would have certainly been perceptible, but none whatever were discovered; in fact, all that we have learnt regarding the intrigues of the king and his party show that that he did not look to any conspiracy or combination in India itself, but rather to foreign aid from beyond the frontier, from Persia or from Russia. Indeed, the notions developed are generally so absurd as to show that these intrigues were destitute of any reasonable plan, and were conceived by persons in a great measure ignorant of the subject.

22. The Chief Commissioner's opinions and conclusions on this important subject have now been stated without reserve. The terrible experience of Hindustan during 1857 must ever be applicable to all other provinces of the empire; it should command attention in the Panjáb especially. The Chief Commissioner has every reason to speak well of the Panjábí troops, and indeed it would be difficult to praise too highly their services during the present war; they have resisted sore temptations, and undergone severe trials. Nevertheless, there was a time when it seemed doubtful what course they would ultimately adopt; and the Chief Commissioner fully believes that, had we failed to take Dehli last autumn, even their fidelity would not have remained proof against the bad example

around them. At that juncture the Chief Commissioner himself could not avoid apprehending the day when, besides the British soldiers, there would be no man on our side. That such a day did not arrive is due only, in the Chief Commissioner's eyes, to the infinite mercy of the Almighty. The misfortunes and calamities which we experienced in Afghanistan in 1842 were renewed and surpassed in Hindustan during 1857. The issue has been less disastrous, because in the last instance the country was less strong, the people less formidable, and our resources less distant; but, above all, because the Almighty Disposer of Events, though apparently determined to humble, had not resolved to destroy us. Many thoughtful and experienced men now in India believe that we have been extricated from destruction only by a series of miracles. It is no exaggeration to affirm, that in many instances the mutineers acted as if a curse rested on their cause. Had a single leader of ability risen amongst them, nay, had they followed any other course but the infatuated course which they actually did pursue in many instances, we must have been lost beyond redemption; but such a destruction was not decreed; it was a struggle between Christianity and civilisation on the one side and barbarism and heathenism on the other. That we escaped from destruction, and even obtained success, can be accounted for in no other way than by attributing it all to the operation of the Divine Will. And now, having been preserved by Providence thus far victorious, it urgently behoves us to strive to gain a right understanding of the real circumstances which brought on this crisis. If we can but acquire this, then there is hope that we may profit by a knowledge of the past, and in future avoid those errors which had well-nigh led to our ruin.

23. In conclusion, I am to submit the Chief Commissioner's recommendation in regard to the future disposal of the prisoner Muhammad Bahádar Shah, ex-King of Dehli. The Chief Commissioner suggests, then, that the said prisoner be transported beyond the seas as a felon, and be kept in some island or settlement, where he will be entirely isolated from all other Muhammadans. As regards the prisoner's wife, Zinat-Mahal, and his son, Jawán Bakht, no charges having been exhibited against them, and the latter being only 17 years of age, but they both having been present at Dehli, the Chief Commissioner suggests that they be allowed the option of accompanying the prisoner to his place of transportation; and that, in the event of their declining to do so, they be confined as State prisoners somewhere in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency.

24. While forwarding these proceedings, I am to state that the Chief Commissioner commends to the favourable consideration of the Supreme Government the able exertions of Major J. F. Harriott, of 3rd Light Cavalry, the Deputy Judge Advocate General, in conducting this protracted trial. The Chief Commissioner also desires to bring to notice the valuable services of Mr. James Murphy, Collector of Customs, who acted as interpreter to the Court. This gentleman, unaided by any munshi, translated all the numerous and difficult documents adduced at the trial; he also read the originals before the Court, and conducted the examination

of the native witnesses. The translations are believed to be exceedingly faithful; and the circumstance that he was able to dispense with native assistance in the work ensured secrecy and other advantages, and evinced his eminent attainments as an Urdu and Persian scholar. The Chief Commissioner, I am to add, contemplates shortly proposing some reward in behalf of this meritorious officer.

I have, &c.

(signed) R. TEMPLE.

(True copy.)

(signed) J. W. KAYE,
Secretary in the Political and Secret Departments.

